Garcia v. Patton et al
ORDER Granting 22 Cynthia Jamison, LPC's and Progressive Therapy Systems' Objection by Subpoenaed Third Party [which this court views as a Motion Quash Subpoena] ; Granting to the extent not already stipulated by the parties as descri bed in footnote 1 26 Motion to Partially Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum Directed to the Denver Adult Probation Department, or Alternatively, for Entry of a Protective Order; Denying 31 Plaintiff's Motion to Compel and Opposition to Motion to Quash (Subpoena to Cynthia Jamison, LPC & Progressive Therapy Systems) ; Denying 57 Plaintiff's Motion to Compel (Subpoena to RSA, Inc.). By Magistrate Judge Michael J. Watanabe on 10/21/2014.(emill)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 14-cv-01568-RM-MJW
REGINA GARCIA as Parent and Next Friend to T.D., a minor,
KELCEY PATTON and
THE DENVER DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
CYNTHIA JAMISON, LPC’S AND PROGRESSIVE THERAPY SYSTEMS’
OBJECTION BY SUBPOENAED THIRD PARTY (Docket No. 22);
DENVER PROBATION’S MOTION TO PARTIALLY QUASH SUBPOENA DUCES
TECUM DIRECTED TO THE DENVER ADULT PROBATION DEPARTMENT, OR
ALTERNATIVELY, FOR ENTRY OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER (Docket No. 26);
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL AND OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO QUASH
(SUBPOENA TO CYNTHIA JAMISON, LPC & PROGRESSIVE THERAPY SYSTEMS)
(Docket No. 31);
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL (SUBPOENA TO RSA, INC.)
(Docket No. 57).
Michael J. Watanabe
United States Magistrate Judge
Tiercel Duerson was convicted of an attempted sexual offense against a minor.
As part of his probation agreement, he participated in mental-health and sex-offender
counseling. The treatment records from that counseling are arguably privileged under
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996), but are also highly relevant to the case before the
Court—a civil case to which Mr. Duerson is not a party. Four motions concerning those
records are now pending. As a matter of first impression, the Court concludes that a
selective-waiver doctrine should apply under the present circumstances—and therefore,
that these records are privileged and cannot be disclosed without Mr. Duerson’s consent.
The Court has considered the motions and briefs, taken judicial notice of the
court’s file on this case, directed additional documents to be filed, and considered the
relevant Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, statutes, and case law. The Court now being
fully informed makes the following findings of fact, conclusions of law, and orders.
Mr. Duerson pled guilty to Attempted Sexual Assault on a Child on March 24, 2006,
in Denver County District Court Case No. 05-CR-1546. The victim was his minor
daughter, P.G. Mr. Duerson was sentenced to eight years of Sex Offender Supervised
Probation. As a condition of his probation, Mr. Duerson was ordered to complete
counseling and to sign a disclosure form for his counseling records. (Document 66-8,
p.2. (“You shall attend and actively participate in a sex offender evaluation and treatment
program . . . . You shall submit, at your own expense, to any program of psychological
or physiological assessment and monitoring . . . . You shall sign Releases of
Information to allow the probation officer to communicate with other professionals
involved in your treatment program . . . .”) Colorado’s Sex Offender Management Board
referred Mr. Duerson to Redirecting Sexual Aggression, Inc. (“RSA”) for treatment in May
2006. He violated his probation and was incarcerated from November 2007 until March
2009, when he was released on parole. On parole, the Sex Offender Management
Board referred Mr. Duerson to Progressive Therapy Systems (“PTS”) for treatment.
According to the Complaint in this case, Denver’s Department of Human Services
removed Plaintiff’s son, T.D., from Plaintiff’s home in 2010 and placed him with his father,
Mr. Duerson—resulting in severe abuse to T.D. at Mr. Duerson’s hands. Plaintiff has
sued the city under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for doing so, acting as next friend of T.D. The
records from Mr. Duerson’s criminal case and sex-offender treatment are clearly relevant,
and Plaintiff has subpoenaed those records from a number of sources. At issue here:
● The Denver Probation Department (“DPD”) received a subpoena for all records
relating to Mr. Duerson. DPD has produced most of the requested documents,
but has moved either to quash the subpoena or for a protective order as regards
Mr. Duerson’s treatment records, references to treatment in other documents,
and the presentence investigation report. This motion is fully briefed. 1 (Docket
Nos. 26, 34, 36, & 53.)
