Burns et al v. Hickenlooper et al
ORDER that Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction ECF No. 8 is GRANTED and Defendants are hereby ENJOINED from enforcing or applying Article II, Section 31 of the Colorado Constitution and C.R.S. §§ 14-2-104(1)(b) and 14-2-104(2) as a basis to deny marriage to same-sex couples or to deny recognition of otherwise valid same-sex marriages entered in other states; and FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Motion to Stay Proceedings and Non- Opposition to Proposed Preliminary Injunct ion ECF No. 16 is DENIED as to their request to stay the preliminary injunction but GRANTED as to a stay of all other proceedings in this case until three (3) days after the final mandate is issued in Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 13-4178, __ F.3d __, 2014 WL 2868044 (10th Cir. June 25, 2014), or further order of this Court; and FURTHER ORDERED that the preliminary injunction is TEMPORARILY STAYED until 8:00 a.m. on Monday, August 25, 2014, to allow Defendants time to seek relief from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit or the Supreme Court. by Judge Raymond P. Moore on 7/23/2014.(evana, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Raymond P. Moore
Civil Action No. 14-cv-01817-RM-KLM
KAREN COLLIER; and
JOHN W. HICKENLOOPER, JR., in his official capacity as Governor of Colorado;
JOHN SUTHERS, in his official capacity as Attorney General of Colorado; and
PAM ANDERSON, in her official capacity as Clerk and Recorder for Jefferson County,
Plaintiffs are six same-sex couples who have been legally married in another state but
whose marriage Colorado does not legally recognize or who have been refused a Colorado
marriage license, solely because they are same-sex couples. Two issues are before the Court: (1)
whether a preliminary injunction should be entered enjoining Defendants from enforcing Article
II, Section 31 of the Colorado Constitution and C.R.S. §§ 14-2-104(1)(b) and 14-2-104(2)
(collectively, “Challenged Laws”), laws which declare that only a union between one man and
one woman may be recognized as a marriage in Colorado; and (2) if a preliminary injunction is
ordered, whether such order and this entire proceeding should thereafter be stayed until such
time as Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 13-4178, __ F.3d __, 2014 WL 2868044 (10th Cir. June 25,
2014) becomes final. In Kitchen, the Tenth Circuit found that Utah’s ban against same-sex
marriage, which is similar to the Challenged Laws, violated the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution. The mandate in Kitchen has been stayed by
the Tenth Circuit pending the disposition of any petition for writ of certiorari. Upon
consideration of all relevant matters, including argument of counsel, and for the reasons stated
herein, the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED; the Defendants’ Motion
to Stay the preliminary injunction until resolution of Kitchen is DENIED, but instead only a
temporary stay is GRANTED; and the Defendants’ Motion to Stay further proceedings in this
matter, apart from the preliminary injunction, is GRANTED.
I. PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Plaintiffs’ civil rights action for declaratory and injunctive relief seeks to declare the
Challenged Laws banning same-sex marriage as unconstitutional under the United States
Constitution, and to enjoin the Defendants from enforcing those laws. Plaintiffs’ two claims for
relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allege violations of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs have filed a Motion
for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 8) supported by affidavits. Defendants have filed a “nonopposition” (ECF No. 16), revealing a far from unified front. Defendant Attorney General
believes Kitchen is incorrect while Defendant Governor believes Kitchen was correctly decided.
Defendant Anderson takes no position on this issue. Nevertheless, Defendants collectively do
not oppose entry of a preliminary injunction, but also ask that the injunction, as well as further
proceedings in this matter, be stayed. Relying primarily on the Kitchen decision, Plaintiffs argue
they have established the requisite elements for the issuance of a preliminary injunction against
Defendants. Based on its independent analysis, the Court agrees.
Before a preliminary injunction may be issued, the moving party must establish: “(1) a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury will result if the injunction
does not issue; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs any damage the injunction may
cause the opposing party; and (4) issuance of the injunction would not be adverse to the public
interest.” Northern Natural Gas Co. v. L.D. Drilling, Inc., 697 F.3d 1259, 1266 (10th Cir. 2012)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “Generally, where the three latter factors weigh in favor of
the movant, the probability of success factor is relaxed.” Id. (internal alterations and quotation
marks omitted). That is not the case, however, where the requested injunction is one of three
disfavored types of preliminary injunctions, i.e., those that alter the status quo, “mandatory”
preliminary injunctions, and those granting the moving party all the relief it could achieve at
trial. See id.; Flood v. ClearOne Commc’ns, Inc., 618 F.3d 1110, 1117 n.1 (10th Cir. 2010).
