Drive Sunshine Institute et al. v. High-Performance Transportation Enterprise, et al.

Filing 114

ORDER denying 113 Motion To Vacate and Objection To Order 110 Re Motion for Restricted Access 91 .That under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), the objection stated in 113 the Motion To Vacate and Objection To Order 110 Re Motion for Restricted Access 91 , is overruled. By Judge Robert E. Blackburn on 9/8/2015.(mlace, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Robert E. Blackburn

Civil Action No. 14–cv–00844–REB–KMT
DRIVE SUNSHINE INSTITUTE, and
CLIFF SMEDLEY,
Plaintiffs,
v.
HIGH PERFORMANCE TRANSPORTATION ENTERPRISE, et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTION
TO ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Blackburn, J.
The matter before me is the objection contained in the Motion To Vacate and
Objection To Order [#110] Re Motion for Restricted Access [#91] [#113]1 filed
February 20, 2015. I overrule the objection.
The objection pertains to non-dispositive matters that were referred to the
magistrate judge for resolution. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(a), I may modify or set aside any portion of an order of a magistrate judge which I
find to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Having reviewed the apposite motion,
responses, and reply, the order of the magistrate judge, and the plaintiff’s objection, I
conclude that the order of the magistrate judge is not clearly erroneous or contrary to
1

“[#113]” is an example of the convention I use to identify the docket number assigned to a
specific paper by the court’s case management and electronic case filing system (CM/ECF). I use this
convention throughout this order.

law. Therefore, I overrule the objection [#113].
The underlying motion [#91] is a motion for restricted access to a certain
document filed by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs sought a Level 2 restriction. In her order
[#110], the magistrate judge cited valid reasons to grant the motion, but determined that
a Level 1 restriction, rather than a Level 2 restriction, was proper.
One novel contention raised in the objection is that the magistrate judge
exceeded her authority in issuing her order because the order makes a dispositive
ruling on the question of the level of restricted access to be applied to a filing in this
case. Citing the order of reference [#7] to the magistrate judge, the plaintiffs note that
the order authorizes the magistrate judge to hear and make recommendations on
dispositive matters that have been referred as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). The
dispositive matters defined in § 636(b)(1)(A) are, in essence, motions that dispositive of
a claim in a civil or criminal case, motions to suppress evidence in a criminal case,
motions for injunctive relief, and motions for class certification. The motion in question
here does not fall within the dispositive matters defined in § 636(b)(1)(A). Rather, the
magistrate judge had full authority to address and resolve the motion for restricted
access [#91].
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED as follows:
1. That under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), the objection
stated in the Motion To Vacate and Objection To Order [#110] Re Motion for
Restricted Access [#91] [#113] filed February 20, 2015, is overruled; and
2. That to the extent the Motion To Vacate and Objection To Order [#110] Re

2

Motion for Restricted Access [#91] [#113] filed February 20, 2015, can be read as a
motion rather than an objection, the motion is denied.
Dated September 8, 2015, at Denver, Colorado.
BY THE COURT:

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