Lester v. City of Lafayette, Coloardo

Filing 114

MINUTE ORDER; 110 Ralph Lamaer's Motion for Leave to Deposit Funds in the Court's Registry is GRANTED and 112 Motion for Indicative Ruling is DENIED, by Magistrate Judge Michael J. Watanabe on 6/8/15.(morti, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 13-cv-01997-CMA-MJW
MARY LESTER,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF LAFAYETTE, COLORADO,
Defendant.
MINUTE ORDER
Entered by Magistrate Judge Michael J. Watanabe
It is hereby ORDERED that Ralph Lamaer’s Motion for Leave to Deposit Funds
in the Court’s Registry (Docket No. 110) is GRANTED, as follows, and that Ralph
Lamar’s Motion for Indicative Ruling (Docket No. 112) is DENIED, as follows.
During trial-level litigation in this case, the Court awarded Defendant its fees and
costs incurred in defending a discovery motion. (Docket Nos. 55, 92.) The Court later
granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. (Docket Nos. 94, 95.) Plaintiff
timely appealed. (Docket No. 101.) During appeal, the parties settled. (Docket No.
111, p.3.) As represented by Plaintiff’s counsel: “As part of the agreement Defendant
agreed not to oppose a motion by Ralph Lamar (Plaintiff’s counsel) to vacate the
Magistrate’s sanctions order.” (Id. at 3-4.) Stated more comprehensively:
Under the Settlement, Plaintiff withdraw[s] her appeals and
Defendant agrees to waive its Bill of Costs, as filed with this Court.
Defendant also agreed not to seek payment of the sanctions award from
Plaintiff and that it would not oppose a motion by Ralph Lamar for the
vacation of the sanctions order and award. However, in the event this
Court does not order vacatur of the sanctions order and award, Mr. Lamar
has reserved the right to pursue his appeal of the matter to the 10th Circuit
Court of Appeals and Defendant has the right to seek recovery of the
awarded cost and fees against Mr. Lamar.
(Docket No. 112 ¶ 5.) Thus, it appears that (1) all questions in the case have been
resolved by mutual agreement except for the discovery sanction imposed against
Plaintiff’s counsel; and (2) the parties have agreed that Plaintiff would seek relief from
the discovery sanctions from this Court, unopposed; but (3) if this Court denies such
relief, the parties will return to litigating the discovery sanctions on appeal.

Plaintiff cites the legal standards governing vacatur on grounds of mootness.
See generally U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18 (1994);
United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950). Under those cases, mootness
caused by a settlement agreement generally bars vacatur, because the party seeking
relief voluntarily relinquishes its legal recourse. See Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. at 25. Here,
however, the parties haven’t truly settled the sanctions order. They’ve settled the
remaining issues, and Defendant has agreed to let Plaintiff seek vacatur unopposed in
the first instance--but in the event this Court declines to vacate its own order, Plaintiff
has preserved her right to appeal the sanction order and Defendant has preserved its
right to enforce that order. Thus, the issue is not actually moot, and the Munsingwear/
Bonner Mall line of cases has no real relevance.
Rather, the issue currently before the Court is a straightforward and unopposed
Rule 60(b) order, brought as a request for an indicative ruling under Rule 62.1.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) provides that “the court may relieve a
party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding” for various
reasons listed in the rule. The rule “seeks to strike a delicate balance between two
countervailing impulses: the desire to preserve the finality of judgments and the
incessant command of the court’s conscience that justice be done in light of all the
facts.” Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Bielenberg Masonry Contracting, Inc., 715 F.2d 1442, 1444
(10th Cir. 1983). “Rule 60(b) gives the court a grand reservoir of equitable power to do
justice in a particular case.” State Bank v. Gledhill (In re Gledhill), 76 F.3d 1070, 1080
(10th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 231 F.3d
694, 697 (10th Cir. 2000) (“district court has substantial discretion to grant relief as
justice requires” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The simple fact that the parties have settled the case and have agreed to vacate
the discovery sanctions is generally insufficient to justify relief under Rule 60(b).
Indeed, courts in this circuit have expressly warned against such relief, believing it might
encourage parties to hazard greater risks at the trial level--knowing that they could
settle, and vacate sanctions, during appeal. See, e.g., Nease v. State Farm, 2014 WL
6626430 at *2 (E.D. Okla. Nov. 21, 2014). While recognizing that the sanctions order
impinges on Plaintiff’s counsel’s reputation, the Court does not believe that the order
was unwarranted--and therefore does not believe that the cost to Plaintiff’s counsel’s
reputation is unwarranted.
Thus, even though this motion is unopposed, the Court does not see grounds
justifying relief under Rule 60(b). Of course, the Court lacks jurisdiction over
noncollateral matters while this case is pending appeal. Pursuant to Rule 62.1(a),
where the Court lacks authority to grant relief, it may nonetheless deny the motion.
Accordingly, the motion for an indicative ruling is denied.
By contrast, the Court finds Plaintiff’s counsel’s argument that he should be
allowed to deposit funds into the Court registry rather than incur the expense of an
appellate bond to be well-taken. Pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR 67.2(a), Plaintiff is

hereby authorized to deposit $4,675.23 in the Court Registry pending final resolution of
her appeal.

Date: June 8, 2015