Pinson v. Berkabile

Filing 12

ORDER Denying 10 Motion to Reconsider and request for a stay, by Judge Lewis T. Babcock on 3/18/13.(sgrim)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 12-cv-02673-BNB
JEREMY PINSON,
Applicant,
v.
DAVID BERKABILE,
Respondent.

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO RECONSIDER

At issue is Applicant’s “Motion to Reconsider (Doc. No.8),” ECF No. 10, filed on
January 11, 2012. The Court must construe the Motion liberally because Mr. Pinson is
proceeding pro se. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Hall v.
Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). For the reasons stated below, the Court
will deny the Motion.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize a “motion for
reconsideration.” Hatfield v. Board of County Com’rs for Converse County, 52 F.3d 858
(10th Cir. 1995) (citing Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir.
1991) cert. denied, 506 U.S. 828 (1992)). Nonetheless, a litigant subject to an adverse
judgment, and who seeks reconsideration by the district court of that adverse judgment,
may “file either a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
59(e) or a motion seeking relief from the judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).”
Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir. 1991). Mr. Pinson’s
Motion, however, does not challenge a final judgment.

The Motion is an “interlocutory motion invoking the district court’s general
discretionary authority to review and revise interlocutory rulings prior to entry of final
judgment.” Fye v. Oklahoma Corp. Com’n, 516 F.3d 1217, 1224 n.2 (10th Cir. 2008)
(citing Wagoner v. Wagoner, 938 F.2d 1120, 1122 n.1 (10th Cir. 1991) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). The Court, therefore, is not subject to the strict standards
under Rules 59(e) and 60(b). Id. Based on its general discretionary authority, the Court
will deny the Motion for the following reasons.
In the Motion to Reconsider, Mr. Pinson asserts that the action should be
considered as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 and that Mr. Bacote be allowed to
proceed in this action because he is incompetent and not capable of proceeding in a
separate case without Mr. Pinson’s help. Mr. Pinson also requests that if the Court
denies the Motion the Court grant a motion to stay so he can appeal ECF No. 8.
First, a prerequisite for class action certification is a finding by a court that the
representative party can “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). Because a layperson ordinarily does not possess the legal training
and expertise necessary to protect the interests of a proposed class, courts are
reluctant to certify a class represented by a pro se litigant. See 7A Wright, Miller &
Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure Civil 3d § 1769.1 & n.13 (3d ed. 2005 & Supp.
2009); see also Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) (pro se
prisoners are not adequate representatives for a class). The Tenth Circuit has held that
while a prisoner proceeding pro se may assert his own claims in federal court, his
competence as a layperson is too limited to protect the rights of others. See Menefee v.

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Werholtz, 368 F. App’x 879, ** 2 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Fymbo v. State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co., 213 F.3d 1320, 1321 (10th Cir. 2000); see also House v. Utah, 129 F. App’x
432, ** 1 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Fymbo for the same proposition). Pro se prisoner
litigants also are subject to logistical and administrative constraints which severely
restricts their ability to investigate class claims and contact class members. Because
Mr. Pinson, the putative class representative, is a prisoner litigant proceeding pro se the
Court finds that class certification is inappropriate.
Second, Mr. Pinson may not assert claims on behalf of other individuals. A pro
se litigant may not represent other pro se litigants in federal court. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1654; see also Fymbo v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 213 F.3d 1320, 1321 (10th Cir.
2000). “A litigant may bring his own claims to federal court without counsel, but not the
claims of others.” Fymbo, 213 F.31 at 1321. Furthermore, prisoners don’t have a
protected legal interest in acting as a jailhouse lawyer for other prisoners. See Smith v.
Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 950 (10th Cir. 1990). Mr. Pinson, therefore, does not have the
right to assert any mental health claims on Mr. Bacote’s behalf. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the “Motion to Reconsider (Doc. 8),” ECF No.10, is denied. It is
FURTHER ORDER that Mr. Pinson’s request for a stay, ECF No. 10, is denied.
DATED March 18, 2013, at Denver, Colorado.
BY THE COURT:
s/Lewis T. Babcock
LEWIS T. BABCOCK, Senior Judge
United States District Court

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