Mason, III v. Clear Creek County Sheriff et al

Filing 13

ORDER to Dismiss in Part and Assign Remaining Claims and Case to a Presiding Judge by Judge Lewis T. Babcock on 8/20/14. Defendants Fifth Judicial District Attorney, John Hickenlooper, Rachel Olguin-Fresquez, People of the State of Colorado, Douglas K. Wilson, Denver City Attorney and Denver County Court Judge are dismissed. (dkals, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 14-cv-01917-BNB
JAH FREDERICK NATHANIEL MASON, III,
Plaintiff,
v.
CLEAR CREEK COUNTY SHERIFF,
JUDGE RACHEL OLGUIN-FRESQUEZ,
FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY,
DOUGLAS K. WILSON, State Public Defender,
JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colo. Governor,
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO,
DENVER COUNTY COURT JUDGE ROOM 100-K, and
DENVER CITY ATTORNEY,
Defendants.

ORDER TO DISMISS IN PART AND ASSIGN REMAINING
CLAIMS AND CASE TO A PRESIDING JUDGE

Plaintiff, Jah Frederick Nathaniel Mason, III, is incarcerated at the Clear Creek
County Jail in Georgetown, Colorado. Mr. Mason initiated this action by filing pro se a
Complaint (ECF No. 1). The Court determined the Complaint was deficient, and on July
14, 2014, Magistrate Judge Boyd N. Boland entered an order (ECF No. 3) directing Mr.
Mason within thirty days to cure certain designated deficiencies and file an amended
Prisoner Complaint that sued the proper parties, complied with the pleading
requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and alleged the
personal participation of each named Defendant.
On August 7, 2014, Mr. Mason filed an amended Prisoner Complaint (ECF No. 9)
for money damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Religious Freedom Restoration

Act (RFRA), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
Mr. Mason has been granted leave to proceed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
Subsection (e)(2)(B) of § 1915 requires a court to dismiss sua sponte an action at any
time if the action is frivolous, malicious, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant
who is immune from such relief. A legally frivolous claim is one in which the plaintiff
asserts the violation of a legal interest that clearly does not exist or asserts facts that do
not support an arguable claim. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989).
Mr. Mason is cautioned that his ability to file a civil action or appeal in federal
court in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 may be barred if he has three or
more actions or appeals in any federal court that were dismissed as frivolous, malicious,
or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(g). Under § 1915(g), the Court may count dismissals entered prior to the
enactment of this statute. Green v. Nottingham, 90 F.3d 415, 420 (10th Cir. 1996).
The Court must construe Mr. Mason’s amended Prisoner Complaint liberally
because he is not represented by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520-21 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). However, the
Court should not be an advocate for a pro se litigant. See Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.
Merely making vague and conclusory allegations that his federal constitutional rights
have been violated does not entitle a pro se pleader to a day in court, regardless of how
liberally the court construes such pleadings. See Ketchum v. Cruz, 775 F. Supp. 1399,
1403 (D. Colo. 1991), aff’d, 961 F.2d 916 (10th Cir. 1992). “[I]n analyzing the
sufficiency of the plaintiff’s complaint, the court need accept as true only the plaintiff’s
well-pleaded factual contentions, not his conclusory allegations.” Hall, 935 F.2d at

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1110. A court may disregard conclusory allegations, which are not entitled to a
presumption of truthfulness. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009); Meek v.
Jordan, 534 F. App’x 762, 764 (10th Cir. 2013). For the reasons stated below, the
Prisoner Complaint and the action will be dismissed in part as legally frivolous pursuant
to § 1915(e)(2)(B).
I. Background
Mr. Mason makes the vague and conclusory allegation that in October 2008 he
received a “fully favorable [canonical (religious)] disability determination” by a United
States magistrate judge, apparently Plaintiff’s purported justification for asserting
jurisdiction pursuant to the ADA. Although Mr. Mason asserts jurisdiction based upon
the ADA violations, apparently Title II of the ADA, he fails to allege facts indicating that

he is a qualified individual with a disability who was excluded from participation in or
denied the benefits of a public entity’s services, programs, or activities, and that
exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was because of a disability. See
Anderson v. Colorado, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1143 (D. Colo. 2012) (discussing the
elements of Title II of the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act). Mr. Mason’s
reliance upon the ADA is misplaced.
Mr. Mason alleges that he chooses to exercise his religious freedom, apparently
pursuant to RFRA, not to “work for (serve) or bow to (submit) any agency or entity that
uses satanic imagery in its seals.” ECF No. 9 at 6. He contends government agencies
use satanic imagery on their seals. ECF No. 9 at 5. RFRA was held unconstitutional as
applied to the states in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532-36 (1997); Rocky
Mountain Christian Church v. Board of County Comm’rs of Boulder County, 612 F.

