Barnett v. Board of County Commissioners of the County of Montrose, The et al

Filing 101

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: Granting in part and denying in part 95 PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT AND PRE AND POST-JUDGMENT INTER[E]ST. By Judge James A. Parker on 9/11/15.(kfinn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

STEPHANIE BARNETT,
Plaintiff,
vs.

No. CIV 14-1765 JAP/GPG

THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
OF THE COUNTY OF MONTROSE,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This employment gender and/or pregnancy discrimination case was tried before a jury
from July 13, 2015 to July 17, 2015 in the federal courthouse in Grand Junction, Colorado. The
jury found in favor of Plaintiff and awarded back pay damages of $270,000.00, compensatory
damages of $32,500.00 for pain and suffering and humiliation, and special out of pocket
damages of $3,900.00.
Plaintiff now seeks prejudgment and post judgment interest on the jury’s award of
backpay and compensatory damages. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
AND PRE AND POST-JUDGMENT INTER[E]ST (Motion) (Doc. No. 95). Defendant concedes
an award of post judgment interest under 28 U.S.C. § 1961 but argues Plaintiff is not entitled to
prejudgment interest on the backpay award or the compensatory damages award.
DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
AND PRE AND POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST (Response) (Doc. No. 97). Defendant also
challenges Plaintiff proposed interest rate. PLAINTIFF’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION

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FOR PRE AND POST JUDGMENT INTEREST (Reply) (Doc. No. 98) urges the Court to reject
all of Defendant’s arguments.
I.

Prejudgment Interest
A. Prejudgment Interest on Backpay Award

“Title VII authorizes prejudgment interest as part of the backpay remedy in suits against
private employers.” Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 557–58 (1988). “A backpay award
authorized by § 706(g) of Title VII, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), is a manifestation of
Congress' intent to make “persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination.” Id. at
558 (citation omitted). Prejudgment interest is an element of complete compensation. Id.
(citation omitted). “[P]rejudgment interest helps to make victims of discrimination whole and
compensates them for the true cost of money damages they incurred.” Reed v. Mineta, 438 F.3d
1063, 1066 (10th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
The Court exercises its sound discretion in determining an award of prejudgment interest.
Caldwell Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 287 F.3d 1276, 1287–88 (10th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
“A two-step analysis governs the determination of such an award. Id. at 1286. The district court
first determines if an award of prejudgment interest will serve to compensate the injured party.
Even if found compensatory in nature, the court also must determine whether “the equities would
preclude the award of prejudgment interest.” Id.
The Court finds that awarding prejudgment interest on the backpay award is
compensatory in nature, rather than punitive. Awarding prejudgment interest on the backpay
award will place Plaintiff in the position she would have been but for the wrongful termination.
The Court further finds that awarding prejudgment interest on the backpay award would not be
inequitable. Normally, prejudgment interest is awarded on successful federal claims. FDIC v.

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UMIC, Inc., 136 F.3d 1375, 1388 (10th Cir. 1998). In fact, in the federal context, the Tenth
Circuit Court has preferred to award prejudgment interest. United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Midland
Fumigant, Inc., 205 F.3d 1219, 1236-37 (10th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). The Court
concludes that the equities favor granting prejudgment interest on the backpay award and will,
therefore, grant prejudgment interest on the $270,000.00 in backpay damages.
B. Prejudgment Interest on Compensatory Damages
As conceded by Plaintiff, Title VII does not expressly authorize an award of prejudgment
interest on compensatory damages. Instead, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 permits the Court to “order any
other equitable relief” the Court deems appropriate. An award of prejudgment interest under
federal law is intended “to compensate the wronged party for being deprived of the monetary
value of [her] loss from the time of the loss to the payment of judgment.” U.S. Indus., Inc. v.
Touche Ross & Co., 854 F.2d 1223, 1256 (10th Cir. 1988), implied overruling on other grounds
recognized by Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1231 (10th Cir. 1996).
The Court finds that the award of prejudgment interest on the $270,000.00 award of
backpay damages will sufficiently compensate Plaintiff for the pertinent period of loss. An award
of prejudgment interest on the compensatory damages would duplicate damages already
permitted. See Hall v. Terrell, 648 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1232 (D. Colo. 2009) (concluding that
while the plaintiff’s injuries were “horrific,” her emotional distress and suffering did not actually
deprive her of the monetary value of her loss; consequently, an award of prejudgment interest
would be duplicative). Having found that an award of prejudgment interest on the compensatory
damages portion of the verdict would be inequitable and inappropriate, the Court exercises its
discretion and declines to grant prejudgment interest on the compensatory damages of
$32,500.00 and the out-of-pocket expenses of $3,900.00.

