BWP Media USA, Inc. et al v. Clarity Digital Group, LLC. et al

Filing 66

ORDER by Judge Philip A. Brimmer on 3/31/15. ORDERED: Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 19] is GRANTED. ORDERED: Plaintiffs' claims are dismissed and this case is dismissed in its entirety. (kpreu)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Philip A. Brimmer

Civil Action No. 14-cv-00467-PAB-KMT
BWP MEDIA USA INC., d/b/a Pacific Coast News, and
NATIONAL PHOTO GROUP, LLC,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CLARITY DIGITAL GROUP, LLC,
Defendant.
_____________________________________________________________________
ORDER
_____________________________________________________________________
This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket
No. 19] filed by defendant Clarity Digital Group, LLC. The Court has subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
I. BACKGROUND1
Defendant owns and operates www.examiner.com (“Examiner.com” or the
“site”), a website where were visitors can access articles on a variety of topics including
arts, entertainment, news, sports, and technology. Docket No. 19 at 2.
Plaintiffs are the owners of photographs, which they license for use by online
and print publications. Docket No. 63 at 4, ¶ 18; see also Docket No. 1-2. Plaintiffs
accuse defendant of copying, posting, and/or displaying 75 of their photographs
(“plaintiffs’ photographs”) on Examiner.com without permission or authorization. Docket

1

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise indicated.

No. 1 at 3, ¶ 16. Content on the site is produced by contributing authors, referred to as
“Examiners.” Docket No. 19 at 2, ¶¶ 1-2.
Defendant recruits individuals to contribute to its site. Docket No. 21 at 2, ¶ 4.
Examiner.com states that contributors will enjoy benefits such as increased exposure
for their work product, compensation tied to writing activity and reader interest,
“Examiner Support . . . available 24/7 to help you improve your writing, technical and
marketing skills, and a team of staff “based in Denver, CO who are available to offer
feedback, answer your questions and welcome you to our community of independent
contributors.” Docket No. 64-4 at 2.
In order to become an Examiner, interested persons must submit an application
and writing sample. Docket No. 63 at 4, ¶ 22. As part of their application, applicants
indicate the topic on which they wish to write. Defendant reviews applications from
potential Examiners to confirm that the applicant has some ability to write, is somewhat
knowledgeable regarding the topic they have chosen, and appears to be reasonably
qualified to create the type of content that defendant wishes to feature on the Examiner.
Docket No. 19 at 2, ¶ 2. Defendant also conducts regular background checks on
applicants. Docket No. 64-4 at 2. False information provided by an Examiner as part of
his or her application “is grounds for immediate dismissal.” Id.
Once defendant accepts an applicant, defendant sends the Examiner an email
confirming the topic on which that Examiner will provide content. Docket No. 63 at 5, ¶
21. The Examiner must also enter into the “Examiners Independent Contractor
Agreement and License” (the “Examiner agreement”) before receiving permission to
post to the site. Docket No. 19 at 2, ¶ 3. By signing the Examiner agreement, the
2

