Carrillo, et al v. Wieland, et al

Filing 3

ORDER DISMISSING CASE With Prejudice. The Court finds that Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. By Judge William J. Martinez on 10/15/2012. (ervsl, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge William J. Martínez
Civil Action No. 12-cv-2680-WJM-MEH
ALFONSO A. CARRILLO,
JANET PINA,
SERGIO HERNANDEZ,
GONZALO PEREZ,
ESTELA PEREZ,
GERMAN JASSO BRUNO,
JULIO ARREGUIN,
RAQUEL BARRIENTOS,
JORGE RAMIREZ,
MIGUEL ANGEL CAMPOS,
Plaintiffs,
v.
RICHARD A. WIELAND, United States Trustee for the District of Colorado, in his official
and individual capacities,
JARROD MARTIN, Deputy United States Trustee for the District of Colorado in his
official and individual capacities,
Defendants.

ORDER DISMISSING CASE SUA SPONTE FOR FAILURE TO STATE
A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF COULD BE GRANTED

On October 10, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging that Defendants violated their constitutional rights as well as two federal
statutes. (ECF No. 1.) Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court may
dismiss a complaint sua sponte “when it is ‘patently obvious’ that the plaintiff could not
prevail on the facts alleged, and allowing him an opportunity to amend his complaint
would be futile.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). For the

reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted and that amendment would be futile.
Plaintiff has sued Defendants in both their official and personal capacities.
Claims brought against a governmental officer in his official capacity are essentially
claims brought against the governmental entity itself. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159, 165 (1985). As Defendants are Trustees for the United States Bankruptcy Courts,
Plaintiffs’ official capacity claims are essentially brought against the United States. As
such, these claims are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See United States
v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941); Pleasant v. Lovell, 876 F.2d 787, 793 (10th Cir.
1989).
With respect to the claims against Defendants in their personal capacities,
Plaintiffs allege that the manner in which Defendants performed their duties as Trustees
for the United States Bankruptcy Court violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. (Id. at 6.)
The Court finds that these claims are barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity.
Judges enjoy absolute immunity from civil liability for judicial acts, unless such action is
in clear absence of all jurisdiction. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357 (1978). This
immunity is not limited solely to judges; “[i]mmunity which derives from judicial immunity
may extend to persons other than a judge where performance of judicial acts or activity
as an official aide of the judge is involved.” Henricksen v. Bentley, 644 F.2d 852, 855
(10th Cir. 1981). “[A]bsolute judicial immunity has been extended to non-judicial
officers where ‘their duties had an integral relationship with the judicial process.’”

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Whitesel v. Sengenberger, 222 F.3d 861, 867 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Eades v.
Sterlinske, 810 F.2d 723, 726 (7th Cir. 1987); see also Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219
(1988).
Judicial immunity has been specifically extended to apply to trustees in
bankruptcy proceedings. Gregory v. U.S. Bankr. Ct., 942 F.2d 1498, 1500 (10th Cir.
1991) (bankruptcy trustee entitled to absolute judicial immunity); see also Gross v. Rell,
__ F.3d __, 2012 WL 4353145, *5 (2d Cir. Sept. 25, 2012); In re Mailman Steam Carpet
Cleaning Corp., 196 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1999); Boullion v. McClanahan, 639 F.2d 213,
214 (5th Cir. 1981). Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendants acted outside of their
statutory authority or were not otherwise under the supervision of the bankruptcy court
when the events at issue in this case occurred. (See ECF No. 1.) Accordingly, the
Court finds that Defendants are entitled to immunity from Plaintiffs’ claims in this case
and Plaintiffs’ claims must be dismissed.1 See Roth v. King, 449 F.3d 1272, 1286 (D.C.
Cir. 2006) (judicial immunity bars claim for injunctive relief). Additionally, because
Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by judicial immunity, the Court finds that amendment of the
Complaint would be futile.

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The Court notes that Plaintiffs here seek only injunctive relief, and traditionally judicial
immunity did not bar claims for injunctive relief. See Schepp v. Fremont County, 900 F.2d 1448
(10th Cir. 1990) (judges are not “shielded by absolute immunity from declaratory or injunctive
relief”). However, in 1996, Congress amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to disallow injunctive relief
against judges “unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 309(c), 110 Stat. 2847, 2853
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). Plaintiffs do not allege that any declaratory
decree was involved with this case or that declaratory relief was unavailable. Thus, even
Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief are barred by judicial immunity.

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For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Complaint is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk shall close the case.
Dated this 15th day of October, 2012.
BY THE COURT:

William J. Martínez
United States District Judge

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