Evans, et al v. Loveland Automotive Investments, Inc., et al

Filing 46

ORDER denying 45 Motion to Recalculate Judgment and for Attorney's Fees on Appeal, by Judge William J. Martinez on 03/30/2016.(cthom, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge William J. Martínez
Civil Action No. 13-cv-2415-WJM-KMT
WILLIAM EVANS, and
JEFFREY THAYER,
Plaintiffs,
v.
LOVELAND AUTOMOTIVE INVESTMENTS, INC.,
JOHN RICHARD PIPE d/b/a LOVELAND AUTO TRANSPORT, and
PIPELINE AUTO TRANSPORT, INC.,
Defendants.

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO RECALCULATE JUDGMENT AND FOR
ATTORNEYS’ FEES ON APPEAL

Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion to Recalculate Judgment and for Additional
Attorneys’ Fees for Successful Appeal. (ECF No. 45.) All Defendants remain in default
(see ECF Nos. 27, 32, 33), and no response from Defendants was otherwise received.
For the reasons explained below, the Court will not recalculate or otherwise
modify its previously entered Judgment (ECF No. 33) because: (a) the Tenth Circuit’s
mandate forecloses the possibility of awarding both liquidated damages under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., and prejudgment interest under
the Colorado Wage Claim Act (CWCA), Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 8-4-101 et seq.; and
(b) awarding FLSA liquidated damages instead of CWCA prejudgment interest would
leave Plaintiffs with less money than awarded in the Judgment as it currently stands. In
addition, the Court may not grant attorneys’ fees for the appeal because Evans did not

request them from the Tenth Circuit.
I. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiffs brought to this action against Defendants for unpaid wages under
theories of breach of contract, violation of the FLSA and CWCA, and (with respect to
Plaintiff Thayer) violation of Colorado’s dishonored check statute. (ECF No. 1.)
Defendants failed to enter an appearance and the Clerk entered def ault against them.
(See ECF No. 27.) Plaintiffs then moved for summary judgment (ECF No. 31), which
this Court interpreted as a motion for default judgment (see ECF No. 32 at 4). The
Court found that Plaintiffs had established liability on all of their statutory theories of
relief. (Id. at 7–10.)
As for damages, the Court concluded that awarding damages under both the
FLSA and CWCA would constitute double recovery, and so the Court awarded only
CWCA damages because, under the circumstances, the CWCA allowed for a greater
recovery—actual unpaid wages—as compared to the FLSA, which calculates actual
damages by multiplying uncompensated hours by the federal minimum wage. (Id. at
11.) The Court also awarded the CWCA-authorized 125% penalty on the unpaid
wages, prejudgment interest of 8% on the unpaid wages, and postjudgment interest at
the federal statutory rate. (Id. at 12, 13–14, 15.) The Judgment accordingly followed.
(ECF No. 33.)
In electing to award Plaintiffs CWCA damages but not FLSA damages, the Court
did not specifically discuss FLSA liquidated damages, which the FLSA awards as “an
additional equal amount” (i.e., an amount equal to actual damages). 29 U.S.C.

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§ 216(b). Nor did the Court discuss whether FLSA liquidated damages could be
awarded alongside the CWCA 125% penalty. The Court simply stated that it would
award damages under the CWCA, not the FLSA. (ECF No. 32 at 11.)
Plaintiff Evans (but not Thayer) appealed to the Tenth Circuit, challenging the
implied denial of FLSA liquidated damages. (ECF No. 35.) Evans acknowledged that
he could not recover actual damages (the unpaid wages themselves) under both the
CWCA and the FLSA, but argued that FLSA liquidated damages could be awarded
alongside the CWCA penalty because FLSA liquidated damages are considered
compensatory (essentially a rough approximation of consequential damages) whereas
the CWCA penalty is designed as a deterrent to the employer. (See Evans v. Loveland
Auto. Invs., Inc. et al., No. 15-1049 (10th Cir.), Brief of Appellant William Evans at 4–11
(filed May 6, 2015).)
In an unpublished order and judgment, the Tenth Circuit agreed with Evans and
held that this Court could award FLSA liquidated damages in addition to the CWCA
penalty. (ECF No. 42 at 4–6.) The Tenth Circuit went further, however, and noted that
FLSA liquidated damages and prejudgment interest cannot coexist:
[L]ike FLSA liquidated damages, prejudgment interest also is
meant to compensate the wronged party for being deprived
of the monetary value of his loss from the time of the loss to
the payment of the judgment. Thus, on remand, if the
district court awards FLSA liquidated damages it must
vacate its award of prejudgment interest.
Therefore, we remand to the district court to recalculate the
amount of damages in light of our determination that it is
permissible for the court to award both FLSA liquidated
damages and a CWCA penalty. If the court awards FLSA
liquidated damages, it must vacate the award of
prejudgment interest.
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(Id. at 6–7 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).)
Following issuance of the mandate, this Court ordered Plaintiff Evans to file a
motion stating the amount of damages to which he believed he was entitled in light of
the Tenth Circuit’s disposition. (ECF No. 44.) Evans—and Thayer—timely filed such a
motion, which is the motion at issue here. (ECF No. 45.)
II. ANALYSIS
Although both Evans and Thayer move for recalculation, the Court will first focus
on Evans and then address whether Thayer is entitled to any relief.
A.