● Licensed Professional Counselor Cynthia Jamison and her employer, PTS,
received a subpoena for all records relating to Mr. Duerson and also “[a]ll
documents related to testimony provided, or prepared to provide, in Case No.
10-JV-0668 in the Denver Juvenile Court on or about January 22, 2013.” PTS
filed an objection, which this Court views as a motion to quash; Plaintiff moved to
compel, and the motions are now fully briefed. 2 (Docket Nos. 22, 31, 33, & 35.)
DPD initially objected to producing any information that might identify P.G., the
victim of Mr. Duerson’s crime. P.G. has since consented to such disclosure, and DPD
has produced documents previously withheld on that basis. DPD also initially objected
to producing certain criminal background records; those records have been procured by
Plaintiff elsewhere, and so Plaintiff has withdrawn its request for those documents.
The parties do not explain why TPS provided or prepared to provide testimony for a
Denver Juvenile Court case. The Court assumes the testimony relates to Mr. Duerson’s
counseling and is therefore subject to the same privilege analysis as the rest of TPS’s
records. The Court will entertain a motion to reconsider, as to these records, if that
assumption is incorrect.
● RSA received a subpoena for all records relating to Mr. Duerson. It declined to
produce any records, citing confidentiality of mental-health records. Plaintiff
has moved to compel. (Docket No. 57.)
Like Mr. Duerson, DPD, PTS, and RSA are not parties to this lawsuit.
Mr. Duerson has not authorized the release of any information to Plaintiff or to
Plaintiff’s attorneys. However, as ordered by the sentencing court, he signed a HIPAA
waiver form stating:
I, Tiercel Duerson, authorize the exchange of and disclosure of information
pertaining to me, between the Probation Department for the 2nd Judicial
District, State of Colorado, and members of the Interagency Community
Supervision Team. The persons to whom information will be disclosed
pursuant to this authorization are:
Sex offender treatment evaluator/provider/program approved by the
Colorado Sex Offender Management Board.
Polygraph examiner approved by the Colorado Sex Offender
Abel Assessment of Sexual Interest/plethysmograph examiner.
Victim(s) therapist and other involved professionals.
Physician as indicated by the Interagency Community Supervision
Team (monitored medication, antabuse, etc.)
Federal, state, county, or city law enforcement agencies.
(Docket No. 31-3.) The form is a select-all-that-apply form; the foregoing options were
selected in a version signed by Mr. Duerson in January 2007. There is an undated
version of the form in the record selecting the same boxes. (Docket No. 35-2.) The
context would suggest the undated version was signed in April 2006—and for purposes of
these motions, the Court so finds.
As part of his treatment with PTS, Mr. Duerson was required to sign a form titled
“Sex Offender Treatment Contract and Safety Plan.” (Docket No. 33 p. 2 & n.1.) That
contract included the following confidentiality provision:
Your personal information is confidential with the following exceptions
according to state law and Sex Offender Management Board (SOMB)
If you are thought to be of imminent danger to yourself or others or if you are
gravely disabled due to a mental illness, crucial information needed to allow
you to receive emergency mental health care may be released to other
agencies who can help you.
Any report of suspected child abuse or neglect will be reported to the
appropriate authorities, as required by state law.
You should know that signing this contract is, as required by SOMB
standards (3.200), a waiver of confidentiality and a release of information to
include but not limited to your supervising officer, community corrections
staff, polygraph examiners, guardians ad litem or custodial relative of your
victim, to the victim(s) who you have offended, and any other therapists who
provide you with services. Progressive Therapy Systems agrees to
safeguard your personal information and only release information to other
parties in regard to your compliance and progress with treatment and
information about your risk, threats and/or possible escalation of violence.
Your waiver of confidentiality extends beyond termination until you provide
written notice to discontinue this waiver to Progressive Therapy Systems.
In order to allow your supervising officer to monitor your treatment progress,
treatment compliance, and your risk to others, your therapist will share
information with your officer.
Any information that you hear about or from any group member is strictly
confidential. Clients who disclose personal information about other clients
to people outside their group are subject to termination from this treatment
(Docket No. 33-1.)
