Drive Sunshine Institute et al. v. High-Performance Transportation Enterprise, et al.

Filing 68

ORDER denying 26 Verified Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. By Judge Robert E. Blackburn on 10/7/2014.(alowe)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Robert E. Blackburn
Civil Action No. 14–cv–00844–REB–KMT
DRIVE SUNSHINE INSTITUTE, and
CLIFF SMEDLEY,
Plaintiffs,
v.
HIGH PERFORMANCE TRANSPORTATION ENTERPRISE,
MICHAEL CHEROUTES, ESQ., in his capacity as Director of HPTE and as an
individual,
TIM GAGEN, in his capacity as Chair of the HPTE Board of Directors and as an
individual,
KATHY GILLILAND, in her capacity as Vice-Chair (and at times Acting Chair) of the
HPTE Board of Directors and as an individual,
DOUG ADEN, HPTE Board Member, as an individual,
BRENDA SMITH, HPTE Board Member, as an individual,
DON MARISTICA, HPTE Board Member, as an individual,
GARY REIFF, ESQ., HPTE Board Member, as an individual,
TREY ROGERS, ESQ., HPTE Board Member, as an individual,
JANE HICKEY, in her capacity as Secretary of the HPTE Board and as an individual,
JOHN SUTHERS, ESQ., in his capacity as Colorado State Attorney General and as an
individual,
KATHRYN E. YOUNG, ESQ., in her capacity as First Assistant Attorney General and
counsel for HPTE and as an individual,
JOHN DOE 1, ESQ., in his capacity within the Colorado Solicitor General’s Office and
as an individual,
JORDAN CHASE, ESQ., in his capacity as Assistant Attorney General and counsel for
HPTE and as an individual,
KUTAK ROCK LLP, in its capacity as counsel for HPTE and as an individual,
MICHAEL THOMAS, ESQ., as counsel for HPTE and as an individual,
THOMAS WEIHE, ESQ., as counsel for HPTE and as an individual,
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP, in its capacity as counsel for HPTC and as an individual,
MIKE MATHEOU, ESQ., as counsel for HPTE and as an individual,
DAVID SCOTT, ESQ., as counsel for HPTE and as an individual,
COLORADO TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION,
COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
AMY FORD, in her capacity as HPTE Communications Director and as an individual,
GOLDMAN, SACHS & CO.,
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON TRUST COMPANY, N.A.,
FITCH RATINGS, INC., and

PLENARY ROADS DENVER LLC,
Defendants.

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Blackburn, J.
This matter is before me on the Verified Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction [#26]1 filed September 17, 2014. In a previous
order [#66], I denied the motion to the extent the plaintiffs sought a temporary
restraining order. Addressing the request for a preliminary injunction, the defendants
against whom a preliminary injunction is sought filed a response [#42], and the plaintiffs
filed a reply [#49]. I deny the motion for preliminary injunction.2
I. JURISDICTION
I have jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and
§ 1367 (supplemental).
II. BACKGROUND
The complaint [#4] and the motion for preliminary injunction [#26] describe the
operation of defendant High-Performance Transportation Enterprise (HPTE) and related
entities. According to the complaint, the HPTE is a government owned business within
the Colorado Department of Transportation. HPTE is a key entity managing a project
for the expansion of U.S. Highway 36 between Denver and Boulder, Colorado.

1

“[#26]” is an example of the convention I use to identify the docket number assigned to a
specific paper by the court’s case management and electronic case filing system (CM/ECF). I use this
convention throughout this order.
2

The issues raised by and inherent to the motion for preliminary injunction are briefed
adequately, obviating the necessity for evidentiary hearing or oral argument. C.f. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a)(2).
Thus, the motion stands submitted on the papers.

