Radeker v. County of Elbert
Filing
119
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 108 Motion for Reconsideration. The Court modifies its order denying Defendants' summary judgment motion (Doc. # 107 ) and hereby grants summary judgment in favor of Defendants Schlegel, Rowland, and Ross on Plaintiff's due process claim (claim one). By Judge Christine M. Arguello on 04/19/2016. (athom, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Christine M. Arguello
Civil Action No. 14-cv-01238-CMA-KMT
CHERIE RADEKER,
Plaintiff,
v.
ELBERT COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS,
KURT SCHLEGEL, in his official and individual capacities,
ROBERT ROWLAND, in his official and individual capacities, and
LARRY ROSS, in his official and individual capacities,
Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION (DOC. # 108)
Currently before the Court is the Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s
Summary Judgment Order on Qualified Immunity filed by Defendants Kurt Schlegel,
Robert Rowland, and Larry Ross. (Doc. # 108.) Plaintiff Cherie Radeker opposes
Defendants’ motion. (Doc. # 116.) For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants in part
and denies in part Defendants’ motion for reconsideration.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, a former employee of Elbert County, Colorado claims that her
employment was improperly terminated while she was on authorized medical leave. In
her Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), filed on May 19, 2015, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants violated her constitutionally-protected right to due process (claim one), the
Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act (claim two), and the Family
and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) (claim three). (Doc. # 45.) Plaintiff also alleges
breach of contract (claim four) and promissory estoppel (claim five). (Doc. # 45.)
On July 31, 2015, Defendants moved for summary judgment. (Doc. # 73.) One
of the arguments advanced by Defendants Schlegel, Rowland, and Ross was that they
are entitled to qualified immunity with regard to Plaintiff’s due process and FMLA claims.
(Doc. # 73 at 35-39.) Plaintiff opposed Defendants’ motion. (Doc. # 85.)
On December 3, 2015, the Court entered an order denying Defendants’ summary
judgment motion because the Court found that “genuine issues of material fact
preclude[d] the Court from granting the summary judgment motion.” (Doc. # 107.) The
Court’s order did not explicitly address Defendants’ qualified immunity argument. On
December 24, 2015, Defendants moved for reconsideration, arguing that “the Court
should set forth its determination” as to whether or not Defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s due process and FMLA claims. (Doc. # 108 at 2.)
II. DISCUSSION
A. Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration
Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not formally recognize motions
for reconsideration, a party may file a motion seeking relief from an order or judgment
pursuant to Rule 59(e) or Rule 60. See, e.g., Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d
1241, 1243 (10th Cir. 1991). Rule 60(a) provides that “[t]he court may correct . . . a
mistake arising from oversight or omission whenever one is found in a[n] . . . order.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a). The permissible grounds for such relief include “mistake,”
“inadvertence,” or “any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), (6).
“The district court has substantial discretion in connection with a Rule 60(b) motion.”
Pelican Prod. Corp. v. Marino, 893 F.2d 1143, 1146 (10th Cir. 1990).
2
Defendants argue that whether they are entitled to qualified immunity is a legal
determination and that the Court should provide a specific finding with regard to this
question. (Doc. # 108 at 4.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ motion is
“improper because it relies on contested factual arguments that the [C]ourt already
rejected in denying summary judgment.” (Doc. # 116 at 1.)
In Cox v. Glanz, 800 F.3d 1231, 1240 (10th Cir. 2015), the Tenth Circuit
reviewed a district court order denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment
because genuine disputes as to material facts rendered summary judgment
inappropriate. The defendant had asserted that he was entitled to qualified immunity,
but the district court did not expressly address this argument in its order denying the
defendant’s motion. Id. at 1241. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit found that “[t]he [district]
court’s analysis was not consonant with our settled mode of qualified-immunity
decisionmaking.” Id. at 1243 (emphasis in original). The Tenth Circuit made clear that,
when faced with a qualified immunity defense at the summary judgment phase, the
district court’s “‘principal purpose is to determine whether plaintiff’s factual allegations
are sufficiently grounded in the record such that they may permissibly comprise the
universe of facts that will serve as the foundation for answering the legal question
before the court.’” Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Thomson v. Salt Lake City, 584
F.3d 1304, 1326 (10th Cir. 2009)). This is distinct from the more familiar analytic
framework of whether a plaintiff survives summary judgment because the plaintiff’s
evidence raises material issues that warrant resolution by a jury. Id. In light of Cox, the
Court finds that it must reconsider its prior order and provide a more in-depth analysis of
Defendants’ qualified immunity argument.