It is undisputed that none of the parties in this case are within the scope of any of
the confidentiality waivers signed or agreed to by Mr. Duerson. Further, there is no
indication that any party has provided Mr. Duerson with notice of the subpoenas and the
subject motions (Docket Nos. 22, 26, 31, and 57). The Court finds that Mr. Duerson has
not been given notice nor provided due process as to the disclosure of the subpoenaed
While Plaintiff insists on production of the subpoenaed documents, Plaintiff has no
objection to protective orders restricting access to those documents.
The Court finds that it has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties
to this lawsuit, that venue is proper in the state and District of Colorado, and that all
parties have been given a fair and adequate opportunity to be heard.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(d)(3)(A)(iii), the Court must quash or
modify a subpoena that requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter. Here,
because this is a federal-question case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and federal law will
provide the rules for decision, any applicable privileges will be governed by federal
common law. Fed. R. Evid. 501. That said, “the policy decisions of the States bear on
the question whether federal courts should recognize a new privilege or amend the
coverage of an existing one.” Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 12–13. Further, state confidentiality
laws should be accommodated if it is possible to do so without undermining federal
interests. See Gottlieb v. Wiles, 143 F.R.D. 235, 237 (D. Colo. 1992); United States v.
King, 73 F.R.D. 103, 105 (E.D. N.Y. 1976).
DPD, PTS, and RSA object to producing Mr. Duerson’s treatment records on the
basis of Colorado’s psychotherapist-patient privilege. They cite Colorado Revised
Statutes (C.R.S.) § 13-90-107(1)(g), and point out that the records cannot be disclosed,
even in camera, without Mr. Duerson’s consent. See People v. Sisneros, 55 P. 3d 797,
800 (Colo. 2002). Further, under state law, TPS and RSA are prohibited from producing
the records, even pursuant to a court order, unless that court order involved notice to Mr.
Duerson and an opportunity for hearing. C.R.S. § 27-65-121(1)(f).
Those statutes have no direct application here, but federal law also provides for a
psychotherapist-patient privilege. Jaffee, 518 U.S. 1. Plaintiff argues that the privilege
does not apply here, for two reasons: (1) Mr. Duerson’s treatment was not confidential
and was therefore never privileged in the first place, and (2) even if the treatment was
privileged, he waived that privilege for all purposes by signing the HIPAA forms. The
Expectation of Confidentiality
It is true, as Plaintiff argues, that a communication is not privileged if the party
asserting the privilege does not keep the communication confidential. As a general rule,
“[a]ny voluntary disclosure by the client is inconsistent with the [privileged] relationship
and waives the privilege.” United States v. Bernard, 877 F.2d 1463, 1465 (10th Cir.
1989). But that rule does not apply to involuntary disclosures, United States v. Ary, 518
F.3d 775, 783–85 (10th Cir. 2008), and it is far from clear that Mr. Duerson voluntarily
disclosed anything. Certainly, in the strictest sense of the word, Mr. Duerson had a
choice between signing his probation agreement and going to prison. But that sort of
formalistic reasoning is not persuasive. Viewed in a more realistic light, Mr. Duerson did
not choose to waive confidentiality—it was a compelled waiver, part of the price for
staying out of prison. There are numerous cases deciding that Courts have the authority
to impose such waivers as a condition of probation. See, e.g., United States v. Daniels,
541 F.3d 915, 929 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Dupes, 2008 WL 90073, at *4 (2d
Cir.2008); United States v. Lopez, 258 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir.2001); United States v.
Cooper, 171 F.3d 582, 587 (8th Cir.1999). Those cases do not consider whether the
compelled disclosure waives privilege in later proceedings—but by holding that courts
have the authority to compel disclosure even when the defendants object to it, these
cases suggest that such disclosures are in fact judicially compelled, i.e., not voluntary.
The expectation-of-confidentiality cases relied upon by Plaintiff are distinguishable
for that reason. In each, the mental-health counseling took place either as part of some
essentially voluntary activity like applying for a job, or as part of an investigation in
anticipation of litigation. Doe v. Ensey, 220 F.R.D. 422 (M.D. Pa. 2004) (counseling
records of priests prepared as part of sex-abuse investigation); Kamper v. Gray, 182
F.R.D. 597 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (mental evaluations of police officer from pre-employment
screening and from post-shooting investigation); Barrett v. Vojtas, 182 F.R.D. 177 (W.D.
