Aker v. Yuma County Sheriffs Department et al

Filing 35

ORDER; 32 Defendant Steve Gallagher's Motion to Stay is GRANTED. All discovery in this matter is hereby STAYED, by Magistrate Judge Kathleen M. Tafoya on 8/21/14.(morti, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Magistrate Judge Kathleen M. Tafoya
Civil Action No. 13–cv–02683–KMT
AKER ALICE,
Plaintiff,
v.
JON LYNCH,
STEVE GALLAGHER, and
FIVE UNKNOWN YUMA COUNTY SHERIFFS,
Defendants.

ORDER

This matter is before the court on “Defendant Steve Gallagher’s Motion to Stay” (Doc.
No. 32, filed August 8, 2014). Defendant John Lynch joined in the Motion to Stay on August
13, 2014. (Doc. No. 33.)
In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See
(Doc. No. 18, filed March 4, 2014.) On August 8, 2014, Defendant Lynch filed a motion to
dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 30.) On
August 8, 2014, Defendant Gallagher also filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
arguing, inter alia, that he is entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff’s claims. (Doc. No.
31.) The defendants now move for a stay of discovery in this action until it is determined, by

way of a ruling on their motions to dismiss, whether Defendant Gallagher is entitled to qualified
immunity.
Immunity provisions, whether qualified, absolute or pursuant to the Eleventh
Amendment, are meant to free officials from the concerns of litigation, including avoidance of
disruptive discovery. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009) (citing Siegert v. Gilley,
500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)); see also Workman v. Jordan,
958 F.2d 332, 335 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting that qualified immunity, if successful, protects an
official both from liability and the ordinary burdens of litigation, including far-ranging
discovery) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982)). As explained by the
Court in Iqbal, there are serious and legitimate reasons for this protection:
If a Government official is to devote time to his or her duties, and to the
formulation of sound and responsible policies, it is counterproductive to require
the substantial diversion that is attendant to participating in litigation and making
informed decisions as to how it should proceed. Litigation, though necessary to
ensure that officials comply with the law, exacts heavy costs in terms of
efficiency and expenditure of valuable time and resources that might otherwise be
directed to the proper execution of the work of the Government. The costs of
diversion are only magnified when Government officials are charged with
responding to [the burdens of litigation discovery].
Id. at 685.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly provide for a stay of proceedings.
See String Cheese Incident, LLC v. Stylus Shows, Inc., 02-CV-01934-LTB-PA, 2006 WL
894955, at *2 (D. Colo. March 30, 2006). Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 does, however, provide that
[a] party or any person from whom discovery is sought may move for a protective
order in the court where the action is pending . . . . The court may, for good
cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense . . . .
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Moreover,
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[t]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court
to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and
effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. How this can best be done calls for
the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an
even balance.
Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936) (citing Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 760, 763 (1931)). An order staying discovery is thus an appropriate exercise of
this court’s discretion. Id.
Additionally, “a court may decide that in a particular case it would be wise to stay
discovery on the merits until [certain challenges] have been resolved.” 8A Charles Alan Wright,
Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2040, at 198 (3d ed.
2010). Although a stay of all discovery is generally disfavored, see Bustos v. U.S., 257 F.R.D.
617, 623 (D. Colo. 2009), a stay may be appropriate if “resolution of a preliminary motion may
dispose of the entire action.” Nankivil v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 216 F.R.D. 689, 692 (M.D.
Fla. 2003). See also Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’r, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 804 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (“When a particular issue may be dispositive, the court may stay discovery concerning
other issues until the critical issue is resolved”). When considering a stay of discovery, this court
considers: (1) the plaintiff’s interests in proceeding expeditiously with the civil action and the
potential prejudice to plaintiff of a delay; (2) the burden on the defendants; (3) the convenience
to the court; (4) the interests of persons not parties to the civil litigation; and (5) the public
interest. See String Cheese Incident, 2006 WL 894955, at *2 (citing FDIC v. Renda, No. 852216-O, 1987 WL 348635, at *2 (D. Kan. 1987)).
Plaintiff opposes the Motion to Stay. (See Doc. No. 32 at 1.) Though the court
acknowledges that Plaintiff has an interest in proceeding expeditiously with this case, the court

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finds that this interest is overcome by the burden Defendants might face if they were forced to
proceed with discovery in spite of well-established precedent supporting a stay when an
immunity defense has been raised. Further, although qualified immunity is a potential defense
only as to Plaintiff’s individual-capacity claims under § 1983, see Rome v. Romero, 225 F.R.D.
640, 643-644 (D. Colo. 2004), the Supreme Court has recognized:
It is no answer to these concerns [of avoiding disruptive discovery] to say that
discovery can be deferred while pretrial proceedings continue for other
defendants. It is quite likely that, when discovery as to the other parties proceeds,
it would prove necessary for petitioners and their counsel to participate in the
process to ensure the case does not develop in a misleading or slanted way that
causes prejudice to their position. Even if petitioners are not yet themselves
subject to discovery orders, then, they would not be free from the burdens of
discovery.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685. As such, proceeding with discovery as to claims that are not subject to
the assertion of qualified immunity is not a permissible alternative. Additionally, discovery
should be stayed in the case as a whole even when some of the defendants are asserting qualified
immunity.
The third String Cheese factor also favors a stay. Although the court has an interest in
managing its docket by seeing cases proceed expeditiously, any inconvenience that might result
from rescheduling the docket is outweighed by the potential waste of judicial and party resources
that would result from allowing discovery to proceed, only to have the case dismissed in its
entirety on the grounds raised in the motions to dismiss. See Nankivil, 216 F.R.D. at 692 (a stay
may be appropriate if “resolution of a preliminary motion may dispose of the entire action.”).
Finally, neither the interest of nonparties nor the public interest in general prompt the
court to reach a different result. Accordingly, on balance, the court finds that a stay of discovery
is appropriate in this case. Therefore, it is
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ORDERED that the “Defendant Steve Gallagher’s Motion to Stay” (Doc. No. 32) is
GRANTED. All discovery in this matter is hereby STAYED. The parties shall file a Joint
Status Report within ten days of a ruling on the motions to dismiss, if any portion of the case
remains pending, to advise if a Scheduling Conference should be set.
Dated this 21st day of August, 2014.

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