Big Cats of Serenity Springs, Inc. et al v. Vilsack et al

Filing 32

ORDER granting 30 Defendant's Unopposed Motion to Vacate Scheduling Conference. All discovery is STAYED pending resolution of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [# 23 ]. The Scheduling Conference set for June 27, 2014, at 9:30 a.m. is VACATED. By Magistrate Judge Kristen L. Mix on 5/27/20144.(klyon, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 13-cv-03275-REB-KLM
BIG CATS OF SERENITY SPRINGS, INC., doing business as Serenity Springs Wildlife
Center,
NICK SCULAC,
JULIE WALKER, and
JULES INVESTMENT, INC.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
THOMAS J. VILSACK, in his official capacity as Secretary of Agriculture,
CINDY RHODES,
TRACY THOMPSON, and
OTHER UNNAMED USDA EMPLOYEES,
Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________
ORDER
______________________________________________________________________
ENTERED BY MAGISTRATE JUDGE KRISTEN L. MIX
This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Unopposed Motion to Vacate
Scheduling Conference [#30]1 (the “Motion”). Defendants state that they “move to vacate
the [S]cheduling [C]onference . . . because the discovery process should not commence
in light of [D]efendants’ motion to dismiss, in which the individual [D]efendants have raised
a well-supported and colorable qualified immunity defense.” Motion [#30] at 1. While the
Motion purports to only seek to vacate the Scheduling Conference, ultimately, the relief
requested, if granted, would result in a stay of discovery pending resolution of Defendants’

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“[#30]” is an example of the convention I use to identify the docket number assigned to
a specific paper by the Court’s case management and electronic case filing system (CM/ECF). I
use this convention throughout this Order.

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Motion to Dismiss [#23].
Although a stay of proceedings in a case is generally disfavored, the Court has
discretion to stay discovery while a dispositive motion is pending. See Wason Ranch Corp.
v. Hecla Mining Co., No. 07-cv-00267-EWN-MEH, 2007 WL 1655362, at *1 (D. Colo. June
6, 2007) (“A stay of all discovery is generally disfavored in this District.” (citation omitted));
String Cheese Incident, LLC v. Stylus Shows, Inc., No. 02-cv-01934-LTB-PAC, 2006 WL
894955, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2006) (finding that a thirty day stay of discovery was
appropriate when a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction was pending);
Nankivil v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 216 F.R.D. 689, 692 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (finding that a stay
may be appropriate if “resolution of a preliminary motion may dispose of the entire action.”);
8 Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2040, at 521-22 (2d ed.
1994) (“[W]hen one issue may be determinative of a case, the court has discretion to stay
discovery on other issues until the critical issue has been decided.”); Vivid Techs., Inc. v.
Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 804 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“When a particular issue may
be dispositive, the court may stay discovery concerning other issues until the critical issue
is resolved.”); Gilbert v. Ferry, 401 F.3d 411, 415-16 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that staying
discovery is not an abuse of discretion when a defendant has filed a motion to dismiss
challenging the court’s actual subject matter jurisdiction); Chavous v. D.C. Fin.
Responsibility & Mgmt. Assistance Auth., 201 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2005) (“A stay of
discovery pending the determination of a dispositive motion is an eminently logical means
to prevent wasting the time and effort of all concerned, and to make the most efficient use
of judicial resources.” (internal quotation omitted)). Further, in their pending Motion to
Dismiss [#23], the two Defendants named in their individual capacities assert that they are
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entitled to qualified immunity. See Motion to Dismiss [#23] at 11-21.
Qualified immunity “give[s] government officials a right, not merely to avoid ‘standing
trial,’ but also to avoid the burdens of ‘such pretrial matters as discovery . . . .’” Behrens
v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 308 (1996) (citation omitted). Immunity questions should be
resolved at the earliest possible stage of the litigation, thereby avoiding many of the
associated burdens and costs. See id. at 308, 310 (1996) (noting that discovery can be
particularly disruptive when a dispositive motion regarding immunity is pending); Mitchell
v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (“the qualified immunity doctrine is [designed] . . . to
permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment and to avoid
subjecting government officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broadreaching discovery . . . .”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Moore v. Busby,
92 F. App'x 699, 702 (10th Cir. 2004) (affirming trial court’s stay of discovery pending
resolution of absolute immunity question); Albright v. Rodriguez, 51 F.3d 1531, 1534 (10th
Cir. 1995) (“the Supreme Court has repeatedly ‘stressed the importance of resolving
immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.’” (citation omitted)). Qualified
immunity “is [designed] . . . to permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on
summary judgment and to avoid subjecting government officials either to the costs of trial
or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery . . . .”

Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526. “The

entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an
absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Id.
(emphasis in original). Accordingly, an order denying qualified immunity is immediately
appealable. Id. at 527. The Court is obligated to “exercise its discretion so that officials
[properly asserting qualified immunity] are not subjected to unnecessary and burdensome
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discovery or trial proceedings.” Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 597-98 (1998).
When exercising its discretion to enter a stay, the Court considers the following
factors: (1) the interest of the plaintiff in proceeding expeditiously and the potential
prejudice to the plaintiff of a delay; (2) the burden on the defendant; (3) the convenience
to the Court; (4) the interests of nonparties; and (5) the public interest. String Cheese
Incident, LLC, 2006 WL 894955, at *2 (citing FDIC v. Renda, No. 85-2216-O, 1987 WL
348635, at *2 (D. Kan. Aug. 6, 1987)).
In this case, staying discovery would apparently not prejudice Plaintiffs, as they do
not oppose the Motion. Therefore, the Court finds that the first String Cheese Incident
factor weighs in favor of a stay. With regard to the second factor, it appears Defendants
will not be burdened by a stay because they are seeking a stay. The Court therefore finds
that the second String Cheese Incident factor weighs in favor of a stay. With regard to the
third factor, it is certainly more convenient for the Court to enter a stay until it is clear which
claims, if any, will move forward. The Court therefore finds that the third String Cheese
Incident factor weighs in favor of a stay. With regard to the fourth factor, there are no
nonparties with significant particularized interests in this case. Accordingly, the fourth
String Cheese Incident factor neither weighs in favor nor against a stay. With regard to the
fifth and final factor, the Court finds that the public’s only interest in this case is a general
interest in its efficient and just resolution. Avoiding wasteful efforts by the Court and
litigants serves this interest. Thus, the fifth String Cheese Incident factor weighs in favor
of a stay.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion [#30] is GRANTED. Accordingly,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all discovery is STAYED pending resolution of
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Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [#23].
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Scheduling Conference set for June 27, 2014,
at 9:30 a.m. is VACATED. The Court will reset the Scheduling Conference, if necessary,
after resolution of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [#23].
Dated: May 27, 2014

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