Siegle v. Colvin

Filing 28

ORDER AFFIRMING ALJ'S DECISION denying disability benefits. Each party shall pay its own costs and attorney fees. By Judge Christine M. Arguello on 04/24/2014. (athom, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Christine M. Arguello
Civil Action No. 13-cv-01838-CMA
CHRISTINA SIEGLE,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner of Social Security Administration,
Defendant.

ORDER AFFIRMING ALJ’S DECISION

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Christina Elaine Siegle’s appeal of the
Commissioner’s decision denying her claim for disability benefits. Exercising jurisdiction
under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court affirms the judgment of the Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ).
I. BACKGROUND
Although Plaintiff alleged before the ALJ that she had more than a half-dozen
disabling impairments, her appeal before this Court principally implicates her allegations
of debilitating foot and back pain. The foot pain derives from a small fiber neuropathy—
a condition that both parties agree causes Plaintiff at least some pain and loss of
sensation in her feet. See, e.g., AR 33-34. Plaintiff provides more generalized
allegations about the back pain, suggesting, inter alia, that she suffers from spasms,
soreness, chronic pain, acute pain, and pain sometimes focused in the right lower back.

See, e.g., AR 266-67, 371, 430-32, 457, 502-03. Finally, Plaintiff indisputably suffers
from advanced arthritis in her left shoulder, which limits her ability to lift her left arm
above her head or elevate it repeatedly. See, e.g., AR 33.
In his written decision denying Plaintiff disability benefits, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff’s foot, back, and shoulder pain impairments were not disabling. In particular,
the ALJ found that Plaintiff had severe impairments—including the shoulder impairment
and fiber neuropathy in her feet—but that her assertions as to the disabling limitations of
such impairments were not fully credible. The ALJ further concluded that Ms. Knight’s
opinions about Plaintiff’s limitations in functioning were not well-supported or consistent
with the record as a whole. See AR 9-25.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court’s review of the ALJ’s determination as to Plaintiff’s disabilities is
limited to determining whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence
and whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards. Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d
1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 2009).
Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It requires more than a scintilla, but
less than a preponderance. Wall, 561 F.3d at 1084. In reviewing the record and the
arguments of counsel, the Court does not reexamine the issues de novo, Sisco v.
United States Department of Health and Human Services, 10 F.3d 739, 741 (10th
Cir. 1993), nor does it re-weigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the
Commissioner, Salazar v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 615, 621 (10th Cir. 2006). Thus, even

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when some evidence may have supported contrary findings, the Court “may not
displace the agency’s choice between two fairly conflicting views,” even if the Court
may have “made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo.” Oldham v.
Astrue, 509 F.3d 1254, 1257-58 (10th Cir. 2007).
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff advances two arguments for why the ALJ erred in determining that she
was not disabled. As is explained below, the Court finds neither persuasive.
A.

MS. KNIGHT’S TESTIMONY
First, Plaintiff finds fault with the manner in which the ALJ discounted the written

testimony of Ruth Knight, a physician’s assistant, who suggested that Plaintiff’s “back
and leg pain” were in fact disabling. AR 367; see also AR 499-503 (report from
Ms. Knight concluding that Plaintiff was disabled). Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ
dismissed Ms. Knight’s opinion in a conclusory manner and in contravention of Social
Security Ruling (SSR) 06-03P, 2006 WL 2329939 (Aug. 9, 2006).
This argument fails for a number of reasons. As an initial matter, contrary to
Plaintiff’s characterization, the ALJ did not discount Ms. Knight’s opinion in a conclusory
manner. Rather, the ALJ did not credit Ms. Knight’s position because, among other
things, Plaintiff’s “own reported activities of daily living require more than this P.A.
[referring to Ms. Knight] said she could do” and clinical examinations of Plaintiff “have
not noted significant abnormalities or functional limitations.” AR 22.
This reasoning is not conclusory. Further, it is supported by substantial evidence
in the record. Compare AR 502 (report from Ms. Knight suggesting that Plaintiff can

