Ruckdeschel v. Colvin

Filing 27

ORDER REMANDING CASE TO COMMISSIONER, by Judge William J. Martinez on 1/12/2015. (dhans, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge William J. Martínez
Civil Action No. 13-cv-2803-WJM
GARRETT C. RUCKDESCHEL,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

ORDER REMANDING CASE TO COMMISSIONER

This social security benefits appeal is before the Court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Plaintiff Garrett Ruckdeschel (“Plaintiff”) challenges the final decision of Defendant, the
Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”), denying his application for disability
insurance benefits. The denial was affirmed by an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), who
ruled Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act (“Act”).
This appeal followed.
For the reasons set forth below, the ALJ’s decision denying Plaintiff’s application
for Social Security disability benefits is VACATED and the case is REMANDED to the
Commissioner for additional proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was born on August 19, 1978 and was 31 years old on the alleged
disability onset date. (Admin. Record (“R.”) (ECF No. 14) at 23.) Plaintiff has a high
school education and has past relevant work experience as a plumber helper, plumber,

and a cook. (Id.) Plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and disability
insurance benefits on February 8, 2012, alleging that he had been disabled since March
16, 2010 due to a back injury. (R. 86.) Plaintiff’s application was initially denied on July
31, 2012. (Id.)
After requesting a hearing, Plaintiff’s claims were heard by Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) Jennifer B. Millington on July 17, 2013. (R. 10.) Plaintiff was represented
by counsel at the administrative hearing, and testified on his own behalf. (Id.) Elizabeth
Ruckdeschel, Plaintiff’s wife, and vocational expert Nora Dunne also testified. (Id.)
On July 26, 2013, the ALJ issued a written decision in accordance with the
Commissioner’s five-step sequential evaluation process.1 At step one, the ALJ found
that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 16, 2010. (R.
12.) At step two, she found that Plaintiff suffered from degenerative disc disease of the
lumbar spine, spondyliasthesis—status post spinal fusion, and stenosis, which were
severe impairments. (Id.) The ALJ did not find Plaintiff’s prior alcohol abuse, anxiety
disorder, or other mental health issues to be severe impairments. (R. 13.) At step
three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s back issues, while severe impairments, did not meet
any of the impairments or combination of impairments listed in the social security
regulations. (R. 14.) The ALJ assessed Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”),

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The five-step process requires the ALJ to consider whether a claimant: (1) engaged in
substantial gainful activity during the alleged period of disability; (2) had a severe impairment;
(3) had a condition which met or equaled the severity of a listed impairment; (4) could return to
his past relevant work; and, if not, (5) could perform other work in the national economy. See
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4); Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-51 (10th Cir.
1988.) The claimant has the burden of proof through steps one to four; the Social Security
Administration has the burden of proof at step five. Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th
Cir. 2007).

