Spring Creek Exploration & Production Company, LLC v. Hess Bakken Invenstment II, LLC et al

Filing 93

ORDER. ORDERED that plaintiff Spring Creek Exploration & Production Company, LLC's Motion for Reconsideration Regarding Portions of the Court's Order Granting in Part and Dismissing in Part the Defendants Motions to Dismiss 52 is DENIED. Entered by Judge Philip A. Brimmer on 06/05/15.(jhawk, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Philip A. Brimmer
Civil Action No. 14-cv-00134-PAB-KMT
SPRING CREEK EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION COMPANY, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
HESS BAKKEN INVESTMENT II, LLC f/k/a TRZ Energy, LLC, and
STATOIL OIL & GAS, LP f/k/a Brigham Oil & Gas, LP,
Defendants.

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Reconsideration Regarding
Portions of the Court’s Order Granting in Part and Dismissing in Part the Defendants’
Motions to Dismiss [Docket No. 52] filed by plaintiff Spring Creek Exploration &
Production Company, LLC (“Spring Creek”). The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises out of a dispute concerning an agreement (the “Agreement”)
and an Area of Mutual Interest (“AMI”) entered into between Spring Creek and
defendant Hess Bakken Investment II, LLC (“Hess Bakken”) whereby Hess Bakken
agreed to assign to Spring Creek an overriding royalty interest in all current and future
leases it held in an area known as the Tomahawk Prospect. Docket No. 3 at 3, ¶ 10.
In exchange for the overriding royalty interest in the leases, Spring Creek sold its oil and
gas interests in the Tomahawk Prospect to Hess Bakken and agreed not to acquire any

additional interests in the Tomahawk Prospect. Id. In April 2010, Hess Bakken sold
certain of its leases in the Tomahawk Prospect to defendant Statoil Oil & Gas, LP
(“Statoil”) (with respect to the agreement between defendants, the “Hess/Statoil
Agreement”). After Hess Bakken’s sale of its interests in the Tomahawk Prospect to
Statoil, Statoil honored the Agreement in part, by paying Spring Creek royalties on
leases in the Tomahawk Prospect that Hess Bakken owned at the time of the
Hess/Statoil Agreement, but Statoil did not assign overriding royalty interests to Spring
Creek in any leases that it acquired in the Tomahawk Prospect after it acquired Hess
Bakken’s leases in that area. Id. at 6, ¶¶ 27-28.
Spring Creek initiated this action on December 13, 2013, asserting claims for
relief for breach of contract, fraudulent concealment, and civil conspiracy against Hess
Bakken and Statoil, as well as a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing against Hess Bakken and a claim for tortious interference with contract
against Statoil. See generally Docket No. 3.
In its September 5, 2014 Order, the Court dismissed plaintiff’s claims for breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, tortious interference with contract,
fraudulent concealment, and civil conspiracy. Docket No. 48 at 28. The Court also
partially dismissed Spring Creek’s breach of contract claims against each defendant.
With respect to Spring Creek’s breach of contract claim against Hess Bakken, the Court
dismissed the claim with regard to the theories that Hess Bakken failed to disclose
leases acquired after the Hess/Statoil Agreement and failed to acquire new leases. Id.
The Court also partially dismissed Spring Creek’s claim against Statoil for breach of
contract with regard to the theory that Statoil breached the Agreement by failing to
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disclose all of the leases it acquired in the Tomahawk Prospect. Id.
Spring Creek seeks reconsideration of a portion of the Court’s September 5,
2014 Order. Specifically, Spring Creek asks the Court to reconsider the Court’s holding
that neither the Agreement nor the AMI obligated Hess Bakken to acquire new leases.
Docket No. 52 at 2. The result of this holding was partial dismissal of Spring Creek’s
first claim for relief (breach of contract against Hess Bakken). See Docket No. 48 at 910, 28.
II. ANALYSIS
Spring Creek brings its motion pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 60(b), which concerns
relief from a “final judgment, order, or proceeding.” However, no final judgment or order
has entered against Spring Creek. Where a party files a motion for reconsideration
prior to the entry of judgment or of a final order, Rules 59(e) and 60(b) do not apply.
Houston Fearless Corp. v. Teter, 313 F.2d 91, 92 (10th Cir. 1962). Thus, Spring
Creek’s motion is procedurally improper and is denied on this ground. In the
alternative, even if the Court construes Spring Creek’s motion as a motion for
reconsideration, the Court nevertheless determines that Spring Creek has failed to
demonstrate entitlement to relief.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not specifically provide for motions for
reconsideration. See Hatfield v. Bd. of County Comm’rs for Converse County, 52 F.3d
858, 861 (10th Cir. 1995). Instead, motions for reconsideration fall within a court's
plenary power to revisit and amend interlocutory orders as justice requires. See
Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Thompson Theatres, Inc., 621 F.2d 1088, 1090 (10th Cir.

