Carl v. Colvin

Filing 28

ORDER by Magistrate Judge Kristen L. Mix on 1/29/15 re: 9 SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD. (lgale, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 13-cv-03146-KLM
JULIE A. CARL,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
______________________________________________________________________
ORDER
______________________________________________________________________
ENTERED BY MAGISTRATE JUDGE KRISTEN L. MIX
This matter is before the Court1 on the Social Security Administrative Record
[#9],2 filed on March 12, 2014, in support of Plaintiff’s Complaint [#1] seeking review of the
decision of Defendant Carolyn Colvin, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (“Defendant” or “Commissioner”) denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability
insurance benefits pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (the
“Act”). See Compl. [#1]. On July 18, 2014, Plaintiff filed an Opening Brief [#18] (the
“Brief”). On August 18, 2014, Defendant filed a Response [#19]. No Reply was filed. The
Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s final decision under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The Court has reviewed the entire case file and the applicable law and is sufficiently

1

The parties consented to proceed before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)
and D.C.COLO.LCivR 72.2. See Consent Form [#26]; Order of Reference [#27].
2

“[#9]” is an example of the convention the Court uses to identify the docket number
assigned to a specific paper by the Court’s case management and electronic case filing system
(CM/ECF). This convention is used throughout this Order.

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advised in the premises. For the reasons set forth below, the Court AFFIRMS the decision
of the Commissioner.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff alleges that she became disabled on May 1, 2010, at the age of fifty-three.
Tr. 137.3 On January 18, 2012, she filed for Title II disability insurance benefits. Tr. 137.
On May 24, 2013, a hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (the “ALJ”). Tr.
31. On June 21, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision in which he determined that Plaintiff last
met the insured status requirements of the Act on March 31, 2012. Tr. 13. He further
determined that she did not engage in substantial gainful activity from her alleged onset
date through her date last insured.

Tr. 13.

He found that she had three severe

impairments during the relevant period: (1) “status post two knee replacements,” (2)
degenerative disc disease, and (3) carpal tunnel syndrome. Tr. 13. However, the ALJ
concluded that Plaintiff “did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met
or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526).” Tr. 19. After
reviewing the evidence of record, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”)
to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except she could
perform work that allowed her to alternate between sitting and standing
positions at will, provided that she remained productive. The claimant could
occasionally kneel, crouch, crawl and climb ramps and stairs but she could
never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds. She could perform frequent handling
and fingering with the right upper extremity.

3

The Court refers to the Transcript of the Administrative Proceedings, located at Docket
Nos. 9-1, 9-2, 9-3, 9-4, 9-5, 9-6, 9-7, 9-8, and 9-9, by the sequential transcript numbers instead of
the separate docket numbers.

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Tr. 20. Based on the RFC and the testimony of an impartial vocational expert (“VE”), the
ALJ found that Plaintiff “was capable of performing past relevant work as an Accounting
Clerk, a Route Account Clerk and a Patient Account Clerk” and that these jobs “did not
require the performance of work-related activities precluded” by Plaintiff’s RFC. Tr. 25. He
therefore found Plaintiff “not disabled” at step four of the sequential evaluation. Tr. 26.
Plaintiff appealed to the Appeals Council, which denied her request for review of the
ALJ’s decision. Tr. 1-7. Therefore, the ALJ’s decision became a final decision of the
Commissioner for purposes of judicial review. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981.
II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
Pursuant to the Act:
[T]he Social Security Administration is authorized to pay disability insurance
benefits and Supplemental Security Income to persons who have a
“disability.” A person qualifies as disabled, and thereby eligible for such
benefits, “only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such
severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot,
considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other
kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.”
Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 21-22 (2003) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A),
1382c(a)(3)(B)). Under the applicable legal standard, a claimant is disabled if she is unable
“to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(a); see also Wall
v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1051 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a)). The
existence of a qualifying disabling impairment must be demonstrated by “medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic” findings.
423(d)(5)(A).
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42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3),

