Johnson v. Western State Colorado University et al

Filing 188

ORDER denying 93 Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions. By Judge William J. Martinez on 12/5/2014.(alowe)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge William J. Martínez
Civil Action No. 13-cv-2747-WJM-KMT
KEIFER JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
BRAD BACA, in his official capacity as President of Western State Colorado University,
GARY PIERSON, in his official capacity as Vice President of Student Affairs & Dean of
Students,
SARA PHILLIPS, in her official capacity as Title IX Coordinator,
CHRIS LUEKENGA, in his official capacity as Associate Vice President for Student
Affairs, and
SUSAN COYKENDALL, in her capacity as an employee of Western State,
Defendants.

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

Plaintiff Keifer Johnson (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against employees of
Western State University (“Defendants”) under 42 U.S.C. § 19831 alleging that a
disciplinary action taken against him violated his First Amendment rights. (ECF No.
138.) Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11 (“Motion”). (ECF No. 93.) For the reasons set forth below, the
Motion is denied.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
By signing and filing a pleading, written motion, or other paper, counsel is
certifying that to the best of his or her knowledge, information or belief, formed after a

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The Court previously dismissed all claims brought under Title IX. (ECF No. 173.)

reasonable inquiry: (1) the filing is not presented for any improper purpose, (2) that any
legal arguments, claims or defenses are warranted by existing law or a non-frivolous
argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law, and (3) that any
allegations or factual contentions or denials of factual contentions have evidentiary
support, or “if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b);
see also Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench Holding Corp., 90 F.3d 1523, 1540 (10th Cir.
1996). The standard to be applied is an objective one—whether a reasonable,
competent attorney would believe, under the same circumstances, that the contentions
were warranted. See, e.g., White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 680 (10th Cir.
1990). Whether to impose Rule 11 sanctions is within the sound discretion of the Court.
Coffey v. Health Trust, Inc., 1 F.3d 1101, 1104 (10th Cir. 1993); 5A C. Wright & A.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1331 at 476 (3d ed.) (explaining that under the
1993 amendments to Rule 11, “[t]he district court now has discretion in determining
whether or not to apply sanctions for a Rule 11 violation and no longer is mandated to
do so as was true under the 1983 amendment”).
II. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff contends that the Court should impose Rule 11 sanctions on Defendants’
attorneys based on allegedly false representations made in Defendants’ opposition to
Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief. (ECF No. 93.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants misled the Court by stating that they did not have knowledge of the events
underlying the second disciplinary proceeding during the pendency of the first
disciplinary proceeding. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that the evidence disclosed during
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discovery shows that this was not an accurate statement, and that Defendants’ counsel
was aware of the inaccuracy when their motion papers were filed. (Id.)
The Court has reviewed the documents filed by Plaintiff in support of these
claims, and compared them to the statements made by Defendants’ counsel. The Court
strongly disagrees with Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants’ counsel affirmatively misled
the Court, or otherwise misstated the facts. Defendants have consistently represented
that, at the time of the first disciplinary proceeding, Onna Gould had not yet made a
formal sexual assault complaint against Plaintiff. Nothing in the documents provided
refutes that representation. Rather, these documents show that Defendants were
generally aware of the nature of the relationship between Ms. Gould and Plaintiff, and
suspected that a formal complaint could be filed. However, they also show that Ms.
Gould’s formal complaint was not submitted until the day after the first disciplinary
proceeding concluded.
Having reviewed the relevant documents, it is apparent that the parties view the
evidence through vastly different lenses. However, nothing in this case remotely
approaches sanctionable conduct. Defendants’ counsel is entitled to make factually
accurate arguments that favor their clients, which is what they did in this case. See
Coffey, 1 F.3d at 1104 (“It is the obligation of counsel opposing the value of evidence,
not the proponent, to expose weakness in evidence upon which an attorney relies for
the filing of pleadings, motions and other papers.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for
Sanctions is denied.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 93) is
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DENIED.
Dated this 5th day of December, 2014.
BY THE COURT:

William J. Martínez
United States District Judge

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