Carbajal v. St. Anthony Central Hospital et al

Filing 236

ORDER OVERRULING 231 PLAINTIFFS CONTEMPORANEOUS OBJECTION TO MAGISTRATE JUDGES JULY 30, 2014 ORDER [# 226 ]. By Judge Robert E. Blackburn on 10/6/2014. (alowe)

PUBLISH
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Robert E. Blackburn
Civil Action No. 12-cv-02257-REB-KLM
DEAN CARBAJAL,
Plaintiff,
v.
ST. ANTHONY CENTRAL HOSPITAL, a corporation, ET AL.,
Defendants.

ORDER OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S CONTEMPORANEOUS
OBJECTION TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S JULY 30, 2014 ORDER [#226]
Blackburn, J.
The matter before me is Plaintiff Mr. Carbajal’s Contemporaneous Objection
to Magistrate Judge Kristen L. Mix’s July 30, 2014 Order [#226] [#231],1 filed August
19, 2014. I overrule the objections.
Plaintiff’s objections pertain to non-dispositive matters that have been referred to
the magistrate judge for resolution. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a),
I may modify or set aside any portion of a magistrate judge’s order which I find to be
clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Moreover, because plaintiff is proceeding pro se, I
have reviewed his filings more liberally than pleadings or papers filed by attorneys.
See, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L.Ed.2d

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“[#231]” is an example of the convention I use to identify the docket number assigned to a
specific paper by the court’s case management and electronic case filing system (CM/ECF). I use this
convention throughout this order.

1081 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d
652 (1972); Andrews v. Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir. 2007); Hall v.
Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
Having reviewed the magistrate judge’s order, the apposite motion, response,
and reply, and plaintiff’s objections, I conclude that the magistrate judge’s order is not
clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Plaintiff seeks the issuance of 25 subpoenas
duces tecum, seeking documents from third parties who are not named defendants.
Although certain of the defendants in this case filed a response to the motion asking the
court to quash these subpoenas, the magistrate judge correctly noted that these
defendants lacked standing to do so. Nevertheless, relying on the court’s inherent
authority to protect parties and non-parties alike from oppressive use of process, the
magistrate judge considered whether the information sought by the subpoenas was
relevant to plaintiff’s claims. With respect to certain of the subpoenas, she concluded in
the negative, and therefore denied in part plaintiff’s motion.
By his objection, plaintiff asserts that the language of Fed R. Civ. P. 45 vests the
court with no such discretion to determine the relative merits of his subpoenas duces
tecum prior to issuance. In other words, plaintiff asserts that the court must issue, and
the US Marshal’s Service must serve, his subpoenas without further inquiry, and may
review them for burdensomeness and relevance only if and when quashal is sought by
an implicated non-party. The law, however, is to the contrary.
While it is true that the court’s “inherent powers must be exercised with great
caution” and only in “exceptional circumstances,” they do operate within the realm

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where “congressionally authorized powers fail to protect the processes of the court.”
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc. 501 U.S. 32, 64, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 2143, 115 L.Ed.2d 27
(1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This is
one such circumstance. “Rule 45 provides little practical protection to the Marshals
Service or non-parties against service of unreasonable, abusive, or frivolous
subpoenae.” Jackson v. Brinker, 1992 WL 404537 at *5 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 21, 1992).
Numerous courts thus have relied on the court’s inherent authority to bridge that gap,
finding the discretion necessary to deny issuance of subpoenas which are irrelevant,
frivolous, unduly burdensome, or harassing. See, e.g, Manning v. Lockhart, 623 F.2d
536, 539 (8th Cir.1980); Christian v. Ford, 2014 WL 2480585 at *1-2 (E.D. Mo. June 3,
2014); Hughes v. Friedman 2013 WL 93177 at *1-2 (D. Ariz. Jan. 8, 2013); Andrade
v. Oba 2009 WL 650469 at *1 (D. Colo. March 11, 2009); Leadbetter v. City of Fort
Wayne, 2007 WL 2323109 at *1-2 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 10, 2007);Tuvalu v. Woodford, 2006
WL 3201096, at *5 (E.D.Cal. Nov. 2, 2006), adopted, 2008 WL 2774571 (E.D. Cal. July
15, 2008); Jackson, 1992 WL 404537 at *6.
The necessity of exercising the court’s inherent authority to prevent abuse of
process is especially keen when the requesting party is proceeding in forma pauperis,
as plaintiff does in this case. Although Rule 45 does offer some protection against
burdensome and unreasonable subpoenas, both in the process of and after service,
[b]ecause indigent parties are largely immune from monetary
deterrents, sanctions can't be relied on as an effective
protection for the Marshals Service and non-parties against
service of unreasonable or abusive subpoenae. In forma
pauperis parties often proceed pro se as well, thus lessening
the deterrent effect of threatening sanctions for submission
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of legally unreasonable, but innocently-intentioned,
subpoenae. The possibility of quashing or modifying an
unreasonable subpoena comes too late to prevent the costs
incurred by its service.
Jackson, 1992 WL 404537 at *5. Other courts have noted that an indigent civil
plaintiff’s right to subpoenas “cannot be less than its discretion to refuse to subpoena
witnesses for an indigent defendant in a criminal prosecution” under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 17(b), which imposes, inter alia, a requirement that the indigent
defendant make a showing of materiality of witness testimony before a subpoena will
issue at government expense. Estep v. United States, 251 F.2d 579, 582 (5th Cir.
1958). See also Coleman v. St. Vincent de Paul, 144 F.R.D. 92, 96 (E.D. Wis. 1992)
(“An IFP litigant should only be entitled to subpoena witnesses for trial at government
expense after a preliminary and complete showing of the materiality and necessity of
each witness.”). Nothing in Rule 45 requires the court, the Marshals Service, nor the
non-parties to whom the subpoenas are directed to shoulder the burden and expense
attendant on the service of and response to facially improper subpoenas. Indeed, such
inefficiency and expense are contrary to the overarching purpose of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
The exercise of the court’s inherent authority to undertake the task prior to
service is informed by considerations of relevance, as developed and understood in the
context of Rule 26(b)(1). See Hughes, 2013 WL 93177 at *1; Stockdale v. Stockdale
2009 WL 4030758 at *1 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 18, 2009); Avery v. Pazos 2007 WL 4284729
at *1-2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2007); Transcor, Inc. v. Furney Charters, Inc., 212 F.R.D.
588, 591 (D. Kan. 2003). The magistrate judge relied on precisely those considerations
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here, invoking the broad conception of relevance appropriate in these circumstances.
Even under that expansive standard, however, the magistrate judge found many of
plaintiff’s document requests untenable. Nothing in plaintiff’s objections to the
magistrate judge’s thorough and well-reasoned consideration of these issues convinces
me that her determinations in this regard were clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the objections stated in Plaintiff Mr.
Carbajal’s Contemporaneous Objection to Magistrate Judge Kristen L. Mix’s July
30, 2014 Order [#226] [#231], filed August 19, 2014, are OVERRULED.
Dated October 6, 2014, at Denver, Colorado.
BY THE COURT:

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