Examiner agrees to use his or her “best efforts” to create works on a topic for a specific
Examiner.com edition, maintain his or her topic page, publish works to the topic page
using the Examiner.com publishing application, create an online community related to
his or her topic page, and drive legitimate traffic to the topic page. Docket No. 21-2 at
2. The Examiner agreement states that Examiners will “regularly create and post new
Works to the Web Page and update the W eb Page as often as reasonably needed.”
Docket No. 21-2 at 2, ¶ 1. The Examiner agreement obligates the examiner to
“coordinate with a representative designated by Examiner.com . . . in the provision of
the Services. You will alert the Representative regarding any important or interesting
Works to be featured on the Web Page.” Docket No. 21-2 at 2, ¶ 1.
The Examiner agreement states that Examiners “must have permission from the
owner/copyright holder of any content before including it on your Web Page, unless it
was provided by Examiner.com.” Docket No. 12-2 at 3, ¶ 4.a.
The Examiner agreement also requires Examiners to comply with the
Examiner.com Editorial Requirements (the “Editorial Requirements”). Docket No. 19 at
2, ¶ 3. The Editorial Requirements direct Examiners to follow the “AP Style” guidelines
and to keep their articles free of profanity, focused on the Examiner’s assigned topic
“unless otherwise approved by Examiner.com,” and composed of original content.
Docket No. 21-3 at 2. Objectionable photos, audio, or v ideo are prohibited unless
approved by Examiner.com before publication. Id. at 2-3. Examiners are required to
submit accurate articles, “[e]nsure that all articles posted on the site are clearly relevant
to your topic,” and, if a “Local Examiner,” “are expected to either write about stories that
are specific to their market[] or to effectively localize a National story.” Id. at 4-5.
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Submitted articles “should be about 200 to 400 works on average, with a minimum of
150 words.” Id. at 5. “Any approvals by Examiner.com described in these Content
Requirements should be sent to your Channel designate.” Id. at 4. The Editorial
Requirements prohibit Examiners from posting content that the Examiner does not have
a right to make publicly available and state:
Do not include any copyrighted material on our site (including text, photos,
video, audio, or anything else) without the permission of the owner, and be
sure to provide attribution to the source where applicable . . . . You also may
not post any content that infringes any patent, trademark, trade secret,
copyright or other proprietary rights of any party. Repeat infringers will be
terminated as Examiners in appropriate circumstances.
Id. at 3-4.
An Examiner is eligible to be compensated for his or her posts pursuant to the
Examiner.com Payment Policy. Docket No. 64-5 at 2. In order to be eligible for
compensation, an Examiner must post a new article at least once a month. Id. The
amount of compensation an Examiner receives is determined by a number of factors,
including revenue, subscriptions, sponsorship, page view traffic, and session length. Id.
Examiner.com does not guarantee that Examiners will be compensated for their work.
Id.; see also Docket No. 64-7. The Examiners who used plaintiffs’ photographs in their
articles earned $415,907.56 from defendant between June 2012 and February 2014,
although it is not entirely clear whether this amount reflects those Examiners’ total
compensation for that time period or reflects only compensation related to articles
containing plaintiffs’ photographs. Docket No. 63 at 5, ¶ 27; see also Docket No. 64-6.
Defendant asserts that it did not derive any revenue directly attributable to the
plaintiffs’ photographs. Docket No. 19 at 4, ¶ 9. Plaintiffs dispute this assertion, citing
4

to the declaration of defendant’s Vice President of Content Operations Lucy Suzanne
Austin, which states, in relevant part, that defendant
derives revenue from display advertising placed by third parties on the
Examiner.com website. While those revenues are determined, in part, by
the volume of visitors to Examiner.com, no advertising revenues are
associated with or dependent upon any particular webpage posted by an
Examiner, much less with any particular photograph posted by any examiner.
Docket No. 21 at 4, ¶ 14.
Once an Examiner has been approved and has agreed to defendants’ terms, the
Examiner is given authorization to use defendant’s publishing tool to contribute content
directly to Examiner.com on the Examiner’s assigned topic. Docket No. 21 at 2, ¶ 6.
The Examiner posts content on an assigned topic directly to his or her topic page,
which bears the Examiner’s name and assigned topic title. Docket No. 21 at 2, ¶¶ 6-7.
The Examiner may modify or remove an article from his or her topic page at any time,
id.; however, once an article is posted on the topic page, defendant exclusively
determines whether an article will be featured elsewhere on the site, such as the
Examiner.com main page or, for example, the site’s “Arts & Entertainment” page.
Docket No. 63 at 5, ¶ 30.
Plaintiff disputes this, arguing that, although Ms. Austin states that defendant
does not review all material posted to the site, Ms. Austin does not state that def endant
reviews none of the material posted by Examiners. Docket No. 63 at 4, ¶ 15 (citing
Docket No. 21 at 3, ¶ 9).
Defendant asserts, within each Examiner’s assigned topic, each Examiner alone
determines the content what he or she posts to the topic site. Docket No. 19 at 3, ¶ 5.
Plaintiffs dispute this assertion, citing to periodic emails from Examiner.com to
5