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C. Interest Rate
Having found that prejudgment interest will be awarded on the backpay damages, the
Court must resolve the dispute over what interest rate should apply. Plaintiff argues that the
Court should use the State of Colorado general statutory interest rate of 8% per annum. Motion
at 3 (citing § 5-12-101 C.R.S.). Defendant proposes a prejudgment interest rate of 0.26%, which
Defendant contends is equal to the weekly average 1-year constant maturity treasury yield for the
calendar week preceding the date of the verdict. Response at 4–5. Defendant relies on 28 U.S.C.
§ 1961(a) in support of its proposed interest rate, which refers to the weekly average 1-year
constant maturity treasury yield “for the calendar week preceding the date of the judgment.”
The Court has significant discretion in setting the prejudgment interest rate. EEOC v.
Western Trading Co., Inc., 291 F.R.D. 615, 621 (D. Colo. 2013). In Western Trading Co., the
District Court for the District of Colorado observed that courts had applied any of three interest
rates, including the Colorado statutory interest rate of 8%, the then federal post-judgment interest
rate of 0.5%, and the IRS underpayment rate set forth in 26 U.S.C. § 6621, which is the federal
short-term rate plus three percent. Id. The Court elected to use the rate set forth in 26 U.S.C.
§ 6621, finding that it “best reflect[ed] the economic reality of the backpay period” and that the
rate in § 6621 “split[] the difference, ensur[ing] that [the plaintiff] is fully compensated for his
damages without receiving a windfall.” Id. at 621–22.
For similar reasons, this Court will use the rate set forth in 26 U.S.C. § 6621, which is the
quarterly rate of 0.54% for September 2015 plus 3 percent, or 3.54%. The Court required counsel
for the parties to confer and submit their computation for prejudgment interest on the backpay
damages of $270,000.00 at a rate of 3.54%, consistent with the Reed Court’s instructions that

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backpay losses were not incurred all at once and that interest could not begin on the entire
amount all at once. Reed, 438 F.3d at 1067 n.4.
On September 9, 2015, counsel for the parties filed the INTEREST CALCULATION
with an attached worksheet, setting forth a total prejudgment interest amount of $11,178.35 on
the backpay award of $270,000.00. Doc. No. 100.
II.

Post Judgment Interest

Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to post judgment interest on all of her damages,
including front pay. Interest is to be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case recovered in
a district court and “shall be calculated from the date of the entry of judgment, at a rate equal to
the weekly average 1-year constant maturity Treasury yield.” 28 U.S C. § 1961.
Defendant concedes that “post-judgment interest from the entry of the district court’s
judgment is mandatory pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a).” Response at 5 n.1. Although Defendant
opposed Plaintiff’s request for front pay, the Court found that Plaintiff is entitled to an award of
front pay. Doc. No. 99. Thus, it appears Defendant agrees that Plaintiff is entitled to post
judgment interest on all of her damages.
The Court will grant Plaintiff’s request for post judgment interest on all of Plaintiff’s
damages and sets a post judgment interest rate of .37%, the weekly average 1-year constant
maturity Treasury yield for the week ending September 4, 2015, which is the week preceding the
date of Judgment. To recap, post judgment interest will be allowed on the following damages:
backpay, including prejudgment interest, of $281,178.35, compensatory damages of $32,500.00,
out of pocket expenses of $3,900.00, and, front pay of $465,011.00.

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF
JUDGMENT AND PRE AND POST-JUDGMENT INTER[E]ST (Doc. No. 95) is GRANTED
in part and DENIED in part.
To summarize the Court’s findings of the amounts to be paid to Plaintiff, I find that
Plaintiff is entitled to the total award of $782,589.35, which is comprised of:
1) backpay with prejudgment interest at a rate of 3.54% in the total sum of $281,178.35;
2) compensatory damages of $32,500.00, without prejudgment interest;
3) out of pocket expenses of $3,900.00, without prejudgment interest; and
4) front pay in the total sum of $465,011.00.
In addition, Plaintiff will be awarded post judgment interest at a rate of .37% on the total
sum of $782,589.35.

________________________________________
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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