“When a claimant has one or more severe impairments the Social Security [Act]
requires the [Commissioner] to consider the combined effects of the impairments in making
a disability determination.” Campbell v. Bowen, 822 F.2d 1518, 1521 (10th Cir. 1987)
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C)). However, the mere existence of a severe impairment or
combination of impairments does not require a finding that an individual is disabled within
the meaning of the Act. To be disabling, the claimant’s condition must be so functionally
limiting as to preclude any substantial gainful activity for at least twelve consecutive
months. See Kelley v. Chater, 62 F.3d 335, 338 (10th Cir. 1995).
The Court reviews a final decision of the Commissioner by examining the
administrative record and determining “whether the [ALJ’s] factual findings are supported
by substantial evidence in the record and whether the correct legal standards were
applied.” Wilson v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 1136, 1140 (10th Cir. 2010). However, the Court
“may neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute [its] judgment for that of the agency.”
Harper v. Colvin, 528 F. App’x 887, 890 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Barnett v. Apfel, 231 F.3d
687, 689 (10th Cir. 2000)). In other words, the Court does not reexamine the issues de
novo. Sisco v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 10 F. 3d 739, 741 (10th Cir. 1993).
Thus, even when some evidence could support contrary findings, the Court “may not
displace the agency’s choice between two fairly conflicting views,” even if the Court may
have “made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo.” Oldham v. Astrue,
509 F.3d 1254, 1257-58 (10th Cir. 2007).
A.

Legal Standard
The Social Security Administration uses a five-step framework to determine whether

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a claimant meets the necessary conditions to receive Social Security benefits. See 20
C.F.R. § 416.920. The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four, and
if the claimant fails at any of these steps, consideration of any subsequent steps is
unnecessary. Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750 (10th Cir. 1988) (“If a determination
can be made at any of the steps that a claimant is or is not disabled, evaluation under a
subsequent step is not necessary.”). The Commissioner bears the burden of proof at step
five. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987).
Step one requires the ALJ to determine whether a claimant is “presently engaged
in substantial gainful activity.” Wall, 561 F.3d at 1052 (quoting Allen v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d
1140, 1142 (10th Cir. 2004)). If not, the ALJ considers at step two, whether a claimant has
“a medically severe impairment or impairments.” Id. “An impairment is severe under the
applicable regulations if it significantly limits a claimant’s physical or mental ability to
perform basic work activities.” Wall, 561 F.3d at 1052 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521). Next,
at step three, the ALJ considers whether a claimant’s medically severe impairments are
equivalent to a condition “listed in the appendix of the relevant disability regulation,” i.e., the
“Listings.” Wall, 561 F.3d at 1052 (quoting Allen, 357 F.3d at 1142). “If a claimant’s
impairments are not equivalent to a listed impairment, the ALJ must consider, at step four,
whether a claimant’s impairments prevent her from performing her past relevant work.”
Wall, 561 F.3d at 1052 (citing Allen, 357 F.3d at 1142). “Even if a claimant is so impaired,
the agency considers, at step five, whether she possesses the sufficient [RFC] to perform
other work in the national economy.” Id.
B.

Substantial Evidence
An ALJ must consider all evidence and explain why he or she finds a claimant not
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disabled. Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009 (10th Cir. 1996). However, the ALJ need
not specifically “reference everything in the administrative record.” Wilson, 602 F.3d at
1148. “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. at 1140 (internal quotation marks omitted). “It
requires more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d
1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007). A decision by the ALJ is not based on substantial evidence
“if it is overwhelmed by other evidence in the record . . . .” Grogan v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d
1257, 1261-62 (10th Cir. 2005). In other words, the Court’s determination of whether the
ALJ has supported his ruling with substantial evidence “must be based upon the record
taken as a whole.” Washington v. Shalala, 37 F.3d 1437, 1439 (10th Cir. 1994). Further,
evidence is not substantial if it “constitutes mere conclusion.” Musgrave v. Sullivan, 966
F.2d 1371, 1374 (10th Cir. 1992). In addition, “if the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal
test, there is a ground for reversal apart from a lack of substantial evidence.” Thompson
v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1993).
III. Analysis
Plaintiff requests judicial review of the ALJ’s decision denying her supplemental
social security income benefits. Brief [#12] at 1. Plaintiff brings four main challenges to the
ALJ’s findings. The Court addresses each of these arguments in turn.
A.