Examiners suggesting content that Examiner.com intends to cover and/or place “at the
top believe of the website,” encouraging Examiners to “please participate and let us
help you increase your exposure to gain a bigger audience.” See, e.g., Docket No. 6410 at 7. Defendant asserts it did not review, discuss, or approve the use of plaintiffs’
photographs before they were posted to Examiner.com. Docket No. 19 at 5, ¶ 15.
Defendant asserts it does not pre-screen, edit, or approve articles before an Examiner
posts them to his or her topic site. Docket No. 19 at 6, ¶ 6. Examiners post
approximately 1,600 articles per day and defendant “does not review all of the material
posted . . . ; nor does [defendant] have the staff available to do so.” Docket No. 21 at 3,
¶ 9. Plaintiffs dispute these assertions by citing to a screen capture from the
Examiner.com blog that states, in relevant part, “We have Content Managers and a
Review Team who provide in depth training and resources center, Examiner University,
to provide assistance and coaching. These teams are constantly providing editorial
guidance and monitoring content to ensure there is the highest quality of accurate
information available on the site.” Docket No. 64-3 at 2. Ms. Austin states that
defendant was previously unaware of these statements contained on the Examiner.com
blog and that such statements were promptly removed from the site. Docket No. 65-1
at 1-2, ¶¶ 2, 4. Ms. Austin states that, to her knowledge, defendant has never provided
“extensive training” or “constantly provid[ed] editorial guidance and monitor[ed] content”
posted to the Examiner site. Id. at 2, ¶ 5. Nonetheless, there is evidence that
Examiner.com staff communicate with Examiners regarding the content of their posts.
For example, plaintiffs provide an email exchange between defendant’s Director of
Content Matt Sandy and one of the Examiner’s at issue Sara Gundell. See Docket No.
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64-1 at 4; see generally Docket No. 64-9. Mr. Sandy and Ms. Gundell discuss the lack
of traffic generated by her posts and engage in a dialogue regarding the importance of
developing contacts with movie studios and getting media credentials for movie
premieres. Id. at 3-4.
Defendant claims that Examiners can post as frequently or infrequently as they
like, id., whereas plaintiffs assert that the Examiner Agreement obligates Examiners to
regularly create content as “reasonably needed.” Docket No. 21-2 at 2, ¶ 1. Plaintif fs
also cite to emails from Examiner.com staff to Examiners “who haven’t published this
month” encouraging each Examiner to publish before a certain date to “keep your
account active.” See, e.g, Docket No. 64-8 at 2; see also id. at 8-9.
Defendant provides Examiners with free access to a library of photos it licenses
from Getty Images, regularly encouraging Examiners to make use of such photos.
Docket No. 19 at 3, ¶ 7. An online training module that is part of Examiner University
provides examiners with additional instructions regarding copyrighted content. Id. at 3,
¶ 8. Defendant maintains a list of Examiners who have been subject to complaints for
posting copyrighted material without permission. Docket No. 19 at 5, ¶ 16. Under
defendant’s policy, after an Examiner receives three complaints regarding instances of
infringement, the Examiner is subject to termination from use of the site. Docket No. 20
at 4, ¶ 16. Defendant takes no steps to interfere with third-party copyright protection
measures. Docket No. 19 at 5, ¶ 17.
Defendant admits that the Examiner site displayed 75 of plaintiffs’ copyrighted
photographs without permission, but argues that the Examiners who included those
images in posted content did so without involvement from Examiner.com staff. Docket
7

No. 63 at 4, ¶ 19; see also Docket No. 1-2. On July 9, 2013, defendant received a
letter from plaintiffs’ counsel identifying certain of plaintiffs’ photographs that appeared
on Examiner.com and asserting that defendant was in violation of plaintiffs’ copyrights.
Docket No. 19 at 4, ¶ 11. 2 On July 24, 2013, defendant notified plaintiffs that all
identified photographs had been removed from Examiner.com. Id. at 4, ¶ 12.
Defendant received no other communication from plaintiffs until February 25, 2014,
when plaintiffs’ complaint was served on defendant. Docket No. 19 at 4-5, ¶ 13. On
March 3, 2014, defendant’s general counsel provided written notification to plaintiffs
that all photographs identified in the complaint had been removed from Examiner.com
on February 27, 2014. Id. at 5, ¶ 14.
On February 24, 2014, plaintiffs filed this case against defendant and the
Anschutz Corporation. Docket No. 1. On April 7, 2014, plaintif fs voluntarily dismissed
the Anschutz Corporation from the case. Docket No. 11. Plaintiffs bring claims against
defendant for direct copyright infringement, contributory copyright infringement,
vicarious copyright infringement, and inducement of copyright infringement. Docket No.
1 at 4-6. Plaintiffs also seek injunctive relief and attorneys’ fees. Id. at 7.
On May 15, 2014, defendant filed the present motion seeking summary
judgment in its favor on all plaintiffs’ claims. Docket No. 19. Defendant argues that it is
entitled to immunity from plaintiffs claims under the “safe harbor” provision of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), 17 U.S.C. § 512(c). Id. at 1. In the alternative,