2

According to the allegations in the motion for preliminary injunction, HPTE has
repeatedly violated Colorado statutes, such as the Colorado Open Records Act
(CORA), part 2 of article 72 of title 24, C.R.S., the Colorado Open Meetings Law, part 4
of article 6 of title 24, C.R.S., the Colorado State Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
part 4 of article 4 of title 24, C.R.S., and a provision of the Constitution of the State of
Colorado known as TABOR. COLO. CONST., Art. X, § 20. In addition, the plaintiffs
allege that the actions of the defendants are violating the rights of the plaintiffs under
the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Constitution of the United
States and of the Constitution of the State of Colorado.
On June 27, 2013, the HPTE purportedly entered into a fifty-year concession
agreement with defendant Plenary Roads Denver LLC (Plenary). Apparently, the
concession agreement permits Plenary to build and complete the project and to take
control of managed lanes in the US 36 expansion project. In the view of the plaintiffs,
the HPTE improperly embedded public policy changes in the concession agreement
without complying with the CORA, the Open Meetings Law, the APA, and TABOR.
According to the plaintiffs, the approval of the concession agreement is void ab initio
because the HPTE did not comply with the requirements of Colorado law before
approving the agreement. The plaintiffs contend the HPTE planned to ratify an
amended and restated concession agreement at a meeting scheduled for September
17, 2014. Defendant Michael Cheroutes reports in his affidavit that the HPTE tabled
consideration of the proposed amendments at the September 2014 HPTE board
meeting. Response [#42], Exhibit A (Cheroutes Affidavit), ¶ 19. The HPTE board
expects to discuss the amendments at its regular October 2014 meeting. Id. According
to the plaintiffs, the HPTE again has not complied with the requirements of Colorado law
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with regard to the proposed amended and restated concession agreement. Thus, the
plaintiffs contend, HTPE may not validly approve the amended and restated agreement.
Although not entirely clear, it appears that the September 17, 2014, meeting was
the impetus for the filing of the motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction on the morning of September 17, 2014.3 In the view of the plaintiffs, the
HPTE seeks to rush forward the arguable effective date of the Amended
and Restated Concession Agreement in order to counter Plaintiffs’ stated
intention to seek a preliminary injunction of JPTE violations of the law - the
sooner that HPTE can justify turning over control of the US 36 Expansion
Project to Plenary, the sooner JPTE and the other Defendants can attempt
to argue that the public is not entitled to enjoin the project or Pleanry’s
rights thereunder because doing so would disrupt the status quo.
Motion [#26], p. 21.
In their motion, the plaintiffs seek the entry of a preliminary injunction against
some, but not all, of the named defendants. The plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction
which provides more than 20 discrete forms of relief. Motion [#26], pp. 120 - 123. For
example, plaintiffs seek an order enjoining the implementation and enforcement of all
rules made or announced by the HPTE without compliance with the APA. However, the
plaintiffs do not specify which rules they seek to have enjoined. They seek an order
prohibiting the adoption of any new rules by HPTE unless the procedures used are in
full compliance with the APA, the CORA, the Open Meetings Law, and federal and state
constitutional provisions. The plaintiffs seek an order enjoining the ratification of the
amended and restated concession agreement and the implementation of myriad terms
allegedly included in the amended and restated concession agreement. Among the
many policies the plaintiffs seek to have enjoined is “the implementation of snow and ice
removal and mitigation policies which would permit preferential service to be rendered
3

The motion was filed at 5:54 a.m. (MDT).