Pa. 1998) (same). Such records are fully voluntary; moreover, they are neither for the
purpose of treatment nor intended to be confidential. Here, by contrast, Mr. Duerson’s
counseling took place for the purpose of actual treatment—and confidentiality was
waived only for the limited purpose of allowing the state to enforce or compel that
The Court has not found many analogous cases of privilege waiver as part of a
probation agreement. This is not surprising, as it is hard to imagine a condition of
probation that would require a criminal defendant to waive the attorney-client privilege, or
the priest-penitent privilege, or the like. The Court has found only one federal case
where the defendant argued that mental-health records remained privileged despite such
a judicially compelled disclosure: United States v. Kokoski, 435 F. App’x 472, 476–77 (6th
Cir. 2011). But there, unlike here, the treatment records were being used within the
scope of the waiver: the probation department sought to use them to revoke probation.
The defendant thus argued that the waiver was made under duress and was invalid; he
didn’t argue, as DPD, TPS, and RSA do here, that the treatment records remained
privileged for other purposes.
The Kokoski court is obviously correct that, because courts have the ability to
compel disclosure for purposes of monitoring probation, the otherwise-confidential
information must be admissible in a probation-revocation hearing. But that reasoning
does not require finding that the privilege has been waived for all purposes—and given
the less-than-fully voluntary nature of the waiver, the Court must consider whether a
selective-waiver doctrine should apply.
Plaintiff correctly points out that the “selective waiver” doctrine has not been
approved by the Tenth Circuit. As the Tenth Circuit explained in In re Qwest
Communications International, Inc. Securities Litigation, 450 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2006),
the doctrine has been adopted by some courts, in the attorney-client context, as a way of
encouraging cooperation with government investigations. Id. at 1186–88. The Tenth
Circuit disagreed with those courts, declining to adopt a rule that would allow litigants to
disclose privileged information to government agencies but maintain the privilege against
third parties. Id. at 1201. But the Tenth Circuit did not entirely foreclose the idea: it
explicitly found that “the record in this case does not justify adoption of selective waiver.”
Id. (emphasis added). The court came to its conclusion after evaluating six
considerations—and here, each of those six considerations counsels in favor of the
opposite conclusion. 3
First, the Tenth Circuit noted that the record did not support the purported policy
behind the selective-waiver doctrine: promoting government investigations. Id. at 1193.
To the contrary, Qwest had willingly disclosed nearly a quarter-million pages of
documents to the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission
The Tenth Circuit actually considered a seventh factor as well—the problematic
“culture of waiver” allegedly imposed upon corporate America by the federal government.
Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1199–1200. It rejected the concern based on the institutional
limitations of the judiciary. The consideration has no relevance here.
without any assurance that the records would be protected by the selective-waiver
doctrine; further, the federal government had specifically declined to endorse the doctrine
at the Tenth Circuit’s invitation. Id. Here, by contrast, the record does not undercut the
purported government interest. Mr. Duerson’s participation in the treatment programs
came subject to assurances that his records would remain confidential within the
Second, in Qwest, the Tenth Circuit noted that the confidentiality agreements
between Qwest and DOJ left very few restrictions on DOJ’s use of the documents. Id. at
1194. Here, by contrast, the confidentiality waiver was tightly circumscribed: disclosure
was limited to (1) those entities directly involved in Mr. Duerson’s treatment and in
supervising his probation, and (2) those entities implicated by immediate public-safety
concerns, like Mr. Duerson’s employer and his victim.
Third, and most importantly, the Tenth Circuit observed that the purpose of the
selective-waiver doctrine—facilitating government investigations—had no relationship to
the policies underlying privilege—promoting frank communication between lawyers and
clients. Id. at 1195. Indeed, “[r]ather than promoting exchange between attorney and
client, selective waiver could have the opposite effect of inhibiting such communication.”
Id. Here, by contrast, the policy behind selective waiver is entirely consonant with the
policies underlying the psychotherapist-patient privilege. Probationers in Mr. Duerson’s
position have already been forced to disclose their treatment records to the probation
office. But by allowing selective waiver, probationers would be encouraged to
communicate with their therapists fully and freely nonetheless—knowing that although
their probation officer will have access to their records, no one else will. Further, unlike
Qwest—where the SEC’s and DOJ’s interest in the communications ran counter to those
of Qwest’s lawyers’—a probation officer’s interest in the records aligns with those of the
counselor. As DPD persuasively puts it:
Denver Probation’s repository of confidential and privileged information is
intended to be used by the Colorado criminal courts to monitor compliance
with probation and to sanction noncompliance in accordance with the law.