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Supp. 2d 1163, 1171 (D. Colo. 2009). Mr. Mason’s reliance upon RFRA also is
misplaced.
Mr. Mason asserts nine claims based on his belief that the use of satanic
imagery on the seals of government justifies his driving without a license because the
seal on Colorado drivers’ licenses displays satanic images. He also apparently believes
that, by following his religious beliefs in not carrying a driver’s license, he should not be
charged with traffic offenses as a result. He references on pages two to three of the
amended Prisoner Complaint additional individuals he has not included as parties in the
caption to this case. They are Bryan Garrett, deputy district attorney; Bruce I. Brown,
district attorney; John Doe, Manitou Springs, Colorado, police officer; and John Doe,
Denver parking management meter agent.
II. Claims
Claim One
As his first claim, Mr. Mason alleges in September 2012 a police officer ticketed
him for driving without a license and speeding near Georgetown, Colorado. He further
alleges that on December 14, 2012, while he was parked on the side of the road at a
rest stop area, a Manitou Springs police officer approached his vehicle; demanded
identification; discovered a warrant for Mr. Mason’s arrest based on the outstanding
ticket for driving without a license and speeding; arrested him; took him to the El Paso
County Jail in Colorado Springs, Colorado; and subsequently transferred him to the
Clear Creek County Jail, where he currently is confined. Based on these allegations,
Mr. Mason contends he was subjected to an unconstitutional search and seizure and a
violation of his due process rights.

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Claim Two
As his second claim, Mr. Mason alleges that on December 21, 2012, after he was
incarcerated in the Clear Creek County Jail, he appeared before the Honorable Rachel
Olguin-Fresquez, who he informed he had a religious disability and did not consent to
the court’s jurisdiction. On January 23, 2013, he was appointed a public defender and
released on a personal recognizance bond. He asserts that at a subsequent hearing he
“showed my [public defender] evidence of my SSI canonical disability and evidence
(court precedence) that I was exempt from having a driver’s license.” ECF No. 9 at 15.
He contends he cannot be compelled to carry a driver’s license because the Colorado
seal displays satanic images and that he also cannot be denied the privilege of driving.
He asserts the public defender moved to withdraw from his case, and apparently was
granted the right to do so because he also alleges that at a subsequent pretrial motions
hearing he proceed pro se before a “‘John Doe’” Judge, ECF No. 9 at 17. He alleges
that the People of the State of Colorado were represented by Deputy District Attorney
Bryan Garrett, who acted under the direction of Bruce I. Brown. He contends the “John
Doe” Judge rejected his arguments and ruled they were inadmissable at the hearing
and at trial. Based on these allegations, Mr. Mason asserts claims of “judicial lack of
jurisdiction” and “freedom of religion persecution.” ECF No. 9 at 15.
Claim Three
As his third claim, Mr. Mason alleges that he filed a complaint in an unspecified
United States District Court in July 2009 “after acquiring self-authenticating evidence
from the U.S. Naval Observatory’s astronomical almanac, that the Earth’s tilt (obliquity)
was rapidly decreasing to vertical.” ECF No. 9 at 18. He alleges that the complaint was

