Chorak v. Union Pacific Railroad Company

Filing 33

ORDER Denying 24 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, by Judge Wiley Y. Daniel on 1/14/2015.(evana, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Senior Judge Wiley Y. Daniel
Civil Action No. 13-cv-02438-WYD-CBS
JEFFREY CHORAK,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a Delaware corporation,
Defendant.

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 24), filed July 8, 2014.
By way of background, this case arose out of a motorcycle accident that occurred
at a railroad crossing that intersects Main Street in Florence, Colorado (the
“Intersection”). On September 13, 2011, at approximately 8:00 p.m., Plaintiff was
operating his motorcycle when he crossed the Intersection while traveling east on Main
Street. While crossing the Intersection, Plaintiff alleges that his motorcycle traversed an
irregular surface in the roadbed, which created a sharp pain in his back and caused him
to lose control of his motorcycle. At the time of the September 13, 2011 accident,
Defendant Union Pacific owned and operated the main single-railroad track at the
Intersection.
In this case, Plaintiff claims that he suffered injuries as a result of the accident.
Plaintiff asserts that his injuries were caused by Union Pacific’s failure to fulfill its duties

under the Colorado Premises Liability Act. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that as an
“invitee,” Union Pacific owed a duty to protect him from dangerous conditions of which it
knew or should have known on its property. Plaintiff further contends that Union
Pacific’s purported inspections of the subject railroad crossing were ineffective, and that
photographs of the crossing reveal “holes in the crossing timbers, visible to any
reasonable person’s naked eye, revealing dangers and hazards of which Union Pacific
either knew or show have known” presented a dangerous condition. (Resp. to Mot.
Summ. J. at 6).
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment asserts that judgment should be
entered because Union Pacific fulfilled its duties as a landowner under the Colorado
Premises Liability Act and exercised reasonable care to protect against dangerous
conditions that it knew or should have known about.
Pursuant to rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court may
grant summary judgment where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and the ... moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250
(1986); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm. v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220
F.3d 1184, 1190 (10th Cir. 2000). “When applying this standard, the court must ‘view
the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to
the party opposing summary judgment.’” Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of
Wichita, 226 F.3d 1138, 1148 (10th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted). “‘Only disputes over
-2-

facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly
preclude the entry of summary judgment.’” Id. (quotation omitted). Summary judgment
may be granted only where there is no doubt from the evidence, with all inferences
drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, that no genuine issue of material fact remains for
trial and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Bee v.
Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984).
After thoroughly reviewing Defendant’s pending motion and the parties’ related
submissions, I find that genuine issues of fact exist in this case with respect to whether
Union Pacific unreasonably failed to “warn of dangers not created by the landowner
which are not ordinarily present on property of the type involved and of which the
landowner actually knew” or unreasonably failed to “exercise reasonable care to protect
against dangers of which [it] actually knew or should have known.” Colo. Rev. Stat.
§§ 13-21-115(3)(b) and (c). Thus, Defendant’s request for summary judgment is
denied. Once a Final Pretrial Order is entered by the magistrate judge, this matter will
be set for a jury trial. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 24) is
DENIED.
Dated: January 14, 2015

BY THE COURT:

s/ Wiley Y. Daniel
Wiley Y. Daniel
Senior United States District Judge
-3-