Vreeland, II v. Archuleta et al

Filing 149

ORDER by Chief Judge Philip A. Brimmer on 8/24/2023. ORDERED that 126 applicant's Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) Based upon Extraordinary Circumstances is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. ORD ERED that 129 applicant's Motion for Relief and to Vacate Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) is DENIED. ORDERED that 131 applicant's Motion for Release on Bail Pending Litigation of Motion for Relief from Judgment bas ed upon Extraordinary Circumstances Motion for Relief and to Vacate Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 60(b) New Application for Habeas Corpus Relief Under 28 U.S.C. 2254 or U.S.C. 2241 and/or any Appellate Proceedings Relevant to any of the A bove Litigation is DENIED. ORDERED that 132 applicant's Motion to Chief Judge P.A. Brimmer to Take Judicial Notice of Attached Public Record Photographic Evidence in Support of Motion for Relief from Judgment (ECF 126 ) and Motion for Release on Recognizance Bail is DENIED as moot. (jtorr, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Chief Judge Philip A. Brimmer
Civil Action No. 14-cv-02175-PAB
DELMART E.J.M. VREELAND, II,
Applicant,
v.
DAVID ZUPAN, and
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF COLORADO,
Respondents.
ORDER
This Matter is before the Court on applicant’s Motion for Relief from Judgment
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) Based upon Extraordinary Circumstances [Docket
No. 126] (the “First Rule 60(b) Motion”), Motion for Relief and to Vacate Judgment
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) [Docket No. 129] (the “Second Rule 60(b) Motion”),
Motion for Release on Bail Pending Litigation of Motion for Relief from Judgment based
upon Extraordinary Circumstances Motion for Relief and to Vacate Judgment Pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 60(b) New Application for Habeas Corpus Relief Under 28
U.S.C. 2254 or U.S.C. 2241 and/or any Appellate Proceedings Relevant to any of the
Above Litigation [Docket No. 131] (the “Bail Motion”), and Motion to Chief Judge P.A.
Brimmer to Take Judicial Notice of Attached Public Record Photographic Evidence in
Support of Motion for Relief from Judgment (ECF 126) and Motion for Release on
Recognizance Bail [Docket No. 132] (the “Judicial Notice Motion”). Respondents filed
a response to applicant’s First Rule 60(b) Motion, Docket No. 137, and a combined

response to applicant’s Second Rule 60(b) Motion and Bail Motion. Docket No. 138.
Applicant filed a combined reply in support of his First Rule 60(b) Motion and his
Second Rule 60(b) Motion, Docket No. 147, 1 and a reply in support of his bail motion.
Docket No. 146.
I. BACKGROUND 2
Applicant is a prisoner in the custody of the Colorado Department of Corrections.
See Docket No. 126 at 12. On August 6, 2014, applicant initiated this action by filing
an Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging
the validity of his criminal conviction in Case No. 04CR706 in the District Court for
Douglas County, Colorado. Docket No. 1 at 1-2. On September 29, 2014, pursuant to
court order, see Docket No. 5 at 2, applicant filed an amended application, which
asserted thirty-two claims, of which one had five subparts. Docket No. 8. On
December 21, 2015, the Court dismissed claims six through nine, eleven through
twenty-six, subpart (a) of twenty-seven, twenty-nine, and thirty as procedurally barred
from federal habeas review; claims four, thirty-one, and thirty-two because they are not
cognizable in a federal habeas action; and subparts (b)-(e) of claim twenty-seven and
claim twenty-eight as unexhausted. Docket No. 46 at 19-20. The Court ordered
respondents to file an answer that fully addressed the merits of the remaining claims
one through three, five, and ten. Id. at 20. Upon review, the Court denied the