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for express lanes compared to general lanes of traffic.” Motion [#26], p. 121, ¶ 5.e. The
plaintiffs also seek an order enjoining what the plaintiffs see as the rule-making aspects
of the concession agreement including, inter alia, enjoining future toll increases initiated
by Plenary if those increases are not without full compliance with the APA, the CORA,
the Open Meetings Law, and federal and state constitutional provisions. Id., p. 120.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
I begin by rehearsing the familiar. A preliminary injunction constitutes
extraordinary relief. A party seeking a preliminary injunction must show (1) a substantial
likelihood that the movant eventually will prevail on the merits; (2) that the movant will
suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction issues; (3) that the threatened injury to the
movant outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing
party; and (4) that the injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public interest.
Lundgrin v. Claytor, 619 F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir. 1980).
When the moving party has established that the three harm factors tip decidedly
in favor of the movant, the probability of success requirement is somewhat relaxed, and
the movant need only show questions going to the merits so serious, substantial,
difficult, and doubtful as to make them a fair ground for litigation. Nova Health Systems
v. Edmondson 460 F.3d 1295, 1298 n. 6 (10th Cir. 2006). On the other hand, some
types of temporary restraining orders or preliminary injunctions are disfavored and,
therefore, require the plaintiff to satisfy a heightened burden of showing that the four
primary factors
weigh heavily and compellingly in movant’s favor before such an injunction
may be issued. The heightened burden applies to preliminary injunctions
that (1) disturb the status quo, (2) are mandatory as opposed to
prohibitory, or (3) provide the movant substantially all the relief he may
recover after a full trial on the merits.
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Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 955 (10th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation and citation
omitted).
Having reviewed the complaint and the motion for preliminary injunction, I find
and conclude that the plaintiffs seek in their motion substantially all the relief they seek
in their complaint, meaning they seek substantially all the relief they could recover after
a full trial on the merits. Therefore, I conclude that the plaintiffs are not entitled to a
preliminary injunction unless they meet the heightened burden of showing that the four
relevant factors weigh heavily and compellingly in their favor. However, even under the
standard preliminary injunction analysis, I find and conclude that the plaintiffs have not
shown that they are entitled to the preliminary injunction they seek.
I deny the motion for preliminary injunction without holding a hearing on the
motion. Rule 65(a) does not explicitly require an evidentiary hearing before a court may
rule on a motion for preliminary injunction. If the party requesting a preliminary
injunction does not show that there is a dispute concerning one or more material facts
relevant to the required elements, a hearing on the request for injunctive relief is not
necessary. See, e.g., Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 862 F.2d 890, 894 (1st Cir. 1988);
Elliott v. Kiesewetter, 98 F.3d 47, 53 (3d Cir. 1996); Anderson v. Jackson, 556 F.3d
351, 360-61 (5th Cir. 2009). In this case, there is no indication that there is a dispute
concerning a material fact relevant to the motion for preliminary injunction. The parties
have had a reasonable opportunity to present relevant facts and to brief the issues. In
these circumstances, a hearing is not necessary.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Likelihood of Success
The defendants contend that the plaintiffs have not demonstrated a substantial
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likelihood that they eventually will prevail on the merits of any of their claims tied to the
request for a preliminary injunction. I agree.
In their complaint [#4], the plaintiffs assert eight claims for relief: (1) violation of
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S.
Constitution; (2) violation of the right to petition guaranteed in the First Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution; (3) violation of the right to free speech guaranteed in the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; (4) violation of the rights to due process, to
petition, and to free speech under the Colorado Constitution; (5) violation of the
Colorado Open Meetings Law; (6) violation of the Colorado Open Records Act; (7)
violation of the Colorado Administrative Procedures Act; and (8) violation of the
disclosure duties of unspecified federal securities laws in the course of issuing bonds in
the name of HPTE and issuance of those bonds without authority. The plaintiffs allege
also that any defendant who is a licensed attorney owes additional duties to the
plaintiffs under the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct, including the duty of
candor, the duty to exercise independent professional judgment, and the duty not to
engage in conduct which violates the law. Complaint [#4], ¶ 76.
Group Pleading - Throughout the complaint, the plaintiffs frequently make
allegations in which they contend that the defendants as a large group or certain subsets of defendants, such as the “Agency Defendants,” the “HPTE Defendants,” and the
“Outside Counsel Defendants,” have taken certain actions. Complaint [#4], pp. 40 - 50.
When alleging facts in support of a claim, “the burden rests on the plaintiffs to provide
fair notice of the grounds for the claims made against each of the defendants. Given the
complaint's use of either the collective term ‘Defendants’ or a list of the defendants
named individually, but with no distinction as to what acts are attributable to whom, it is
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impossible for any of these individuals to ascertain what particular [unlawful] acts they
are alleged to have committed.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir.
2008) (emphasis added). To the extent the plaintiffs allege claims based on such group
pleading against the defendants, I cannot conclude that the plaintiffs have shown a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits of those claims. An inadequately pled
claim, by definition, is not a claim which has a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits.
Claim (1) - Due Process - The Fourteenth Amendment provides, inter alia, that
a state may not deprive any person of “life, liberty or property without due process of
law.” U.S. CONST., amend. XIV. Of course, the Fifth Amendment contains a similar
Due Process Clause. The procedural component of due process protects “the
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To
make out a claim for violation of the right to procedural due process, plaintiffs must
show, inter alia, the deprivation of an interest within the ambit of the protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment, that is, an interest in “life, liberty, or property.” See Ingraham
v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977); Darr v. Town of Telluride, Colo., 495 F.3d 1243,
1251 (10th Cir. 2007); Elliott v. Martinez, 675 F.3d 1241, 1244 (10th Cir. 2012).
In their complaint, the plaintiffs do not identify a liberty or property interest of
which any defendant has deprived or threatens to deprive any plaintiff. Complaint [#4],
¶¶ 72 - 78. Absent an identified and relevant liberty or property interest, the plaintiffs
are not likely to succeed on the merits of their due process claim.
Claims (2) & (3) - First Amendment - Petition & Free Speech - The plaintiffs
allege that “HTPE interfered with and / or denied Plaintiffs’ rights to petition on February