Whether the ALJ Was Required to Consult a Medical Advisor
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have consulted a medical advisor to determine

the onset date of Plaintiff’s depression. Brief [#18] at 35-36. Social Security Ruling (“SSR”)
83–20, 1983 WL 31249, at *3, “calls for an ALJ to consult a medical advisor for assistance

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if a claimant’s onset date must be inferred from the medical evidence.” Kilpatrick v. Astrue,
502 F. App’x 801, 805 (10th Cir. 2012).
The ALJ found that Plaintiff failed to establish severe depression prior to March 31,
2012, the date Plaintiff last met the insured status requirements of the Act. Tr. 13, 18.
Plaintiff admits there was “a lack of evidence” in this regard, because Plaintiff did not start
psychiatric treatment until May 2013. Brief [#18] at 36; Tr. 519. However, Plaintiff points
to her medical records from the relevant period that indicate her diagnosis of depression
and the medications she took to combat the illness. Brief [#18] at 36 (citing Tr. 270-344).
Plaintiff argues that a medical advisor’s testimony was required because the onset date of
Plaintiff’s depression had to be inferred from other facts in the record such as Plaintiff’s
testimony and last date of employment. Brief [#18] at 36.
Defendant argues that the ruling applies to establishing the onset date of disability
only when the ALJ has determined that Plaintiff was actually disabled at some point during
the relevant period. Response [#19] at 19. Under SSR 83-20:
In addition to determining that an individual is disabled, the decisionmaker
must also establish the onset date of disability. In many claims, the onset
date is critical; it may affect the period for which the individual can be paid
and may even be determinative of whether the individual is entitled to or
eligible for any benefits. In title II worker claims, the amount of the benefit
may be affected . . . . Consequently, it is essential that the onset date be
correctly established and supported by the evidence, as explained in the
policy statement.
In title II cases, disability insurance benefits (DIB) may be paid for as many
as 12 months before the month an application is filed. Therefore, the earlier
the onset date is set, the longer is the period of disability and the greater the
protection received.
...
POLICY STATEMENT: The onset date of disability is the first day an
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individual is disabled as defined in the Act and the regulations. Factors
relevant to the determination of disability onset include the individual's
allegation, the work history, and the medical evidence. These factors are
often evaluated together to arrive at the onset date. However, the individual's
allegation or the date of work stoppage is significant in determining onset
only if it is consistent with the severity of the condition(s) shown by the
medical evidence.
A title II worker cannot be found disabled under the Act unless insured status
is also met at a time when the evidence establishes the presence of a
disabling condition(s). Although important to the establishment of a period
of disability and to the payment of benefits, the expiration of insured status
is not itself a consideration in determining when disability first began.
1983 WL 31249, at *1.
In a case similar to the present one, Bigpond v. Astrue, 280 F. App’x 716, 717-18
(10th Cir. 2008), the claimant argued that the ALJ was required under SSR 83-20 to consult
a medical advisor concerning the onset date of her cardiac disability. The claimant argued
that the evidence with respect to the onset date of her cardiac disability was ambiguous.
At the outset, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the ambiguity must relate to the
relevant period, i.e., the time before the date last insured. Thus, the question was whether
the evidence showed that the claimant’s cardiac problems may have been disabling on or
before the date last insured. Because the evidence demonstrated that the claimant’s
cardiac problems were not disabling prior to the date last insured, the Tenth Circuit held
that the ALJ did not err in failing to consult with a medical advisor with respect to the onset
date of her cardiac disability.
Here, in assessing Plaintiff’s depression, the ALJ provided a lengthy, thorough
discussion at step two of the analysis in which he discussed Plaintiff’s medical record, work
history, and testimony. Tr. 17-20. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s depression was not
a severe impairment at any time during the period she was insured under the Act. Tr. 17-8-