2

At all times relevant, defendant has had a Designated Agent to Receive
Notification of Claimed Infringement and has place contact information for its agent on
Examiner.com. Docket No. 19 at 4, ¶ 10.
8

defendant argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiffs’ claim for
inducement of copyright infringement. Docket No. 19 at 17. On June 20, 2014,
plaintiffs filed a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) seeking to defer further briefing on
defendant’s motion pending discovery on the applicability of the safe harbor provision.
Docket No. 36. On August 7, 2014, the assigned magistrate judge granted plaintiffs’
motion in part. Docket No. 46. On February 17, 2015, plaintiffs filed their response
brief to defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Docket No. 63. On March 9, 2015,
defendant filed its response brief.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 when
the “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50 (1986). A disputed f act is “material” if
under the relevant substantive law it is essential to proper disposition of the claim.
Wright v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 259 F.3d 1226, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 2001). Only disputes
over material facts can create a genuine issue for trial and preclude summary
judgment. Faustin v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 423 F.3d 1192, 1198 (10th Cir. 2005). An
issue is “genuine” if the evidence is such that it might lead a reasonable jury to return a
verdict for the nonmoving party. Allen v. Muskogee, 119 F.3d 837, 839 (10th Cir.
1997). “In applying this standard, we view all facts and any reasonable inferences that
might be drawn from them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”
Henderson v. Inter-Chem Coal Co., Inc., 41 F.3d 567, 569 (10th Cir. 1994).

9

III. ANALYSIS
The DMCA was enacted in 1998 with one of its goals being to “update domestic
copyright law for the digital age.” Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 26
(2d Cir. 2012). In so doing, Congress did not alter existing copyright law, but instead
created safe harbor provisions to limit liability for “service providers.” Id. at 27; see also
UMG Recordings v. Shelter Capial Partners LLC (“UMG II”), 718 F.3d 1006, 1028 (9th
Cir. 2013) (“Congress explicitly stated in three different reports that the DMCA was
intended to protect qualifying service providers from liability for all monetary relief for
direct, vicarious, and contributory infringement.”) (emphasis and quotations omitted).
“Because the DMCA safe harbors are affirmative defenses, [defendant] has the burden
of establishing that [it] meets the statutory requirements.” Columbia Pictures Indus.,
Inc. v. Fung (“Fung II”), 710 F.3d 1020, 1039 (9th Cir. 2013).
To qualify for safe harbor protection, a party must satisfy a set of threshold
criteria. Viacom, 676 F.3d at 27. First, the party must be a “service provider” as that
term is defined under the DMCA. 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1). Second, in satisf ying
“conditions of eligibility,” the party must adopt and reasonably implement “a policy that
provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account
holders . . . who are repeat infringers” and must accommodate “standard technical
measures” that copyright owners use to identify or protect copyrighted works. § 512(i).
Here, plaintiffs concede that defendant is a “service provider” and do not dispute that
defendant has satisfied the threshold conditions of eligibility. See Docket No. 63 at 7.
Once a service provider initially qualifies for protection under the DMCA, it must satisfy

10

the requirements of a particular safe harbor. Viacom, 676 F.3d 27.
A. Applicability of § 512(c)
The parties dispute whether defendant is entitled to protection pursuant to the
§ 512(c) safe harbor provision.
A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except as
provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for
infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user
of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or
for the service provider, if the service provider-(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using
the material on the system or network is infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to
remove, or disable access to, the material;
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing
activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to
control such activity; and
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3),
responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is
claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity.
§ 512(c)(1).3
1. “at the direction of a user”
Section 512(c) applies to infringements that occur “by reason of the storage at
the direction of a user of material” on a service provider’s system or network.

3

Section 512(c)(2) also requires that the service provider have a designated
agent to receive notifications of claimed infringements. Plaintiffs do not dispute that
defendant has properly registered such an agent for receipt of DMCA notices. See
Docket No. 63 at 7.
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§ 512(c)(1). Thus, before reaching the three prongs of the § 512(c) safe harbor
defense, see § 512(c)(1)(A)-(C), the initial applicability of § 512(c) turns on whether the
claimed infringements occurred in the manner contemplated by § 512(c)(1). Plaintiffs
dispute only whether the Examiners at issue are “user[s]” under § 512(c). Docket No.
63 at 11-12. Plaintiffs argue that the term “user” should not be given its plain and
ordinary meaning, but should instead be defined so as to exclude from the “user” a
service provider’s “owner[s], employee[s] and/or agent[s].” Id. at 9. Defendant, on the
other hand, argues that the term “user” is not a term of art and refers to any person who
uses an “internet-based platform.” Docket No. 65 at 5. Defendant contends that the
proper inquiry for determining the threshold applicability of § 512(c) is “[w]as the
allegedly infringing content at issue posted ‘at the direction of a user’ or was it ‘at the
direction of’ [defendant]?” Id. (citation and quotations omitted, emphasis in original).
Defendant takes the position that this question is best answered by reference to
traditional principles of agency law. Id.
The Court first turns to the meaning of the term “user.” Section § 512(c) does
not define “user” and it appears, as the parties’ briefs suggest, that no court has
squarely construed the term. In interpreting a statute, the Court begins with the plain
language of the statute, interpreting it “in light of the purposes Congress sought to
serve” and considering a particular provision’s place in the overall statutory scheme.
Wright v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 451 F.3d 1231, 1234 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotations
omitted). “If the statutory language is clear, our analysis ends and we must apply its
plain meaning.” Thomas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 631 F.3d 1153, 1161 (10th Cir.

