Arend v. Paez
Filing
80
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 46 Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Issue of Liability or in the Alternative to Stay Until the Issue of Collateral Estoppel can be Determined. The motion for partial summary judgmen t is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE with leave to refile once all legal issues concerning Paezs conviction and appeal are resolved. It is FURTHER ORDERED that since the length of such appeals process is unknown, the motion to administratively close the c ase is GRANTED. All deadlines in this case are stayed, and it shall be administratively closed until Paezs state court appeal is concluded pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR 41.2. Within 21 days of the final resolution of all legal issues concerning Paezs conviction and appeal, either party may move to reopen this case, by Judge Wiley Y. Daniel on 2/20/2014.(evana, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 12-cv-01270-WYD-CBS
VALERIE AREND,
Plaintiff,
v.
OFFICER HECTOR PAEZ, Denver Police Department, in his personal capacity,
Defendant.
ORDER
I.
INTRODUCTION AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on the Issue of Liability or in the Alternative to Stay Until the Issue of
Collateral Estoppel can be Determined (ECF No. 46). Based on my review of the
pleadings and relevant record, I deny the motion for partial summary judgment without
prejudice with leave to refile once there is a final judgment on the merits. However, I
grant the motion to administratively close this action.
Plaintiff Valerie Arend asserts a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful
seizure, excessive force and cruel and unusual punishment based on an incident
occurring on May 16, 2010. According to the Complaint, Defendant Hector Paez, a
Denver Police Officer, contacted Plaintiff while he was on duty and in uniform and
informed her that she had an outstanding arrest warrant. There was no such warrant.
Paez then handcuffed Plaintiff and placed her in the back of his patrol vehicle. Paez
stopped his vehicle in a remote location and sexually assaulted Plaintiff. Paez then
forced Plaintiff out of the patrol car onto the street.
Plaintiff reported the kidnaping and assault to the Denver Police Department
Internal Affairs Division. Paez was charged with second degree kidnaping, sexual
assault and attempt to influence a public servant. Following a jury trial in Denver District
Court, Paez was convicted of sexual assault and kidnaping. Paez appealed his
conviction, which is currently pending before the Colorado Court of Appeals.
In the pending motion for partial summary judgment, Plaintiff moves for judgment
against Paez on the issue of liability arguing that the facts determined in the prior
criminal prosecution should be given preclusive effect in the instant action.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court may
grant summary judgment where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and the . . . moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250
(1986); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n. v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220
F.3d 1184, 1190 (10th Cir. 2000). “When applying this standard, the court must view
the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to
the party opposing summary judgment.” Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of
Wichita, 226 F.3d 1138, 1148 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). All
doubts must be resolved in favor of the existence of triable issues of fact. Boren v.
-2-
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 933 F.2d 891, 892 (10th Cir. 1991).
III.
DISCUSSION
The doctrine of collateral estoppel, sometimes referred to as issue preclusion,
provides that a court's final decision on an issue actually litigated and decided in a
previous suit is conclusive of that issue in a subsequent suit. Carpenter v. Young, 773
P.2d 561, 565 (Colo. 1989). Application of this doctrine is “intended to relieve parties of
the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and by
preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication.” Bebo Const.
Co. v. Mattox & O’Brien, P.C., 990 P.2d 78, 84 (Colo. 1999).
To determine whether collateral estoppel applies to Plaintiff’s claim against Paez,
I must apply Colorado law. See In re Young, 91 F.3d 1367, 1374 (10th Cir. 1996) (“in
determining the collateral estoppel effect of a state court judgment, federal courts must .
. . apply the state's law of collateral estoppel”). Thus, under Colorado law, collateral
estoppel bars relitigation of an issue if
(1) the issue precluded is identical to an issue actually litigated and
necessarily adjudicated in the prior proceeding; (2) The party against
whom estoppel was sought was a party to or was in privity with a party to
the prior proceeding; (3) There was a final judgment on the merits in the
prior proceeding; (4) The party against whom the doctrine is asserted had
a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the prior proceeding.
Michaelson v. Michaelson, 884 P.2d 695, 700-01 (Colo. 1994). Collateral estoppel is an
affirmative defense, thus Plaintiff bears the burden of proof of establishing these four
elements. Bebo Const. Co., 990 P.2d at 85.
In response to the motion for partial summary judgment, Paez argues that the
-3-
fourth element necessary for collateral estoppel has not been satisfied because there
has not been a final judgment on the merits. In Rantz v. Kaufman, 109 P.3d 132, 141
(Colo. 2005), the Colorado Supreme Court held that “for the purposes of issue
preclusion, a judgment that is still pending on appeal is not final” and further overruled a
“line of court of appeals cases to the extent they hold to the contrary.” Id. Here, it is
undisputed that following a jury trial, Paez was convicted of kidnaping and sexually
assaulting Plaintiff. On May 22, 2013, Paez filed his Notice of Appeal, which is currently
pending before the Colorado Court of Appeals. I agree with Paez. Due to the
pendency of the appeal, the judgment of conviction is not final, and thus has no
preclusive effect. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment is denied
without prejudice with leave to refile once there has been a final judgment on the
merits.1
However, because determination of this matter may hinge on the outcome of
Paez’s appeal, in the interest of efficiency and to prevent unnecessary duplicative
litigation of factual issues, all deadlines in this case are stayed and it will be
administratively closed until Paez’s state court appeal (and the full panoply of rights
associated with the appeal) is concluded. D.C.COLO.LCivR 41.2. Within 21 days of
the final resolution of all legal issues concerning Paez’s conviction and appeal, either
party may move to reopen this case.
1
I note that should Plaintiff wish to refile this motion once there has been a final
judgment on the merits, I remind her that she has the burden of proving each and every
element of the collateral estoppel analysis including establishing that the underlying
proceeding adequately addressed each element of her civil claims asserted in this case.
-4-
IV.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Issue of
Liability or in the Alternative to Stay Until the Issue of Collateral Estoppel can be
Determined (ECF No. 46) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The motion
for partial summary judgment is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE with leave to refile
once all legal issues concerning Paez’s conviction and appeal are resolved. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that since the length of such appeals process is unknown,
the motion to administratively close the case is GRANTED. All deadlines in this case
are stayed, and it shall be administratively closed until Paez’s state court appeal is
concluded pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR 41.2. Within 21 days of the final resolution of
all legal issues concerning Paez’s conviction and appeal, either party may move to
reopen this case.
Dated: February 20, 2014
BY THE COURT:
s/ Wiley Y. Daniel
Wiley Y. Daniel
Senior United States District Judge
-5-
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?