Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1-19

Filing 9

ORDER Finding Joinder Improper and Dismissing Without Prejudice All Defendants Other than John Doe 1 re: 1 Complaint, filed by Malibu Media, LLC, John Doe 1 added. John Does 1-19 terminated. The parties and the Clerk shall omit any reference to John Doe Defendants 2-19 from any future filing in this action, by Judge William J. Martinez on 12/7/2012. (ervsl, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge William J. Martínez
Civil Action No. 12-cv-3168-WJM-MEH
MALIBU MEDIA, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN DOES 1-19,
Defendants.

ORDER FINDING JOINDER IMPROPER AND DISMISSING WITHOUT
PREJUDICE ALL DEFENDANTS OTHER THAN JOHN DOE 1
_____________________________________________________________________
On December 4, 2012, Plaintiff Malibu Media, LLC initiated this action against
John Does 1-191 alleging that Defendants unlawfully downloaded a portion of Plaintiff’s
copyrighted work. (Compl. (ECF No. 1) ¶ 45.) Having reviewed the Complaint, the
Court sua sponte finds that joinder of all the named Defendants was not proper and
dismisses the claims against John Doe Defendants 2-19 without prejudice to refiling
separate cases against each Defendant accompanied by payment of a separate filing
fee as to each case.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
Permissive joinder of claims is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20,
which provides that persons may be joined as defendants if:
(A)

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any right to relief is asserted against them jointly,
severally, or in the alternative with respect to or
arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or

Defendants are known to Plaintiff only by their IP address. (Compl. ¶ 7.)

(B)

series of transactions or occurrences; and
any question of law or fact common to all defendants
will arise in the action.

The remedy for improper joinder of parties is not dismissal of the action. Fed. R. Civ. P.
21. Rather, the court may “at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party. The court
may also sever any claim against a party.” Id.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Malibu Media, LLC holds the copyright to “Wild Things” (the “Work”). At
some point, Plaintiff learned that the Work was being unlawfully downloaded using a
computer protocol called BitTorrent2 and retained a company to investigate. During the
course of this investigation, the company identified nineteen IP addresses in the District
of Colorado that had downloaded a file with the hash number3
BC2FB2F0B4C21041E44FF3ED68364E5365D0856D (“Hash Number”), which has
been associated with the Work. These nineteen IP addresses were allegedly assigned
to the nineteen John Doe Defendants at the time this file was downloaded.
III. ANALYSIS
This case is part of an “outbreak of similar litigation . . . around the country in
which copyright holders have attempted to assert claims against multiple unknown
defendants by joining them, in often large numbers, into a single action.” Raw Films,
Inc. v. Does 1-32, 2011 WL 6840590, *1 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 29, 2011). Like the plaintiffs in

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BitTorrent is a computer protocol that works with computer software to break large
files, such as movies, into smaller files for the purpose of speeding up and easing download.
(Compl. ¶ 15.)
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BitTorrent assigns each smaller piece of copyrighted work a unique identifier which is
commonly referred to as a “hash”. (Compl. ¶ 19.)

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the other cases, Malibu Media claims that the Defendants here participated in the same
BitTorrent “swarm” for the purpose of unlawfully downloading Plaintiff’s copyrighted
Work. The BitTorrent swarm process has been described as follows:
In the BitTorrent vernacular, individual downloaders/
distributors of a particular file are called “peers.” The group
of peers involved in downloading/distributing a particular file
is called a “swarm.” A server which stores a list of peers in a
swarm is called a “tracker.” A computer program that
implements the BitTorrent protocol is called a BitTorrent
“client.”
The BitTorrent protocol operates as follows. First, a user
locates a small “torrent” file. This file contains information
about the files to be shared and about the tracker, the
computer that coordinates the file distribution. Second, the
user loads the torrent file into a BitTorrent client, which
automatically attempts to connect to the tracker listed in the
torrent file. Third, the tracker responds with a list of peers
and the BitTorrent client connects to those peers to begin
downloading data from and distributing data to the other
peers in the swarm. When the download is complete, the
BitTorrent client continues distributing data to the peers in
the swarm until the user manually disconnects form the
swarm or the BitTorrent client otherwise does the same.
Diabolic Video Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-2099, 2011 WL 3100404, *2 (N.D. Cal. May 31,
2011). The theory behind this “swarm joinder” is that “when each defendant is one of
many users simultaneously uploading and downloading a protected work, the defendant
acts as part of a ‘swarm’ in a ‘series of transactions’ involving ‘common questions of law
and fact.’” Raw Films, 2011 WL 6840590, at *1.
Courts across the country are split on whether this theory of swarm joinder is
appropriate. A number of courts, including one judge in this District, have held that
joinder is appropriate. See Patrick Collins, Inc. v. John Does 1-15, 2012 WL 415436
(D. Colo. Feb. 8, 2012) (finding joinder appropriate); Digital Sin, Inc. v. Does 1-176, 279
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F.R.D. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“it is difficult to see how the sharing and downloading
activity [of individuals using the BitTorrent protocol in the same swarm] could not
constitute a ‘series of transactions or occurrences' for purposes of Rule 20(a).”); MGCIP
v. Does 1–316, 2011 WL 2292958, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 9, 2011) (“[G]iven the
decentralized nature of BitTorrent’s file-sharing protocol—where individual users
distribute the same work’s data directly to one another without going through a central
server—the Court finds that sufficient facts have been plead to support the joinder of
the putative defendants at this time.”).
However, a growing number of district courts have recently held that swarm
joinder is not appropriate. See, e.g., Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1-23, 2012 WL
1999640, *4 (E.D. Va. May 30, 2012) (finding that, in a file sharing case, “a plaintiff
must allege facts that permit the court at least to infer some actual, concerted exchange
of data between those defendants.”); Digital Sins, Inc. v. John Does 1-245, 2012 WL
1744838, *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2012) (finding no concerted action between defendants
that only utilized the same computer protocol to download a file); SBO Pictures, Inc. v.
Does 1–3036, 2011 WL 6002620, *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2011) (“The Court cannot
conclude that a Doe Defendant who allegedly downloaded or uploaded a portion of the
Motion Picture on May 11, 2011[and] a Doe Defendant who allegedly did the same on
August 10, 2011 . . . were engaged in the single transaction or series of closely-related
transactions recognized under Rule 20.”); Lightspeed v. Does 1–1000, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 35392, *4–7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2011) (finding that Doe defendants using
BitTorrent technology were misjoined on the basis that the putative defendants were