12

2011). If the court determines that the statute is ambiguous, “the court then looks
beyond the plain text to resolve the ambiguity, examining legislative intent [and] overall
statutory construction.” Id. (quotations omitted).
Here, the words of § 512(c) do not compel the conclusion that “user” should be
defined narrowly or with reference to traditional principles of agency. The dictionary
definition of “user” is “one that uses,” and the definition of “use” is “to put into action or
service: to avail oneself of” or “to carry out with a purpose or action by means of.”
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1297 (10th ed. 2001). If these definitions are
applied to § 512(c)(1), then “user” describes a person or entity who avails itself of the
service provider’s system or network to store material. This description is consistent
with the generally understood meaning of the term in the DMCA context. See Viacom,
676 F.3d at 39 (referring to “users” both as persons who upload content to YouTube
and persons who access YouTube to view uploaded content); UMG II, 718 F.3d at
1018 (same).
Plaintiffs argue that the term “user” cannot be interpreted in this way because
“[o]wners, employees and agents are typically users of their business’ website” and
“courts have already found that owners, employees, agents (and even implied agents)
are not ‘users’ within the meaning of the DMCA safe harbor provisions.” Docket No. 63
at 8-9. Therefore, plaintiffs claim that “case law dictates that the word ‘user’ is a legal
term of art for purposes of applying the safe harbor provisions of the DMCA.” Id. at 9.
There are several problems with this argument. First, plaintiffs assume that the word
“user” cannot be given its plain meaning because there is a need to distinguish between

13

storage at the direction of the service provider and storage at the direction of third
parties and that such distinction should be made through the interpretation of “user.”
However, as other provisions of § 512 demonstrate, Congress knew how to make such
a distinction without mentioning “user.” Both §§ 512(a)(1) and 512(b)(1)(A) utilize the
phrase “a person other than the service provider” to differentiate between the service
provider and other persons. More specifically, § 512(a)(1) uses the phrase “at the
direction of a person other than the service provider,” which is analogous to the
distinction that plaintiffs urge be made through the definition of “user” in § 512(c)(1).
The fact that Congress elsewhere in the statute made the distinction between service
providers and third parties with different words cautions against plaintiff’s interpretation.
Second, the perceived need to distinguish between service providers and third
parties in the language of § 512(c)(1) does not exist. The service provider behavior
that plaintiffs are concerned about is already addressed in subparagraphs (A) through
(C) of § 512(c)(1). For example, the term “storage” limits a service provider from
invoking safe harbor protection for its own conduct because, although “storage”
encompasses “automated process[es] for making files accessible,” UMG II, 718 F.3d at
1020, service providers lose protection for activities they undertake that lack a causal
connection to user-initiated storage of infringing material. See, e.g., Viacom, 676 F.3d
at 40 (remanding for further fact finding where YouTube manually selected “copyrighted
material for licensing to a third party”); Gardner v. CafePress Inc., 2014 WL 794216, at
*1 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2014) (ruling that service provider who had exclusive control of
marketplace where uploaded infringing images were sold and ability to modify such
images was not entitled to safe harbor protection as a matter of law). Moreover,
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§ 512(c)(1)(B) excludes from safe harbor protection infringing activity that confers a
financial benefit upon the service provider if the service provider “exert[s] substantial
influence on the activities of users,” such as “high levels of control over activities of
users” or “purposeful conduct.” UMG II, 718 F.3d at 1030. Thus, to define the term
“user” narrowly or to read agency principles into the term would, in many instances, be
unnecessary and redundant given the effect of § 512(c)’s other provisions. See
Freytag v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 877 (1991) (noting that court
should avoid interpreting a statutory provision “so as to render superfluous other
provisions in the same enactment”).
The cases upon which the parties rely do not compel a different interpretation of
the term “user.” Both parties cite to Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 972 F. Supp.
2d 500, 517-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), in support of their respective arguments. In Vimeo,
the court considered whether § 512(c) applied to protect the video sharing site Vimeo
from copyright infringement liability for videos uploaded by Vimeo employees. Id. at
518. Plaintiff argued that such videos were not “stor[ed] at the direction of a user.” Id.
Although the court did not identify an ambiguity in § 512(c)(1), it relied on legislative
history that stated “‘[i]nformation that resides on the system or network operated by or
for the service provider through its own acts or decisions and not at the direction of a
user does not fall within the liability limitation of subsection (c).’” Id. at 517 (quoting
S.Rep. No. 105-190, at *43 (1998)). 4 In determining if “employee-uploaded videos may
4

