Schlumbrecht-Muniz v. Steamboat Ski and Resort Corporation et al
Filing
54
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO ALTER ORDER: Steamboat's Motion to Alter the Court's March 12, 2015 Opinion and Order 51 is DENIED. by Chief Judge Marcia S. Krieger on 6/18/15.(msksec, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Chief Judge Marcia S. Krieger
Civil Action No. 14-cv-00191-MSK-NYW
LINDA SCHLUMBRECHT-MUNIZ, M.D.,
Plaintiff,
v.
STEAMBOAT SKI AND RESORT CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation doing
business as Steamboat,
Defendant.
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO ALTER ORDER
THIS MATTER comes before the Court pursuant to the Defendant’s Motion for
Reconsideration and to Alter this Court’s Opinion and Order of March 12, 2015 (#51), the
Plaintiff’s Response (#52), and the Defendant’s Reply (#53).
The Plaintiff Linda Schlumbrecht-Muniz (“Dr. Muniz”) asserts three claims against the
Defendant Steamboat Ski and Resort Corporation (“Steamboat”) for injuries she suffered after
colliding with a snowmobile while skiing at Steamboat. As relevant to the instant motion,
Steamboat moved to dismiss Dr. Muniz’s negligence claim on the grounds that it was barred by
the Colorado Ski Safety Act, which provides immunity to ski are operators from any claims
resulting from the inherent risks and dangers of skiing. See C.R.S. §§ 33-44-103(3.5)-112. The
Court concluded that the Amended Complaint contained sufficient allegations to support a
plausible claim that Dr. Muniz’s collision with a snowmobile was not an inherent risk or danger
of skiing and denied Steamboat’s Motion to Dismiss.
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Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), Steamboat moves for reconsideration of the Court’s
March 12, 2015 Opinion and Order Denying Motion to Dismiss (#50). Steamboat argues that the
Court erred in relying on Graven v. Vail Associates, Inc., 909 P.2d 514 (Colo. 1995).
Specifically, Steamboat argues Graven is no longer good law because it was decided before the
General Assembly amended the Colorado Ski Safety Act to strike the word “integral” from the
definition of inherent dangers and risks of skiing.
There are three possible situations which warrant reconsideration: (1) an intervening
change in controlling law, (2) new evidence which was previously unavailable, or (3) the need to
correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice. See Servants of the Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d
1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000). When, as here, a party alleges there was clear error, a court may
reconsider its prior ruling if it has misapprehended the facts or a party’s position, but it is not
appropriate to revisit issues that have already been addressed or for a party to advance arguments
that could have been raised previously.
The Court has thoroughly reviewed the Motion, Response and Reply. Steamboat is
correct that the Court improvidently included the word “integral” in quoting from Graven rather
than using the precise language of the Ski Safety Act. Because such reference caused confusion
and misunderstanding, the Court takes this opportunity to clarify its reasoning.
The Court’s reference to Graven and use of the word “integral” in quoting from it does
not reflect application of the Graven standard that ski operators are shielded from liability only
for injuries arising from “dangers that are inherent and integral to the sport of skiing” as
compared to the current standard embodied in the Ski Safety Act that protects ski area operators
from liability for injuries that result from “inherent dangers and risks of skiing”. The Court’s
reference to Graven was for its reasoning, not for the standard it applied (which is partially
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abrogated by the terms of the Ski Safety Act). What is important about the Graven decision is
that it recognized that the determination of whether a particular occurrence or condition
constitutes an inherent danger or risk of skiing is not always a question of law – consideration of
the facts relevant to the occurrence may be critical. Indeed, the facts of a particular occurrence
can be important because what is an inherent risk of skiing is not necessarily limited to the
circumstances specifically enumerated in the Ski Safety Act in C.R.S. §33-44-103. See: See
Fluery v. IntraWest Winter Park Operations Corporation, 2014 Colo. Ct. App. 13, __ P.3d ___,
2014 WL 554237, pet. for cert. pending (2014 Colo. Sup. Ct. 224) (avalanches occurring within
the bounds of a ski area are inherent dangers and risks of skiing). And as Graven recognized,
some events might generally fit within the Ski Safety Act, but a particular circumstance would not.
Collisions with snowmobiles are not listed as inherent risks of skiing in C.R.S. §33-44103. Although Steamboat argues that collisions with snowmobiles should be treated as an
inherent danger and risk of skiing, it points to no Colorado case-law that has made such
determination with regard to all snowmobile collisions.1 Under these circumstances, the Court
defers to the fact specific analysis recognized in Graven, and declines at this juncture to dismiss
the negligence claim for failure to state a claim recognized under Colorado law. Of course, this
conclusion does not prevent Steamboat from renewing its argument after the facts have been
developed either by way of dispositive motion or at trial.
1
This Court’s decision in Robinette v. Aspen Skiing Co., LLC, 2009 WL 1108093, *2 (D. Colo.
2009), aff’d 363 Fed. Appx. 547 (10th Cir. 2010) is inapposite here. The language considered
was “risk of skiing/riding” contained in a release, not the statutory language at issue.
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Accordingly, Steamboat’s Motion to Alter the Court’s March 12, 2015 Opinion and
Order (#51) is DENIED.
Dated this 18th day of June, 2015.
BY THE COURT:
Marcia S. Krieger
Chief United States District Judge
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