Reid v. Colorado Department of Parole et al

Filing 10

ORDER Of Dismissal. The habeas corpus application (ECF No. 1 ) is denied and the action dismissed without prejudice. Leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal is denied. Respondents Motion for Substitution of Respondents(ECF No. 8 ) is granted and the clerk of the court is directed to substitute the Parole Division, Colorado Department of Corrections for the other named Respondents. By Judge Lewis T. Babcock on 6/20/2014. (klyon, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 14-cv-01314-BNB
RYAN REID,
Applicant,
v.
PAROLE DIVISION, COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Applicant, Ryan Reid, is a prisoner incarcerated at the Arapahoe County
Detention Facility. On May 9, 2014, Mr. Reid initiated this action by filing pro se an
Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (ECF No. 1)
challenging his parole hold. He has paid the $5.00 filing fee.
On May 13, 2014, Magistrate Judge Boyd N. Boland entered an order (ECF No.
4) directing Respondents to file a preliminary response limited to addressing the
affirmative defenses of timeliness under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) and/or exhaustion of state
court remedies under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) if Respondents intended to raise either
or both of those defenses in this action. Magistrate Judge Boland also directed
Respondents to advise the Court who the proper Respondents are and move for
substitution of party if Respondents are not the appropriate parties to respond to
Applicant’s claims challenging his parole hold.
On June 3, 2014, Respondents filed a Preliminary Response (ECF No. 7) and a
Motion for Substitution of Respondents (ECF No. 8). The Motion for Substitution is

granted and the Parole Division, Colorado Department of Corrections, is substituted as
Respondent in place of the other named Respondents. Mr. Reid filed a letter (ECF No.
9) in response to the Preliminary Response.
The Court must construe liberally the filings of Mr. Reid because he is not
represented by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Hall v.
Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). However, the Court should not be an
advocate for a pro se litigant. See Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. For the reasons stated
below, the Court will deny the habeas corpus application and dismiss the action without
prejudice for failure to exhaust state court remedies.
In the Application, Mr. Reid alleges that he was sentenced to six years of
incarceration in the Colorado Department of Corrections with a three year period of
mandatory parole. He further alleges that while on parole he was arrested pursuant to
an arrest warrant. (ECF No. 1 at 3). Mr. Reid alleges that the parole hold prevents him
“from making bail, posting bond, and exercising my right to due process on an unrelated
offense.” (Id.). He also contends that the Parole Board refuses to schedule a parole
revocation hearing because “there has been no disposition on [the] new unrelated
pending charge.” (Id.). He asserts that the parole agreement is an invalid contract. (Id.
at 3-4). Finally, Mr. Reid alleges that, prior to filing the instant action, he filed “a
motion/petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Arapahoe County District Court.” (Id.
at 4, 12-14).
Judicial review of the execution of a sentence is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Caravalho v. Pugh, 177 F.3d 1177, 1178 (10th Cir. 1999). A federal court may only
grant habeas relief when a state prisoner is “in custody in violation of the constitution,
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laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Federal courts do not
possess supervisory authority over state judicial proceedings; they may only intervene
to correct violations of federal law. See, e.g., Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221
(1982). Review of § 2241 habeas actions is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2243, which vests
the Court with the authority to decide the case as a matter of law. See 28 U.S.C. §
2243; Watts v. Hadden, 489 F. Supp. 987, 989 (D. Colo. 1980), aff’d, 651 F.2d 1354
(10th Cir. 1981).
“A habeas petitioner is generally required to exhaust state remedies whether his
action is brought under § 2241 or [28 U.S.C.] § 2254.” Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d
862, 866 (10th Cir. 2000). In particular:
We emphasize that the federal claim must be fairly
presented to the state courts. If the exhaustion doctrine is to
prevent unnecessary conflict between courts equally bound
to guard and protect rights secured by the Constitution, it is
not sufficient merely that the federal habeas applicant has
been through the state courts. The rule would serve no
purpose if it could be satisfied by raising one claim in the
state courts and another in the federal courts. Only if the
state courts have had the first opportunity to hear the claim
sought to be vindicated in a federal habeas proceeding does
it make sense to speak of the exhaustion of state remedies.
Accordingly, we have required a state prisoner to present the
state courts with the same claim he urges upon the federal
courts.
Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-76 (1971) (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted). “The exhaustion requirement is not one to be overlooked lightly. Principles of
comity and federalism demand that the requirement be strictly enforced.” Hernandez v.
Starbuck, 69 F.3d 1089, 1092 (10th Cir. 1995) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).

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Mr. Reid is required to exhaust state remedies before he may raise his claims in
federal court. See Montez, 208 F.3d at 866. The exhaustion requirement is satisfied
once the federal claim has been presented fairly to the state courts. See Castille v.
Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989). Fair presentation requires that the federal issue be
presented properly “to the highest state court, either by direct review of the conviction or
in a postconviction attack.” Dever v. Kansas State Penitentiary, 36 F.3d 1531, 1534
(10th Cir. 1994). “An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies
available in the courts of the State . . . if he has the right under the law of the State to
raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). A
state prisoner bringing a federal habeas corpus bears the burden of showing that he
has exhausted all available state remedies. See Miranda v. Cooper, 967 F.2d 392, 398
(10th Cir. 1992).
Mr. Reid’s federal habeas challenge must be dismissed for failure to exhaust
state remedies. “A state prisoner is generally barred from obtaining federal habeas
relief unless the prisoner has properly presented his or her claims through one
‘complete round of the State’s established appellate review process.’” Woodford v.
Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92 (quoting O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999)). Mr.
Reid concedes that he has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Arapahoe
County District Court challenging his parole hold. (ECF No. 1 at 4, 12-14; ECF No. 9).
Mr. Reid also admits that he has not yet received a ruling on the petition filed in the
Arapahoe County District Court. (ECF No. 9). Therefore, his claim has not been
adequately presented to the state courts, he has failed to exhaust state remedies, and
the application must be dismissed without prejudice.
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Furthermore, the Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any
appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis
status will be denied for the purpose of appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369
U.S. 438 (1962). If Mr. Reid files a notice of appeal he also must pay the full $505.00
appellate filing fee or file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit within thirty days in accordance with Fed. R. App.
P. 24.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the habeas corpus application (ECF No. 1) is denied and the
action dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal is
denied. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent’s Motion for Substitution of Respondents
(ECF No. 8) is granted and the clerk of the court is directed to substitute the Parole
Division, Colorado Department of Corrections for the other named Respondents.
DATED at Denver, Colorado, this 20th day of

June , 2014.

BY THE COURT:

s/Lewis T. Babcock
LEWIS T. BABCOCK, Senior Judge
United States District Court

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