Seader v. Storey et al

Filing 6

ORDER of Dismissal. ORDERED that the Prisoner Complaint and the action are dismissed. Leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal is denied without prejudice, by Judge Lewis T. Babcock on 3/28/13. (sgrim)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 13-cv-00609-BNB
JASON SEADER,
Plaintiff,
v.
SCOTT STOREY,
THOMAS M. JACKSON,
AMY RUPPECK,
JANE DOE, and
JOHN DOE,
Defendants.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiff, Jason Seader, is a prisoner in the custody of the Colorado Department
of Corrections at the Arrowhead Correctional Center in Cañon City, Colorado. Mr.
Seader has filed pro se a Prisoner Complaint (ECF No. 1) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claiming that Defendants violated his rights under the United States Constitution. He
seeks damages as relief.
Mr. Seader has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915 in this action. Pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), the Court must dismiss the
action if the claims Mr. Seader asserts are frivolous. A legally frivolous claim is one in
which the plaintiff asserts the violation of a legal interest that clearly does not exist or
asserts facts that do not support an arguable claim. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 327-28 (1989). For the reasons stated below, the Court will dismiss the action as

legally frivolous.
The Court must construe the Prisoner Complaint liberally because Mr. Seader is
not represented by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972);
Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). If the Prisoner Complaint
reasonably can be read “to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, [the
Court] should do so despite the plaintiff’s failure to cite proper legal authority, his
confusion of various legal theories, his poor syntax and sentence construction, or his
unfamiliarity with pleading requirements.” Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. However, the Court
should not be an advocate for a pro se litigant. See id.
Mr. Seader’s claims in this action arise out of his appearance before a grand jury
in Jefferson County, Colorado, on March 4, 2011. Mr. Seader alleges that he did not
appear before the grand jury voluntarily, he was denied the opportunity to speak with
counsel prior to and during his grand jury appearance, and he was compelled and
coerced into making incriminating statements during his grand jury appearance. Mr.
Seader further alleges that he was indicted by the grand jury on March 22, 2011, and
that the indictment was dismissed by the district court on September 2, 2011. Part of
the relief Mr. Seader seeks is an award of damages for two periods of detention at the
Jefferson County Jail he contends are relevant to the grand jury indictment. The two
periods include five days in March 2011 immediately after he appeared before the grand
jury and 152 days from April 4, 2011, when he was returned to the Jefferson County Jail
following his indictment, until September 2, 2011, when the indictment was dismissed.
Mr. Seader’s claims for damages for his allegedly wrongful confinement at the
Jefferson County Jail the are legally frivolous and must be dismissed because the
2

claims are barred by the rule in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Pursuant to
Heck, if a judgment for damages necessarily would imply the invalidity of a criminal
conviction or sentence, the action does not arise until the conviction or sentence has
been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by an
authorized state tribunal, or called into question by the issuance of a federal habeas
writ. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. Although Mr. Seader is not challenging the validity
of a conviction or sentence, the rule in Heck also applies to other claims that challenge
the validity of the length of an inmate’s confinement. See Crow v. Penry, 102 F.3d
1086, 1087 (10th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (stating that Heck applies to proceedings
related to parole and probation). In short, a civil rights action filed by a state prisoner “is
barred (absent prior invalidation) – no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable
relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or
internal prison proceedings) – if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate
the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82
(2005).
As noted above, Mr. Seader asserts that the indictment that resulted in the
allegedly wrongful confinement at the Jefferson County Jail was dismissed on
September 2, 2011. However, he fails to mention that the district court’s judgment
dismissing the indictment was reversed on appeal and that the case was remanded with
directions to reinstate the indictment. See People v. Seader, 292 P.3d 1193 (Colo. App.
2012). Because the indictment was reinstated, Mr. Seader has not demonstrated that
the allegedly wrongful confinement has been invalidated. Therefore, the Court finds
that Mr. Seader’s claims for damages are barred by the rule in Heck and must be
3