. . . [D]isclosure to third parties undermines a supervised probationary
system that operates most efficiently and effectively when probationers are
open and honest, and they possess some reasonable expectation of
privacy that the information they disclose in treatment or to their probation
officer is intended for the very specific purpose of monitoring their
compliance with court-ordered probation, and not subject to the reach of a
third-party private litigant, no matter how meritorious any personal claim
(Docket No. 36, pp. 5–6.) Certainly, a different context would lead to a different
conclusion. But here, in the context of compelled disclosure and coerced rehabilitative
treatment, selective waiver reinforces the policies of the underlying privilege.
Fourth, the Qwest court examined the fairness to the parties—noting the inherent
inequity in allowing Qwest to disclose information to get a better deal from the SEC but
still refuse to disclose that information to private litigants. 450 F.3d at 1195–96. There
is no analogous unfairness here. Unlike Qwest, Mr. Duerson has not sought to withhold
from Plaintiff the same information that he traded to the government in exchange for some
benefit. Cf. United States v. Hudson, 2013 WL 4768084, at *3–5 (D. Kan. Sept. 5, 2013)
(rejecting selective waiver where privilege-holder had disclosed the records in an
application for disability benefits). To be sure, the information was generated while
receiving the benefit of a deferred sentence. But Mr. Duerson did not trade the
information for that benefit—he enrolled in the treatment for that benefit, and he signed
the waiver because he was compelled to as an ancillary matter. Further, in Qwest, the
Tenth Circuit found there to be little if any unfairness to Qwest if the selective-waiver rule
were not adopted. 450 F.3d at 1195. Here, by contrast, Mr. Duerson has not even
been given notice of this proceeding.
Fifth, the Tenth Circuit noted the great weight of authority, in both federal and state
courts, against selective waiver in the attorney-client context. Id. at 1196–97. Here, by
contrast, there is very little case law on point. The Court has discovered no federal
cases in the context of probation agreements, other than the Kokoski case; the Court has
likewise found few state cases. Plaintiff does direct the Court to two state cases, but
both are distinguishable. In Saenz v. Alexander, 584 So. 2d 1061, 1062 (Fla. App.
1991), the party asserting the privilege had waived confidentiality as part of a
deferred-prosecution agreement, similar to Mr. Duerson. But the party asserting the
privilege was also the defendant in the case: he was being sued for civil damages by the
victim of his crime. He was very literally, then, picking and choosing among his
opponents—placing his mental health at issue to get the government off his back in the
criminal case, while trying to keep that same information away from his victim in a related
civil case. Further, it is worth noting that at least one court in Florida has come to a
different conclusion on the question. Davis v. Dep’t of Corrs., 2014 WL 3866472, at *4–
5 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 6, 2014) (applying same state statutory privilege in same
probation-records context). In Plaintiff’s other case, Hertog, ex rel S.A.H. v. City of
Seattle, 979 P.2d 400 (Wash. 1999), the court resolved the question not on grounds of
selective waiver, but on the lack of any expectation of confidentiality. The court did not
consider whether the probationer’s waiver of confidentiality was truly voluntary, and as a
result this Court finds the case less persuasive. More compelling is a Colorado case
arising in a different context. In L.A.N. v. L.M.B., 292 P.3d 942, 950–53 (Colo. 2013), the
Colorado Supreme Court decided to allow limited-scope waivers of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege. A limited-scope waiver is somewhat distinct from a
selective waiver, insofar as a “limited scope” waiver discloses some but not all of the
confidential information, while a “selective” waiver discloses information to some but not
all third parties. But both attempts at partial waiver are historically frowned upon at
common law, for the same reasons—and despite those reasons, the court endorsed a
limited waiver of psychotherapist-patient privilege for purposes of determining the best
interest of the child in guardian ad litem cases. Id. at 950–53. The rehabilitative interest
here is a different one, but the government interests are equally consistent with the
purpose of the privilege.
