MacIntyre v. JP Morgan Chase Bank,NA, et al

Filing 126

ORDER The Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge ECF No. 117 is ADOPTED; Plaintiffs Objections to the Recommendation ECF No. 118 are OVERRULED; Defendants Motion to Dismiss Third Amended Complaint ECF No. 110 is GRANTED; and Plaintiffs claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of jurisdiction, and the Clerk shall enter judgment against Plaintiff and in favor of Defendant. The parties shall bear their own costs, by Judge William J. Martinez on 7/31/2014.(evana, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge William J. Martínez
Civil Action No. 12-cv-2586-WJM-MEH
HOLLY MACINTYRE,
Plaintiff,
v.
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK,
Defendant.

ORDER ADOPTING FEBRUARY 21, 2014 RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE
JUDGE AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

This matter is before the Court on the February 21, 2014 Recommendation of
United States Magistrate Judge Michael E. Hegarty (“Recommendation”) (ECF No. 117)
that Defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank’s (“Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”)
(ECF No. 110) be granted. The Recommendation is incorporated herein by reference.
See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Plaintiff Holly MacIntyre (“Plaintiff”)
filed a timely Objection to the Recommendation (ECF No. 118), and Defendant filed a
Response to the Objection (ECF No. 120). For the reasons set forth below, the
Objection is overruled, the Recommendation is adopted, and the Motion is granted.
I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
When a magistrate judge issues a recommendation on a dispositive matter,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(3) requires that the district judge “determine de
novo any part of the magistrate judge’s [recommendation] that has been properly
objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). In the absence of a timely and specific objection,