This legislative history does not indicate that the term “user” was intended to
mean what plaintiffs suggest. Moreover, the legislative history does not indicate that
the issue of whether information resides on a system through the acts or decisions of a
service provider must be addressed, as the parties appear to argue, by a dispositive,
15

be deemed to have been stored ‘at the direction of a user,’” the Court concluded that
the relevant inquiry was whether, “under traditional principles of agency law, Vimeo’s
employees stored their videos as independent ‘users’ or rather on behalf of the
company as Vimeo staff.” Id. at 518 (citing Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists
Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1161-62 (2d Cir. 1971) (discussing vicarious and
contributory copyright infringement)). However, the court did not, as plaintiffs suggest,
define the term “user” or otherwise explain why traditional agency principles were the
appropriate measure by which to determine whether Vimeo was entitled to § 512(c)
protection as opposed to, for example, charging Vimeo with knowledge of its
employees’ uploads under § 512(c)(1)(A). Moreover, unlike Vimeo, plaintiffs here do
not claim that the Examiners at issue were defendant’s employees. As a result, Vimeo
is not directly applicable to the present dispute.
Plaintiffs cite to Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung (“Fung I”), 2009 WL
6355911, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009), affirmed in part as modified by Fung II, 701
F.3d at 1020, where the court considered whether the operator of multiple bit torrent
websites was liable for inducement of infringement due, in part, to statements made by
moderators on defendants’ websites. However, Fung I did not interpret the term “user”
or the initial requirements of § 512(c) and is therefore inapplicable.
Defendant cites Capitol Records, Inv. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627,
635 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), modified on reconsideration on other grounds by 2013 WL
1987225 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2013), where defendant’s executives used their personal
initial inquiry as to the meaning of “user.” To so conclude would contravene or render
superfluous other provisions of § 512(c).
16

accounts to download copyrighted songs onto defendant’s servers. The court did not
consider whether defendant’s executives were “users,” but rather whether the
executives’ activity was sufficient to satisfy § 512(c)(1)(A)’s actual or “red flag”5
knowledge requirement. Id. at 644. The court concluded that, because plaintif f failed
to show that defendant’s executives downloaded songs “from clearly pirate websites,”
such activity was, by itself, insufficient to confer the requisite knowledge on defendant.
Id. MP3tunes is therefore unhelpful in resolving whether defendant has satisfied the
initial requirements of § 512(c)(1).
For the foregoing reasons, the Court rejects plaintiffs’ proposed definition of the
term “user” and instead adopts the plain meaning definition the Court identified earlier.
Plaintiffs do not raise any other arguments regarding the initial requirements of
§ 512(c)(1). As a result, the Court finds that the Examiners are “users” within the
meaning of the statute. However, as discussed above, safe harbor protection does not
extend to all user uploaded content, but only to content uploaded “at the direction of a
user.” § 512(c)(1) (emphasis added). The question becomes whether plaintiffs’
photographs were stored on defendant’s system at the direction of the Examiners at
issue or whether plaintiffs’ photographs were stored on defendant’s system at the
direction of defendant. On this question, plaintiffs provide no evidence creating a
genuine dispute of material fact.
Defendant asserts each Examiner alone determines the content of his or her

5

So called “red flag” knowledge refers to an awareness of the “facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.” See UMG II, 718 F.3d at
1023.
17

