Frye v. Cherry Creek School District No. 5

Filing 20

MINUTE ORDER denying 19 Motion to Reopen the Case, by Magistrate Judge Michael E. Hegarty on 9/09/2014.(slibi, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 14-cv-02051-MEH
DANIELLE FRYE, parent of JA (minor child) and JO (minor child),
Plaintiff,
v.

CHERRY CREEK SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 5, its Cimarron Elementary School, and
DIANA ROYBAL, in her official capacity as Principal,
Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________________
MINUTE ORDER
______________________________________________________________________________
Entered by Michael E. Hegarty, United States Magistrate Judge, on September 9, 2014.
Before the Court is a letter to the Court signed by Plaintiff [filed September 8, 2014; docket
#19]. To the extent this letter can be construed as a motion to reopen the case, it is denied because
it fails to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a), which states in pertinent part,
Every pleading, written motion, and other paper must be signed by at least one
attorney of record in the attorney’s name – or by a party personally if the party is
unrepresented.
Plaintiff is a represented party, and, therefore, her attorney must sign every “pleading, written
motion, and other paper.” Plaintiff suggests that she is no longer represented by counsel; however,
her attorney has not notified the Court that he has withdrawn representation. Furthermore, Plaintiff
explains that she seeks to reopen the case in order to “find ethical representation.” The Court does
not have the authority to grant this request. Allegations of attorney misconduct or ethical violations
are considered by the Colorado Supreme Court Attorney Regulation Counsel.
Because this action was dismissed without prejudice, Plaintiff is not precluded from bringing
her original claims in a new action. See E.E.O.C. v. W.H. Bram, Inc., 347 F.3d 1192, 1201 (10th
Cir. 2003) (“Where a case is voluntarily dismissed without prejudice, the dismissal ‘leaves the
parties as though the action had never been brought.’”) (citing Brown v. Hartshorne Public School
Dist., 926 F. 2d 959, 961 (10th Cir. 1991)). Additionally, the complaint (docket #1) indicates that
the events giving rise to her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim occurred in early 2014. See Hunt v. Bennett,
17 F.3d 1263, 1266-67 (10th Cir. 1994) (affirming application of Colorado’s two-year statute of
limitations to a § 1983 claim).