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1980) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)); see also Houston Fearless Corp., 313 F.2d at 92.
However, in order to avoid the inefficiency which would attend the repeated
re-adjudication of interlocutory orders, judges in this district have imposed limits on their
broad discretion to revisit interlocutory orders. See, e.g., Montano v. Chao, No. 07-cv00735-EWN-KMT, 2008 WL 4427087, at *5-6 (D. Colo. Sept. 28, 2008) (a pplying Rule
60(b) analysis to the reconsideration of interlocutory order); United Fire & Cas. Co. v.
McCrerey & Roberts Constr. Co., No. 06-cv-00037-WYD-CBS, 2007 WL 1306484, at
*1-2 (D. Colo. May 3, 2007) (applying Rule 59(e) standard to the reconsideration of the
duty-to-defend order). Regardless of the analysis applied, the basic assessment tends
to be the same: courts consider whether new evidence or legal authority has emerged
or whether the prior ruling was clearly in error. Motions to reconsider are generally an
inappropriate vehicle to advance “new arguments, or supporting facts which were
available at the time of the original motion.” Servants of the Paraclete v. Does, 204
F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000).
As grounds for reconsideration, Spring Creek argues that the Court was not, at
the pleadings stage, provided with a complete version of the Agreement, as the
Agreement consisted of a number of different contracts, not all of which were attached
to Spring Creek’s complaint. See Docket No. 52 at 2-3. According to Spring Creek, the
entire agreement is ambiguous as to whether Hess Bakken had an obligation to acquire
new leases, and Spring Creek should be allowed to present evidence regarding the
parties’ intent. Id. at 6-7. Hess Bakken argues that Spring Creek’s failure to attach the
complete Agreement to its complaint is not grounds for reconsideration of the Court’s

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order of dismissal. Docket No. 60 at 3. The Court agrees. Spring Creek’s motion is
not based on evidence discovered after the Court issued its September 5, 2014 Order.
Rather, as Spring Creek acknowledges, the additional contracts that it attaches to its
motion for reconsideration were all “executed on or around October 8, 2009.” Docket
No. 52 at 3. Moreover, as Hess Bakken notes, see Docket No. 60 at 3, Spring Creek’s
argument in response to Hess Bakken’s motion to dismiss was that the AMI
“unambiguously” obligated Hess Bakken to pursue additional leases. See Docket No.
33 at 4-5. Spring Creek did not rely on any of the documents that it contends comprise
the Agreement. The Court rejected Spring Creek’s argument and finds that Spring
Creek’s attempt to resurrect its breach of contract claim against Hess Bakken by raising
an argument based on different agreements fails.
A motion for reconsideration is not the proper forum to entertain new
interpretations of “supporting facts which were available at the time of the original
motion.” Servants of the Paraclete, 204 F.3d at 1012. Thus, even if the Court were to
construe the instant motion as a motion for reconsideration, Spring Creek would not be
entitled to relief.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is
ORDERED that plaintiff Spring Creek Exploration & Production Company, LLC’s
Motion for Reconsideration Regarding Portions of the Court’s Order Granting in Part
and Dismissing in Part the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss [Docket No. 52] is DENIED.

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DATED June 5, 2015.
BY THE COURT:

s/Philip A. Brimmer
PHILIP A. BRIMMER
United States District Judge

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