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dismissed. On the basis of these allegations, Mr. Mason asserts claims of “religious
freedom God-preservation,” “inalienable right self-preservation,” “lack of jurisdiction,”
and “governmental abandonment.” ECF No. 9 at 18. A review of this Court’s docketing
records reveals the complaint was not filed in the District of Colorado. Mr. Mason fails
to make clear against which Defendant, if any, claim three is made. Because this claim
is vague and conclusory, concerns an action not filed in this Court, and is not asserted
against any named defendant, the claim need not be addressed further.
Claim Four
In claim four, Mr. Mason alleges that near the end of December 2013 he was
“pulled over by an unmarked police car,” ECF No. 9 at 19, and issued a citation for
driving without a license. He further alleges that “a month or so later,” ECF No. 9 at 19,
he parked his car at 10th and Lincoln in Denver, and a meter agent issued him a ticket
for missing a front license plate, despite his explanation that he considered himself to be
a “religious sovereign and had conscientious objections to the image of mountains on
the Colorado plates as they violate God’s commands.” ECF No. 9 at 19. He further
alleges that the meter agent called the Denver police, who had his car towed with his
personal property inside because he lacked identification.
He also alleges that he had a trial scheduled for February 12, 2014, before the
Honorable Rachel Olguin-Fresquez in Denver County Court Case No. 2012 T 976,
which was continued until June 25, 2014, and a replevin action in the same court
regarding his car, which the judge dismissed.
He asserts that he filed a “notice of my canonical disability and notice of nonconsent,” ECF No. 9 at 21, in the Denver County Court Room 100-K, and provided

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copies to his unnamed public defender and the unnamed city attorney. At a hearing
held in May 2014, he contends the unnamed judge, public defender, and city attorney
disregarded his claims and defenses “in an effort to coerce [Plaintiff] into relinquishing
[his] religious freedoms and acquiring [a] driver’s license.” ECF No. 9 at 21. On the
basis of these allegations, he asserts claims of First Amendment retaliation and
violations of his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments.
Claim Five
In claim five, Mr. Mason alleges he was arrested for failure to appear at his trial
before the Honorable Rachel Olguin-Fresquez in Denver County Court Case No. 2012 T
976, scheduled for June 25, 2014, at 8 a.m., because he failed to arrive at the
courthouse until 9:15 a.m., and was “booked, imprisoned, and placed on the 1:30 p.m.
docket.” ECF No. 9 at 23. He complains that as of July 28, 2014, he has been
imprisoned seventy-three days and his next court hearing is scheduled for August 5,
2014. On the basis of these allegations, he contends he has been subjected to cruel
and unusual punishment and his equal protection rights have been violated.
Claim Six
In claim six, Mr. Mason alleges that on June 25, 2014, he was taken into custody
by the Clear Creek County Sheriff and unable to make an initial telephone call until July
15, 2014, because the numbers he needed to retrieve were in his mobile telephone,
which he was not allowed to use pursuant to the sheriff’s policy. On the basis of these
allegations, he alleges violations of his First Amendment rights and right to equal
protection.
Claim Seven

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In claim seven, Mr. Mason contends that pursuant to policy of the Clear Creek
County Sheriff he has been denied the ability to make photocopies for Denver County
Court Case No. 2012 T 976, a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Colorado
Supreme Court, and in the instant action. On the basis of these allegations, he asserts
violations of the First Amendment, his right of access to the courts, and due process.
Claim Eight
In claim eight, Mr. Mason contends he is a “professional Messianic Hebrew.”
ECF No. 9 at 25. He complains that on June 25, 2014, when he was taken into custody
by the Clear Creek County Sheriff, and despite the fact that he requested a religious
diet, over half his meals contained pork until July 5, 2014, and on August 2, 2014, he
was served an undercooked cheeseburger, which the control center staff exchanged for
a peanut butter and jelly sandwich. He alleges that he later was informed that, pursuant
to the sheriff’s policy, he was to be given peanut butter and jelly sandwiches. On the
basis of these allegations, he asserts he was denied a religious diet and subjected to
religious persecution.
Claim Nine
As his ninth and final claim, Mr. Mason alleges that after being taken into custody
by the Clear Creek County Sheriff he submitted a medical request for anti-anxiety
medication similar to the marijuana he usually consumed. On July 14, 2014, he met
with a physician, who prescribed Olanzapine, an anti-anxiety and antipsychotic
medication that caused him side effects, and on July 28, 2014, was prescribed
Risperdal, an antipsychotic. He complains that pursuant to the Clear Creek County
Sheriff’s policy, the Clear Creek jail medical staff cannot give him anti-anxiety