dismissed to the extent he seeks damages based on the allegedly wrongful confinement
at the Jefferson County Jail.
The Court also finds that Mr. Seader’s claims in the Prisoner Complaint are
legally frivolous and must be dismissed because he fails to allege specific facts to
support those claims. Merely making vague and conclusory allegations that his federal
constitutional rights have been violated does not entitle a pro se pleader to a day in
court, regardless of how liberally the court construes such pleadings. See Ketchum v.
Cruz, 775 F. Supp. 1399, 1403 (D. Colo. 1991), aff’d, 961 F.2d 916 (10th Cir. 1992).
“[I]n analyzing the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s complaint, the court need accept as true
only the plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual contentions, not his conclusory allegations.” Hall,
935 F.2d at 1110.
Mr. Seader fails to allege specific facts in support of his claims that he was forced
to appear before the grand jury involuntarily, was denied counsel, and was compelled
and coerced to make incriminating statements. Furthermore, Mr. Seader’s vague and
conclusory assertions that he was forced to appear before the grand jury involuntarily,
that he was denied counsel, and that he was compelled and coerced to make
incriminating statements are contradicted by the facts set forth in the decision of the
Colorado Court of Appeals that reversed the judgment of the Jefferson County District
Court and reinstated the indictment. In relevant part, the Colorado Court of Appeals
described Mr. Seader’s appearance before the grand jury as follows:
¶ 2 Defendant was being held at the City and County of
Denver Jail on an unrelated matter. It was undisputed that
the Jefferson County authorities executed a transport writ so
that he could be taken to Jefferson County Jail in order to
testify before a Jefferson County grand jury. It was also
4

undisputed that defendant was never served with a grand
jury subpoena.
¶ 3 After defendant arrived at the Jefferson County Jail, a
district attorney investigator met with him. The investigator
informed defendant that he had been transferred to answer
questions before a grand jury, if he chose to do so, and that
he should consider “helping himself.” Defendant asked to
speak with an attorney, but the investigator told defendant
he would need to make his own arrangements to do so.
¶ 4 Two district attorney investigators then had defendant
released to their custody, and together they transported
defendant in handcuffs and shackles to the grand jury
waiting area inside the district attorney’s office.
¶ 5 There, a deputy district attorney told defendant that he
was likely to be charged by the grand jury and that he might
be able to help himself if he testified. The deputy district
attorney informed defendant that (1) he was not under
subpoena to testify, (2) he could choose not to testify, (3)
anything he said could be used against him, and (4) if he
chose to proceed without an attorney, he would do so
voluntarily. Defendant did not speak with an attorney, and
no plea agreement was reached.
¶ 6 After this discussion, defendant was brought inside the
grand jury room. Before defendant testified regarding the
matter under investigation, the following exchange took
place:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: You are not under
subpoena here today; is that correct?
DEFENDANT: Correct.
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: You are here of your
own free will and volition, meaning that
although you wouldn’t be able to walk away
from custody, you don’t have to be in here and
you know that?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: You know and we
5

talked about the fact that anything you say in
here can be used against you?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: And that you could – I
think at one point you indicated that you may
want to consult with an attorney, but you
decided to go forward without an attorney; is
that correct?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: You and I, at this
point, do not have any plea bargain
agreements or deals in place that would say, if
you came in and testify, here’s what we’re
going to do for you?
DEFENDANT: Right.
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: But I have told you
that we will treat you like every other witness
who comes in an cooperates, in that we will
factor into what happens here – and I can’t
promise you what is or what is not going to
happen – we will factor into whatever happens,
your cooperation.
That’s what we talked about; is that right?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
¶ 7 Defendant testified before the grand jury regarding his
involvement in the theft and sale of certain brass cemetery
vases and sprinkler parts. The grand jury subsequently
returned an indictment against him.
Seader, 292 P. 3d at 1194.
Because Mr. Seader’s assertions that he was forced to appear before the grand
jury involuntarily, that he was denied counsel, and that he was compelled and coerced
to make incriminating statements are not supported with specific factual allegations and,
6

in fact, are contradicted by the facts set forth in the state court decision quoted above,
those assertions will not support an arguable claim for relief. Therefore, the Court finds
that Mr. Seader’s claims in the Prisoner Complaint are legally frivolous and must be
dismissed.
Furthermore, the Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any
appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis
status will be denied for the purpose of appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369
U.S. 438 (1962). If Plaintiff files a notice of appeal he also must pay the full $455
appellate filing fee or file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit within thirty days in accordance with Fed. R. App.
P. 24. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the Prisoner Complaint and the action are dismissed as legally
frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). It is

7

FURTHER ORDERED that leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal is
denied without prejudice to the filing of a motion seeking leave to proceed in forma
pauperis on appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
DATED at Denver, Colorado, this

28th

day of

March

, 2013.

BY THE COURT:

s/Lewis T. Babcock
LEWIS T. BABCOCK, Senior Judge
United States District Court

8