Wojdacz v. Colorado Springs City Police Department et al.

Filing 278

ORDER Denying Defendant Gary Norman's 264 Emergency Motion for Leave to File a Motion for Summary Judgment. By Judge Robert E. Blackburn on 4/1/2014.(klyon, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Robert E. Blackburn
Civil Action No. 12-cv-01483-REB-MEH
ELIZABETH WOJDACZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
GARY LEE NORMAN, and
CLIFF HUDSON,
Defendants.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT GARY NORMAN’S EMERGENCY
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Blackburn, J.
The matter before me is Defendant Gary Norman [sic] Emergency Motion for
Leave To File Motion for Summary Judgment [#264],1 filed March 24, 2014. I deny
the motion.
Mr. Norman points out that he is proceeding pro se, and he is correct that his
status requires the court to more liberally construe his pleadings and hold them to a less
stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007); Andrews v. Heaton,
483 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir. 2007); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.
1991) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595-96, 30 L.Ed.2d
652 (1972)). The leeway afforded pro se pleadings, however, does not absolve pro se

1

“[#264]” is an example of the convention I use to identify the docket number assigned to a
specific paper by the court’s case management and electronic case filing system (CM/ECF). I use this
convention throughout this order.

litigants of the necessity of complying with the apposite rules and procedures that
govern proceedings in federal court. Murray v. City of Tahlequah, 312 F.3d 1196,
1200 n.3 (10th Cir. 2002); Odgen v. San Juan County, 32 F.3d 452, 455 (10th Cir.
1994); Pohl v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 2008 WL 681477 at *1 (D. Colo.
March 6, 2008). Thus, Mr. Norman’s asserted failure to realize that there might be a
time limit within which to file a motion for summary judgment does not excuse his failure
to timely file such a motion.
Nothing in the motion establishes good cause to allow the filing of a belated
motion for summary judgment barely one month before trial. Mr. Norman has presented
nothing to demonstrate that plaintiff cannot substantiate her legal claims against him. At
best, he merely denies that plaintiff’s claims are meritorious. Yet Mr. Norman’s own
incredulity of the facts as alleged by plaintiff is insufficient to entitle him to summary
judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact such that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548,
2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In resolving such a motion, the court is required to
construe the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Simms v. Oklahoma ex
rel Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services, 165 F.3d 1321,
1326 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 53 (1999). Mr. Norman has not demonstrated
that the facts construed under this standard would fail to establish legal claims for relief

2

as to which plaintiff could recover.2
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Gary Norman [sic] Emergency
Motion for Leave To File Motion for Summary Judgment [#264], filed March 24,
2014, is DENIED.
Dated April 1, 2014, at Denver, Colorado.
BY THE COURT:

2

Mr. Norman’s professed assumption “that at some point common sense would prevail” is indeed
quixotic. “It is not the proper function of the district court to assume the role of advocate for the pro se
litigant." Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. The court must rely on the parties, whether represented or not, to
present the issues and prosecute the case. A party who fails to actively participate in the litigation, hopeful
that the court will act on his behalf regardless, does so at his own peril.

3