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medications and his prison trust fund account was charged for the medications he was
prescribed, despite the fact that he has medical insurance to cover his expenses for
medical treatment.
III. Legal Analysis
Mr. Mason was informed in the July 14 order for an amended Prisoner Complaint
that his claims against the Honorable Rachel Olguin-Fresquez are subject to dismissal
based on the doctrine of judicial immunity. Likewise, his claims against the unnamed
Denver County Court Judge in Room 100-K are subject to judicial immunity. Judges
are absolutely immune from a civil rights suit based on actions taken in their judicial
capacity, unless they acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. See Mireles v. Waco,
502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978); Hunt v.
Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263, 1266-67 (10th Cir. 1994). Judicial immunity “is not overcome by
allegations of bad faith or malice,” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11, or an assertion that the judge
acted in error or exceeded his or her authority, see Stump, 435 U.S. at 1105. Further,
a judge acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction only when he or she “acts clearly
without any colorable claim of jurisdiction.” Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 686 (10th
Cir. 1990). Mr. Mason does not state any facts to indicate that Judge Olguin-Fresquez
or the unnamed Denver County Court Judge in Room 100-K was acting outside of his or
her judicial capacity. Therefore, the claims against Judge Olquin-Fresquez and the
unnamed Denver County Court Judge in Room 100-K will be dismissed as legally
frivolous.
Mr. Mason also cannot pursue claims against the unnamed district attorney in the
Fifth Judicial District and the Denver City attorney, who he names as Defendants, or

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Bryan Garrett, deputy district attorney, and Bruce I. Brown, district attorney, who he
appears to be suing but fails to name as parties in the caption to the amended Prisoner
Complaint. State prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity in § 1983 suits for
activities within the scope of their prosecutorial duties. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409, 420-24 (1976); see also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978).
Initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution are acts are “‘intimately associated with
the judicial process’” Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 686 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430). The unnamed district attorney in the Fifth Judicial District, the
Denver City attorney, Bryan Garrett, and Bruce I. Brown are immune from liability for
any claims that they initiated a baseless prosecution against Mr. Mason. The claims
asserted against them will be dismissed as legally frivolous.
Mr. Mason also may not sue Douglas K. Wilson, a state public defender.
Defense attorneys, whether court-appointed or privately retained, performing in the
traditional role of attorney for the defendant in a criminal proceeding are not deemed to
act under color of state law; such attorneys represent their client only, not the state, and
cannot be sued in a § 1983 action. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325
(1981); Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263, 1268 (10th Cir. 1994). The claims against
Douglas K. Wilson will be dismissed as legally frivolous.
Mr. Mason fails to allege the reason or reasons he is suing Colorado Governor
John Hickenlooper or the People of the State of Colorado, which is merely the name in
which criminal lawsuits are prosecuted because they are brought to represent and
protect the legal interests of the people of the State of Colorado. As Mr. Mason was
told in the July 14 order for an amended Prisoner Complaint, in order to state a claim in

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federal court, he “must explain what each defendant did to him or her; when the
defendant did it; how the defendant’s action harmed him or her; and, what specific legal
right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated.” Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E.
Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). Mr. Mason has failed to do so as to
these two Defendants. Therefore, the claims against them will be dismissed as legally
frivolous.
Mr. Mason’s claims against the unnamed Denver parking management meter
agent are without merit. He is suing the meter agent for issuing a ticket for a missing
front license plate and calling the police, who had his car towed, despite his explanation
that he considered himself to be a “religious sovereign and had conscientious objections
to the image of mountains on the Colorado plates as they violate God’s commands.”
ECF No. 9 at 19. Although the First Amendment provides protection to religious
thoughts and beliefs, the free exercise clause does not prohibit Congress and local
governments from validly regulating religious conduct. Grace United Methodist Church
v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 649 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)). Neutral rules of general applicability normally do not
raise free exercise concerns even if they incidentally burden a particular religious
practice or belief. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (free exercise
clause “does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral
law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct
that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)” (internal quotation omitted)). Thus, a law
that is both neutral and generally applicable need only be rationally related to a
legitimate governmental interest to survive a constitutional challenge. United States v.