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19, 2014 and March 19, 2014, under the First Amendment of the federal Constitution by
arbitrarily and capriciously imposing alleged procedural rules of HPTE . . . .” Complaint
[#4], ¶ 80. The plaintiffs allege also that the HPTE “interfered with and / or denied
Plaintiffs’ rights to free speech . . . by using its power to prevent Plaintiffs from speaking
and / or having their attorney speak on their behalf because of the anticipated specific
content of their speech . . . .” Complaint [#4], ¶ 85.
According to the plaintiffs, at a February 19, 2014, HTPE meeting, defendant Tim
Gagen, chair of the HPTE board of directors, denied the request of plaintiff Cliff
Smedley to permit counsel for Mr. Smedley to speak on his behalf at the meeting.
Complaint [#4], ¶ 54. The plaintiffs challenge also the procedures used by HPTE to
establish rules for this meeting. The plaintiffs describe the same scenario in their
motion for preliminary injunction. Motion [#26], pp. 44 - 47. The plaintiffs allege that a
preliminary injunction is necessary to “restrain these Defendants from continuing their
stubborn refusal to accord Plaintiffs” their rights. Complaint [#4], ¶¶ 83, 88.
As the defendants note, the right to speak at a meeting of a government agency
is far from unfettered. See, e.g., Shero v. City of Grove, Okl., 510 F.3d 1196, 1203
(10th Cir. 2007) (summarizing basic standards applicable to restrictions on speech at
public meetings; three-minute time limitation imposed on speech a restriction
appropriately designed to promote orderly and efficient meetings); Jones v. Heyman,
888 F.2d 1328, 1333 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that the removal of a public speaker by
the mayor at a city commission meeting was not a First Amendment violation and thus
permissible because “to deny the presiding officer the authority to regulate irrelevant
debate and disruptive behavior at a public meeting ... would cause such meetings to
drag on interminably, and deny others the opportunity to voice their opinions”); Wright
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v. Anthony, 733 F.2d 575, 577 (8th Cir.1984) (noting that restriction during public
debate “may be said to have served a significant governmental interest in conserving
time and in ensuring that others had an opportunity to speak”).
Given the circumstances described in the motion for preliminary injunction, I find
that the plaintiffs have not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on their First
Amendment claims. The HTPE is permitted to impose reasonable restrictions on
speech in an effort to run orderly meetings. On the current record, there are significant
questions about whether or not the restrictions at issue here were unreasonable.
Equally important, the plaintiffs allege restrictions on speech at the February 19, 2014,
HTPE meeting and, to some extent, at the March 19, 2014, HTPE meeting. The
plaintiffs appear to infer that similar and purportedly unlawful restrictions will be imposed
at all HTPE meetings. However, there is little in the record to support the inference that
the HTPE will impose improper restrictions at future meetings. A preliminary injunction
cannot remedy allegedly improper restrictions imposed last February or March. The
allegations of the plaintiffs do not show a substantial likelihood that the HTPE will
impose unlawful restrictions on the speech in the future. I find that the plaintiffs have
not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their First Amendment
claims.
Claims (1), (2), & (3) - Personal Participation - The federal constitutional claims
of the plaintiffs are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. When asserting a § 1983 claim
against an individual defendant, the plaintiffs must allege personal participation in the
alleged violation by that individual defendant. “Personal participation is an essential
allegation in a § 1983 claim.” Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1262 - 1263 (10th
Cir.1976). Generally, as to defendants Michael Cheroutes, Kathy Gilliland, Doug Aden,
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Brenda Smith, Don Marostica, Gary Reiff, Trey Rogers, John Suthers, and Jordan
Chase, the plaintiffs fail to allege personal participation by these defendants in any
alleged constitutional violation. At most, the plaintiffs make conclusory allegations of
constitutional violations by these defendants, including improper group pleading
allegations against these defendants. Absent allegations of personal participation as to
an individual defendant, I cannot conclude that the plaintiffs have shown a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits of a § 1983 claim against that individual defendant.
Claim (4) - Colorado Constitution - As alleged in the complaint, the claims of
the plaintiffs under the Colorado Constitution essentially parallel their due process, right
to petition, and right to free speech claims under the U.S. Constitution. For the same
reasons noted with regard to the federal constitutional claims of the plaintiffs, I find that
the plaintiffs have not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their
state constitutional claims.
Claim (5) - Colorado Open Meetings Law - The plaintiffs allege the HPTE
violated the Open Meetings Law by its failure to specify a central place where the
plaintiffs can find full and timely notice of scheduled HPTE meetings and agendas,
failure to update its mater calendar to reflect 2014 meeting dates, failure to provide a
specific agenda for meetings when possible, failure to adhere to agendas, and failure to
provide information necessary for the plaintiffs to provide meaningful comment at HPTE
meetings. As noted by the defendants in their response [#42], there is, at minimum,
significant debate about precisely what the Open Meetings Law requires of the HPTE.
Given that debate, I find that the plaintiffs have not shown a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits of their Open Meetings Law claim.
Claim (6) - Colorado Open Records Act (CORA) - The plaintiffs allege that
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HPTE and defendant Michael Cheroutes violated CORA by withholding from the
plaintiffs complete copies of contracts relevant to HPTE’s operations. Complaint [#4],
¶¶ 98 - 102. The defendants contend CORA does not provide a private right of action
for violation of its provisions. I disagree. Under §24-72-204(5), C.R.S., a person denied
the right to inspect any record covered by the act “may apply to the district court of the
district wherein the record is found for an order directing the custodian of such record to
show cause why the custodian should not permit the inspection of such record.”
Section 24-72-204 (5.5), C.R.S. provides a procedure for records of an executive
session. There is a private right of action to remedy a violation of CORA, but the
plaintiffs in this case have not sought to assert that right of action. The plaintiffs must
assert the right of action provided specifically in the applicable statute before attempting
to seek broader relief not specified in the applicable statute. Absent an effort by the
plaintiffs to assert the specific relief available under CORA, I conclude that the plaintiffs
have not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their CORA claim,
as alleged in the complaint.
Claim (7) - Administrative Procedures Act (APA) - In their complaint, the
plaintiffs allege that HTPE is required to comply with the APA “when taking legislative
rule-making actions, yet they have failed to do so.” Complaint [#4], ¶ 104. As an
example, the plaintiffs allege HPTE failed to follow the APA when setting tolls and toll
policies. The defendants contend adherence to APA procedures is required “(w)hen
any agency is required or permitted by law to make rules . . . .” §24-4-103(1), C.R.S.
This requirement is not applicable to HTPE, the defendants assert, because HTPE has
specific statutory authority to “impose user fees” and to operate toll highways. §43-4806(2)(c)(I), C.R.S. Under §24-4-107, C.R.S., “where there is a conflict between this
12