20. As the ALJ stated, “[t]he claimant’s minimal treatment during the period relevant to this
decision suggests that her mental impairments did not have at least more than a minimal
effect on her ability to do work-related activity as of the date last insured . . . .” Tr. 20.
Thus, because substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s
depression was not disabling at any time during the relevant period, there was no need for
the ALJ to consult a medical advisor to establish the precise date on which Plaintiff became
disabled. SSR 83-20, 1983 WL 31249, at *1; Bigpond, 280 F. App’x at 717-18. Thus, the
Court finds that the ALJ did not commit error by failing to consult a medical advisor.
B.

Whether the ALJ Failed to Account for Fatigue and Mental Impairments
Plaintiff argues that, even if the ALJ’s decision at step two was correct that Plaintiff’s

fatigue and mental impairments were not severe impairments, the ALJ erred by failing to
consider those limitations at step four of the analysis when he determined Plaintiff’s RFC.
Brief [#18] at 31-35. According to SSR 96–8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *5 (S.S.A. July 2,
1996):
In assessing RFC, the adjudicator must consider limitations and restrictions
imposed by all of an individual's impairments, even those that are not
“severe.” While a “not severe” impairment(s) standing alone may not
significantly limit an individual's ability to do basic work activities, it may –
when considered with limitations or restrictions due to other impairments –
be critical to the outcome of a claim. For example, in combination with
limitations imposed by an individual's other impairments, the limitations due
to such a “not severe” impairment may prevent an individual from performing
past relevant work or may narrow the range of other work that the individual
may still be able to do.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not account for Plaintiff’s “well-documented limitations from
depression and fatigue in the RFC.” Brief [#18] at 31. In support, Plaintiff provides a
thorough list of evidence demonstrating Plaintiff’s history of fatigue and depression. Id. at
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31-35.
Even though the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s fatigue and psychological impairments
were not severe impairments during the relevant period, he considered these impairments
when determining Plaintiff’s RFC. He first noted that Plaintiff discussed her depression and
fatigue when she applied for disability insurance benefits. Tr. 20. He then stated:
The claimant’s activities of daily living further suggest that her conditions
were not as limiting as alleged. At her March of 2012 consultative
examination, the claimant reported that depression and fatigue limited her
ability to perform activities for more than several hours at a time. However,
she noted that she was able to get herself out of bed, bathe herself, dress
herself and perform chores around the house without any difficulty. Her
ability to perform these tasks, albeit with some limitations due to fatigue,
suggest that she retains physical abilities consistent with those contemplated
by the above-referenced residual functional capacity. This evidence is not
consistent with the claimant’s allegations, made through her representative,
that she cannot perform the full range of sedentary or light exertional work
and that she therefore cannot meet the demands of her past relevant work.
Tr. 23 (citations to the record omitted).
The ALJ clearly complied with the requirement of SSR 96–8p that he consider
Plaintiff’s non-severe impairments at step four of the analysis. Beyond this, Plaintiff’s
argument “is merely an invitation to the [C]ourt to reweigh the evidence and substitute its
judgment for that of the ALJ.” Slaughter v. Colvin, No. 13-2203-JWL, 2014 WL 3557633,
at *6 (D. Kan. July 18, 2014). However, it is not the Court’s role to reweigh the evidence.
Perez-Leeds v. Colvin, __ F. App’x __, __, No. 14-2069, 2014 WL 7375618, at *4 (10th Cir.
Dec. 30, 2014).

