Johnson v. Santini et al

Filing 61

ORDER by Magistrate Judge Boyd N. Boland on 11/4/14. Defendants' Motion to Stay Discovery 57 is DENIED. (bsimm, )

IN THE UNITED STATE DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Magistrate Judge Boyd N. Boland
Civil Action No. 13-cv-02664-REB-BNB
JOSHUA C. JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
GEORGE SANTINI,
ALICIA VINYARD,
T. K. COZZA RHODES, and
PETER BLUDWORTH,
Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
______________________________________________________________________________
This matter arises on Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery [Doc. #57, filed
11/03/2014] (the “Motion”), which is DENIED.
Several statements contained in the Motion require a response. In particular, the
defendants argue:
Defendants responded to the complaint on April 30, 2014, by
asserting qualified immunity in a motion for summary judgment
that set forth undisputed evidence establishing that they did not
violate clearly established law in their care and treatment of
Plaintiff.
* * *
On September 2, 2014, prior to Plaintiff filing a response [to the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment], the Court sua sponte
(Magistrate Judge Boland) denied Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment without prejudice and ordered Defendants to
file an answer. The Magistrate’s order (which was not a
recommendation) did not address the merits of Defendants’
defenses or state the reason for denial of Defendants’ motion.

On September 11, 2014, Defendants answered Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint.
Motion [Doc. # 57] (internal citations omitted).
In what can only be viewed as an intentional attempt to mislead the district judge, the
defendants improperly fail to acknowledge that a scheduling conference was held on October 22,
2014, where defense counsel raised these same concerns. I explained at that time that the
defendants had failed to comply with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A) by failing
to file an answer within the time allowed.1 Defense counsel’s suggestion to the contrary
notwithstanding, the filing of a motion for summary judgment does not relieve a party of the
obligation to answer. 5B Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d § 1348 at p.
53. I also explained at the scheduling conference that the plaintiff had filed a motion for
extension of time [Doc. # 41] to respond to the defendants’ first motion for summary judgment,
arguing that he needed copies of his medical records in order to respond to the defendants’ first
motion for summary judgment;2 that I had construed that as a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d);
and that I had denied the defendants’ first motion for summary judgment without prejudice as
Rule 56(d)(1) expressly allows. The failure of defense counsel to acknowledge this explanation

1

In the Order [Doc. # 44] denying the defendants’ first motion for summary judgment
without prejudice, I explained that the defendants failed to respond to the plaintiff’s complaint
prior to February 6, 2014, which was the deadline allowed by the Federal Rules. Consequently,
on February 24, 2014, I ordered the defendants to file a responsive pleading on or before March
3, 2014. After being granted an extension, the defendants filed their first motion for summary
judgment on March 30, 2014. They failed to file a responsive pleading, however. See Order
[Doc. # 44] at pp. 1-2.
2

Significantly, the defendants state that they have requested a copy of the plaintiff’s
medical records from the Bureau of Prisons, Motion [Doc. # 57] at p. 4, but there is no
commitment that those records will be voluntarily provided.
2

is inexplicable and unprofessional.
The availability of a stay of proceedings pending the determination of qualified immunity
was closely examined in Rome v. Romero, 225 F.R.D. 640, 643-44 (D. Colo. 2004), where the
court ruled:
Although the Supreme Court recognizes that a well-supported
claim of qualified immunity should shield a defendant from
unnecessary and burdensome discovery, invocation of the defense
is not a bar to all discovery.
* * *
Even where a qualified immunity defense is asserted, some limited
discovery is still permitted. As the Supreme Court in Crawford-El
[523 U.S. 574 (1998)] observed, qualified immunity does not
protect an official from all discovery, but only from that which is
broad-reaching. Limited discovery may be necessary when the
doctrine is asserted in a motion for summary judgment on
contested factual assertions. A plaintiff faced with a defense of
qualified immunity in a motion for summary judgment may also be
entitled to conduct discovery to explore facts essential to justify
opposition to the motion as provided for by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56[(d)].
(Internal quotations and citations omitted except as noted.)
A blanket stay of discovery is unwarranted and unsupportable under Rome. Instead, and
as I explained at the scheduling conference, the defendants may move for a protective order if
the plaintiff attempts to take “unnecessary and burdensome” discovery. In the face of the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment, however, the scope of permissible discovery as
contrasted with that which is unnecessary and burdensome cannot be determined in the abstract
and must await the plaintiff’s specific discovery requests. Accord Wanstall v. Armijo, 2014 WL
4636457 (D. Colo. Sept. 16, 2014) (refusing a request to stay all discovery and staying only the
defendants’ depositions, noting that “[d]epositions are generally the most burdensome aspect of
discovery on individual defendants”).

3

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery [Doc. #57] is DENIED.
Dated November 4, 2014.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Boyd N. Boland
United States Magistrate Judge

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