Liquidated Damages & Prejudgment Interest
Evans requests the same amount of FLSA liquidated damages he requested

before the appeal: $725. (Compare ECF No. 31 at 17 with ECF No. 45 at 3.) Rather
surprisingly, however, Evans asks for that amount plus prejudgment interest, offering a
creative interpretation of the Tenth Circuit’s order:
The Tenth Circuit also held that “[i]f the court awards FLSA
liquidated damages, it must vacate the award of
prejudgment interest.” Doc. 42 at 6-7 (citing Dep’t of Labor
v. City of Sapulpa, 30 F.3d 1285, 1290 (10th Cir. 1994)).
Though perhaps not entirely clear from the Tenth Circuit
order, City of Sapulpa discusses prejudgment interest on
FLSA actual damages. The award of FLSA liquidated
damages should not affect the availability of prejudgment
interest for actual damages on other claims. Because here
the only actual damages awarded are under the Colorado
Wage Claim Act, not the FLSA, prejudgment interest on the
actual damages should be permitted as originally envisioned
by the Court.
(ECF No. 45 at 2.) Whether or not this distinction is relevant, it is “entirely clear” that
this Court would be contradicting the Tenth Circuit’s mandate if it entered an amended

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judgment that includes both the current prejudgment interest award and FLSA
liquidated damages.
A district court must “comply strictly with the mandate rendered by the reviewing
court,” particularly where the reviewing court has “issued a mandate that specifically
limits the district court’s discretion.” Huffman v. Saul Holdings Ltd. P’ship, 262 F.3d
1128, 1132–33 (10th Cir. 2001). That is the case here. The Tenth Circuit explicitly
directed, “If the court awards FLSA liquidated damages, it must vacate the award of
prejudgment interest.” (ECF No. 42 at 7.) The definite article “the” can only refer to the
prejudgment interest awarded in the Judgment as it currently stands, which is
prejudgment interest on the unpaid wages awarded as actual damages under the
CWCA. (See ECF No. 32 at 13–15; ECF No. 33.) Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit
permitted this Court to choose only one of two options: (a) FLSA liquidated damages, or
(b) the previously entered award of prejudgment interest, but not both. If Evans
believes the Tenth Circuit erred in extending its order this far, Evans should have
moved for rehearing in the Tenth Circuit. Evans did not do so, the mandate issued, and
this Court is now bound to follow it.
The Court previously found Evans entitled to compensation in the form of
prejudgment interest, and presumes that Evans desires more money, not less. The
Court accordingly elects to maintain the Judgment as-is, with its award of prejudgment
interest and not FLSA liquidated damages, because Evans received $1,077.18 in
prejudgment interest (see ECF No. 33 at 1), but would only receive $725 in FLSA
liquidated damages.

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B.

Recalculation of Prejudgment Interest
Evans further requests that the Court extend the 8% prejudgment interest rate all

the way through the amended judgment that he expects to receive. (ECF No. 45 at 3.)
As just explained, however, the Court will not enter an amended judgment. The Tenth
Circuit never vacated the current Judgment, and this Court has chosen to leave the
Judgment undisturbed because, given the options presented by the Tenth Circuit,
Evans would receive more money in that posture than if the Court instead awarded
FLSA liquidated damages. Thus, Evans’s request for recalculation of prejudgment
interest is moot and the Court expresses no opinion on its merits.
C.

Attorneys’ Fees on Appeal
“The court in [any action to recover wages under the FLSA] shall, in addition to

any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to
be paid by the defendant . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Citing this statute, Evans requests
attorneys’ fees incurred on appeal. (ECF No. 45 at 2–3.)
This Court has reviewed Evans’s appellate brief and has found no request for
attorneys’ fees. More importantly, neither the Tenth Circuit’s order nor its mandate say
anything about attorneys’ fees on appeal. Thus, any order from this Court awarding
attorneys’ fees on appeal would be a modification of the Tenth Circuit’s mandate, and
this Court obviously has no authority to modify the mandate. See Marcum v. Dahl, 535
F. Supp. 48, 49–50 (W.D. Okla. 1981) (“An award of attorneys’ fees and expenses by
this Court as requested by the Motion under consideration would be an amendment to
or alteration of the Judgment of the Court of Appeals and not the Judgment of this

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Court. Only the Court of Appeals may amend or alter its Judgment.”). Evans cites no
authority to the contrary. Evans’s request for attorneys’ fees is accordingly denied.
D.

Thayer
Although Thayer never appealed, he requests that he receive all of the same

relief as Evans. In support, he generically invokes Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60
and the notion of an intervening change in law. (ECF No. 45 at 2.) The Court deems
this argument moot because Thayer, like Evans, would receive less compensation if the
Court awarded FLSA liquidated damages ($507, as opposed to $939.19 in prejudgment
interest), and the Court has already determined that it will not elect a course of action
that leaves a plaintiff with less compensation than originally awarded. Moreover, the
Court cannot possibly see how Thayer is entitled to attorneys’ fees on appeal when he
did not appeal.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Recalculate Judgment and for
Additional Attorneys' Fees for Successful Appeal (ECF No. 45) is DENIED.
Dated this 30th day of March, 2016.
BY THE COURT:

William J. Martínez
United States District Judge

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