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finding that he had the RFC to perform “light” work as defined by the regulations, except
that he could only occasionally climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. (R. 14.)
Given this RFC, at step four the ALJ found that Plaintiff could not perform his past
relevant work as a plumber or cook, because such work would require him to perform
activities that were restricted by his RFC. (R. 23.) At step five, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff could work as a cashier, furniture retail clerk, or storage rental facility clerk, and
that there are a significant number of jobs in these fields in the national economy. (Id.)
Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act
and therefore was not entitled to benefits. (R. 24.)
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on December 9, 2013.
(R. 1.) Thus, the ALJ’s July 26, 2013 decision is the final administrative action for
purposes of review.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether substantial
evidence in the record as a whole supports the factual findings and whether the correct
legal standards were applied. Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 2009).
Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. Id. “It requires more than a scintilla, but less than a
preponderance.” Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007). Evidence is not
substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence in the record. Grogan v. Barnhart,
399 F.3d 1257, 1261-62 (10th Cir. 2005). In reviewing the Commissioner’s decision,
the Court may neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute its judgment for that of the
agency. Salazar v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 615, 621 (10th Cir. 2006). “On the other hand, if
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the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal test, there is a ground for reversal apart from a
lack of substantial evidence.” Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir.
1993).
III. ANALYSIS
On appeal, Plaintiff raises six issues: (1) that the ALJ erred at step two by not
finding Plaintiff’s chronic pain syndrome to be a severe impairment; (2) that the ALJ
erred at step three by finding that Plaintiff’s severe impairments did not meet or
medically equal the listings; (3) that the ALJ failed to properly develop the medical
record; (4) that the ALJ improperly weighed the medical evidence, particularly the
opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physician; (5) that the ALJ improperly judged Plaintiff’s
credibility; and (6) there is not substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding at step
five. (ECF No. 17.) Because the Court concludes that the ALJ’s analysis at step three
was deficient, and that this requires remand, it will address only this issue.
At step three, an ALJ is required to consider whether a claimant has an
impairment that meets or equals any listing found at 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1 (“Listing”). If a claimant has such an impairment, he is deemed disabled
and no further analysis is required. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii); (d). A
claimant’s impairment “meets” a Listing if such impairment matches all of the specified
criteria in one of the Listings. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(c)(3). However, under step three, a
finding of disability is also required if a claimant’s impairment, or combination of
impairments, medically “equals” a Listing. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526(a). An impairment
“equals” a Listing where the impairments “is at least equal in severity and duration to the
criteria of any listed impairment.” Id.
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The ALJ’s step three analysis was limited to the following:
While the claimant has “severe” impairments within the
meaning of the Social Security Act and the Regulations, the
undersigned concludes, based on a review of the entire
record, that the claimant’s physical impairments, either
individually or collectively, do not meet or equal a listing.
The medical records indicate that no State agency
physicians or consultative examiner concluded that the
claimant’s impairments meet or equal a listing. In addition,
no treating or examining physician suggested that the
claimant’s impairments meet or equal a listing.
In reaching this finding, the undersigned has considered all
relevant listings, including, but not limited to Listing 1.04
Disorders of the Spine.
(R. 14.)
An ALJ is required “to discuss the evidence and explain why [s]he found that [a
claimant] was not disabled at step three.” Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009 (10th
Cir. 1997). In the absence of ALJ findings supported by specific weighing of the
evidence, the reviewing court “cannot assess whether relevant evidence adequately
supports the ALJ’s conclusion that the appellant’s impairments did not meet or equal
any Listed Impairment, and whether he applied the correct legal standards to arrive at
that conclusion.” Id.
In this case, the ALJ failed to discuss any evidence at step three or even outline
the requirements for the relevant Listings. Such cursory discussion does not allow the
Court to review whether the ALJ properly determined that Plaintiff’s severe impairments
do not meet or medically equal any of the Listings. As such, the Court concludes that
the ALJ’s step three analysis was so deficient that remand is required. See Dye v.
Barnhart, 180 F. App’x 27, 29 (10th Cir. 2006) (finding similar conclusory statement that
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the claimant’s impairment did not meet the Listing to be error which required remand).
Because this error alone requires remand, the Court need not address the other
arguments raised by Plaintiff. See Madrid v. Barnhart, 447 F.3d 788, 792 (10th Cir.
2006) (when the ALJ’s error affected the analysis as a whole, court declined to address
other issues raised on appeal); Watkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1299 (10th Cir.
2003) (“We will not reach the remaining issues raised by appellant because they may
be affected by the ALJ’s treatment of this case on remand.”). The Court expresses no
opinion as to Plaintiff’s other arguments and neither party should take the Court’s
silence as tacit approval or disapproval of how the evidence was considered. The Court
does not intend by this opinion to suggest the result that should be reached on remand;
rather, the Court encourages the parties as well as the ALJ to consider the evidence
and the issues anew.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Commissioner’s decision is VACATED and
this case is REMANDED to the Commissioner for rehearing.
Dated this 12th day of January, 2015.
BY THE COURT:

William J. Martínez
United States District Judge

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