LNV Corporation v. Hook et al

Filing 222

ORDER denying 220 Motion for Entry of Judgment under Rule 54(b); denying 220 Motion for Reconsideration ; denying 220 Motion to Vacate, by Judge Raymond P. Moore on 12/14/2015.(cthom, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Raymond P. Moore
Civil Action No. 14-cv-00955-RM-CBS
LNV CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,
v.
M. JULIA HOOK, an individual,
THE PRUDENTIAL HOME MORTGAGE, INC.,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
SAINT LUKE’S LOFTS HOMEOWNER ASSOC. INC.,
DEBRA JOHNSON, in her official capacity as the Public Trustee of the City and County of
Denver, Colorado, and
DAVID L. SMITH, an individual,
Defendants.
____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
_____________________________________________________________________________
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Julia Hook’s Motion Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 54(b) and 60(b)(4) (the “Motion”) (ECF No. 220) seeking relief from this Court’s Order
(“Order”) of December 3, 2015. In the Motion, Hook seeks an entry of final judgment on the
Order or, in the alternative, a revision or reconsideration of that Order. Hooks also seeks to have
the Order vacated or set aside. The Court has considered the Motion, along with the Court file
and all applicable rules, statutes, and case law. Upon such consideration, and being otherwise
fully advised, the Motion is DENIED.1
Hook asserts two bases for the relief requested. First, she argues there are
“jurisdictional/constitutional errors.” Next, she argues there are “other statutory and
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The Court finds that no further briefing is required on the Motion. See D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(d) (“Nothing in this
rule precludes a judicial officer from ruling on a motion at any time after it is filed.”)

constitutional violations.” None of the arguments affords Hook the relief she seeks.
First, as to the asserted jurisdictional/constitutional errors, such alleged errors are wholly
unrelated – and therefore irrelevant – to the Order at issue. That Order addressed the United
States’ Renewed Motion to Dismiss. Hook’s arguments here, however, attack the United States’
“Claim for Proceeds.” Moreover, such arguments were previously raised and rejected by the
Court, are conclusory, and lack analysis or supporting legal authority. Accordingly, such alleged
errors do not support the relief requested.
Next, as to the asserted “other statutory and constitutional violations,” they are essentially
based on challenges to the Court’s November 20, 2014 Order in Case No. 13-cv-01156-RM-KLM
and/or to the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Hook v. United States, No. 15-1022, 2015 WL 4927272
(10th Cir. Aug. 19, 2015) (unpublished), affirming the November 20, 2014 Order. Again, Hook
raises arguments previously raised and rejected before this Court and/or the Tenth Circuit. In
addition, Hook appears to rely on this Court’s alleged abuse of discretion to establish statutory or
constitutional violations. To the extent Hook raises any “new” arguments, they are conclusory,
unsupported by any legal authority and/or unsupported by sufficient (or any) legal or factual
analysis. Indeed, Hook relies on the Tenth Circuit’s alleged violation of Hook’s constitutional
rights to request relief in the case at bar. Hook’s challenges simply cannot be sustained.
In addition to the above deficiencies, Hook also fails to set forth or establish the
requirements for granting the relief she seeks under any theory raised. Instead, Hook summarily
argues the Court should determine there is no just reason for delay and direct entry of a final
judgment. Simply using the appropriate “buzz words” or parroting the language of Rule 54(b) is
insufficient. See Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1261 (10th Cir. 2006) (Plaintiff “Bricktown, Inc.’s
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use of antitrust buzz-words and parroting of general antitrust theories is insufficient to support a
Sherman Act violation.”) Similarly, simply stating that the requirements for voiding a judgment
under Rule 60(b)(4) are met is insufficient to even show the Rule relied upon applies in the first
instance. Here, Hook argues the Order is a void judgment, but no judgment has been entered.
Finally, Hook fails to address the requirements for a motion to reconsider, such as an intervening
change in the controlling law, new evidence previously unavailable, or the need to correct a legal
error. See Servants of the Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000).
In the penultimate sentence, almost as a throw-away, Hook argues this Court’s fairness and
impartiality is “reasonably questionable,” and therefore also a violation of her constitutional
rights. “Some arguments are so powerful that nothing more [than two paragraphs are] [] needed,
but this is hardly of that character.” Berkshire Medical Center, Inc. v. U.W. Marx, Inc., 644 F.3d
71, 79 (1st. Cir. 2011). Here, there is only one sentence. Nonetheless, the Court has reviewed
this contention, as it has done before, and finds that its impartiality or fairness might not reasonably
be questioned. It is therefore
ORDERED that Defendant Julia Hook’s Motion Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) and

60(b)(4) (ECF No. 220) is DENIED.
DATED this 14th day of December, 2015.
BY THE COURT:

____________________________________
RAYMOND P. MOORE
United States District Judge

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