It is clear from a review of the ALJ’s decision that he thoroughly

considered all evidence and explained why he chose not to put parameters on Plaintiff’s
ability to work based on her alleged fatigue and psychological impairments. See Tr. 17-20,
23; Clifton, 79 F.3d at 1009. As noted above, the ALJ need not specifically “reference
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everything in the administrative record.” Wilson, 602 F.3d at 1148. Here, the ALJ’s
analysis of the record demonstrates that substantial evidence supports his conclusion. See
id. at 1140. The evidence analyzed and cited by the ALJ is not “overwhelmed by other
evidence in the record,” including the evidence cited by Plaintiff. Brief [#18] at 31-35;
Grogan, 399 F.3d at 1261-62. Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err by
failing to impose RFC limitations based on Plaintiff’s alleged fatigue and psychological
impairments.
C.

Whether the ALJ Erred Regarding Plaintiff’s “Light Work” RFC Assessment
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by finding that she was capable of light work with

an at-will sit/stand option, because this assessment is inconsistent with the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles (“DOT”). Brief [#18] at 29-31. The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s RFC
permitted her to perform light work, so long as it allowed her to alternate between sitting
and standing at will. Tr. 20. Plaintiff argues that this is inconsistent with the DOT, which
specifies “standing” as “being on one’s feet in an upright position without moving about” and
“light work” as standing for up to six hours a day in “an upright position without moving
about.” Brief [#18] at 30. Plaintiff argues that this means that her RFC is actually in the
sedentary range and that she cannot perform her past work as a Route Account Clerk,
contrary to the findings of the ALJ. Id.
The Court need not determine whether Plaintiff’s argument is correct, because even
if it were, the ALJ’s alleged error would be harmless. The ALJ found that Plaintiff could
perform two other jobs that she had previously held, both of which are generally performed
at the sedentary level: Accounting Clerk and Patient Account Clerk. Tr. 25. There is no
requirement that a claimant must be able to perform all past relevant work; so long as she
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can continue to perform at least one job, she will be found to be not disabled. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(f) (stating that an individual who can perform past relevant work will be found
not disabled); 404.1560(b)(2)-(3) (stating that if a claimant can meet the demands of past
relevant work, whether as it is generally performed in the national economy or as the
claimant actually performed it, then she will be found not disabled). Thus, Plaintiff’s alleged
inability to meet the demands of her previous work as a Route Account Clerk is immaterial,
because she could work as an Accounting Clerk or a Patient Account Clerk. Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ committed reversible error on this point is without merit.
D.

Whether the ALJ Failed to Adequately Weigh the Treating Sources’ Opinions
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to adequately weigh the opinions of Plaintiff’s