articles, including whether or not they are illustrated by photographs. Docket No. 19 at
3, ¶ 5. Plaintiffs attempt to create a genuine dispute of material fact by citing to emails
from defendant to Examiners where defendant solicits articles on specific topics. See
generally Docket No. 64-10. For example, defendant emailed Examiners to announce
a new “Examiner Celebrity” page. Id. at 17. Defendant states that it is looking for
content concerning celebrities’ physiques, fashion trends, or news and that “[s]lide
shows are a must for this area.” Id. However, there is no indication that defendant
directed the Examiners to upload plaintiffs’ photographs or any other infringing content.
The record contains no evidence of any communications between defendant and the
Examiners at issue regarding plaintiffs’ photographs or the posts in which plaintiffs’
photographs appeared. Defendant asserts that it did not pre-screen, edit, or approve
any of the content at issue before it was posted to Examiner.com. Docket No. 19 at 3,
¶ 6. Although a dispute of fact may exist as to whether defendant had content
managers or a review team, Docket No. 64-3 at 2; Docket No. 65-1 at 1-2, ¶ 5, there is
no evidence suggesting that a content manager, review team, or any Examiner.com
staff had any actual control or influence over the content of the articles containing
plaintiffs’ photographs so as to render the use of plaintiffs’ photographs at the direction
of defendant.
Moreover, defendant explicitly directs Examiners not to post infringing content,
stating in the Examiner agreement that Examiners “must have permission from the
owner/copyright holder of any content before including it on your Web Page, unless it
was provided by Examiner.com.” Docket No. 21-2 at 3, ¶ 4.a. The Editorial
Requirements contain a similar prohibition on unlicensed content. See Docket No. 21-3
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at 3, ¶ 6 (“[d]o not include any copyrighted material on our site (including text, photos,
video, audio, or anything else) without the permission of the owner”). Defendant
notifies Examiners of its repeat infringer policy and has barred repeat copyright
infringers from posting material on Examiner.com. See Docket No. 20 at 4-5, ¶¶16-19.
Defendant also provides Examiners with free access to a library of licensed photos,
regularly encouraging examiners to make use of such photos. Docket No. 19 at 3, ¶ 7.
These agreements and policies may not, by themselves, be sufficient to render the
upload of infringing material “at the direction of a user.” However, in the absence of
evidence that defendant directed the Examiners at issue to upload plaintiffs’
photographs to the site, defendant’s policies further support the conclusion that
plaintiffs’ photographs did not come to reside on Examiner.com at the direction of
defendant. Defendant has presented sufficient evidence upon which to satisfy the
initial requirements of § 512(c)(1), and plaintiffs have failed to provide evidence or
argument that creates a genuine dispute of material fact.
2. Knowledge
Defendant asserts that it has satisfied § 512(c)(1)(A) because, upon receiving
information from plaintiffs’ counsel notifying defendant that plaintiffs’ photographs were
posted on Examiner.com, it promptly removed plaintiffs’ photographs from the site.
Docket No. 19 at 4-5, ¶¶ 11-14 (citing Docket No. 20). Plaintiffs argue that defendant
had actual knowledge pursuant to § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) or “red flag” knowledge pursuant to
§ 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) because it was “willfully blind” to infringements occurring on
Examiner.com. Docket No. 63 at 16-17.
The safe harbor provision of § 512(c) does not place upon the service provider
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the burden of determining whether materials on its system or network are actually
illegal. Viacom, 676 F.3d at 32. “[M]erely hosting a category of copyrightable content .
. . with the general knowledge that one’s services could be used to share infringing
material, is insufficient to meet the actual knowledge requirement under §
512(c)(1)(A)(i).” UMG II, 718 F.3d at 1022. Rather, § 512(c) requires knowledge or
awareness “of [the] specific infringing activity.” Viacom, 676 F.3d at 30. Thus, “the
actual knowledge provision turns on whether the provider actually or ‘subjectively’ knew
of specific infringement, while the red flag provision turns on whether the provider was
subjectively aware of facts that would have made the specific infringement ‘objectively’
obvious to a reasonable person.” Id. at 31. The willful blindness doctrine may be
applied in the context of § 512(c)(1)(A), but only to the extent the evidence establishes
that a service provider “willfully bur[ied] its head in the sand to avoid obtaining . . .
knowledge” of the specific infringing activity. UMG II, 718 F.3d at 1023.
The only evidence plaintiffs provide of defendant’s willful blindness to the
Examiners’ use of plaintiffs’ photographs is the series of emails from defendant to
various examiners requesting photos and videos regarding “the Oscars, new TV lineups
and premiers, new movies, celebrity scandals, celebrity bodies, celebrity styles,
celebrity news and Emmy Awards fashions.” Docket No. 63 at 17-18 (citing Docket No.
64-10). However, plaintiffs do not provide any evidence that, by posting photos or
videos on such topics, Examiners would necessarily use plaintiffs’ copyrighted
photographs. The emails upon which plaintiffs rely, at best, suggest that defendant
may have had a general awareness that Examiners could post infringing content in
response to such requests, but general awareness is insufficient to create a genuine
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dispute as to whether defendant had knowledge of or was willfully blind to the specific
infringements alleged in this case. See UMG II, 718 F.3d at 1023. Plaintiffs otherwise
fail to provide evidence specific to any of the claimed infringements upon which a
reasonable juror could conclude that defendant possessed the requisite actual or red
flag knowledge.
As to § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii), plaintiffs do not dispute that, upon receiving information
from plaintiffs’ counsel regarding the claimed infringements, defendant acted
expeditiously to remove plaintiffs’ photographs from Examiner.com. Defendant has
provided sufficient evidence upon which to conclude that it satisfied the requirements of
§ 512(c)(1)(A). Plaintiffs have failed to provide evidence creating a genuine dispute of
material facts. As a result, defendant is entitled to summary judgment as to
§ 512(c)(1)(A).
3. “financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity”
In order to receive safe harbor protection, the service provider must establish
that it “does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity,
in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity.”
§ 512(c)(1)(B). As to the issue of financial benefit, Ms. Austin states that defendant
derives revenue from display advertising placed on Examiner.com, but, although “those
revenues are determined, in part, by the volume of visitors to Examiner.com, no
advertising revenues are associated with or dependent upon any particular web page
posted by an Examiner, much less any particular photograph posted by any examiner.”
Docket No. 21 at 4, ¶ 14. Plaintiff argues that the fact that defendant receives revenue
from display advertising and the fact that Examiners are contractually obligated to drive
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traffic to the site creates “a symbiotic relationship between AXS and its Examiners,
whereby both derive a financial benefit from the Examiners’ efforts to drive traffic to the
Website and share in the resulting revenue derived by such traffic.” Docket No. 63 at
19. Plaintiffs provide no additional evidence in support of their argument.
The Ninth Circuit has suggested that, where a service provider charges users for
its services, a directly attributable financial benefit exists “where there is a causal
relationship between the infringing activity and any financial benefit a defendant reaps,
regardless of how substantial the benefit is in proportion to a defendant’s overall
profits.” Fung II, 710 F.3d at 1044 (quotations omitted, emphasis in original). Where,
as here, the service provider derives its revenue from advertising, the inquiry focuses
on whether “the connection between the infringing activity and [the service provider’s]
income stream derived from advertising is sufficiently direct.” Id. at 1045. In Fung II,
the court found a sufficient connection based upon a confluence of circumstances:
“Fung promoted advertising by pointing to infringing activity; obtained advertising
revenue that depended on the num ber of visitors to his sites; attracted primarily visitors
who were seeking to engage in infringing activity, as that is mostly what occurred on his
sites; and encouraged that infringing activity.” Id.; see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill
LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1117 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that, where a service provider
derives revenue from subscribers, the relevant inquiry is “whether the infringing activity
constitutes a draw for subscribers, not just an added benefit” (quotations omitted));
Wolk v. Kodak Imaging Network, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 724, 748 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(finding no direct financial benefit where no evidence indicated that defendants

