Purzel Video GmbH, Inc. v. Does 1-200

Filing 23

MINUTE ORDER denying without prejudice 21 Motion to Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum, by Magistrate Judge Michael E. Hegarty on 7/31/2013. (mehcd)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 13-cv-00683-WYD-MEH
PURZEL VIDEO GmbH,
Plaintiff,
v.
DOES 1-200,
Defendants.

MINUTE ORDER
Entered by Michael E. Hegarty, United States Magistrate Judge, on July 31, 2013.
The Motion to Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum [filed July 30, 2013; docket #21] filed by Doe
49 is denied without prejudice on the following grounds.
First, the pending motion fails to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a), which states in pertinent
part,
Every pleading, written motion, and other paper must be signed by at least one
attorney of record in the attorney’s name – or by a party personally if the party is
unrepresented. The paper must state the signer’s address, email address, and
telephone number.
From the content of the present motion, the Court infers that Doe 49 seeks to proceed in this
litigation anonymously. However, he has failed to seek permission from the Court to do so. See KBeech, Inc. v. Does 1-29, 826 F. Supp. 2d 903, 905 (W.D.N.C. 2011) (noting that a party who wishes
to proceed anonymously may overcome the presumption against anonymous proceedings by filing
a well-reasoned motion to proceed anonymously); see also West Coast Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-5829,
275 F.R.D. 9, 12 (D.D.C. 2011) (“federal courts generally allow parties to proceed anonymously
only under certain special circumstances when anonymity is necessary to protect a person from
harassment, injury, ridicule or personal embarrassment”). Therefore, if Doe 49 wishes to re-file his
motion in accordance with this order and all applicable local and federal court rules, he must first
(or contemporaneously) file a motion to proceed anonymously and provide to the Court his name,
address, telephone number and email address in accordance with Rule 11(a) and D.C. Colo. LCivR
10.1K. If Doe 49 wishes to keep his identifying information confidential, he may file his Signature
Block separately, and may request that the document be maintained under Restriction Level 2
pursuant to the procedure set forth in D.C. Colo. LCivR 7.2.

Second, Doe 49 has not complied with Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a)(1)(D) and D.C. Colo. LCivR

5.1G. Rule 5(a)(1)(D) requires that a written motion filed with the Court must be served on every
party. Local Rule 5.1G requires, in pertinent part, that “[e]ach paper, other than one filed ex parte,
shall be accompanied by a certificate of service indicating the date it was served, the name and
address of the person to whom it was sent, and the manner of service.” Doe 49's motion contains no
such certificate, nor any other indication of service on Plaintiff.
Finally, with respect to Doe 49's request to quash, Doe 49 has failed to provide a copy of the
challenged subpoena. To the extent the present motion seeks to quash or modify a subpoena issued
through any district other than the District of Colorado, this Court must deny such request without
prejudice. Pursuant to Rule 45(c)(3)(A), only “the issuing court” may quash or modify a subpoena
(emphasis added). See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 141 F.3d 337, 341 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (only the issuing
court has the power to act on its subpoenas); In re Digital Equipment Corp., 949 F.2d 228, 231 (8th
Cir. 1991) (court in district where underlying action was pending did not have jurisdiction to rule
on objections to deposition subpoenas obtained in another district). “Subpoenas are process of the
issuing court, and nothing in the rules even hints that any other court may be given the power to
quash or enforce them.” In re Sealed Case, 141 F.3d at 341 (citations omitted). Accordingly, the
court where the action is pending lacks jurisdiction to rule on subpoenas issued from other courts,
unless there is a transfer or remittance of the matter from the issuing court. See In re Digital
Equipment Corp., 949 F.2d at 231.
The Court advises Doe 49 that it may strike any motion or other filing that deviates from the
requirements of this order or from those set forth in the applicable local or federal rules.

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