Sanchez v. Stellar Recovery, Inc.
Filing
31
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 29 , by Judge William J. Martinez on 6/10/2015.(dhans, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge William J. Martínez
Civil Action No. 14-cv-2018-WJM-KLM
CRYSTAL SANCHEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
STELLAR RECOVERY, INC., a Florida corporation,
Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
Plaintiff initiated this action on July 21, 2014 arising out of Defendant’s alleged
violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), specifically 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692e(2)(A), e(8), and e(10). (ECF No. 1.) On December 10, 2014, Plaintiff filed a
Notice of Acceptance of Defendant’s Offer of Judgment, and final judgment was
entered in Plaintiff’s favor in the amount of $1,001.00. (ECF Nos. 24 & 26.) The Offer
of Judgment provided that Plaintiff’s costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees would be
added to the judgment against Defendant. (ECF No. 24-1.) Costs were taxed against
Defendant on December 22, 2014. (ECF No. 28.) Plaintiff accordingly filed her Motion
for Attorneys’ Fees (“Motion”), which is now before the Court, on December 31, 2014.
(ECF No. 29.) On January 14, 2015, Defendant filed its response to the Motion. (ECF
No. 30.) No reply was filed. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is granted in
part and denied in part.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
To determine a reasonable attorneys’ fee, the Court must calculate a “lodestar
figure” by multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the hours reasonably expended.
Praseuth v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 406 F.3d 1245, 1257 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Case v.
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, 157 F.3d 1243, 1249 (10th Cir. 1998)). Counsel should
exercise “billing judgment” prior to submitting a fee request to eliminate any needless,
excessive, or redundant hours. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983). Billing
judgment should also take into account the experience and relative skill of the billing
attorneys. Id. Additional factors to determine a fee’s reasonableness include “the
complexity of the case, the number of reasonable strategies pursued, . . . the
responses necessitated by the maneuvering of the other side,” any potential duplicative
services, and whether the hours would “normally be billed to a paying client.” Ramos v.
Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 554 (10th Cir. 1983). A court m ay use its discretion to fashion an
award of attorneys’ fees it deems appropriate where counsel requests payment for
hours other than those reasonably expended. Id. at 554-55.
II. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. David Larson, claims that he expended 15.1 hours on this
matter at an hourly rate of $250.00, and accordingly seeks $3,775.00 in attorneys’ fees.
(ECF No. 29.) Defendant agrees that $250.00 is a reasonable hourly rate, but argues
that the time expended by counsel on this matter is excessive. (ECF No. 30.) Mr.
Larson has litigated over 2,200 FDCPA cases and, according to Defendant, has filed
approximately 20 FDCPA cases against Defendant in the past two years containing
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allegations similar to those at bar. (ECF Nos. 29 at 6 & 30 at 6.) Because of Mr.
Larson’s extensive experience litigating FDCPA cases, Defendant argues that “[t]his
case involved no depositions, boilerplate discovery requests and no work other than an
obvious copy and paste document production.” (ECF No. 30 at 6.) Defendant further
argues that the sheer volume of FDCPA cases filed by Mr. Larson dictates that he
should require less time to draft FDCPA complaints, form motions, and other
documents common to this type of matter. (Id.)
The Court has reviewed the Motion and accompanying documentation and
agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff’s fee request is excessive. As U.S. District Judge
R. Brooke Jackson stated in his September 24, 2012 Order on Mr. Larson’s Motion for
Attorneys’ Fees, Mr. Larson should be able to efficiently litigate FDCPA matters:
The preparation of a complaint in this case was a relatively simple
process. This is not complex litigation. Mr. Larson has filed an
astonishing number of these cases in this district alone. . . . Mr. Larson, as
apparently one of the leading specialists in this type of litigation, deserves
to be reasonably compensated. However, the fact is that this is high
volume, small dollar, non-complex litigation. The efficiencies of scale that
Mr. Larson has achieved, to his credit, sometimes enable him . . . to
“investigate” the facts, prepare pleadings, and negotiate settlements with
small investments of time. Such was the case here.
Ellis v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 11-cv-02860-RBJ, at *7-8 (D. Colo. Sep. 24, 2012).
The Court finds some of Mr. Larson’s largest time entries in this matter to be
excessive. For example, Mr. Larson spent 1.9 hours drafting the summons and
Complaint; 0.5 hours reviewing Defendant’s Answer to “compare [it] to allegations in
Complaint”; 0.9 hours drafting discovery requests and initial disclosures; and 1 hour
drafting the instant Motion. (ECF No. 29-1.) Defendant claims that Mr. Larson submits
the same motion for attorneys’ fees “in every case,” and his pleadings vary “only as to a
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few paragraphs dealing with the specific alleged violations, most of which share a
common theme and theory of liability.” (ECF No. 30 at 5-7.) Defendant further states
that in the roughly 20 lawsuits Mr. Larson has filed against Defendant, Mr. Larson
submits “the exact same initial disclosures” in each case along with “boilerplate
discovery requests.” (Id. at 6-7.) Mr. Larson’s time spent reviewing brief docket entries
or completing clerical tasks, such as his review of the return of service, review of an
unopposed motion for continuance, emailing defense counsel audio recordings, and
mailing discovery requests and initial disclosures, also warrant close scrutiny. (ECF No.
29-1 at 3-5.)
Mr. Larson evidently takes advantage—as he should—of the similar legal issues
that arise in many FDCPA matters through the use of form pleadings, motions, and
discovery requests. Mr. Larson has not disputed this point. T hese “efficiencies of
scale” should allow Mr. Larson to spend a nominal amount of time on such relatively
routine matters. Ellis, 11-cv-02860-RBJ, at *8. Mr. Larson’s billings, however, do not
reflect this reality.
The Court accordingly finds that Plaintiff’s fee request is excessive, and warrants
a 15% reduction to account for Mr. Larson’s inefficiencies in handling this matter.
While the Court must specify the reasons underlying its fee award, “[a] general
reduction of hours claimed in order to achieve what the court determines to be a
reasonable number is not an erroneous method, so long as there is sufficient reason for
its use.” McInnis v. Fairfield Communities, Inc., 458 F.3d 1129, 1147 (10th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Mares v. Credit Bureau of Raton, 801 F.2d 1197, 1203 (10th Cir. 1986). As
discussed above, this reduction accounts for any needless, redundant, and otherwise
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unnecessary time spent reviewing simple docket entries, completing administrative
tasks, and drafting routine documents. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434; see also Missouri v.
Jenkins by Agyei, 491 U.S. 274, 288, n. 10 (1989) (“Of course, purely clerical or
secretarial tasks should not be billed at a paralegal rate, regardless of who performs
them.”). The Court will therefore award Plaintiff $3,208.75 in attorneys’ fees, rather
than $3,775.00 as the Motion requests.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’
Fees (ECF No. 29) is GRANTED IN PART and Plaintiff is awarded $3,208.75 in
attorneys’ fees.
Dated this 11th day of June, 2015.
BY THE COURT:
William J. Martínez
United States District Judge
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