With disfavored injunctions, the movant must satisfy a heightened standard and make a “strong
showing” as to the likelihood of success on the merits and that the balance of harm favors issuing
the requested injunction. See Northern Natural Gas Co., 697 F.3d at 1266; ClearOne
Commc’ns, Inc., 618 F.3d at 1117 n.1.
In this case, Plaintiffs rely on the traditional four requirements for granting injunctive
relief. Although the Court finds Plaintiffs seek a disfavored injunction and, therefore, a
heightened standard applies, it nonetheless concludes such standard is satisfied. First, Plaintiffs
have made a strong showing of a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their claims.
In Kitchen, the Tenth Circuit held that Utah’s same-sex marriage bans do not withstand
constitutional scrutiny as “under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United
States Constitution, those who wish to marry a person of the same sex are entitled to exercise the
same fundamental right as is recognized for persons who wish to marry a person of the opposite
sex.” Kitchen, 2014 WL 2868044, at *32. Subsequently, the Tenth Circuit decided Bishop v.
Smith, Nos. 14-5003 & 14-5006, __ F.3d __, 2014 WL 3537847 (10th Cir. July 18, 2014), which
reaffirmed that “[s]tate bans on the licensing of same-sex marriage significantly burden the
fundamental right to marry.” Id. at *6. The Court agrees with the analysis in Kitchen and
Bishop that marriage is a fundamental right and that the Challenged Laws impermissibly infringe
upon that right. The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiffs will likely succeed in establishing
that Colorado’s ban impermissibly violates Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Accordingly, this
factor favors granting an injunction.
Next, Plaintiffs have also shown that substantial irreparable injury will result if the
injunction does not issue. Where the harm is “great” or “substantial,” the deprivation of
constitutional rights, for even minimal periods of time, constitutes irreparable harm. See Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1146 (10th Cir. 2013) (“establishing a likely
[Religious Freedom Restoration Act] violation satisfies the irreparable harm factor”), aff’d on
other grounds, 573 U.S. __, 2014 WL 2921709 (2014); Heideman v. South Salt Lake City, 348
F.3d 1182, 1190 (10th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal
periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S.
347, 373 (1976)); 11A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 2948.1 (3d ed.
2014) (where alleged deprivation of constitutional right is involved, “most courts hold that no
further showing of irreparable injury is necessary”). Here, Plaintiffs’ establishment of a
violation of their constitutional rights – their fundamental right to marry and to have their
marriages recognized – satisfies the irreparable harm factor. 1 See Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at
Third, the threatened injury to Plaintiffs by the enforcement of Colorado laws which are
unconstitutional outweighs any damage the injunction may cause to Defendants. Due to
Defendants’ non-opposition to the granting of an injunction, they did not address in that context
how this or any other factor favored them. Nonetheless, in arguing for a stay of the injunction,
Defendants contend that enjoining a state law as unconstitutional creates irreparable injury. But
here, the Court is enjoining state laws without opposition from Defendants, which laws the Court
has further found to be clearly unconstitutional. Thus, the equities tip strongly in favor of
Finally, the issuance of the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest as “‘it is
always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.’” Hobby
Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1147 (quoting Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1132 (10th Cir. 2012)).
Accordingly, this factor also favors Plaintiffs.
In summary, even under the heightened standard, Plaintiffs have shown that all the
preliminary injunction factors tip in their favor and that an injunction should be entered.
Plaintiffs also rely on financial injury, e.g., money to address estate planning issues that would not have been
required if they were considered married, but such economic loss, without more, does not constitute irreparable
harm. See Heideman, 348 F.3d at 1189.
II. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STAY
Defendants’ Motion to Stay raises the issue of whether this Court should stay not only
this Order, but also this entire proceeding and await a determination of whether this case may be
affected – not by an appeal of this Order in this case but by an appeal of another order in another
case, i.e., the Kitchen case. This issue is far from simple.
