Marshall v. Osagie et al

Filing 7

ORDER denying 5 Plaintiff, LaRon Marshall's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, by Judge Lewis T. Babcock on 6/24/2013.(ervsl, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 13-cv-01607-BNB
LA’RON MARSHALL,
Plaintiff,
v.
ANTHONY OSAGIE,
R. CAMACHO,
C. WILSON,
FETTERHOFF,
D. ALLRED,
JAMES PELTON,
FRANK CORDOVA,
KELLER,
CLOUGH,
MCMAN,
R. HUDDLESTON,
P. KLEIN,
D. HALL,
DAVID BERKEBILE,
HENRY JAMES,
PAUL HARVEY,
LISA GREGORY,
PAUL LAIRD,
NEWTON E. KENDIG,
HARRELL WATTS,
CHARLES E. SAMUELS, and
FBOP,
Defendants.

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Plaintiff, La’Ron Marshall, is a prisoner in the custody of the Federal Bureau of
Prisons who currently is incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary, Administrative
Maximum, in Florence, Colorado. He has submitted pro se a Prisoner Complaint (ECF

No. 1), and has been granted leave to proceed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. On June
19, 2013, Mr. Marshall filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order
(ECF No. 4).
The Court must construe liberally the June 19 motion for a preliminary injunction
because Mr. Marshall is not represented by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
However, the Court should not be an advocate for a pro se litigant. See Hall, 935 F.2d
at 1110. For the reasons stated below, the motion for a preliminary injunction will be
denied.
A party seeking a preliminary injunction must show a substantial likelihood of
prevailing on the merits, that he will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction issues,
that the threatened injury outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may
cause the opposing party, and that the injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the
public interest. See Lundgrin v. Claytor, 619 F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir. 1980). Similarly, a
party seeking a temporary restraining order must demonstrate clearly, with specific
factual allegations, that immediate and irreparable injury will result unless a temporary
restraining order is issued. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy and “the primary goal of a
preliminary injunction is to preserve the pre-trial status quo.” RoDa Drilling Co. v.
Siegal, 552 F.3d 1203, 1208 (10th Cir. 2009). Therefore, “courts should be especially
cautious when granting an injunction that requires the nonmoving party to take
affirmative action - a mandatory preliminary injunction - before a trial on the merits
occurs.” Id. Because Mr. Marshall is seeking a mandatory preliminary injunction that
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seeks to alter the status quo, he must make a heightened showing of the four factors
listed above. See id. at 1209.
Mr. Marshall alleges that he needs medical treatment by a urologist for blood in
his urine and pain in his testicles and kidney area, an ophthalmologist for eye itching
and vision issues, and a dermatologist for skin rashes. He alleges that he has
experienced urology issues since March 2012, eye issues since February 2012, and
skin rashes since December 2011. The allegations in the motion for preliminary
injunction are related to the allegations in the complaint Mr. Marshall filed.
Mr. Marshall’s allegations do not demonstrate a substantial likelihood of
prevailing on the merits, that he will suffer irreparable injury if no preliminary injunction is
issued, that his threatened injuries outweigh whatever damage the proposed injunction
may cause the opposing party, or that a preliminary injunction would not be adverse to
the public interest. Therefore, the motion for a preliminary injunction will be denied.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the emergency motion for a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 5)
that Plaintiff, La’Ron Marshall, filed on June 19, 2013, is denied.
DATED at Denver, Colorado, this 24th day of

June

, 2013.

BY THE COURT:

s/Lewis T. Babcock
LEWIS T. BABCOCK
Senior Judge, United States District Court

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