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Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1126 (10th Cir. 2002). A law is neutral so long as its object is
something other than the infringement or restrictions of religious practices. Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993).
Plaintiff cannot argue there is no legitimate governmental interest in requiring
license plates on cars. Mr. Mason’s religious beliefs--whatever they may be--do not
excuse him from complying with the State’s requirement that he display license plates
attached to his car. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-3-202(1)(a) (license plates to be attached
to the front and rear of a vehicle); see also Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-1-101 (licenses for
drivers required). The requirement for attached license plates is valid and neutral--all
Colorado drivers are required to have license plates on their cars. Furthermore, Mr.
Mason does not allege that the non-use of a license plate is a “deep religious
conviction, shared by an organized group, and intimately related to daily living.” See
United States v. Bales, 813 F.2d 1289, 1297 (4th Cir. 1987) (quoting Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972)), and is more on the order of a “‘philosophical and
personal’ belief, which does not garner protection under the first amendment.” Bales,
813 F.2d at 1297 (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216). Mr. Mason’s claims asserted
against the unnamed Denver parking management meter agent will be dismissed as
legally frivolous.
Mr. Mason’s claims against the John Doe, a Manitou Springs police officer, also
are without merit. In claim one, he alleges that on December 14, 2012, while he was
parked on the side of the road at a rest stop area, a Manitou Springs police officer
approached his vehicle; demanded identification; discovered a warrant for Mr. Mason’s
arrest based upon the outstanding ticket for driving without a license and speeding;

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arrested him; took him to the El Paso County Jail in Colorado Springs, Colorado; and on
December 21, 2012, transferred him to the Clear Creek County Jail, where he currently
is confined. Based on these allegations, he contends he was subjected to an
unconstitutional search and seizure and a violation of his due process rights.
The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches and seizures.”
Grobecker v. Grundy, No. 13-cv-01190-MSK-KLM, 2014 WL 3593513 (D. Colo. July 18,
2014) (not published) (citing U.S. Const. amend. IV). All arrests, with or without a
warrant, “must be reasonable under the circumstances.” Grobecker, 2014 WL
3593513, at *5 (citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011)). Mr. Mason
fails to allege any facts indicating that his arrest, based upon an outstanding warrant for
his arrest, was unreasonable under the circumstances or violated his Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights. The claim asserted against the Manitou Springs police
officer will be dismissed as legally frivolous.
The last remaining Defendant is the Clear Creek County Sheriff, who Mr. Mason
fails to identify in the caption to the amended Prisoner Complaint but who is identified as
Don Krueger in the description of the parties. ECF No. 9 at 2. Mr. Mason asserts
claims against the Clear Creek County Sheriff in claims six, seven, eight, and nine.
Claims six and seven will be dismissed for the reasons stated below.
In claim six, Mr. Mason alleges that on June 25, 2014, when he was taken into
custody by the Clear Creek County Sheriff, he was unable to make an initial telephone
call until July 15, 2014, because the numbers he needed to retrieve were in his mobile
telephone, which he was not allowed to use pursuant to the sheriff’s policy. On the
basis of these allegations, he alleges violations of his rights under the First Amendment

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and to equal protection. Mr. Mason fails to allege sufficient, or any, facts to state a
plausible claim of violations of his First Amendment rights and rights to equal protection.
Without supporting facts, the allegations rest on nothing more than conclusory
allegations. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 681. Mr. Mason’s sixth claim will be dismissed as
legally frivolous.
In claim seven, Mr. Mason contends that, pursuant to policy of the Clear Creek
County Sheriff, he has been denied the ability to make photocopies for Denver County
Court Case No. 2012 T 976, a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Colorado
Supreme Court, and in the instant action. On the basis of these allegations, he asserts
violations of the First Amendment, his right of access to the courts, and due process.
Again, Mr. Mason fails to allege sufficient, or any, facts to state a plausible claim
of violations of his First Amendment rights. Without supporting facts, the allegations
rest on nothing more than conclusory allegations. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 681. Nor does
Mr. Mason allege sufficient facts to assert a claim of access to the courts.
The right of access to the courts extends only as far as protecting an inmate’s
ability to prepare initial pleadings in a civil rights action regarding his current
confinement or in an application for a writ of habeas corpus. See Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 576 (1974); Carper v. DeLand, 54 F.3d 613, 617 (10th Cir. 1995). An
inmate must satisfy the standing requirement of “actual injury” by showing that the
denial of legal resources hindered his efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous claim. Lewis v.
Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349-353 (1995). “The Supreme Court has never extended ‘the
Fourteenth Amendment due process claim based on access to the courts . . . to apply
further than protecting the ability of an inmate to prepare a petition or a complaint.’” See