article [the APA] and a specific statutory provision relating to a specific agency, such
specific statutory provision shall control as to such agency.”
At minimum, there is a strong argument that §24-4-107, C.R.S., considered in
light of the specific authorization of §43-4-806(2)(c)(I), C.R.S., excludes HTPE from the
requirements of the APA. Given this strong argument, I conclude that the plaintiffs have
not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their APA claim, as
alleged in the complaint.
Claim (8) - Duty Not To Take Unauthorized Actions - In this claim, the
plaintiffs allege, inter alia:
(A)ll Defendants” participated in issuing bonds in the name of HPTE which
each knew or reasonably should have known were not duly authorized. In
doing so, Defendants engaged in violations of their disclosure duties under
the federal securities laws, placing the welfare of HPTE in jeopardy and
harming Plaintiffs, including, without limitation, harming Plaintiffs in their
capacities as third party beneficiaries of all transactions made in the name
of HPTE because Plaintiffs actual use of the Colorado resources over
which HPTE exerts authority and which are the subject of these
transactions is impaired.
Complaint [#4], ¶ 108. The plaintiffs seek a judgment declaring “that Defendants’ failure
to adequately advise investors of the material risk and material potential effects of
unauthorized acts taken in the name of HPTE constitute violation of the duties to HPTE,
to investors, and to Plaintiffs,” so defendants will more clearly understand thier duties.”
In the motion for preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs seek an order requiring accurate
disclosures to myriad people and entities concerning the bonds, and restraining
issuance of future bonds without prior disclosure. Motion [#26], p. 122.
There are multiple problems with this claim which preclude a finding that the
plaintiffs have shown a substantial likelihood of success on this claim. Notably, the
plaintiffs do not allege any specific source of the alleged duty of disclosure. They do not
13

