Elliott v. Essex Motors, LLC

Filing 24

ORDER denying 20 Motion to Stay. By Magistrate Judge Kristen L. Mix on 9/13/12.(mjgsl, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 12-cv-01078-REB-KLM
KRISTAN ELLIOTT,
Plaintiff,
v.
ESSEX MOTORS, LLC,
Defendant.
_____________________________________________________________________
ORDER DENYING STAY
_____________________________________________________________________
ENTERED BY MAGISTRATE JUDGE KRISTEN L. MIX
This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Stay Proceedings
Pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 3 [Docket No. 20; Filed August 16, 2012] (the “Motion”). On
September 4, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Response in opposition to the Motion [#22], and on
September 7, 2012, Defendant filed a Reply [#23]. The Motion is premised on the
Defendant’s pending Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings [#8] (“Motion to
Arbitrate”). The Motion to Arbitrate has not been referred to the undersigned for resolution.
On the basis of the Motion to Arbitrate, Defendant seeks to stay discovery in this case until
the validity of the parties’ alleged arbitration agreement is established. For the reasons set
forth below,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion [#20] is DENIED.
Stays are generally disfavored in this District. See Wason Ranch Corp. v. Hecla
Mining Co., No. 07-cv-00267-EWN-MEH, 2007 WL 1655362, at *1 (D. Colo. June 6, 2007)

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(unpublished decision). However, a stay may be appropriate in certain circumstances. The
Court weighs several factors in making a determination regarding the propriety of a stay.
See String Cheese Incident, LLC v. Stylus Show, Inc., No. 02-cv-01934, 2006 WL 894955,
at * 2 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2006) (unpublished decision) (denoting a five-part test). The Court
considers (1) the interest of Plaintiff; (2) the burden on Defendants in going forward; (3) the
Court’s convenience; (4) the interest of nonparties, and (5) the public interest in general.
Id. Here, those factors weigh against entry of a stay.
First, the Court notes that Plaintiff opposes a stay and expresses an interest in
proceeding expeditiously with discovery. See Response [#22]. This is a reasonable
position, as the Court has generally found that with the passage of time, the memories of
the parties and other witnesses may fade, witnesses may relocate or become unavailable,
or documents may become lost or inadvertently destroyed. As such, delay may diminish
Plaintiff’s ability to proceed and may impact her ability to obtain a speedy resolution of her
claims.
Second, in contrast, Defendant does not suggest any undue burden in proceeding
with the case. The ordinary burdens associated with litigating a case do not constitute
undue burdens. See Collins v. Ace Mortgage Funding, LLC, 08-cv-1709-REB-KLM, 2008
WL 4457850, at *1 (D. Colo. Oct. 1, 2008). Although Defendant has filed a Motion to
Arbitrate which, if successful, may justify the imposition of a stay during the pendency of
the arbitration, the Motion is not based on grounds typically warranting the imposition of a
stay. More specifically, while courts have frequently imposed a stay when compelling
issues relating to jurisdiction or immunity have been raised, cf. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S.
226, 231-32 (1991) (noting that immunity is a threshold issue and discovery should not be
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allowed while the issue is pending); Gilbert v. Ferry, 401 F.3d 411, 415-16 (6th Cir. 2005)
(finding stay permissible pending ruling on dispositive motion involving traditional
jurisdictional issue), a stay is only required after a determination has been made that the
parties have a valid arbitration agreement. See 9 U.S.C. § 3 (stay only required by the
court “upon being satisfied that the issue involved . . . is referable to arbitration”); see also
Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp., 466 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (if district court
satisfied issue involved is arbitrable, then it must grant stay). As the Motion to Arbitrate is
not referred to the undersigned, the Court takes no position as to Defendant’s likelihood of
success on it.
Moreover, as has been the Court’s standing practice when resolving motions on this
issue, absent an extraordinary or unique burden imposed by the discovery at issue, the
Court finds that, on balance, a consideration of the first two String Cheese factors weighs
against the imposition of a stay. Compare Stone v. Vail Resorts Dev. Co., No. 09-cv02081-WYD-KLM, 2010 WL 148278 (D. Colo. Jan. 7, 2010) (granting rare stay due to
existence of class claims and potentially onerous discovery during pendency of motion to
compel arbitration which would likely foreclose pursuit of class claims), with e.g., Lester v.
Gene Exp, Inc., No. 09-cv-02648-REB-KLM, 2010 WL 743555 (D. Colo. Mar. 2, 2010)
(denying stay during pendency of motion to compel arbitration); Bushman Inv. Props., Ltd.
v. DBSI E-470 East LLC, No. 09-cv-00674-MSK-KLM, 2010 WL 330224 (D. Colo. Jan. 20,
2010) (same); Orbitcom, Inc. v. Qwest Communs. Corp., No. 09-cv-00181-WDM-KLM,
2009 WL 1668547 (D. Colo. June 15, 2009) (same). It is not clear that the circumstances
of this case present a compelling reason for deviating from the Court’s prior decisions in
this area. Further, any future participation in discovery by Defendant may arguably prove
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useful if the parties are ultimately required to arbitrate this dispute.
Finally, the Court also considers its own convenience, the interest of nonparties, and
the public interest in general. None of these factors prompts the Court to reach a different
result. The Court is inconvenienced by an ill-advised stay because the delay in prosecuting
the case which results from imposition of a stay makes the Court’s docket less predictable
and, hence, less manageable. This is particularly true when the stay is tied to a resolution
of a motion for which ultimate success is not guaranteed. While the Court identifies no
particular interest of persons not parties in the litigation, the Court identifies a strong
interest held by the public in general regarding the prompt and efficient handling of all
litigation. Under these circumstances, the Court finds that a stay of discovery is not
warranted.

Dated: September 13, 2012

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