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Love v. Summit County, 776 F.2d 908, 914 (10th Cir. 1985) (quoting Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576 (1974)). Mr. Mason fails to assert well-pled facts that his
ability to access the court was impeded by an inability to make photocopies for his
pending cases in state and federal courts. Claim seven against the Clear Creek County
Sheriff will be dismissed as legally frivolous.
In claim eight, Mr. Mason asserts that he is a “professional Messianic Hebrew.”
ECF No. 9 at 25. He complains that on June 25, 2014, when he was taken into custody
by the Clear Creek County Sheriff and, despite the fact that he requested a religious
diet, over half his meals contained pork until July 5, 2014, and on August 2, 2014, he
was served an undercooked cheeseburger, which the control center staff exchanged for
a peanut butter and jelly sandwich. He alleges that he later was informed that, pursuant
to the sheriff’s policy, he was to be given peanut butter and jelly sandwiches. On the
basis of these allegations, he asserts he was denied a religious diet and subjected to
religious persecution. This claim will be assigned to a presiding judge and, if
appropriate, to a magistrate judge.
As his ninth and final claim, Mr. Mason alleges that, after being taken into
custody by the Clear Creek County Sheriff, he submitted a medical request for antianxiety medication similar to the marijuana he usually consumed. On July 14, 2014, he
met with a physician, who prescribed Olanzapine, an anti-anxiety and antipsychotic
medication that caused him side effects, and on July 28, 2014, instead was prescribed
Risperdal, an antipsychotic. He complains that pursuant to the Clear Creek County
Sheriff’s policy, the Clear Creek jail medical staff cannot give him anti-anxiety
medications and his prison trust fund account was charged for the medications he was

15

prescribed, despite the fact that he has medical insurance to cover his expenses for
medical treatment. This claim will be assigned to a presiding judge and, if appropriate,
to a magistrate judge.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that all claims, except for claims
eight and nine asserted against the Clear Creek County Sheriff, will be dismissed as
frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that all claims, except for claims eight and nine asserted against the
Clear Creek County Sheriff, are dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B). It is
FURTHER ORDERED that the claims against the following Defendants listed in
the caption to the amended Prisoner Complaint are dismissed: Judge Rachel OlguinFresquez; Fifth Judicial District Attorney; Douglas K. Wilson, state public defender; John
Hickenlooper, Colorado governor; People of the State of Colorado; Denver County
Court Judge Room 100-K; and Denver City Attorney. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that the following individuals not included as parties in the
caption to this case should be added by the clerk of the Court as Defendants, and the
claims against them dismissed: Bryan Garrett, deputy district attorney; Bruce I. Brown,
district attorney; John Doe, Manitou Springs, Colorado, police officer; and John Doe,
Denver parking management meter agent. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that the following Defendants are dismissed as parties to
this action: Judge Rachel Olguin-Fresquez; Fifth Judicial District Attorney; Douglas K.

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Wilson, State Public Defender; John Hickenlooper, Colo. Governor; People of the State
of Colorado; Denver County Court Judge Room 100-K; Denver City Attorney; Bryan
Garrett, deputy district attorney; Bruce I. Brown, district attorney; John Doe, Manitou
Springs, Colorado, police officer; and John Doe, Denver parking management meter
agent. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that the only remaining Defendant is the Clear Creek
County Sheriff. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that the only remaining claims – claims eight and nine
asserted against the Clear Creek County Sheriff – are assigned to a presiding judge
and, if appropriate, to a magistrate judge.
DATED at Denver, Colorado, this 20th

day of

August

, 2014.

BY THE COURT:

s/Lewis T. Babcock
LEWIS T. BABCOCK, Senior Judge
United States District Court

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