Knight v. Century Park Associates
Filing
52
ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOITION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND REMANDING CASE TO STATE COURT 35 Plaintiffs Title VII claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and case is REMANDED to the District Court of Boulder County, Colorado, by Judge William J. Martinez on 07/30/2015.(cthom, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge William J. Martínez
Civil Action No. 14-cv-1584-WJM-NYW
SHARON KNIGHT,
Plaintiff,
v.
CENTURY PARK ASSOCIATES, LLC,
Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND REMANDING CASE TO STATE COURT
On June 5, 2014, Defendant Century Park Associates (“Defendant”) removed
the instant action from the District Court of Boulder County, Colorado, to this Court.
(ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff Sharon Knight (“Plaintiff”) alleges that Defendant, Plaintiff’s
former employer, violated Colorado Revised Statute § 8-2-123, terminated Plaintiff in
violation of public policy, and engaged in discriminatory employment practices in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (“Title
VII”), and the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act, Colorado Revised Statute § 24-34-401,
et seq. (“CADA”). (ECF No. 13.) Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (“Motion”). (ECF No. 35.) For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is
granted in part.
I. BACKGROUND
The relevant facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, are as follows.
Plaintiff was hired at Bridge Assisted Living (“Bridge”), a facility operated by Defendant,
in October 2006. (ECF No. 37-7 at 1.) On November 14, 2010, Plaintiff was notified
that a Bridge resident may have been abused by a staff member. (ECF No. 35 at 2.)
On November 15, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Complaint with the Health Facilities and
Emergency Medical Services Division of the Department of Public Health based on the
resident abuse. (Id.) On November 29, 2010, Plaintiff was notified that a different
Bridge resident had significant bruising, but could not explain how she became bruised.
(Id.) Bridge’s General Manager, Shirley McNeff, reported this incident to the Longmont
Police Department. (Id. at 2-3.)
Plaintiff testified that, beginning in approximately December 2010, Lisa
Rademacher, the business office manager, and two other employees, Jessica Schlagel
and Brittany Cox, harassed and/or undermined Plaintiff. (ECF No. 37-2 at 4-5.) After
Plaintiff complained about the alleged harassment, on January 24, 2011, Plaintiff, Ms.
Rademacher, and Ms. McNeff met with Jackie Bobbitt, Defendant’s Senior Regional
Director of Operations, who informed the three that if they could not “work it out,” she
would decide “what changes would be made.” (ECF No. 37 at 3.) Later that same day,
Ms. Rademacher emailed Ms. Bobbitt alleging Plaintiff had engaged in inappropriate
sexual conduct with Ms. Schlagel. (Id.)
Ms. Bobbitt interviewed Ms. Schlagel and Ms. Cox on February 23, 2011. (ECF
Nos. 35-4 & 35-6). Ms. Schlagel stated that Plaintiff made physical advances on her at
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various times in the workplace. (ECF No. 35-6.) Ms. Cox reported that at a Halloween
party off-site, “[Plaintiff] grabbed my breasts. I said ‘stop.’ Then I walked away.”1 (ECF
No. 35-4 at 3.) Ms. Cox also claimed that she had witnessed Plaintiff and another
Bridge employee, Amanda Cletcher, kissing in a car at work.2 (ECF No. 35-5.) Plaintiff
was terminated on February 23, 2011, allegedly for “poor job performance and poor
judgment.” (ECF No. 37-2.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue of material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Henderson v. Inter-Chem
Coal Co., Inc., 41 F.3d 567, 569 (10th Cir. 1994). W hether there is a genuine dispute
regarding a material fact depends upon whether the evidence presents a sufficient
disagreement as to require submission to a jury or, conversely, is so one-sided that one
party must prevail as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248-49
(1986); Carey v. U.S. Postal Serv., 812 F.2d 621, 623 (10th Cir. 1987).
A fact is “material” if it pertains to an element of a claim or defense, and a factual
dispute is “genuine” if the evidence is so contradictory that if the matter went to trial, a
reasonable juror could return a verdict for either party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The
1
Ms. Schlagel and Ms. Cox’s statements were recorded in separate “Workplace
Investigation” forms attached as exhibits to Defendant’s Motion. (ECF Nos. 35-4 & 35-5.)
2
Ms. Doss’s sworn affidavit satisfies Federal Rule of Evidence 901 as to this evidence
and the information contained in the “Workplace Investigation” forms referenced above. (ECF
No. 40-1.) This evidence is not material to the Court’s holding, in any event.
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Court must examine the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and
resolve factual ambiguities against the moving party. Houston v. Nat’l Gen. Ins. Co.,
817 F.2d 83, 85 (10th Cir. 1987). The summary judgment standard thus favors a right
to trial. See id.