3
B. Qualified Immunity
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “Qualified immunity balances two important
interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power
irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability
when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231
(2009).
When a defendant raises qualified immunity as a defense, “a plaintiff must
properly allege a deprivation of a constitutional right and must further show that the
constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the violation.” Kaufman v.
Higgs, 697 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 2012). The Court is not required to address
these inquiries in any specific order, Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236-37, and if a plaintiff fails
to carry either part of his or her two-part burden, the defendant is entitled to qualified
immunity, Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1128 (10th Cir. 2001).
1. FMLA Claim
In their summary judgment motion, Defendants Rowland, Schlegel, and Ross
argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s FMLA and due process
claims. (Doc. # 73 at 35-39.) With regard to Plaintiff’s FMLA claim, Defendants argue
that Plaintiff cannot show that Defendants violated her FMLA rights because
Defendants were “unable to locate any Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit cases indicating
that Defendants have individual liability under the FMLA.” (Doc. # 73 at 38.)
4
In her response to Defendants’ summary judgment motion, Plaintiff argues that
Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff cites the Tenth Circuit’s
opinion in Gray v. Baker, 399 F.3d 1241, 1245 (10th Cir. 2005), for her assertion that,
“[i]n the FMLA context, a public employee cannot assert a qualified immunity defense
on the basis that, as individuals, they are not employers under the statute.” (Doc. # 85
at 40.) Plaintiff argues that Gray “flatly rejected” the argument that individual public
officials cannot be held liable for violations of the FLSA. (Doc. # 85 at 41.)
After careful review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the relevant case law,
the Court agrees with Plaintiff that Defendants’ position regarding their individual liability
on Plaintiff’s FMLA claim is improperly framed as an argument regarding qualified
immunity. In support of this finding, the Court relies on the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in
Gray.
In Gray, a public employee who was terminated filed suit alleging violations of
due process and the FMLA. The individual defendants moved for summary judgment
arguing (1) that they “were not ‘employers’ under the FMLA and, as public agency
supervisors, could not be sued individually under the FMLA”; and (2) that they “were
entitled to qualified immunity with regard to [the plaintiff’s] FMLA and § 1983 claims.” Id.
at 1244. The district court determined that the defendants were “public agency
employees” and, thus, could be sued in their individual capacities under the FMLA. Id.
at 1244. The district court also concluded that the defendants were not entitled to
qualified immunity on the plaintiff’s due process claim because, “given the conflicting
evidence, it was unclear whether they had acted reasonably.” Id.
5
On appeal, the defendants argued that “the district court erred in determining (1)
they could be sued in their individual capacities for FMLA violations, and (2) they were
not entitled to qualified immunity on [the plaintiff’s] § 1983 due process claim.” Id. The
Tenth Circuit found that it did not have jurisdiction to review the district court’s
determination that the defendants could be sued in their individual capacities under the
FMLA. Id. at 1246. In reaching this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit explicitly rejected the
defendants’ “attempt to frame the district court’s ruling as a rejection of their ‘qualified
immunity’ under the FMLA.” Id. at 1244. The defendants advanced precisely the same
argument that Defendants present here, namely that “it was ‘not clearly established
statutory law that they could be sued under the FMLA as individuals,’ and thus they are
entitled to qualified immunity from that claim.” Id.
