Menocal-Lepe v. Longshore et al

Filing 18

ORDER The Order to Show Cause ECF No. 16 is MADE ABSOLUTE; The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ECF No. 1 is DENIED AS MOOT; and This matter is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The parties shall bear their own costs, by Judge William J. Martinez on 10/1/2014.(evana, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge William J. Martínez
Civil Action No. 14-cv-2122-WJM-BNB
ALEJANDRO MENOCAL-LEPE,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN LONGSHORE, Field Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
JEH JOHNSON, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security,
JOHN MORTON, Director for Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and
ERIC HOLDER, Attorney General, United States of America
Defendants.

ORDER MAKING ABSOLUTE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
AND DENYING PETITION AS MOOT

Petitioner Alejandro Menocal-Lepe (“Petitioner”) brings this action against
Defendants John Longshore, Jeh Johnson, John Morton, and Eric Holder (collectively
“Defendants”) seeking a writ of habeas corpus, release from custody on bond, a
declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees and costs. (ECF No. 1.)
Petitioner alleges that he was unlawfully taken into custody without the possibility of
release on bond (“mandatory detention”) based on Defendants’ misinterpretation of 8
U.S.C. § 1226(c). (Id.)
On September 10, 2014, while the Petition was pending, a hearing was held
before an Immigration Judge at which Petitioner was granted Cancellation of Removal,
a form of immigration relief. (ECF No. 15.) The Department of Homeland Security
waived its right to appeal, and Petitioner was released from custody. (Id.) Petitioner

informed the Court of this development on September 16, 2014. (Id.) On September
17, 2014, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause as to why the Petition was not
moot as a result of Petitioner’s release from custody. (ECF No. 16.) Petitioner’s
Response to the Order to Show Cause was filed on September 24, 2014, in which
Petitioner argues that this action falls under the exception to mootness doctrine for an
unlawful act that is “capable of repetition, but evading review.” (ECF No. 17.)
Mootness is among the justiciability doctrines that arises from Article III of the
United States Constitution, which limits a federal court’s jurisdiction to the adjudication
of “cases” or “controversies.” U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2. The case or controversy
requirement protects the system of separated powers and respect for the coequal
branches of the government by restricting the province of the judiciary to “decid[ing] on
the rights of individuals.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803). Indeed, “‘[n]o
principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government
than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or
controversies.’” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky.
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976)).
Mootness requires a federal court to dismiss a claim when a favorable decision
from the court would have no effect on the rights of the litigants in the case. See
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974); see also Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S.
478, 481 (1982) (“a case becomes moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’
or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted). However, an otherwise moot claim may proceed in federal court where

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the challenged act is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” The Supreme Court
has held this exception to be “limited to the situation where two elements combine[]: (1)
the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its
cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same
complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.” Murphy, 455 U.S. at
482 (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (per curiam)).
Because Petitioner was released from custody before the Court issued a final
ruling on the Petition, the first of the elements of the mootness exception—the short
duration—is satisfied here. However, Petitioner has failed to show that he faces a
reasonable likelihood of being subjected to the mandatory detention provision again in
the future, and thus has failed to satisfy the second element of the “capable of
repetition, yet evading review” exception. See Murphy, 455 U.S. at 482. In an apparent
attempt to meet his burden, Petitioner asserts in a conclusory manner that, despite the
immigration relief he was recently granted, he may be subjected again to mandatory
detention. (ECF No. 17 at 5, 6.) However, he has not provided any explanation or
support for this statement that would allow the Court to evaluate whether there is a
reasonable expectation of such recurrence.
Instead, Petitioner cites a footnote from an unpublished decision by the Northern
District of California, Preap v. Johnson, 2014 WL 1995064, at *2 n.2 (N.D. Cal. May 15,
2014), which rejected a mootness argument under similar factual circumstances.
However, unlike the instant case, both Preap and the caselaw on which it relies were
class actions in which other class members were deemed likely to suffer the challenged

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deprivation. See id. (citing U.S. Parole Comm’n. v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 398-99
(1980); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n.11 (1975)). The class action context
raises distinct issues for purposes of mootness; the Supreme Court has explicitly held
that class certification prevents mootness even where “there is no chance that the
named plaintiff’s expired claim will reoccur,” and that “an action brought on behalf of a
class does not become moot upon expiration of the named plaintiff’s substantive claim”
for the purposes of appealing the denial of class certification. Geraghty, 445 U.S. at
398, 404. None of the cases Petitioner cites alters the requirement that Petitioner
himself must be reasonably likely to suffer the same challenged act in the future for the
“capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to apply in an individual case like
this. See id. at 398 (noting that in individual cases, the exception “has been applied
where the named plaintiff does have a personal stake at the outset of the lawsuit, and
where the claim may arise again with respect to that plaintiff”). Thus, the Court finds
that these cases do not lessen Petitioner’s burden to m eet both prongs of the mootness
exception he invokes.
Because Petitioner’s allegedly unlawful detention has ceased and can no longer
be remedied by this Court, and Petitioner has failed to show that the Court could issue
any declaratory or injunctive relief that would not be an impermissible advisory opinion,
the Court finds that the Petition is moot. Accordingly, the Court must dismiss the
Petition for lack of jurisdiction.
Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby ORDERS as
follows:

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1.

The Order to Show Cause (ECF No. 16) is MADE ABSOLUTE;

2.

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
(ECF No. 1) is DENIED AS MOOT; and

3.

This matter is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The parties shall bear their
own costs.
Dated this 1st day of October, 2014.
BY THE COURT:

William J. Martínez
United States District Judge

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