III. ANALYSIS
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Title VII and CADA gender discrimination claims
are time-barred. (ECF No. 35 at 2.) Defendant further argues that Plaintiff’s retaliation
claims fail because her termination occurred due to the sexual harassment investigation
rather than any other reason. (Id.) Plaintiff responds that the discovery rule or
equitable tolling renders her gender discrimination claims timely, and that Defendant’s
stated reason for her termination was pretextual. The Court addresses these
arguments below.
A. Plaintiff’s Title VII Claim
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Title VII gender discrimination claim is
time-barred. (ECF No. 35 at 11.) A charge of discrimination under Title VII must be
filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) within 180 or 300
days (depending on the situation) “after the alleged unlawful employment practice
occurred.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). “A claim not filed within these statutory limits is
time barred.” Daniels v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 701 F.3d 620, 628 (10th Cir. 2012);
see also Noland v. City of Albuquerque, 779 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1222 (D.N.M. 2011)
(“Filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the
institution of a lawsuit based on a claim of employment discrimination under Title VII.”).
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Plaintiff does not dispute that she was terminated on February 23, 2011, but did not file
a charge of discrimination with the EEOC until January 11, 2013. (Compare ECF No.
35 at 7, with ECF No. 37 at 2.)
The Tenth Circuit has held that “the clock starts running when the plaintiff first
knew or should have known of his injury, whether or not he realized the cause of his
injury was unlawful.” Almond v. Unified Sch. Dist., 665 F.3d 1174, 1176 (10th Cir.
2011). Thus, “an employee who discovers, or should have discovered, the injury (the
adverse employment decision) need not be aware of the unlawful discriminatory intent
behind that act for the limitations clock to start ticking.” Id. at 1177 (emphasis in
original). This rule generally means that “a claim accrues when the disputed
employment practice—the demotion, transfer, firing, refusal to hire, or the like—is first
announced to the plaintiff.” Id. (emphasis added).
Here, Plaintiff argues that she had no knowledge that Defendant may have
terminated her in violation of Title VII until she received Defendant’s initial disclosures in
December 2012, which contained evidence that she had been targeted based on her
“masculine appearance.” (ECF No. 37 at 19.) Plaintiff therefore argues that the
discovery rule or equitable tolling should apply to render her discrimination claim timely.
(Id. at 19-20.)
Plaintiff cites only one case, from the Seventh Circuit, to support her contention
that the discovery rule applies here. (Id.) More importantly, Plaintiff fails to address
how the discovery rule applies in light of Almond’s clear holding that an employee need
not be aware of the discriminatory intent behind the adverse employment action for the
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clock to start running. Plaintiff was obviously aware of her termination on February 23,
2011, at which time the limitations period began to run. The Court therefore declines to
apply the discovery rule to this case.
Nor will equitable tolling save Plaintiff’s claim here, although the concept could
apply in the proper circumstances. See Benton v. Town of S. Fork & Police Dep’t, 553
F. App’x 772, 779 (10th Cir. 2014) (“Compliance with the 300-day filing requirement is a
condition precedent to suit that functions like a statute of limitations and is subject to
waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.”). Equitable tolling “is appropriate only where
the circumstances of the case rise to the level of active deception . . . where a plaintiff is
lulled into inaction by [her] past employer, state or federal agencies, or the courts.” Id.
(citation omitted) (emphasis added). Such active deception occurs where the employer
should have known that its actions would cause the employee to delay filing his charge,
or when the employer misleads the employee regarding a cause of action. Id.
However, equitable tolling is inappropriate if an employee is “aware of all of the facts
constituting discriminatory treatment but lacks direct knowledge of the employer’s
subjective discriminatory purpose.” Bennett v. Coors Brewing Co., 189 F.3d 1221,
1235 (10th Cir. 1999).
Such is the case here. Although Plaintiff claims that she was first put on notice
of the alleged gender discrimination on receipt of Defendant’s initial disclosures,
Plaintiff knew she could have a claim against Defendant long before then as evidenced
by this lawsuit. An employee need not know all of the evidence on which she might rely
at trial in order to file an EEOC charge:
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We may presume that many facts will come to light after the
date of an employee’s termination, and indeed one purpose
of a charge and a complaint is to initiate the process of
uncovering them. It is sufficient that [plaintiff] was on notice
at the moment of his alleged constructive termination “to
inquire whether there was [a] discriminatory motive for the
discharge.”•
Davidson v. Am. Online, Inc., 337 F.3d 1179, 1188 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hulsey v.
