C.S. et al v. Platte Canyon School District No. 1 et al
Filing
84
ORDER Denying Plaintiff's 79 Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). By Judge Christine M. Arguello on 08/17/2015. (athom, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Christine M. Arguello
Civil Action No. 12-cv-03358-CMA-BNB
C.S., an unemancipated person, through his parents and next friends,
Michael and Cynthia Schaffer,
Plaintiff,
v.
PLATTE CANYON SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.1,
MIKE SCHMIDT, Individually, and
MEGGIN STOUT, Individually,
Defendants.
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND THE JUDGMENT
PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 59(e)
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff C.S.’s Motion to Alter or Amend the
Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). (Doc. # 79.) Because the
Court finds that it neither misapprehended material facts nor misapplied controlling law
in its prior order granting in part Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. # 77),
C.S.’s motion is DENIED.
I.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) gives federal courts the power to alter or
amend judgments under certain circumstances. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 59(e). Relief under
Rule 59(e) is appropriate only where “the court has misapprehended the facts, a party’s
position, or the controlling law.” Servants of Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012
(10th Cir. 2000). In a Rule 59(e) motion, “[i]t is not appropriate to revisit issues already
addressed or advance arguments that could have been raised in prior briefing.” Id.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Timeliness of Defendants’ Response to C.S.’s Motion
On September 23, 2014, final judgment was entered in Defendants’ favor (Doc. #
78) following this Court’s grant in part of Defendants’ motion for summary judgement
(Doc. # 77). On October 6, 2014, C.S. timely filed a motion to alter or amend the
judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e). (Doc. # 79.) Twenty-two days later, on October 28,
2014, C.S. filed a “reply” in which he stated that Defendants’ “failure to respond to
Plaintiff’s Motion” means that Defendants “tacitly concede their agreement with the
contents of the Motion and that they do not oppose the relief requested therein.” (Doc.
# 82.) Later that same day, Defendants filed their response to C.S.’s motion, in which
they argue that they were permitted three additional days to respond to C.S.’s motion
under Rule 6(d) because service of the motion was made via “electronic means”
pursuant to Rule 5(b)(2)(E).
Rule 7.1(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Practice for the District of Colorado states
that “[t]he responding party shall have 21 days after the date of service of a motion, or
such lesser or greater time as the court may allow, in which to file a response.”
D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(d). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(d) provides that “3 days
are added” to this time period when service is made pursuant to Rule 5(b)(2)(E), which
allows for service via “electronic means if the person consented in writing.” Rule
5(b)(3) provides that “[i]f a local rule so authorizes, a party may use the court’s
transmission facilities to make service under Rule 5(b)(2)(E).” The Local Rules of Civil
Practice for the District of Colorado authorize service via CM/ECF in Rule 5.1(d), which
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provides that “[w]hen a pleading or document is filed in CM/ECF, it is served
electronically under Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.” D.C.COLO.LCivR 5.1(d). Rule 5.1(d) further
provides that “[r]egistration in CM/ECF shall constitute consent to electronic service of
all pleadings or documents.” Therefore, parties in this District are allowed a total of 24
days to respond to a motion served via CM/ECF. Thus, Defendants’ response to
C.S.’s motion was timely filed on October 28, 2015.
B. C.S.’s Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment
In his motion, C.S. argues that this Court misapprehended and misconstrued
material facts and misapplied controlling law with regard to his due process claim under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. C.S. identifies seven
excerpts from this Court’s order wherein this Court allegedly “misapprehended material
facts, improperly accepted Defendants’ statement of the facts that were directly refuted
by Plaintiffs, or failed to construe the facts in the light most favorable to C.S.” (Doc. #
79 at 2.) After carefully reviewing the excerpts identified by C.S. and this Court’s prior
order granting in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss, this Court finds that it neither
misapprehended material facts nor misapplied controlling law.
C.S.’s argument is based primarily on semantics and characterizations. For
example, C.S. takes issue with this Court’s statement regarding its decision to not
become entangled in the “parsing of the meanings of the terms the paraprofessionals
used to describe Ms. Stout’s behavior.” (Doc. # 79 at 2-3.) This statement, however, is
not a factual finding, and C.S.’s disagreement with the Court’s opinion on this point does
not provide justification to alter or amend the judgment. Also, C.S. criticizes the Court
for its use of the term “tilting technique” to describe Ms. Stout’s actions (Doc. # 79 at 8),
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whereas the paraprofessionals referred to Ms. Stout’s actions as “dumping.” This
difference, however, is not a proper basis to alter or amend the judgment because it
does not involve the misapprehension of a material fact. C.S. does not allege that this
Court misunderstood Ms. Stout’s actions; he simply disagrees with the label that this
Court applied to those actions.
C.S. also takes issue with this Court’s factual finding that C.S. did not suffer from
any physical injuries as a result of Ms. Stout’s actions. (Doc. # 79 at 9-10.) In his Rule
59(e) motion, C.S. alleges that he is “functionally blind, confined to a wheelchair, and
physically incapable of performing almost any task he was able to perform prior to the
abuse.” (Doc. # 79 at 9-10.) However, this Court correctly stated in its order granting
summary judgment that, while C.S. alleged that he suffered from post-traumatic stress
disorder as a result of Ms. Stout’s actions, “there are no documented physical injuries.”
(Doc. # 77 at 20.) C.S.’s motion fails to refute this finding of fact by pointing to any
evidence in the record documenting physical injury C.S. suffered as a result of Ms.
Stout’s actions. C.S. cites to the Forensic Neuropsychological Evaluation conducted by
Helena Huckabee, Ph.D., BCA, dated September 9, 2013. (Doc. # 49-13.) However,
that neuropsychological evaluation does not contain evidence of physical injuries.
Therefore, the Court finds that it did not misapprehend the facts when it stated in its
order that “there are no documented physical injuries.” (Doc. # 77 at 20.)
Lastly, C.S. argues that this Court misapplied controlling law. (Doc. # 79 at 10.)
C.S. begins by discussing this Court’s citation of Gerks v. Deathe, 832 F. Supp. 1450
(W.D. Okla. 1993). The Court notes that a decision from a fellow district court is not
controlling law and, in any event, the Gerks decision is not inconsistent with the Court’s
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decision in this case. Next, C.S. discusses three opinions from the Tenth Circuit cited in
this Court’s order granting summary judgment: Harris v. Robinson, 273 F.3d 927 (10th
Cir. 2001); Abeyta v. Chama Valley Independent School District, 77 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir.
1996); and Armijo v. Wagon Mound Public Schools, 159 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1998).
C.S. states that these cases stand for the proposition that a due process violation may
be found “regardless of the presence or absence of physical injuries.” (Doc. # 79 at 11.)
This correct observation does not provide a basis to alter or amend the judgment,
however, because this Court never stated that C.S. could not state a due process claim
solely because he did not suffer physical injury. After reviewing its prior order and the
cases cited above, this Court believes that C.S. has not demonstrated that it misapplied
controlling law.
III.
CONCLUSION
Because C.S. has not shown that this Court misapprehended the facts or
misapplied controlling law in its order granting Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, his Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e) is DENIED.
DATED: August 17, 2015
BY THE COURT:
CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO
United States District Judge
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