three treating sources: (1) Timothy Allen, M.D. (“Dr. Allen”) of Fort Collins Neurology, (2)
Brienne Loy, M.D. (“Dr. Loy”) of Family Health Care of the Rockies, and (3) Harris Jensen,
M.D. (“Dr. Jensen”), a psychiatrist. Brief [318] at 39-45. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred
by failing “ to provide specific and legitimate reasons for disregarding the RFC opinions”
of these treating sources.
At the outset, the Court notes that a treating source’s opinion regarding a claimant’s
disability status is not a “medical opinion” to which the ALJ is required to give any weight.
Davison v. Colvin, __ F. App’x __, __, No. 14-1122, 2014 WL 7240066, at *6 (10th Cir.
Dec. 22, 2014). Rather, an opinion on the ultimate issue of a claimant’s disability status
is a legal determination reserved to the Commissioner, and a treating source’s opinion on
this issue is “never entitled to controlling weight or given special significance.” Id. (citing
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1); SSR 96–5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *1, *2, *5 (July 2, 1996).
Otherwise, however, treating physicians' opinions are generally given controlling
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weight. Watkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 2003). Even if a treating
physician's medical opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, “[t]reating source medical
opinions are still entitled to deference and must be weighed using all of the factors provided
in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527.” Fowler v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 1451, 1453 (10th Cir. 1989). Those
factors are:
(1) the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination;
(2)the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, including the treatment
provided and the kind of examination or testing performed; (3) the degree to
which the physician's opinion is supported by relevant evidence; (4)
consistency between the opinion and the record as a whole; (5) whether or
not the physician is a specialist in the area upon which an opinion is
rendered; and (6) other factors brought to the ALJ's attention which tend to
support or contradict the opinion.
Drapeau v. Massanari, 255 F.3d 1211, 1213 (10th Cir. 2001); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).
Although the factors listed above are to be considered in weighing medical opinions, the
Court does not insist on a factor-by-factor analysis so long as the “ALJ's decision [is]
‘sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator
gave to the treating source's medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.’” Oldham,
509 F.3d at 1258 (quoting Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1300).
The ALJ discussed the opinions of Dr. Allen, Dr. Loy, and Dr. Jensen at length to
explain why he gave their opinions little weight. Tr. 19, 24. Regarding Dr. Allen, the ALJ
stated:
The undersigned gives little weight to the March of 2013 opinions offered by
Dr. Allen. He indicated that the claimant had heart-related exertional
limitations. He stated that the claimant needed to limit repetitive activities
with the bilateral upper extremities to approximately two hours at a time and
that she would require a large break between activities of two hours. As
discussed above, the claimant did not have a severe cardiovascular condition
during the period relevant to this decision. Dr. Allen’s opinions apparently
focus on the claimant’s functioning after her date last insured and therefore
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the undersigned gives little weight to those opinions.
Tr. 24 (internal citations omitted). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred regarding the onset
of Plaintiff’s heart condition, and that he erred by disregarding the restriction with respect
to Plaintiff’s right upper extremity. Brief [#18] at 39-41. However, the ALJ did not state that
Plaintiff’s heart condition did not begin until after the date last insured. Rather, the ALJ
accepted that Plaintiff did have a heart condition during the relevant period, but he found
that it was minor enough to not be deemed a severe impairment at step two of the analysis.
Tr. 16, 24. Similarly, the ALJ restricted the use of Plaintiff’s right upper extremity to only
“frequent” use in the RFC. Tr. 20. Under the DOT, “[a]n activity or condition is considered
‘constant’ when it exists two-thirds or more of the time; it is considered ‘frequent’ when it
exists from one-third to two-thirds of the time; and it is considered ‘occasional’ when it
exists up to one-third of the time.” Carson v. Barnhart, 140 F. App’x 29, 37 (10th Cir.
2005). Thus, the ALJ appears to have taken Plaintiff’s upper-right-extremity limitation into
account, although he did not limit Plaintiff as severely as Dr. Allen would have. Given these
considerations and its review of Dr. Allen’s opinion, the Court finds that the ALJ's decision
is sufficiently specific to make clear the weight he gave to Dr. Allen's medical opinion and
the reasons for that weight. See Oldham, 509 F.3d at 1258.
Regarding Dr. Loy, the ALJ stated:
The undersigned gives little weight to the May of 2013 opinions offered by
[Dr. Loy]. She opined that the claimant could rarely lift ten pounds. She
further opined that the claimant could sit for 60% of a workday and that the
claimant could stand and walk for a total of 30% of a workday. Dr. Loy
indicated that the claimant could perform only minimal hand movement due