allege that they are investors in HPTE bonds or that the defendants had a duty to
disclose bond information to the plaintiffs. HPTE has statutory authority to issue bonds
and the plaintiffs allege nothing specific about why the bonds in question were issued in
excess of that statutory authority. Finally, as pled, this claim suffers fatally from group
pleading against the defendants. To rehearse yet again, an inadequately pled claim is
not a claim which has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.
Claim (9) - Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights (TABOR) - In their motion for preliminary
injunction [#26], the plaintiffs allege violation by the defendants, or some of them, of a
provision of the Constitution of the State of Colorado known as TABOR. COLO. CONST.,
Art. X, § 20. In their complaint [#4], the plaintiffs do not allege a TABOR claim. A party
seeking a preliminary injunction must establish a relationship between the injury claimed
in the party's motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint. Little v. Jones, 607
F.3d 1245, 1251 (10th Cir. 2010). Absent such a relationship, a plaintiff cannot
demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the claim underlying the
request for preliminary injunction. Absent a TABOR claim in their complaint, the
plaintiffs in this case cannot show a substantial likelihood of success on a TABOR claim.
To the extent the motion for preliminary injunction seeks relief under TABOR, there is
no present basis to consider such relief.
B. Irreparable Injury
In their motion [#26], the plaintiffs rely on their First Amendment rights, and the
relationship of those rights to statutes such as the APA, CORA, and the Open Meetings
Law, to show irreparable injury. To rehearse, the plaintiffs have not shown a substantial
likelihood that they will prevail on their First Amendment claims or their claims under the
state laws purportedly related to the First Amendment. Absent such a showing, there is
14

no basis to conclude that the plaintiffs will suffer irreparable injury absent a preliminary
injunction.
V. CONCLUSION & ORDER
The plaintiffs have not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits of any of their claims; nor have they shown that they will suffer irreparable injury
absent the entry of a preliminary injunction. On the current record, the plaintiffs are not
entitled to a preliminary injunction.
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Verified Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction [#26] filed September 17, 2014, is
DENIED.
Dated October 7, 2014, at Denver, Colorado.
BY THE COURT:

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