Finally, the Qwest court noted that privileges are derogation of the truth and that
new privileges should not easily be found. 450 F.3d at 1197–99. The variation of
selective waiver at issue there could be viewed just as readily as a new “law enforcement”
or “government investigations” privilege. Id. Here, it might be argued, the question
could be construed as a new probation-department privilege. But DPD has already
produced numerous documents related to probation—it objects only to a handful of
documents protected by state confidentiality laws on the basis of their content, not their
source. Further, as the Tenth Circuit noted, many states have adopted selective-waiver
statutes for certain narrow categories of information reported to supervisory agencies,
rather than “in the general law enforcement context.” Id. at 1198 n.8. This case is
closely analogous to those “particularized circumstances” where selective waiver is
Ultimately, in Qwest the Tenth Circuit sided with the majority rule on attorney-client
communications, which it summarized this way:
“The client cannot be permitted to pick and choose among his opponents,
waiving the privilege for some and resurrecting the claim of confidentiality to
obstruct others, or to invoke the privilege as to communications whose
confidentiality he has already compromised for his own benefit.” “We
believe that the attorney-client privilege should be available only at the
traditional price: a litigant who wishes to assert confidentiality must maintain
Id. at 1187 (quoting Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221–22 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (internal citations omitted)). This reasoning simply does not apply to Mr.
Duerson’s case. Mr. Duerson has not tried to “pick and choose among his opponents.”
He provided a judicially compelled waiver, for the purpose of his probation—presumably,
without any way of knowing that some years later his treatment records might be relevant
to civil litigation to which he is not a party.
The Court finds that the Tenth Circuit would likely adopt some variation of selective
waiver in this context. The Court therefore holds that Mr. Duerson’s sex-offender and
mental-health treatment records are privileged and that Mr. Duerson has not waived that
privilege. Plaintiff may not compel the disclosure of these records without Mr. Duerson’s
Presentence Investigation Report and Associated Materials
As the Supreme Court noted in U.S. Department of Justice v. Julian:
[C]ourts have been very reluctant to give third parties access to the
presentence investigation report prepared for some other individual or
individuals. As the Government points out, one reason for this is the fear
that disclosure of the reports will have a chilling effect on the willingness of
various individuals to contribute information that will be incorporated into
the report. A second reason is the need to protect the confidentiality of the
information contained in the report. Accordingly, the courts have typically
required some showing of special need before they will allow a third party to
obtain a copy of a presentence report.
486 U.S. 1, 12 (1988) (internal citations omitted). In this case, Plaintiff sues Denver
Department of Human Services, arguing that the Department deprived T.D. of
substantive due process by housing him with Mr. Duerson. As to these records, Plaintiff
argues only that “Defendant DDHS should have required [Mr. Duerson] to provide these
documents, and then reviewed them, to determine whether [Mr. Duerson] posed a risk of
harm to T.D. before placing him in [Mr. Duerson]’s home.” (Docket No. 34, p. 8.)
Although this theory does establish the relevance of the documents, it does not establish
any special need. Plaintiff has already received various criminal background documents
(Docket No. 34, p. 9); moreover, Plaintiff can establish this point with public documents
from Mr. Duerson’s criminal cases and through testimony conceding that the Department
did not do as Plaintiff suggests it should have. Without a stronger showing of need by
Plaintiff, DPD’s motion to quash this portion of the subpoena must be granted.
WHEREFORE, based upon these findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is
That Cynthia Jamison, LPC’s and Progressive Therapy Systems’ Objection
by Subpoenaed Third Party [which this court views as a Motion Quash
Subpoena] (Docket No. 22) is GRANTED;
That the Motion to Partially Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum Directed to the
Denver Adult Probation Department, or Alternatively, for Entry of a
Protective Order (Docket No. 26) is GRANTED to the extent not already
stipulated by the parties as described in footnote 1 above;
That Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel and Opposition to Motion to Quash
(Subpoena to Cynthia Jamison, LPC & Progressive Therapy Systems)
(Docket No. 31) is DENIED;
That Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel (Subpoena to RSA, Inc.) (Docket No. 57)
That each party shall pay their own attorney fees and costs for this motion.
Done this 21st day of October 2014.
BY THE COURT
s/Michael J. Watanabe
MICHAEL J. WATANABE
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?