The Tenth Circuit was “not persuaded [that] the defense asserted by [the
defendants] to [the plaintiff’s] FMLA claim can legitimately be characterized as a claim
of qualified or ‘good faith’ immunity.” Id. at 1245. This was because the defendants’
defense “d[id] not hinge on their having acted in good faith in their dealings with [the
plaintiff].” Id. The Tenth Circuit further found that the defendants “c[ould not] not
claim[,] given the clear requirements of the FMLA, they were unaware that a particular
course of conduct would be violative of the FMLA.” Id. Thus, the Tenth Circuit found
that the defendants “never asserted a true qualified immunity defense to the FMLA
claims asserted against them, i.e., they have never asserted that they should be
shielded from liability because they acted in good faith in interpreting and applying the
FMLA to [the plaintiff’s] situation.” Id.
6
Even though the ultimate question in Gray was whether the Tenth Circuit could
properly exercise jurisdiction over the defendants’ interlocutory appeal, the Court finds
instructive the Tenth Circuit’s statements regarding qualified immunity to an FMLA
claim. Like the defendants in Gray, Defendants here argue that they are entitled to
qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s FMLA claim because “Defendants have been unable to
locate any Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit cases indicating that Defendants have
individual liability under the FMLA.” (Doc. # 73 at 38.) In accordance with Gray, the
Court finds that Defendants’ argument that they do not have individual liability under the
FMLA cannot “legitimately be characterized as a claim of qualified or ‘good faith’
immunity.” Gray, 339 F.3d at 1245. In the words of the Gray court, Defendants have
not asserted a “true qualified immunity defense” to Plaintiff’s FMLA claim because they
have not “asserted that they should be shielded from liability because they acted in
good faith in interpreting and applying the FMLA to [Plaintiff’s] situation.” Id. Therefore,
Defendants’ summary judgment motion was properly denied to the extent that it argues
that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s FMLA claim. 1
2. Due Process Claim
With regard to Plaintiff’s due process claim, Defendants assert that they are
entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiff “cannot prove she has a property right in
her employment with the County and, therefore, she was not entitled to due process.”
(Doc. # 73 at 36.) In addition, Defendants assert that “it can hardly be argued that the
law is clear such that every reasonable County Commissioner would understand that
[Plaintiff] had a right to procedural due process before her position was eliminated.”
1
Because the issue has not been briefed by the parties, the Court will not address
whether Defendants have individual liability under the FMLA.
7
(Doc. # 73 at 37.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s “status as an at-will employee
deprives her of any property interest in her employment.” (Doc. # 73 at 37.)
In her response to Defendants’ summary judgment motion, Plaintiff argues that
Defendants’ entitlement to qualified immunity on her due process claim is determined by
whether she “had a clearly established constitutional or statutory right to reinstatement
that Defendants violated.” (Doc. # 85 at 41 (emphasis in original).) Plaintiff states that
“the right to reinstatement is clear under the FMLA, as it is under the ADA.” (Doc. # 85
at 41.) Plaintiff then concludes that, “[b]ecause she had a clear statutory right to
reinstatement, Defendants are not entitled to a qualified immunity defense.” (Doc. # 85
at 41.)
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s response is insufficient to satisfy her burden of
demonstrating that the individual Defendants deprived her of a constitutional right and
that such constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.
See Kaufman, 697 F.3d at 1300. Plaintiff fails to provide a single Supreme Court or
Tenth Circuit decision to support the proposition that an employee’s constitutional due
process rights are violated when that employee is not reinstated in violation of the FMLA
or the ADA. Thus, the Court finds that, in response to Defendants’ assertion of qualified
immunity, Plaintiff has not shown that it was clearly established that her constitutional
due process rights would be violated by Defendants alleged failure to reinstate her in
violation of the FMLA. Because Plaintiff has failed to carry her burden, individual
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s constitutional due process
claim. See Medina, 252 F.3d at 1128.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
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ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s Summary
Judgment Order on Qualified Immunity (Doc. # 108) is GRANTED IN PART AND
DENIED IN PART. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that the Court modifies its order denying Defendants’
summary judgment motion (Doc. # 107) and hereby grants summary judgment in favor
of Defendants Schlegel, Rowland, and Ross on Plaintiff’s due process claim (claim
one).
DATED: April 19, 2016
BY THE COURT:
CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO
United States District Judge
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