Ragsdell v. Regional Housing Alliance of La Plata County et al

Filing 103

OPINION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS. Defendant's 96 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Equal Protection Claim is DENIED. The parties are ORDERED to jointly call chambers at 303-844-6118 on or before Friday, March 4, 2016 in order to set a pre-trial conference in this case, by Judge John L. Kane on 2/24/2016.(agarc, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge John L. Kane
Civil Action No. 1:12-cv-967-JLK
KENNETH JASON RAGSDELL,
Plaintiff,
v.
REGIONAL HOUSING ALLIANCE OF LA PLATA COUNTY,
Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
Kane, J.
Remaining in this case are Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for violation of the equal protection
clause, see Doc.1 at ¶¶ 48-59, and Plaintiff’s Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act claim based on
alleged disability discrimination, id. at ¶¶ 76-89. Defendant has moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s §
1983 claim on the ground that it is precluded by the comprehensive remedial scheme of the
Rehabilitation Act (RHA), and Plaintiff’s RHA claim has been dismissed. Doc. 96.
Defendant argues that six other circuits have held that the Rehabilitation Act contains a
comprehensive remedial scheme intended by Congress to foreclose resort to the more general
provisions of § 1983. Doc. 96 at 3-4; Doc. 102 at 7 n.1. However, as Plaintiff notes, these cases
considered use of §1983 to remedy statutory violations, not violations of the equal protection
clause as Plaintiff alleges here. See Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 2002)
(considering statutory violations under § 1983); Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999,
1011 (8th Cir. 1999) (same); Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, Ga., 112 F.3d 1522, 1531 (11th Cir.
1997) (same); A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 806 (3d Cir. 2007) (same); M.M.R.1

Z v. Puerto Rico, 528 F.3d 9, 13 n. 3 (1st Cir. 2008) (same); Latasha v. Houston Indep. Sch.
Dist., 629 F.3d 450, 456–57 (5th Cir. 2010) (analyzing §1983 claim based on statutory and
constitutional violations separately). I agree with Defendants that the Tenth Circuit would find,
based on this authority, that Plaintiff may not bring a claim for violation of the RHA under §
1983. However, these cases do not stand for the proposition that Plaintiff may not resort to §
1983 to assert a violation of the equal protection clause itself.
Defendant briefly argues that Plaintiff’s equal protection claim should be dismissed
because it is not a separate and independent claim from his RHA claim. See Doc. 102 at 5. But
Plaintiff has not simply restated his claims for violation of the RHA as a violation of the equal
protection clause, but has alleged similarly situated individuals were treated differently on
account of their disability. See Doc. 1 at ¶ 25. Although the Tenth Circuit’s order and judgment
in this case did suggest that the equal protection clause did not apply to unequal treatment based
on disability, Doc. 78 at 4-5, the Tenth Circuit was considering whether the law was “clearly
established” for qualified immunity purposes, and expressly did not reach the merits of
Plaintiff’s constitutional claim. Id. at 8. Defendant does not argue that Plaintiff’s equal
protection claim should be dismissed on the merits. Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff’s §
1983 claim is based on violation of the equal protection clause and not the RHA, Defendant’s
motion to dismiss (Doc. 96) is DENIED. The parties are ORDERED to jointly call chambers
at 303-844-6118 on or before Friday, March 4, 2016 in order to set a pre-trial conference in this
case.

DATED:

February 24, 2016

BY THE COURT:
s/John L. Kane
Senior U.S. District Court Judge
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