A stay is not a matter of right, but rather an exercise of judicial discretion, the propriety
of which is dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case. See Nken v. Holder, 556
U.S. 418, 433 (2009). The party requesting the stay of an injunction bears the burden of showing
that the circumstances justify the exercise of that discretion. Id. at 433-434. The Tenth Circuit,
indeed the Supreme Court as well, has directed courts to apply certain accepted standards in
deciding whether to issue a stay. See Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical Health
Servs. v. Abbott, 134 S. Ct. 506, 506, 187 L.Ed.2d 465 (2013); FTC v. Mainstream Mktg. Servs.,
Inc., 345 F.3d 850, 852 (10th Cir. 2003). Those factors are: (1) the likelihood of success on the
merits; (2) the threat of irreparable harm if the stay is not granted; (3) the absence of harm to
opposing parties if the stay is granted; and (4) the risk of harm to the public interest. See
Planned Parenthood, 134 S. Ct. at 506; FTC, 345 F.3d at 852. “The first two factors are the
most critical.” Planned Parenthood, 134 S. Ct. at 506 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case, in terms of a stay of the preliminary injunction, Defendants have not met
their burden. As previously discussed, on the state of the record currently before the Court, it is
Plaintiffs who have shown a likelihood of success on the merits; it is Plaintiffs who suffer
irreparable harm if Colorado’s unconstitutional same-sex marriage ban is not enjoined; and it is
Plaintiffs to whom the balance of harm and the public interest favor. Additionally, in light of
Defendants’ express non-opposition to the entry of the injunction, Defendants cannot reasonably
contend that this Court abused its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction and,
concomitantly, no stay. See Aid for Women v. Foulston, 441 F.3d 1101, 1115 (10th Cir. 2006)
(appellate court reviews grant of preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion). 2
For these reasons, the posture of this case differs from many other cases being litigated in
the federal court system where stays have issued. While the Court acknowledges that
Defendants may file a protective appeal in this matter, Defendants cannot meet the burden
required for a stay pending such appeal under the applicable standard. Defendants have elected
to adopt a practical approach before this Court in recognizing the significance of Kitchen, but
one consequence of that approach and the “non-opposition” to the requested injunction is that
Defendants have not met their burden with respect to a stay pending appeal under the traditional
rules. The factors used to assess whether an injunction should enter are largely the same as those
used to determine whether a stay should enter. Having elected largely to stand silent with
respect to such factors in the context of the injunction, Defendants have not put before this Court
sufficient support for the factors determining entitlement to a stay of the injunction. Rather than
take issue with this, Defendant Attorney General argues that:
with same sex-marriage litigation, federal courts have largely skipped a
methodical assessment of those four factors in favor of entering a stay due to the
“unsettled” nature of the constitutional questions regarding same-sex marriage
and the “confusion, potential inequity, and high costs” that would likely result if
the decision granting injunctive relief were reversed on appeal.
(Attorney General’s Reply, ECF No. 41, pages 6-7.)
As to Defendants Governor and Anderson, it is unclear whether any argument by them that such factors are
satisfied would withstand inquiry where Defendant Governor has affirmatively stated that Kitchen was correctly
decided and Defendant Anderson took no position on the merits of the underlying legal issue in this case.
The Court agrees that in same-sex marriage cases the federal courts appear to
have often put aside the accepted standards they have been repeatedly directed to apply
or, as the case may be, directed the lower federal courts to apply. The Court concludes,
however, that the basis on which this is being done is much simpler than the nuanced
considerations being proffered by Defendant Attorney General. It is being done largely
because federal courts have interpreted Supreme Court actions as implied directives to
issue stays in these matters. As the concurrence in the Ninth Circuit’s Order granting a
On January 6, 2014, the Supreme Court granted the State’s
application for a stay pending the disposition of the appeal in the Tenth
Circuit. Herbert v. Kitchen, 134 S. Ct. 893 (2014). Although the Supreme
Court’s terse two-sentence order did not offer a statement of reasons, I
cannot identify any relevant differences between the situation before us
today and Herbert. And, although the Supreme Court’s order in Herbert
is not in the strictest sense precedential, it provides a clear message – the
Court (without noted dissent) decided that district court injunctions against
the application of laws forbidding same-sex unions should be stayed at the
request of state authorities pending court of appeals review.
Latta v. Otter, No. 14-35420, Order, at 3 (9th Cir. May 20, 2014) (Hurwitz, J., concurring). See
also DeBoer v. Snyder, No. 14-1341, Order, at 1 (6th Cir. March 25, 2014) (“In light of the
Supreme Court’s issuance of a stay in a similar case, Herbert v. Kitchen, 134 S. Ct. 893 (2014), a
stay of the district court’s order is warranted.”); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F.Supp.2d 456, 484 (E.D.
Va. 2014) (same); DeLeon v. Perry, 975 F.Supp.2d 632, 666 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (same).
Plaintiffs challenge the notion of any directive from the Supreme Court by noting
instances in which requests to the Supreme Court for stays have been denied. In that
regard, Plaintiffs rely on National Organization for Marriage v. Geiger, 134 S. Ct. 2722
(U.S. June 4, 2014) and Gaffney v. Whitewood, No. 14-3048 (U.S. July 7, 2014).
Plaintiffs’ reliance, however, is misplaced because in each case, the applicant requesting
the stay was a proposed intervenor who sought to appeal the district court’s order
declaring the state’s same-sex marriage laws as unconstitutional. In short, they were
outsiders to the litigation.