Kmart, Inc., 43 F.3d 555, 558 (10th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit in
which she states that in February 2011 she was “certain” that she had been fired for
discriminatory reasons. (ECF No. 37-7.) That Plaintiff initially believed she had been
fired in retaliation for her reports of resident abuse, rather than for other discriminatory
reasons due to her gender, is irrelevant because she was indisputably aware of
Defendant’s alleged discriminatory motive. Moreover, other than pointing to one line in
an e-mail that allegedly indicates she was subjected to gender discrimination, Plaintiff
cites no evidence that Defendant’s conduct rose to the level of active deception. 3 (ECF
Nos. 37 at 19 & 37-5.) The Court therefore concludes it would be inappropriate to apply
equitable tolling in this case. See Stransky v. HealthONE of Denver, Inc., 868 F. Supp.
2d 1178, 1181 (D. Colo. 2012) (“[T]he decision to invoke equitable tolling in a particular
case lies exclusively within the sound discretion of the trial court.”).
3
The January 24, 2011 and February 21, 2011 e-mails between Ms. Bobbitt and Ms.
Doss (prior to the employee interviews) in which Ms. Bobbitt stated that “[Plaintiff] MUST go”
and Ms. Doss advised Ms. Bobbitt to “[u]ltimately term[inate] [Plaintiff] unless you hear
something different in the meetings with staff (i.e., Jessica),” do not alter the Court’s conclusion.
(ECF Nos. 37-5 & 37-6.) These e-mails do not exhibit that Plaintiff’s termination was a
foregone conclusion, let alone that her termination was gender-based. Rather, Ms. Doss
explicitly stated that termination would be appropriate unless the investigation contradicted the
information received from Ms. Rademacher.
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The Court accordingly concludes that summary judgment should enter on
Plaintiff’s Title VII claim.
B.
Plaintiff’s Remaining State Law Claims
Though the issue has not been raised by either party, the Court has an
independent duty to examine its jurisdiction at every stage of the litigation.
Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988). This case was removed to
federal court because Count Three—the Title VII claim—alleged a violation of federal
law. (ECF No. 13 at 6-7.) Because the Court had original jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
Title VII claim, it had supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims as
well. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The Court has now dismissed the Title VII claim in its entirety,
and Plaintiff’s remaining claims are all grounded in state law. A federal court does not
have independent jurisdiction over state law claims unless those state law claims “turn
on substantial questions of federal law.” Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue,
545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005). None of the state law claims at issue in this case turns on
questions of federal law.
Federal supplemental subject matter jurisdiction over state law claims “is
extended at the discretion of the court and is not a plaintiff’s right.” TV Commc’ns
Network, Inc. v. Turner Network Television, Inc., 964 F.2d 1022, 1028 (10th Cir. 1992)
(citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966)). “[A] federal court
should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values
of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity in order to decide whether to
exercise jurisdiction over a case brought in that court involving pendent state-law
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claims.” Carnegie–Mellon Univ., 484 U.S. at 350. In the interest of comity and
federalism, district courts are advised against making “needless decisions of state law.”
TV Commc’ns Network, Inc., 964 F.2d at 1028. If federal claims are dismissed before
trial, leaving only issues of state law, the federal district court should ordinarily decline
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction by dismissing the case without prejudice. Brooks
v. Gaenzle, 614 F.3d 1213, 1229 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Carnegie–Mellon Univ., 484
U.S. at 350).
The instant suit is not yet at trial, so issues of judicial economy and fairness are
not implicated here. See Carnegie–Mellon Univ., 484 U.S. at 350. Rather, the issues
of comity and federalism are at the forefront, because the Court would have to decide
matters of state law if it continued to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining
claims. See McWilliams v. Jefferson County, 463 F.3d 1113, 1117 (10th Cir. 2006).
“Notions of comity and federalism demand that a state court try its own lawsuits, absent
compelling reasons to the contrary.” Thatcher Enters. v. Cache County Corp., 902 F.2d
1472, 1478 (10th Cir. 1990). The remaining causes of action either arise out of
Colorado statutes or are grounded in Colorado common law; no federal laws are
implicated by these claims. Thus, there is not a compelling reason to maintain
jurisdiction over this suit.
The Court finds that the remaining claims would be better addressed in state
court. See Gaenzle, 614 F.3d at 1229; TV Commc’ns Network, Inc., 964 F.2d at 1028;
Thatcher Enters., 902 F.2d at 1478. Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise its
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims and will remand this case to the
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District Court of Boulder County.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1.
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 35) is GRANTED IN
PART;
2.
Plaintiff’s Title VII claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
3.
The Court DECLINES to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
remaining state law claims; and
4.
The above-captioned action is REMANDED to the District Court of Boulder
County, Colorado. The Clerk shall transmit the record.
Dated this 30th day of July, 2015.
BY THE COURT:
William J. Martínez
United States District Judge
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