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not involved in the “same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrence” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A)).
Given the amount of discourse already produced by courts around the country
on this issue, the Court finds it unnecessary to write a lengthy opinion about whether
joinder is appropriate. Rather, the Court explicitly adopts the reasoning set forth by
Judge Claude Hilton in Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1-23, __ F.Supp.2d __, 2012
WL 1999640 (E.D. Va. May 30, 2012), Judge J. Frederick Motz in Patrick Collins, Inc. v.
Does 1-23, 2012 WL 1144198 (D. Md. April 4, 2012), and Judge Joseph C. Spero in
Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-188, 809 F.Supp.2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2011). As Judge
Spero wrote:
Under the BitTorrent Protocol, it is not necessary that each
of the Does 1-188 participated in or contributed to the
downloading of each other’s copies of the work at issue—or
even participated in or contributed to the downloading by
any of the Does 1-188. Any “pieces” of the work copied or
uploaded by any individual Doe may have gone to any other
Doe or to any of the potentially thousands who participated
in a given swarm. The bare fact that a Doe clicked on a
command to participate in the BitTorrent Protocol does not
mean that they were part of the downloading by unknown
hundreds or thousands of individuals across the country or
across the world.
Hard Drive Prods., 809 F.Supp.2d at 1163. For the reasons set forth in these opinions,
the Court finds that the Defendants in this action are not properly joined and that
dismissal of Does 2-19 is appropriate.
Moreover, even if the Court had found joinder to be proper, it would sever the
remaining Defendants pursuant to the Court’s discretionary authority set forth in Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 20(b) and 21. Lenon v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 136 F.3d
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1365, 1371 (10th Cir. 1998) (Rule 21 permits the district court “considerable discretion”
to dismiss parties “on such terms as are just”); Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d
1271, 1296 (9th Cir. 2000) (court may sever claims under Rule 20 if joinder would
violate “fundamental fairness” or result in prejudice to either side). Even when the
specific requirements of Rule 20 are satisfied, the Court must consider whether
permissive joinder “will comport with the principles of fundamental fairness” or cause
undue prejudice to any party. Desert Empire Bank v. Ins. Co. of N.A., 623 F.2d 1371,
1375 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Intercon Research Assoc., Ltd. v. Dresser Indus., 696
F.2d 53, 58 (7th Cir. 1982) (permissive joinder should be denied where it would create
undue prejudice, expense, or delay). The Court finds that allowing this action to
proceed against all the John Doe Defendants in one case would result in difficult case
management, cause significant prejudice to Defendants, and would be fundamentally
unfair.
First, as this and many other courts have previously recognized, though the
nature of the alleged actions of each Defendant is similar in that they are accused of
having utilized BitTorrent to unlawfully download Plaintiff’s copyrighted work, the
Defendants are likely to present very different defenses to these claims based on their
individual circumstances. For example, “subscriber John Doe 1 could be an innocent
parent whose internet access was abused by her minor child, while John Doe 2 might
share a computer with a roommate who infringed Plaintiffs’ Works. John Does 3
through 203 could be thieves, just as Plaintiffs believe.” Third Degree Films v. Does 13577, 2011 WL 5374569, *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2011). The Court has already observed

