Boxer F2, L.P. v. Flamingo West, Ltd. et al.
Filing
191
ORDER. Defendants William Bronchick and Bronchick & Associates, P.C.'s renewed motion for partial summary judgment 96 is DENIED. Plaintiff Boxer F2, L.P.'s motion for partial summary judgment 95 is GRANTED in part as against Flamingo West and DENIED as against Bronchick & Associates, P.C. By Judge Philip A. Brimmer on 10/23/15.(pabsec)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Philip A. Brimmer
Civil Action No. 14-cv-00317-PAB-MJW
BOXER F2, L.P., a Texas limited partnership,
Plaintiff,
v.
FLAMINGO WEST, LTD., d/b/a Legalwiz Publications,
BRONCHICK & ASSOCIATES,
WILLIAM BRONCHICK, and
BRONCHICK & ASSOCIATES, P.C.,
Defendants.
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on plaintiff Boxer F2, L.P.’s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment [Docket No. 95] and defendants William Bronchick and Bronchick
& Associates, P.C.’s Renewed Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Docket No. 96].
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
I. BACKGROUND1
This case arises out of an alleged breach of a lease agreement. Defendant
Flamingo West, Ltd. (“Flamingo West”) entered into and executed a lease agreement
with RMC/Pavilion Towers in April 2003. Docket No. 95 at 2, Statement of Undisputed
Material Fact (“SUMF”) 1. At all relevant times, both Flamingo West and Bronchick &
Associates PC (“Bronchick PC”) occupied the leased premises, id. at 4, SUMF 12,
1
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise indicated.
though Bronchick PC states that it occupied only a small part of the space. Docket No.
105 at 3, ¶ 12. In June 2011, plaintif f replaced RMC/Pavilion Towers, LLC as Flamingo
West’s landlord. Docket No. 95 at 4, SUMF 13. In 2012, Flam ingo West made late and
partial payments to plaintiff and, after August 2012, stopped paying altogether. Id. at 6,
SUMF 22-23. On November 2, 2012, Flamingo West vacated the leased premises. Id.
at 6, SUMF 25. Plaintiff did not consent to Flamingo West’s abandonment of the
Leased Premises. Id. at 6, SUMF 26. Section 11.1 of the Lease Agreement provides
that abandonment of the leased premises or failure to pay rent constitutes default. Id.
at 6, SUMF 27.
Plaintiff asserts breach of contract claims against Flamingo West, Bronchick &
Associates, Mr. Bronchick, and Bronchick PC as successor to Bronchick & Associates.
Docket No. 65 at 10-13. Plaintiff also asserts an unjust enrichment claim against
Bronchick PC and a fraudulent transfer claim against Flamingo West and Mr.
Bronchick. Id. at 14-15. Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on its breach of contract
claim against Flamingo West and its unjust enrichment claim against Bronchick PC.
Docket No. 95. Mr. Bronchick and Bronchick PC filed a response to the motion, Docket
No. 105, but Flamingo West has not responded.
Defendants William Bronchick and Bronchick PC move for summary judgment
on plaintiff’s breach of contract claims. Docket No. 96. Defendants state that one
party, Flamingo West, signed the lease and successive amendments, and that Mr.
Bronchick signed the lease solely in his capacity as a representative of Flamingo West.
Docket No. 96 at 4. Defendants also argue that Bronchick PC cannot be liable under
the Lease Agreement as a successor entity to Bronchick & Associates because
2
Bronchick & Associates is not a standalone entity but merely a trade name for Flamingo
West. Docket No. 96 at 3.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 when
the “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50 (1986). A disputed f act is “material” if
under the relevant substantive law it is essential to proper disposition of the claim.
Wright v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 259 F.3d 1226, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 2001). Only disputes
over material facts can create a genuine issue for trial and preclude summary
judgment. Faustin v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 423 F.3d 1192, 1198 (10th Cir. 2005). An
issue is “genuine” if the evidence is such that it might lead a reasonable jury to return a
verdict for the nonmoving party. Allen v. Muskogee, 119 F.3d 837, 839 (10th Cir.
1997). Where “the moving party does not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at
trial, it may satisfy its burden at the summary judgment stage by identifying a lack of
evidence for the nonmovant on an essential element of the nonmovant’s claim.”
Bausman v. Interstate Brands Corp., 252 F.3d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 671 (10th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation
marks omitted)). “Once the moving party meets this burden, the burden shifts to the
nonmoving party to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial on a material matter.”
Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1518 (10th Cir.
1994) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)). The nonmoving party
3
may not rest solely on the allegations in the pleadings, but instead must designate
“specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324;
see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). “To avoid summary judgment, the nonmovant must
establish, at a minimum, an inference of the presence of each element essential to the
case.” Bausman, 252 F.3d at 1115 (citation omitted). When reviewing a motion for
summary judgment, a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. Id.; see McBeth v. Himes, 598 F.3d 708, 715 (10th Cir. 2010).
The Court may not grant a motion for summary judgment simply because the
nonmovant has failed to respond. See Galvin v. McCarthy, No. 07-cv00885-PAB-BNB,
2009 WL 890717, at *2 (D. Colo. March 31, 2009) (citing Reed v. Bennett, 312 F.3d
1190, 1194 (10th Cir. 2002)). The Court must apply the usual Rule 56 analysis and
consider whether the moving party has met its burden. Id. (citing Reed, 312 F.3d at
1194); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3) (providing that if the opposing party does not
respond, summary judgment should be entered if “the movant is entitled to it”). The
Court must “accept as true all material facts asserted and properly supported in
[defendants’] summary judgment motion” and grant summary judgment if, based on
those facts, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Reed, 312 F.3d
at 1195.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Boxer’s Breach of Contract Claim Against Flamingo West
Although plaintiff pursues breach of contract claims against Flamingo West, Mr.
Bronchick, Bronchick & Associates, and Bronchick PC, plaintif f seeks summary
4
judgment solely against Flamingo West.
To succeed on its breach of contract claim,2 plaintiff must show there is no
genuine dispute of material facts regarding (1) the existence of a binding agreement
between Flamingo West and Boxer, (2) that Boxer performed its contractual obligations,
(3) Flamingo West’s failure to perform its obligations, and (4) damages to Boxer
therefrom. See Xtreme Coil Drilling Corp. v. Encana Oil & Gas (USA), Inc., 958 F.
Supp. 2d 1238, 1243 (D. Colo. 2013) (citing Western Distributing Co. v. Diodosio, 841
P.2d 1053, 1058 (Colo. 1992)).
Regarding the first element, plaintiff attaches the April 14, 2003 lease, signed by
William Bronchick on behalf of Flamingo West and R. Maurice Crowe, Jr. on behalf of
plaintiff. Docket No. 95 at 2, SUMF 1. As to the second element, plaintiff asserts that it
provided the leased premises that Flamingo West occupied. Id. at 9, ¶ 39. As to the
third allegation, plaintiff asserts that Flamingo West breached the Lease Agreement by
abandoning the entire premises prior to the expiration of the term of the Lease
Agreement, and by failing to make rent and other payments due under the lease
agreement. Id. at 10, ¶¶ 42, 44. Regarding its damages allegations, plaintiff claims
that Flamingo West owes $2,428,625.03. Id. at 14, ¶ 62. This total consists of
$27,873.52 for past-due rent and late fees that accrued between April 1, 2012 and
2
The first and second amendments to the Lease Agreement specify that
Colorado law applies. Docket No. 96-2 at 6, § 15; Docket No. 96-3 at 5, § 11. T he
Lease Agreement and the third and fourth amendments do not specify the applicable
law. See Docket 96-1; Docket No. 96-4; Docket No. 96-5. The parties appear to agree
that Colorado law applies to the breach of contract claims in this case. The Court will
operate under the same premise. Cf. Grynberg v. Total S.A., 538 F.3d 1336, 1346
(10th Cir. 2008) (“Because the parties’ arguments assume that Colorado law applies,
we will proceed under the same assumption.”).
5
October 31, 2012 (id. at 12, ¶ 55), $2,141,735.04 for rent, late fees, and interest
thereon for the period between November 1, 2012 through April 30, 2015 (id. at 13, ¶
58), $75,664.00 for rent payments due between May 1, 2015 and September 30, 2016
(Id. at 13, ¶ 59), $183,351.30 in costs to repair the Leased Prem ises. Id. at 13, ¶ 61.
The damages figure of $2,428,625.03 provided by plaintiff has been reduced by
plaintiff’s damage mitigation resulting from new tenants occupying the Leased
Premises. Docket No. 95 at 15. Plaintiff supports the above calculations with citations
to the report presented by its expert, Mr. Robert Aucone. Flamingo West, by virtue of
not responding to plaintiff’s summary judgment motion, does not contest any of these
facts.
