Williams v. Klein, et al
Filing
22
ORDER Denying Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief. ORDERED that the Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Prisoner Motion for Preliminary Injunction 15 , which the Court construes liberally as a motion for preliminary injunctive relief, is DENIED, by Judge Lewis T. Babcock on 11/7/12.(sgrim)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 12-cv-01580-BNB
KEVIN RAYNELL WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.
TK COZZA-RHODES, Individually and in her official capacity as warden,
CAPTAIN KLIEN, Individually and in his official capacity as captain,
C.O. J. SANDER, Individually and in his official capacity as correctional officer,
C.O. DOCKINS, Individually and in his official capacity as correctional officer,
C.O. ROYAL, Individually and in his official capacity as correctional officer,
C.O. PRICE, Individually and in his official capacity as correctional officer, and
C.O. KOCH, Individually and in his official capacity as correctional officer,
Defendants.
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Plaintiff, Kevin Raynell Williams, is a prisoner in the custody of the Federal
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) who currently is incarcerated at the Federal Correctional
Institute in Florence, Colorado. He submitted pro se an Amended Complaint (ECF No.
31) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), asserting violations of his constitutional
rights. Mr. Williams requests monetary and injunctive relief in his Amended Complaint.
He has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
Plaintiff has filed a “Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Prisoner Motion for
Preliminary Injunction” (ECF No. 15), which the Court construes liberally as a motion for
preliminary injunctive relief. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Hall v.
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Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
Mr. Williams alleges in the Amended Complaint that shortly after he arrived at
USP-Florence in March 2011, Defendants Dockins and Sander began banging on his
cell door three times a night during count, preventing him from sleeping. He alleges that
the banging intensified after he reported the conduct to the Internal Affairs Office and
continued uninterrupted for a period of at least three months. During that period,
Defendant Royal also participated in the banging, and Plaintiff continued to file
administrative remedies against the Defendants. In May 2011, Defendant Klien
threatened Plaintiff with loss of his prison job if he did not stop filing administrative
remedy requests. Plaintiff alleges that in November 2011, and from late December
2011 to March 2012, Defendants Royal and Koch banged on his cell door most nights.
Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Price physically assaulted him and has searched
his cell on numerous occasions and confiscated his personal property in retaliation for
his grievances against other prison officials.
In his motion for preliminary injunctive relief, Mr. Williams seeks an order
enjoining the Defendants from banging on his cell door at night and from confiscating
his personal property.
The Court will construe the motion liberally because Mr. Williams is not
represented by an attorney. See Haines, 404 U.S. at 520-21; Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.
However, the Court should not be an advocate for a pro se litigant. See Hall, 935 F.2d
at 1110. For the reasons stated below, the motions will be denied.
A temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary
remedy”, and, therefore, “the right to relief must be clear and unequivocal.” Schrier v.
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Univ. of Colo., 427 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa
USA, Inc., 936 F.2d 1096, 1098 (10th Cir. 1991)). To obtain a preliminary injunction,
the party seeking the injunction must demonstrate four factors:
(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the case; (2)
irreparable injury to the movant if the preliminary injunction is denied; (3)
the threatened injury to the movant outweighs the injury to the other party
under the preliminary injunction; and (4) the injunction is not adverse to
the public interest.
Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 955 (10th Cir.2001). “To constitute irreparable harm,
an injury must be certain, great, actual ‘and not theoretical.’” Heideman v. S. Salt Lake
City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1189 (10th Cir. 2003); Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b).
In this case, because Mr. Williams seeks a disfavored injunction (i.e., one that is
mandatory as opposed to prohibitory, would alter the status quo, and would provide him
with all the injunctive relief he seeks), he faces a “heightened burden” of showing that
“the exigencies of the case support the granting of a remedy that is extraordinary even
in the normal course.” O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389
F.3d 973, 975 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam) (majority opinion). Thus, he
“must make a strong showing both with regard to the likelihood of success on the merits
and with regard to the balance of harms.” Id. at 976.
The factual allegations contained in the Amended Complaint do not persuade the
Court that Mr. Williams has a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits of his
constitutional claims.
Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials must ensure that prisoners are
afforded “humane conditions of confinement” such as “adequate food, clothing, shelter,
and medical care” and “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the
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inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quotation omitted). To state an
Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must allege facts to show that: (1) objectively,
the deprivation was “sufficiently serious so as to deprive inmates of the minimal civilized
measure of life's necessities . . . [or] so as [to] constitute a substantial risk of serious
harm,” and (2) subjectively, the defendants “act[ed] . . . with deliberate indifference to
inmate health and safety.” Shannon v. Graves, 257 F.3d 1164, 1168 (10th Cir. 2001)
(internal quotations omitted).
Sleep constitutes a basic human need, and conditions designed to prevent sleep
may violate the Eighth Amendment. See Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 720 (5th
Cir.1999); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1090-91 (9th Cir.1996) (Eighth Amendment
claim where inmate subjected to bright light for twenty-four hours per day and alleged to
have suffered grave sleeping problems and psychological harm), amended on other
grounds on denial of rehearing, 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir.1998); see also Merritt v. Hawk,
153 F.Supp.2d 1216, 1228 (D. Colo. 2001). However, “the Constitution does not
mandate comfortable prisons,” and conditions may be “restrictive and even harsh.”
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). The Court cannot find at this stage of
the proceedings that the facts in the Amended Complaint demonstrate a substantial
likelihood that Plaintiff will prevail on his Eighth Amendment claim against the
Defendants.
Moreover, although prison officials may not retaliate against inmates for filing
grievances, Plaintiff must show that the adverse action was taken because of the
exercise of his constitutional rights. See Peterson v. Shanks, 149 F.3d 1140, 1144 (10th
Cir. 1998). Standing alone, temporal proximity between the alleged exercise of rights
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and the administrative segregation does not constitute sufficient circumstantial proof of
a retaliatory motive. Cf. Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 949 (10th Cir. 1990).
Even if Plaintiff has stated an arguable claim of retaliation in the Amended Complaint,
the facts do not establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.
In addition, Plaintiff fails to assert facts in his motion for preliminary injunctive
relief to demonstrate that he will suffer substantial and irreparable harm if a preliminary
injunction is not issued. Finally, Mr. Williams has not shown that his threatened injuries
outweigh whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party, or
that a preliminary injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. Accordingly, it
is
ORDERED that the “Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Prisoner Motion for
Preliminary Injunction” (ECF No. 15), which the Court construes liberally as a motion for
preliminary injunctive relief, is DENIED.
DATED at Denver, Colorado, this 7th day of
November
, 2012.
BY THE COURT:
s/Lewis T. Babcock
LEWIS T. BABCOCK, Senior Judge
United States District Court
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