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never bend, squat, or climb), with AR 52-53 (testimony from Plaintiff that she cleaned
her toilet); AR 462-65 (2011 report noting Plaintiff walked with a normal gait, had no
difficulty climbing onto an examination table, and admitted that nerve medication was
helping with her neuropathy); AR 459 (2011 report noting that Plaintiff reported having
“intermittent” lower back pain and “no h[istory] of chronic back pain”); see also AR 34-36
(hearing testimony from Dr. Gerald Winkler that, based on his review of Plaintiff’s
medical record, although Plaintiff’s ailments were not completely disabling, they would
restrict Plaintiff to a sedentary occupation that did not require Plaintiff to move her left
shoulder much and allowed her the freedom to stand to relieve back pain).
The ALJ also did not violate SSR 06-03P. Plaintiff argues that SSR 06-03P
“clearly says that the same analysis that occurs with an acceptable medical source
should occur with a medical source who is not an acceptable medical source.” Doc.
# 19 at 16. She further suggests that the ALJ erred because, pursuant to SSR 06-03P,
he “should” have considered in his opinion some of the factors listed in this Ruling, such
as the “examining relationship” between Ms. Knight and Plaintiff, the length of this
relationship, and how consistent Ms. Knight’s medical opinion was with the record
as a whole. Id.
Plaintiff misinterprets SSR 06-03P. This Ruling delineates persons who are
“acceptable medical sources,” such as licensed physicians, and makes clear that other
health care providers, such as physician assistants, are not “acceptable medical
source.” 2006 WL 2329939, at *2. However, SSR 06-03P does not collapse the
distinction between acceptable medical sources and other health care providers

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who are not acceptable medical sources. See, e.g., 2006 WL 2329939, at *2 (noting
that “the distinction is necessary for three reasons”). Instead, SSR 06-03P merely
clarifies that other such health care providers may nevertheless provide insight into
a Plaintiff’s impairments and, thus, the factors considered in assessing the opinion of
acceptable medical sources “can be important,” and “can be applied, ” to the opinions
of other health care providers who are not acceptable medical sources. Id. at *4.
Further, SSR 06-03P does not impose a duty on ALJs to explicitly consider in a
written opinion every factor enumerated in the Ruling. Rather, the Ruling establishes
that “[n]ot every factor for weighing opinion evidence will apply in every case,” id. at *5,
and it nowhere mandates a written explanation about why a factor is or is not relevant.
Finally, the ALJ did consider some of the factors listed in SSR 06-03P in
assessing Ms. Knight’s opinion. For example, the ALJ noted how Ms. Knight’s position
was inconsistent with the record as a whole: as discussed above, Ms. Knight’s position
that Plaintiff was limited in her daily activities was contradicted by assessments made
by other medical professionals and by Plaintiff’s own testimony at her hearing.
In sum, then, the ALJ committed no legal error in the way he discounted
Ms. Knight’s testimony and his determination was supported by substantial evidence.
B.

CREDIBILITY DETERMINATION
Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed reversible error because one of the

rationales the ALJ offered in concluding that Plaintiff was not credible was that she had
an interest in the outcome of the proceeding in which she was testifying.

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As an initial matter, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that this is not a particularly
strong reason for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony. A claimant’s financial interest in the
outcome of a hearing before the ALJ is an obvious source of potential bias shared by
every claimant for disability and, by itself, is insufficient to support an adverse credibility
finding. See Wilson v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 1136, 1145 (10th Cir. 2010).
In this case, however, the ALJ offered a number of other rationales to
substantiate his adverse credibility finding. See, e.g., AR 18 (noting that Plaintiff
claim that she became “very, very nervous” around people was inconsistent with her
admission that she enjoyed all-day trips to casinos, attending church, and shopping
in stores); AR 18-19 (noting that Plaintiff’s claim at the hearing that she had not taken
any out-of-state trips was undermined by record testimony in which she admitted to
travelling to North Dakota).
These additional rationales provide sufficient basis for the ALJ’s adverse
credibility finding. Cf. Wilson, 602 F.3d at 1145-46 (noting that a claimant’s multiple
applications for disability benefits did not provide a sufficient basis for an adverse
credibility finding but affirming the ALJ’s judgment on this matter because he provided
numerous other valid reasons to discount the claimant’s credibility).
IV. CONCLUSION
This Court finds that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence
and the ALJ committed no legal error in reaching her adverse finding as to Plaintiff’s
disabilities.

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Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the ALJ’s denial of disability benefits is
AFFIRMED. It is FURTHER ORDERED that each party shall pay its own costs
and attorney fees.
DATED: April

24

, 2014
BY THE COURT:

________________________________
CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO
United States District Judge

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