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“capitalize[] specifically because a given image a user selects to print is infringing”).
Here, there is no evidence that defendant marketed to advertisers by pointing to
infringing content, that users considered Examiner.com a reliable source of infringing
content, that any users visited Examiner.com because it hosted infringing content, or
that defendant actively promoted infringing content as a way of attracting more page
views. Cf. Fung II, 710 F.3d at 1045. To the contrary, the record reflects that
defendant promptly removes infringing content of which it has become aware and has
policies directed at curtailing infringing activity. As a result, there are no facts
supporting an inference that defendant’s revenue stream is in any way predicated on or
derived from the availability of infringing material on Examiner.com. Because plaintiffs
have failed to provide evidence upon which to conclude that defendant derives direct
financial benefit from infringing activity, the Court need not reach the question of
whether defendant had a right and ability to control infringing activity.6 Defendant is
therefore entitled to summary judgment as to § 512(c)(1)(B).
Plaintiffs do not dispute any remaining aspects of § 512(c). As a result, the
Court concludes that defendant is entitled to § 512(c) safe harbor protection.
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted and plaintiffs’ claims for direct
copyright infringement, contributory copyright infringement, vicarious copyright
infringement, and inducement of copyright infringement are dismissed. See UMG II,
718 F.3d at 1013, 1031 (upholding grant of summary judgment in service provider’s

6

Although the “right and ability to control” inquiry is often treated as a threshold
issue, see, e.g., UMG II, 718 F.3d at 1026, the Court need not reach that inq uiry in
order to resolve the present motion.
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favor on claims for direct, vicarious, contributory, and inducement of copyright
infringement).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is
ORDERED that defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 19] is
GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED that plaintiffs’ claims are dismissed and this case is dismissed in its
entirety.

DATED March 31, 2015.
BY THE COURT:

s/Philip A. Brimmer
PHILIP A. BRIMMER
United States District Judge

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