There is at least one aspect of this case which differs from other same-sex
marriage cases being litigated elsewhere in the federal system which has not been
emphasized by the parties. Here, the applicable appellate court has already spoken –
more than once. Kitchen, supra; Bishop v. Smith, supra. Thus, it is conceivable that any
perceived “directive” from the Supreme Court to let appellate courts consider this issue
does not apply here.
The Court has given strong consideration to this difference. The proverbial wild
card in the analysis is the recent stay entered by the Supreme Court in Herbert v. Evans,
No. 14A65, 2014 WL 3557112 (U.S. July 18, 2014). Evans involved a preliminary
injunction issued by the district court to require Utah to recognize same-sex marriages
resulting from licenses issued in the “gap” between the time that an injunction issued in
Kitchen and the Supreme Court issued a stay. The Evans defendants requested a stay
which the Tenth Circuit denied after analyzing the request under the accepted standards
and concluding that defendants failed to meet their burden of showing a stay should be
issued. Evans v. State of Utah, No. 14-4060 (10th Cir. July 11, 2014). Notwithstanding
this denial, and the fact that the Tenth Circuit has already spoken in Kitchen, on July 18,
2014, the Supreme Court still issued a stay “pending final disposition of the appeal by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.” Herbert v. Evans, No. 14A65,
2014 WL 3557112 (July 18, 2014). But, making extraction of the meaning of the stay in
Evans more difficult, Evans is a “companion” case to Kitchen, both addressing the
application of Utah’s same-sex marriage laws.
Based on the most recent stay, it appears to the Court that it may well be that a
message is being sent by the Supreme Court. But this Court is not some modern day
haruspex skilled in the art of divination. This Court cannot – and, more importantly, it
will not – tell the people of Colorado that the access to this or any other fundamental
right will be delayed because it “thinks” or “perceives” the subtle – or not so subtle –
content of a message not directed to this case. The rule of law demands more.
The rules which this Court is to apply in deciding this matter are set forth in Rule
62, Fed.R.Civ.P., and the standards described earlier. As already explained above,
Defendants are not entitled to a stay order under the applicable rules. This is where this
Court’s analysis must end.
The Court recognizes that the Tenth Circuit or the Supreme Court may choose to
issue a stay in this matter. And this Court will not foreclose Defendants from having a
fair opportunity to seek such stay. Accordingly, as it pertains to the preliminary
injunction, this Court will temporarily stay the preliminary injunction order until 8:00
a.m. on August 25, 2014, to permit Defendants time to seek a stay of the injunction from
a higher court.
As to a stay of further proceedings, apart from the preliminary injunction, the Court
exercises its discretion to stay such proceedings in this matter. See Ryan v. Gonzales, 133 S. Ct.
696, 707-708, 183 L.Ed.2d 528 (2013); United Steelworkers of America v. Oregon Steel Mills,
Inc., 322 F.3d 1222, 1227 (10th Cir. 2003). Kitchen will ultimately decide this matter – by the
denial of certiorari and issuance of the mandate from the Tenth Circuit or by Supreme Court
ruling. Indeed, Defendant Attorney General orally conceded at the July 22, 2014 hearing that if
the Kitchen decision is upheld or becomes final, the Challenged Laws are unconstitutional. And
a final merits determination here based on Kitchen will only trail Kitchen in the appellate courts.
Little would thus be served by requiring the parties to incur the costs and expenses of litigating
to final proceedings in this case while trailing Kitchen. 3
Based on the foregoing, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 8) is GRANTED
and Defendants are hereby ENJOINED from enforcing or applying Article II, Section 31 of the
Colorado Constitution and C.R.S. §§ 14-2-104(1)(b) and 14-2-104(2) as a basis to deny marriage
to same-sex couples or to deny recognition of otherwise valid same-sex marriages entered in
other states; and
FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Stay Proceedings and NonOpposition to Proposed Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 16) is DENIED as to their request to
stay the preliminary injunction but GRANTED as to a stay of all other proceedings in this case
until three (3) days after the final mandate is issued in Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 13-4178, __ F.3d
__, 2014 WL 2868044 (10th Cir. June 25, 2014), or further order of this Court; and
Defendant Attorney General has suggested that this Court defer to earlier state litigation under the Colorado River
doctrine. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). This Court declines to
abstain from deciding, and thus to defer to the state, matters of federal constitutional law.
FURTHER ORDERED that the preliminary injunction is TEMPORARILY STAYED
until 8:00 a.m. on Monday, August 25, 2014, to allow Defendants time to seek relief from the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit or the Supreme Court.
DATED this 23rd day of July, 2014.
BY THE COURT:
RAYMOND P. MOORE
United States District Judge
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