“the district court may review a magistrate . . . [judge’s] report under any standard it
deems appropriate.” Summers v. Utah, 927 F.2d 1165, 1167 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 Advisory
Committee’s Note (“When no timely objection is filed, the court need only satisfy itself
that there is no clear error on the face of the record.”). An objection to a
recommendation is properly made if it is both timely and specific. United States v. One
Parcel of Real Property Known As 2121 East 30th St., 73 F.3d 1057, 1059 (10th Cir.
1996). An objection is sufficiently specific if it “enables the district judge to focus
attention on those issues—factual and legal—that are at the heart of the parties’
dispute.” Id. (quoting Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147 (1985)). In conducting its
review, “[t]he district court judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommendation;
receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.”
Id.
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court must liberally construe her
pleadings. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Trackwell v. United States
Gov’t, 472 F.3d 1242, 1243 (10th Cir. 2007). The Court, however, cannot act as
advocate for Plaintiff, who must still comply with the fundamental requirements of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.
1991).
Defendant’s Motion is brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), which empowers a
court to dismiss a complaint for “lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) is not a judgment on the merits of a
plaintiff’s case. Rather, it calls for a determination that the court lacks authority to
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adjudicate the matter, attacking the existence of jurisdiction rather than the allegations
of the complaint. See Castaneda v. INS, 23 F.3d 1576, 1580 (10th Cir. 1994)
(recognizing that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may only exercise
jurisdiction when specifically authorized to do so).
A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss “must be determined from the allegations of
fact in the complaint, without regard to mere conclusory allegations of jurisdiction.”
Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674, 677 (10th Cir. 1971). The burden of establishing
subject matter jurisdiction is on the party asserting jurisdiction. Basso v. Utah Power &
Light Co., 495 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1974). A court lacking jurisdiction “must dismiss
the cause at any stage of the proceeding in which it becomes apparent that jurisdiction
is lacking.” Id.
II. BACKGROUND
The only objection to the recitation of facts set forth by the Magistrate Judge in
the Recommendation is Plaintiff’s contention that the Recommendation misstates her
argument with respect to whether Defendant complied with the Court’s September 11,
2013 order directing the parties to address jurisdictional issues in their briefs. (ECF No.
118 at 1-2.) Because the question of such compliance is not relevant to the Court’s
analysis, the Court adopts and incorporates the factual background detailed in the
Recommendation as if set forth herein.
Briefly, Plaintiff brings this action for quiet title and slander of title in relation to
Defendant’s attempt to foreclose on the property located at 13025 W. 63rd Place, #E,
Arvada, Colorado 80004 (“Property”). (ECF No. 35.) Plaintiff states that she has
owned the Property since March 31, 1995. (Id. at 6.) On June 25, 2013, Defendant
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terminated its non-judicial foreclosure proceeding, and on November 21, 2013, it filed a
judicial foreclosure proceeding in Jefferson County District Court (the “Foreclosure
Proceeding”). (See ECF Nos. 82-1, 110-10.)
On December 2, 2013, with leave of Court, Plaintiff filed her Third Amended
Complaint. (ECF No. 108.) Defendant’s Motion was filed on December 19, 2013.
(ECF No. 110.) Plaintiff filed a Response to the Motion (ECF No. 115), and Defendant
filed a Reply (ECF No. 116). The Recommendation was issued on February 21, 2014.
(ECF No. 117.)
III. ANALYSIS
The Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation contains the following findings and
conclusions: (1) the abstention doctrine set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971), requires the Court to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over this action due to
the ongoing Foreclosure Proceeding; (2) the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine does
not require the Court to exercise jurisdiction; and (3) even if Younger does not apply,
the Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction pursuant to the doctrine set forth in
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
(ECF No. 117 at 10-20.) As a result, the Magistrate Judge recommends granting
Defendant’s Motion and dismissing this case for lack of jurisdiction. (Id. at 20.)
Plaintiff’s Objections argue the following: (1) the Recommendation improperly
stated Plaintiff’s position regarding the Court’s September 11, 2013 order; (2) the
Younger abstention doctrine does not apply to this case; (3) the Colorado River
doctrine does not apply to this case; and (4) the Court must exercise jurisdiction
pursuant to the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine. (ECF No. 118.)
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As to Plaintiff’s first argument, she contends that the Recommendation contains
an erroneous “finding of fact” because it misstates her argument that Defendant failed
to comply with the Court’s September 11, 2013 order directing the parties to address
jurisdictional issues. (Id. at 1-2.) Plaintiff misunderstands the portion of the
Recommendation to which she objects, as it made no findings of fact but simply
summarized the parties’ positions. (See ECF No. 117 at 5.) The Court has made no
finding that either party failed to comply with its September 11, 2013 order, nor is such
compliance currently at issue, as both parties have sufficiently briefed all relevant
jurisdictional issues. Regardless of the accuracy of the summary of Plaintiff’s argument
in the Recommendation, the Court has an independent obligation to ensure that federal
subject-matter jurisdiction exists and will review the issue accordingly. See Arbaugh v.
Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). Therefore, Plaintiff’s Objection is overruled in
this respect.
With respect to Younger, the Recommendation found that the three factors
requiring mandatory abstention were satisfied here: (1) the Foreclosure Proceeding is
