Medved et al v. DeAtley et al

Filing 115

ORDER. ORDERED that this case shall be administratively closed, subject to reopening for good cause, pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR 41.2 by Judge Philip A. Brimmer on 09/09/14. (jhawk, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Philip A. Brimmer
Civil Action No. 12-cv-03034-PAB-MEH
JOHN F. MEDVED, an individual,
DEBRA MEDVED, an individual, and
MEDVED CHEVROLET, INC., a Colorado corporation,
Plaintiffs,
v.
ALAN DEATLEY, an individual, and
RICHARD DAVIS, an individual,
Defendants.

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the Joint Motion for Administrative Closure of
Case Pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR 41.2 [Docket No. 99] filed jointly by plaintiffs John
F. Medved, Debra Medved, and Medved Chevrolet, Inc. and defendant Alan DeAtley.1
Former defendants Leslie A. Powers and Powers & Therrien, P.S. (collectively the
“Powers defendants”) oppose the motion. Docket No. 102.
The parties discussed administrative closure with the magistrate judge and were
directed to file a joint motion to administratively close this case. Docket No. 95. A
consolidated civil conservation easement tax credit case pertaining to the income tax
credits at issue here is currently pending in the District Court for Jackson County,
Colorado, Nichols v. Colorado, No. 2011CV14 (the “Jackson County case”). See

1

Plaintiffs represent that defendant Richard Davis, who appears pro se, does not
oppose the relief requested. Docket No. 99 at 1.

Docket No. 101-1. Mr. DeAtley is a third party defendant in the Jackson County case.
Docket No. 61 at 4. The Jackson County case is in the process of being set for trial.
Nichols, 2011CV14 (July 7, 2014 Minute Order).
The joint motion states that administrative closure of this case “is warranted
pending the resolution of and/or further developments in the related proceedings in
state court.” Docket No. 99 at 2. In support of their motion for certification pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), the Powers defendants argue that plaintiffs and Mr. DeAtley have
admitted that substantive issues between them “will be decided in Jackson County.”
Docket No. 112 at 4. Thus, there appears to be no dispute that plaintiffs’ remaining
claims should not proceed further until relevant issues in the Jackson County case are
resolved. Pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR. 41.2, the Court finds that good cause exists to
administratively close this case. See Lehman v. Revolution Portfolio LLC, 166 F.3d
389, 392 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting that “an administrative closing has no effect other than
to remove a case from the court’s active docket and . . . d[oes] not terminate the
underlying case, but, rather, place[s] it in inactive status until such time as the judge, in
his discretion or at the request of a party, cho[o]se[s] either to reactivate it or to dispose
of it with finality”).
In opposition to the present motion, the Powers defendants primarily repeat
arguments from their motion for certification. Compare Docket No. 102 at 4-8, with
Docket No. 101 at 7-9. Given that the Court denied the Powers defendants’ motion to
certify, the Powers defendants’ arguments in response to the present motion have
already been addressed by the Court and are largely moot. See Docket No. 114. The
Powers defendants’ reliance on Doe v. Masse, No. 11-cv-02107-PAB-KLM, 2012 WL
2

5866417 (D. Colo. Nov. 16, 2012), in support of their argument is misplaced. In Doe,
this Court, on an unopposed motion, directed the entry of a final judgment on less than
all claims and administratively closed the case, in part, because there was no apparent
danger of piecemeal appeals. Id. at *2. Here, the Court reached the opposite
conclusion on the issue of certification. Thus, Doe is inapplicable. As the Court has
previously stated, because the claims against the Powers defendants have already
been dismissed, the primary uncertainty that exists for the Powers defendants is
whether or not plaintiffs will appeal the dismissal. So long as the case remains
administratively closed, a final judgment on plaintiffs’ remaining claims will not issue
and plaintiffs will be prevented from appealing the Court’s decision. Moreover, in order
to reopen the case, plaintiffs must show good cause, which the Powers defendants may
contest if they so choose. These procedural protections effectively vitiate the Powers
defendants’ concerns about being “held captive to a stay.” Docket No. 102 at 2. To the
extent such concerns survive, whatever inequity the Powers defendants perceive is
outweighed by the remaining parties’ interests in staying this litigation and awaiting a
resolution or further developments in the Jackson County case.
Finally, the Powers defendants request that all pending motions be exempted
from the administrative closure. Docket No. 102 at 6. This request is largely moot as
plaintiffs’ Motion to Reconsider Court’s September 11, 2013 Order Denying Plaintiffs’
Conditional Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint [Docket No. 88] is the only motion
currently pending. The Court does not find it necessary to decide plaintiffs’ motion for
reconsideration prior to administratively closing this case and, by rule, “[a]dministrative
closure of a civil action terminates any pending motion.” D.C.COLO.LCivR. 41.2. To
3

the extent the Powers defendants wish to seek fees and costs in the future, they may,
upon a showing of good cause, move to reopen this case and seek appropriate relief.
It is therefore
ORDERED that this case shall be administratively closed, subject to reopening
for good cause, pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR 41.2

DATED September 9, 2014.
BY THE COURT:

s/Philip A. Brimmer
PHILIP A. BRIMMER
United States District Judge

4