to severe carpal tunnel syndrome. Dr. Loy opined that the claimant was
easily distracted and unable to focus due to pain and fatigue, noting that the
claimant’s symptoms constantly interfered with her attention and
concentration. She concluded that the claimant would miss three or more
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days of work due to her impairments and need for treatment. These
limitations are extreme compared to the claimant’s level of treatment during
the period relevant to this decision and compared to the claimant’s
performance during the consultative examination. Moreover, Dr. Loy offered
her opinion well after the claimant’s date last insured. For these reasons, the
undersigned gives very little weight to Dr. Loy’s opinions.
Tr. 25 (internal citations omitted). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ was vague regarding his
reasoning for finding that Dr. Loy’s proposed limitations on Plaintiff’s abilities were
“extreme.” Brief [#18] at 42-43. Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred by giving very little
weight to Dr. Loy’s opinion on the basis that the opinion was provided ten months after the
date last insured. Brief [#18] at 42-43.
The Court disagrees with Plaintiff’s argument. First, the ALJ had already thoroughly
discussed Plaintiff’s treatment during the relevant period throughout his decision. See Tr.
13-24. Second, although Plaintiff had been treated during the relevant period at the facility
where Dr. Loy works, there appears to be no question that she saw Dr. Loy only once, long
after the date last insured. Brief [#18] at 43. Tr. 440-43. Third, medical records from
March 2012, the end of the period for which Plaintiff was last insured, demonstrate a much
greater performance level than that suggested by Dr. Loy ten months later. Tr. 24, 351,
482-85. Given these considerations and its review of Dr. Loy’s opinion, the Court finds that
the ALJ's decision is sufficiently specific to make clear the weight he gave to Dr. Loy's
medical opinion and the reasons for that weight. See Oldham, 509 F.3d at 1258.
Finally, regarding Dr. Jensen, the ALJ stated:
The undersigned gives very little weight to the May of 2013 opinions offered
by Dr. Jensen. He opined that the claimant had up to marked cognitive
limitations and up to marked social limitations. He also noted that the
claimant had limitations in activities of daily living due to her physical
conditions. Dr. Jensen concluded that the claimant was “100% disabled” and
that she would never be able to work. The determination of disability is one
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reserved solely for the Commissioner of Social Security pursuant to Social
Security Ruling 96-5p. Moreover, Dr. Jensen did not treat the claimant until
well after her date last insured. The claimant’s minimal treatment during the
period relevant to this decision suggests that her mental impairments did not
have at least more than a minimal effect on her ability to do work-related
activity as of date last insured, contrary to the opinions of Dr. Jensen.
Tr. 19. Plaintiff concedes that her argument regarding Dr. Jensen’s treatment of her, which
began fourteen months after the date last insured, is the weakest of any regarding the
treating physicians. Brief [#18] at 44. However, she argues that “the mental health
diagnosis and symptoms were documented throughout the record,” and the ALJ erred by
failing to give Dr. Jensen’s opinion at least some weight and include some restrictions in
the RFC in connection with Plaintiff’s depression and fatigue. Id. The Court has already
addressed this argument in connection with two of Plaintiff’s other arguments. See supra
§§ III.A., B. Thus, in consideration of the Court’s earlier discussion and its review of Dr.
Jensen’s opinion, the Court finds that the ALJ's decision is sufficiently specific to make
clear the weight he gave to Dr. Jensen's medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.
See Oldham, 509 F.3d at 1258.
The Court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the
ALJ and the Commissioner. Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1173 (10th Cir. 2005);
White v. Barnhart, 287 F.3d 903, 905, 908, 909 (10th Cir. 2001). However, the conclusions
reached by the ALJ must be reasonable and consistent with the evidence. See Glenn v.
Shalala, 21 F.3d 983, 988 (10th Cir. 1994) (explaining that the Court must affirm if,
considering the evidence as a whole, there is sufficient evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion). An ALJ must evaluate every medical
opinion in the record, although the weight given each opinion will vary according to the
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relationship between the disability claimant and the medical professional.” Hamlin v.
Barnhart, 365 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 401.1527(d)). The ALJ
has met these standards. Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err in his
treatment of Plaintiff’s treating medical sources.
IV. Conclusion
The record contains substantial evidence from which the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff
was not entitled to benefits under the Act during the time relevant to this case. The ALJ’s
decision was based upon substantial evidence and is free of reversible legal error.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each party shall bear its own costs and attorney’s
fees.
Dated: January 29, 2015

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