an ongoing state civil proceeding; (2) the state court provides an adequate forum to
hear the claims Plaintiff raises; and (3) the Foreclosure Proceeding involves an
“important state interest[]”. (ECF No. 117 at 10-15.) Plaintiff objects only to the
Recommendation’s finding as to the first factor, that the Foreclosure Proceeding is an
ongoing state proceeding for Younger purposes. (ECF No. 118 at 8-12.)
Plaintiff argues that the Foreclosure Proceeding should not be considered
“ongoing” because it was filed fourteen months after the instant case. (Id. at 8-9.) A
state proceeding is ongoing for Younger purposes if the federal litigation is in “an
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embryonic stage and no contested matter has been decided.” Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.,
422 U.S. 922, 929 (1975)). Plaintiff contends that the instant action has proceeded
past the embryonic stage because Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss that was
directed to the merits of Plaintiff’s claims, and that motion was briefed in full. (ECF No.
118 at 9.) However, the key question for the purposes of determining the stage of
litigation is whether a ruling has been issued on the merits, not whether the parties have
filed briefs arguing merits issues. See Crown Point I, LLC v. Intermountain Rural Elec.
Ass’n, 319 F.3d 1211, 1215 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing Doran, 422 U.S. at 929). Despite
the nearly two years that have elapsed since the filing of the instant action, no ruling on
the merits has yet been issued. Thus, the Court finds that the Foreclosure Proceeding
is ongoing.
Plaintiff cites two cases from other circuits that she contends support a finding
that the Foreclosure Proceeding is not ongoing for purposes of Younger. (ECF No. 118
at 10-12.) However, the Court finds that both cases are readily distinguishable. In both
For Your Eyes Alone, Inc. v. City of Columbus, 281 F.3d 1209, 1219 (11th Cir. 2002),
and Hoye v. City of Oakland, 653 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 2011), the district courts had
already ruled on motions for a temporary restraining order, in the course of which both
courts reviewed evidence and made rulings regarding the merits of the cases. In
contrast, the Court in the instant matter has made no such rulings, and has questioned
the existence of jurisdiction since Defendant’s initial Motion to Dismiss was filed. (See
ECF No. 117 at 15 (citing ECF No. 39).)
The Court concludes that, due to the early stage of the instant case, the
Foreclosure Proceeding is ongoing for the purposes of Younger. As Plaintiff does not
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object to the findings as to the other two factors, the Court need not review them de
novo. See Summers, 927 F.2d at 1167. The Court has reviewed the analysis in the
Recommendation as to these factors and finds no clear error. Accordingly, that
analysis is adopted, and the Court finds that factors two and three of the Younger
analysis are satisfied. Thus, all three Younger factors are satisfied, and the Court is
required to abstain from exercising jurisdiction in this matter. See Amanatullah v. Colo.
Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 187 F.3d 1160, 1163 (10th Cir. 1999) (“Younger abstention is
non-discretionary”).
Nevertheless, Plaintiff argues in her Objection that the Court is required to
exercise jurisdiction pursuant to the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine. (ECF No. 118
at 2-8.) Plaintiff challenges the Recommendation’s interpretation of the leading case on
the doctrine, Penn General Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania ex rel. Schnader, 294 U.S.
189 (1935). (Id. at 3-8.) Plaintiff’s Objection argues that Schnader requires a finding
that, in this case, the assertion of jurisdiction in the instant action preceded the
Foreclosure Proceeding because the complaint was filed in this Court first. (ECF No.
118 at 2-5.) Plaintiff also argues that Schnader mandates that the first court to exercise
jurisdiction maintain it, because “the jurisdiction of one court must of necessity yield to
that of the other” when both courts require possession or control of the property at issue
to grant relief. (Id. at 5 (quoting Schnader, 294 U.S. at 195; citing Marshall v. Marshall,
547 U.S. 293, 311 (2006) (“[A] second court will not assume in rem jurisdiction over the
same res.”)).)
Even assuming that Plaintiff is correct that this Court was the first to assert
jurisdiction, Plaintiff misreads Schnader when she interprets the prior exclusive
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jurisdiction doctrine as mandatory. The language Plaintiff cites from Schnader clarifies
that both courts may not exercise in rem jurisdiction simultaneously, but does not
mandate that the first court to assert jurisdiction exclude the second court pursuant to
the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine. Rather, Schnader states that the first court
“may” exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the second. 294 U.S. at 196. Thus,
Schnader permits the first court to assert jurisdiction over the subject property to yield
jurisdiction to the second court. As the Court has found that Younger requires
abstention here, the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine does not mandate otherwise.
Because the Court has found that Younger abstention applies here, it need not
review either the Recommendation’s analysis or Plaintiff’s Objection with respect to the
alternative abstention doctrine set forth in Colorado River. Even if Plaintiff’s Objection
with respect to the applicability of Colorado River were sustained, the Court must still
abstain from exercising jurisdiction pursuant to Younger. Accordingly, the Court
concludes that it lacks jurisdiction to hear this case, and Plaintiff’s Objections are
overruled in their entirety.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1.

The Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge (ECF No. 117) is
ADOPTED;

2.

Plaintiff’s Objections to the Recommendation (ECF No. 118) are OVERRULED;

3.

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Third Amended Complaint (ECF No. 110) is
GRANTED; and

4.

Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of jurisdiction,
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and the Clerk shall enter judgment against Plaintiff and in favor of Defendant.
The parties shall bear their own costs.
Dated this 31st day of July, 2014.
BY THE COURT:

William J. Martínez
United States District Judge

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