Viewed in the light most favorable to Flamingo West, the undisputed facts are
sufficient to establish all the elements of Boxer’s breach of contract claim against
Flamingo West.
B. Plaintiff’s Unjust Enrichment Claim Against Bronchick PC
In order to succeed on its unjust enrichment claim, Boxer must show there is no
genuine dispute of material fact that: (1) Boxer conferred a benefit to Bronchick PC; (2)
Bronchick PC accepted the benefit; and (3) it would be inequitable under the
circumstances for Bronchick PC to retain the benefit. See Greenway Nutrients, Inc. v.
Blackburn, 33 F. Supp 3d 1224, 1260 (D. Colo. 2014) (citing Dass v. Epplen, 162 Colo.
60, 78 (Colo. 1967)).
Since plaintiff has reserved its right to claim that one or more of the other
defendants were parties to and liable under the 2003 Lease, see Docket No. 95 at 2
6
n.1, it does not appear that plaintiff predicates its motion on alter ego theories. It is
undisputed that Bronchick PC did not sign the April 14, 2003 lease. Moreover, in its
reply, plaintiff admits that whether Bronchick PC is a party to the Lease Agreement
constitutes a genuine issue of material fact “that currently precludes the entry of
summary judgment against Bronchick PC on [p]laintiff’s unjust enrichment claim.”
Docket No. 113 at 7, ¶ 6. Accordingly, summary judgment is improper on plaintiff’s
unjust enrichment claim against Bronchick P.C.
C. William Bronchick and Bronchick PC’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendants William Bronchick and Bronchick PC move for summary judgment
on Boxer’s breach of contract claims. Defendants allege that only one party, Flamingo
West, signed the lease, and that because Mr. Bronchick signed the lease solely in a
representative capacity, he cannot be liable. Docket No. 96 at 6. Def endants argue
that Bronchick PC cannot be liable under the Lease Ag reement as a successor entity.
Id. at 9. Defendants argue that the third and fourth amendments to the Lease
Agreement list Flamingo West alone as tenant and that the Lease m akes no mention of
either William Bronchick or Bronchick & Associates. Id. at 8. As such, defendants
argue that neither Mr. Bronchick nor Bronchick & Associates can be held liable because
they did not sign the extension agreement to the lease. Id.
However, since Mr. Bronchick and Bronchick PC filed their motion on March 20,
2015, certain facts have been established as findings by the Court. Boxer moved for
sanctions against all defendants on March 2, 2015. Docket No. 89. T he magistrate
judge granted Boxer’s motion. See Docket No. 130. As the appropriate sanction, the
7
magistrate judge entered findings of fact as to certain of plaintiff’s alter ego allegations.
Id. at 8-9; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(I) (authorizing sanctions “directing that the
matters embraced in the . . . designated facts be taken as established for purposes of
the action, as the prevailing party claims[.]”). The Court overruled defendants’
objections to the magistrate judge’s order. Docket No. 185.
The magistrate judge’s sanction order established as fact, among other things,
that Mr. Bronchick is the sole owner, operator, officer, and shareholder of Flamingo
West, that Flamingo West operated as Bronchick & Associates, and that Flam ingo
West has made transfers to Mr. Bronchick with the intent to defraud. Docket No. 130 at
9, ¶¶ 3.a, 3.c. The order also established that Bronchick PC acquired the assets and
the liabilities of Bronchick & Associates, which resulted in a merger or consolidation of
the two entities, and that Bronchick PC is a mere continuation of Bronchick &
Associates. Id. at 9, ¶ 3.b; see id. at 9, ¶ 3.a.
The magistrate judge’s explicit finding that Bronchick PC assumed the liabilities
of Bronchick & Associates obviates the material factual issue of Bronchick &
Associates’ liability under the Lease Agreement and that Bronchick PC would have
assumed any such liability. Mr. Bronchick and Bronchick PC’s motion is inconsistent
with the magistrate judge’s order and thus is denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is
ORDERED that defendants William Bronchick and Bronchick & Associates,
P.C.’s renewed motion for partial summary judgment [Docket No. 96] is DENIED. It is
8
further
ORDERED that plaintiff Boxer F2, L.P.’s motion for partial summary judgment
[Docket No. 95] is GRANTED in part as against Flamingo West and DENIED as against
Bronchick & Associates, P.C.
DATED October 23, 2015.
BY THE COURT:
s/Philip A. Brimmer
PHILIP A. BRIMMER
United States District Judge
9
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?