Harland v. No Named Respondent
Filing
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ORDER denying 18 Motion for Stay, dismissing this action without prejudice, by Judge Lewis T. Babcock on 7/22/14. (dkals, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No.14-cv-01248-BNB
PAUL MICHAEL HARLAND,
Applicant,
v.
TRAVIS TRANI,
WARDEN, Ordway Correctional Facility, and
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF COLORADO,
Respondents.
ORDER DISMISSING CASE
Applicant, Paul Michael Harland, is a prisoner in the custody of the Colorado
Department of Corrections who currently is incarcerated at the Arkansas Valley
Correctional Facility in Ordway, Colorado. Applicant initiated this action by filing a Letter
stating he desired to file a habeas action challenging his state criminal case, Case No.
03CR2876. Applicant also asked for a stay of any habeas proceeding challenging his
criminal case so that he may pursue a Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(a) in state court. On May 1,
2014, Magistrate Judge Boyd N. Boland entered an order that stated Applicant must
have an action pending in this Court for any request to be considered and that
construed this action as filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Applicant was directed to
use a Court-approved form to file his claims and to submit a request for leave to
proceed pursuant to § 1915. Applicant further was directed that he could pay the $5
filing fee if he desired rather than submit a § 1915 request. Applicant complied with the
May 1 Order. Magistrate Judge Boland reviewed the Application, found that Applicant
had failed to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 because he failed to identify the
constitutional violation in each claim he seeks to raise and state the specific facts to
support the alleged violation, and directed Applicant to file an Amended Application.
On July 9, 2014, Applicant filed a Request for an extension of time to amend the
Application. In the Request, Applicant noted that he needed an extension of time to file
his “35(c) issues.” Magistrate Judge Boland denied the Request for lack of just cause.
Subsequently, on July 16, 2014, Applicant filed a Motion for Stay or Request to
Withdraw Present Action, ECF No. 18. In the Request, Applicant indicates that he is
concerned that he is not time-barred in filing a § 2254 habeas action in this Court.
Applicant states that because he has additional postconviction claims to file in state
court he is electing to dismiss this action at this time to pursue those claims and once
he has pursued the new claims he will file a § 2254 action that includes all of his direct
appeal and postconviction claims. Applicant asks that the Court stay this action while
he completes all lower court issues or allow him to withdraw the action.
The United States Supreme Court has found that an applicant could preserve the
timeliness of an application by requesting that the court issue a stay and abeyance
while he continues to pursue his unexhausted claims in state court. See Pliler v. Ford,
542 U.S. 225 (2004) (O’Connor J., concurring). A stay and abeyance, however, is only
available in limited circumstances. Rhines v. Webster, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005).
Applicant must establish "good cause" for his failure to first exhaust the claims in state
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court. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. For the following reasons, a stay and abeyance of this
case is not proper.
The time during which a proper postconviction is pending in state court is tolled
for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). See Habteselassie v. Novak, 209 F.3d 1208
(10th Cir. 2000); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Applicant states that he has five months left
on the one-year time limitation to file a § 2254. Applicant also states that he will be filing
a Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(c) postconviction motion in the next ten to fourteen days in state
court. Based on Applicant’s assertions, and § 2244(d)(2), no basis exists for staying the
instant action until Applicant has exhausted his state court remedies with respect to all
of his claims.
Because the Court finds no basis for staying the action, Applicant’s Motion to
Withdraw Present Action is construed as a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal. Rule
41(a)(1)(A) provides that “the [applicant] may dismiss an action without a court order by
filing: (I) a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a
motion for summary judgment . . . .” No answer on the merits or motion for summary
judgment has been filed by Respondents in this action. Further, a voluntary dismissal
under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(I) is effective immediately upon the filing of a written notice of
dismissal, and no subsequent court order is necessary. See J. Moore, Moore’s Federal
Practice ¶ 41.02(2) (2d ed. 1995); Hyde Constr. Co. v. Koehring Co., 388 F.2d 501, 507
(10th Cir. 1968). The Court, therefore, construes the Notice of Voluntary Dismissal filed
pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(I). The file will be closed as of July 16, 2014, the date the
Notice was filed with the Court. See Hyde Constr. Co., 388 F.2d at 507. Accordingly, it
is
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ORDERED that the Motion for Stay, ECF No. 18, is denied for lack of good
cause. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Withdraw Present Action < ECF No. 18,
is construed as a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
41(a)(1)(A)(I) and is effective as of July 16, 2014, the date Applicant filed the Notice in
this action. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that the action is dismissed without prejudice.
DATED July 22, 2014, at Denver, Colorado.
BY THE COURT:
s/Lewis T. Babcock
LEWIS T. BABCOCK, Senior Judge
United States District Court
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