Rodriguez v. Chavez et al

Filing 220

ORDER. Plaintiff's Motion for Certification of Entry of Final Judgment Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) 190 is DENIED. By Judge Philip A. Brimmer on 11/13/15.(pabsec)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Philip A. Brimmer
Civil Action No. 12-cv-01071-PAB-MJW
IRENE RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHRISTINE CHAVEZ, individually,
JOEY GASCA, individually,
KRISTY GARCIA, individually,
Defendants.
_____________________________________________________________________
ORDER
_____________________________________________________________________
This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Certification of Entry of Final
Judgment [Docket No. 190] filed by plaintiff Irene Rodriguez.
I. BACKGROUND
In her complaint, plaintiff alleged the following claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983:
(1) excessive force; (2) false arrest; (3) unlawful seizure; (4) malicious prosecution; (5)
conspiracy to violate civil rights (also brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1985); and (6)
municipal liability under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S.
658 (1978). Docket No. 1 at 9, 12, 14.
On September 16, 2014, the Court granted defendants’ partial motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(c), dismissing the official capacity claims against defendants
officers Chavez, Gasca, and Garcia. Docket No. 145. On Septem ber 3, 2015, the
Court granted defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment and dismissed the

claims of false arrest, malicious prosecution, and conspiracy against all the defendants.
Docket No. 181. Plaintiff’s remaining claim is for excessive force in violation of the
Fourth Amendment against defendants Chavez, Gasca, and Garcia.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), the district court may direct the entry of a final
judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims in a multiclaim case when
“there is no just reason for delay.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). However, to be a final
judgment for purposes of Rule 54(b), the claims resolved must be “distinct and
separable from the claims left unresolved.” Oklahoma Turnpike Authority v. Bruner,
259 F.3d 1236, 1243 (10th Cir. 2001). Claims are not separable if “the claim that is
contended to be separate so overlaps the claim or claims that have been retained for
trial that if the latter were to give rise to a separate appeal at the end of the case the
[appeals] court would have to go over the same ground that it had covered in the first
appeal.” Jordan v. Pugh, 425 F.3d 820, 827 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Lawyers Title
Insurance Corp. v. Dearborn Title Corp., 118 F.3d 1157, 1162 (7th Cir. 1997)).
Ultimately, the granting of a Rule 54(b) motion is left to the sound discretion of the trial
court, which “must take into account judicial administrative interests as well as the
equities involved.” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8 (1980).
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff contends that the Court’s summary judgment is final because there are
“no other issues or proceedings before the district court which would modify, change or
otherwise affect the Court’s rulings” on plaintiff's dismissed claims, and there is nothing

2

plaintiff can do but appeal. Docket 190 at 3, ¶¶ 5, 6. Plaintiff asserts that there is no
just reason for delay. Id. at 4, ¶ 7. Plaintiff further argues that to proceed to trial on the
excessive force claim, subsequently to appeal the court’s dismissal and summary
judgment orders, and only then to proceed with a second trial is financially burdensome
and will result in undue hardship to plaintiff. Id. at 5, ¶ 10.
Plaintiff's remaining excessive force claim is not separable from the claims
dismissed in the Court’s summary judgment order. Plaintiff’s claims of conspiracy, false
arrest, and malicious prosecution derive from the same underlying facts as the
excessive force claim.
The basis of plaintiff’s Monell claim is that the City and County of Denver and its
former Police Chief Gerald Whitman “adopted policies, customs and/or practices which
encourage Denver police officers to use excessive, unjustified and unnecessary force
causing . . . civil rights violations.” Docket No. 1 at 2, ¶ 1; see id. at 8, ¶ 31. To
establish Monell liability, plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendants committed a
constitutional violation. See Bryson v. City of Okla. City, 627 F.3d 784, 788 (10th Cir.
2010). The Monell and excessive force claims turn on resolution of many of the same
factual questions and involve common legal issues. Therefore, the Monell claim that
has been resolved in the Court’s summary judgment order is not “distinct and separable
from the claims left unresolved.” Jordan, 425 F.3d at 826; see also Richardson v. City
of New York, 2007 WL 1732424, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (denying motion for certification
under Rule 54(b) because the dismissed Monell claims were “inextricably interrelated”
to the underlying § 1983 claim); Cullen v. Margiotta, 618 F.2d 226, 228 (2d Cir. 1980)

3

(finding district court abused its discretion in granting Rule 54(b) certification because
“several questions involved in this appeal may turn on, or be rendered moot by, the
district court’s resolution of issues still pending before it.”).
Plaintiff’s excessive force claim is set for trial in 17 days, on November 30, 2015.
Denying Rule 54(b) certification may prevent an unnecessary appeal, saving time and
expense for both the courts and the parties. Thus, the Court finds that there exists just
reason for delay.
Plaintiff argues that she will be prejudiced if she cannot immediately appeal the
dismissal of her claims because she lacks the financial resources to litigate two trials.
However, denying certification under Rule 54(b) may actually benefit plaintiff. First, she
will be able to try her § 1983 excessive force claim to a jury more quickly because she
will not need to wait for an appellate decision. Second, in the event that the jury
determines that the officers did not use excessive force, plaintiff may appeal the entire
case at once instead of in piecemeal fashion.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is
ORDERED that plaintiff’s Motion for Certification of Entry of Final Judgment
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) [Docket No. 190] is DENIED.

DATED November 13, 2015.
BY THE COURT:

s/Philip A. Brimmer
PHILIP A. BRIMMER
United States District Judge
4