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this to be true in the cases filed in this District. The Magistrate Judge assigned to all
BitTorrent cases has noted that defendants are coming forward with a multitude of
different defenses. Some are businesses alleging that a patron was the unlawful
downloader. Others are elderly grandparents that do not even know what BitTorrent is
or how to download a file from the internet; they may have owned the computer
associated with the unique IP address, but have no knowledge of whether someone in
their household may have used the BitTorrent protocol for the purposes alleged in the
complaint.
The fact-intensive nature of these individualized defenses would require that the
Court give individualized attention to each claim against each Defendant. Therefore,
the Court sees little, if any, judicial economy in allowing the claims to proceed together.
Digital Sins, 2012 WL 1744838, *3 (“There are no litigation economies to be gained
from trying what are in essence 245 different cases together, because each of the John
Does is likely to have some individual defense to assert. Each defendant’s situation,
which is unique to him or her, will have to be proved separately and independently.”).
The Court also finds that Defendants are likely to be significantly prejudiced by
having to proceed in one action. The location of the ISPs—and therefore presumably
the John Doe Defendants themselves—are scattered throughout the state of Colorado.
As one court has noted:
even though they may be separated by many miles and
have nothing in common other than the use of BitTorrent,
each defendant must serve each other with all pleadings—a
significant burden when, as here, many of the defendants
will be appearing pro se and may not be e-filers. Each
defendant would have the right to be at each other
defendant’s deposition—creating a thoroughly
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unmanageable situation. The courtroom proceedings would
be unworkable—with each of the 188 Does having the
opportunity to be present and address the court at each
case management conference or other event. Finally, each
defendant’s defense would, in effect, require a mini-trial.
These burdens completely defeat any supposed benefit
from the joinder of all Does in this case, and would
substantially prejudice defendants and the administration of
justice.
Hard Drive Prods., 809 F.Supp.2d at 1164. Aside from these general difficulties, this
Court’s local rules also require conferral between opposing parties before filing any
motion, which would be difficult with multiple pro se parties. D.C.Colo.LCivR 7.1A.
Thus, the Court finds that Defendants would suffer significant prejudice if forced to
litigate this action as a group.
On the other hand, the Court finds that Plaintiff will suffer no undue prejudice by
severing the Defendants into separate cases. Nothing in this Order prevents Plaintiff
from filing separate actions against each John Doe Defendant. The statute of
limitations for a copyright infringement action is three years, which allows Plaintiff ample
time to refile the individual cases before the limitations period expires. See 17 U.S.C. §
507. The only possible prejudice to Plaintiff is the cost of litigating each of these cases
individually. However, requiring Plaintiff to pay a separate filing fee for each action is
not undue prejudice. As previously stated, because many of these Defendants are
likely to assert fact-intensive defenses that are particular to his or her individual
circumstances, each multi-defendant case is likely to devolve into its own mini-litigation.
Therefore, payment of a separate filing fee for its claim against each Defendant
properly balances the Plaintiff’s right to protect its copyright with the Court’s interest in
cost-efficient adjudication of cases.
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Finally, the Court is troubled by many aspects of this “swarm joinder” model for
copyright litigation. Courts across the country have observed that Plaintiff (and other
companies involved in this type of litigation) do not seem interested in actually litigating
their copyright claims. Rather, they appear to be using the federal courts only to obtain
identifying information for the ISP owners and then attempting to negotiate a quick
settlement. See, e.g., Raw Films, 2011 WL 6180205, at *2 (“This course of conduct
indicates that plaintiffs have used the offices of the Court as an inexpensive means to
gain the Doe defendants’ personal information and coerce payment from them. The
plaintiffs seemingly have no interest in actually litigating the cases, but rather simply
have used the Court and its subpoena powers to obtain sufficient information to shake
down the John Does.”). In finding joinder improper in a similar action, one court
observed:
The federal courts are not cogs in plaintiff’s copyrightenforcement business model. The Court will not idly watch
what is essentially an extortion scheme, for a case that
plaintiff has no intention of bringing to trial. By requiring
Malibu to file separate lawsuits for each of the Doe
Defendants, Malibu will have to expend additional resources
to obtain a nuisance-value settlement—making this type of
litigation less profitable. If Malibu desires to vindicate its
copyright rights, it must do it the old-fashioned way and earn
it.
Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1-10, Case No. 2:12-cv-3623-ODW (C.D. Cal. June
27, 2012). “Our federal court system provides litigants with some of the finest tools
available to assist in resolving disputes; the courts should not, however, permit those
tools to be used as a bludgeon.” In re BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Litigation, 2012
WL 1570765, *10 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2012). The Court fully agrees with the concerns
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expressed by these other judges and finds that this is yet another basis for requiring
that Plaintiff litigate its copyright claim against each John Doe Defendant individually.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1.

Plaintiff’s claims against John Doe Defendants 2-19 are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE;

2.

The parties and the Clerk shall omit any reference to John Doe Defendants 2-19
from any future filing in this action.
Dated this 7th day of December, 2012.
BY THE COURT:

William J. Martínez
United States District Judge

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