Applicant filed two replies in support of Docket Nos. 126 and 129. Docket Nos.
145 and 147. The replies appear identical, except that Docket No. 147 includes
exhibits. See id.; Docket Nos. 147-1-147-7. The Court will cite to Docket No. 147 and
its attached exhibits.
2 These facts are taken in part from the Court’s order on July 2, 2019. See Docket
No. 103 at 1-2.
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application, dismissed the action with prejudice, and found no basis to issue a certificate
of appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) because each remaining claim lacked
merit. Docket No. 75.
Applicant filed a Notice of Appeal. Docket No. 77. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (1) affirmed the Court’s denial of relief on applicant’s Sixth
Amendment claim and (2) denied applicant’s certificate of appealability on his due
process and actual innocence claims, which resulted in the dismissal of the remainder
of the appeal. Vreeland v. Zupan, 906 F.3d 866 (10th Cir. 2018). On February 19,
2019, applicant petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari review. Docket No. 90.
That petition was denied on April 15, 2019. See Docket No. 91.
On June 14, 2019, applicant filed a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) and (d)
arguing that the Court’s order denying applicant’s habeas petition was corrupted by
applicant’s attorney and respondents’ attorney not providing relevant evidence. Docket
No. 102 at 1-2, ¶¶ 3, 5. The Court denied applicant’s motion, ruling it was a successive
habeas petition that the Court did not have jurisdiction to consider. Docket No. 103 at
5. Applicant appealed the Court’s order on his Rule 60(b) and (d) motion. Docket No.
104. On January 24, 2020, the Tenth Circuit denied applicant’s request for a certificate
of appealability. Docket No. 116 at 9.
On November 14, 2022, applicant filed a motion in the Tenth Circuit seeking
authorization to file a successive habeas petition. Docket No. 124-1. On December 5,
2022, the Tenth Circuit denied applicant’s motion for authorization. Docket No. 125.
Applicant subsequently filed his First Rule 60(b) Motion on December 28, 2022, his
Second Rule 60(b) Motion, Bail Motion, and Judicial Notice Motion on January 23,

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2023. Docket Nos. 126, 129, 131, and 132.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Rule 60(b) Motions
Applicant has filed two motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Docket
Nos. 126 and 129. Applicant’s First Rule 60(b) Motion requests “an order granting
relief from judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 60(b)(6) and allow Petitioner to
either amend a past jurisdictional claim, or to amend to present a jurisdictional claim,
and/or for whatever relief this Court can provide consistent with law and Constitution.”
Docket No. 126 at 12. Applicant’s Second Rule 60(b) Motion states “two additional
issues were discovered” after he filed his first Rule 60(b) Motion and requests “an order
vacating the final judgment” in this case finding that the judgment is void. Docket No.
129 at 2, 5.
1. Legal Standard
The Supreme Court has ruled a Rule 60(b) motion is appropriately characterized as a
second or successive § 2255 motion if it attacks a federal court’s denial of habeas relief
on the merits. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 532 (2005). A motion is a proper
Rule 60(b) motion if, instead of questioning the merits of a previous order, it “challenges
only a procedural ruling of the habeas court which precluded a merits determination of
the habeas application, . . . or []challenges a defect in the integrity of the federal habeas
proceeding, provided that such a challenge does not itself lead inextricably to a meritsbased attack on the disposition of a prior habeas petition.” Spitznas v. Boone, 464
F.3d 1213, 1215-16 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532 n.4). If the court
determines a motion is a second or successive habeas motion, the court must either

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dismiss the motion without prejudice or transfer the motion to the Tenth Circuit pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1631. In re Cline, 531 F.3d 1249, 1251 (10th Cir. 2008). The court
may not rule on a successive § 2255 claim unless authorized by the Tenth Circuit. See
id. at 1252. If, however, a court determines a motion is a proper Rule 60(b) motion, it
can rule on the merits. Spitznas, 464 F.3d at 1215-16.
Rule 60(b) states that a court may relieve a party from final judgment under certain
limited circumstances. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Relief after judgment is discretionary
and only appropriate for “(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2)
newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether
previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing
party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or
discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or
applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies
relief.” Id. A Rule 60(b) motion must be made within a reasonable time, and motions
made under Rule 60(b)(1)-(3) must be filed within one year of the entry of judgment.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c).
Because such relief is “extraordinary and may only be granted in exceptional
circumstances,” Servants of the Paraclete v. John Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1009 (10th Cir.
2000), parties seeking relief under Rule 60(b) have a high hurdle to overcome; a Rule
60(b) motion should not be treated as a substitute for an appeal. Zurich N. Am. v.
Matrix Serv., Inc., 426 F.3d 1281, 1289 (10th Cir. 2005). Rule 60(b)(6) has been
described as a “grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a particular case.”

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Pierce v. Cook & Co., Inc., 518 F.2d 720, 722 (10th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (citation
omitted). Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is appropriate when circumstances are so
“unusual or compelling” that extraordinary relief is warranted or when it “offends justice”
to deny such relief. Cashner v. Freedom Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 572, 580 (10th Cir.
1996). “Rule 60(b)(6) relief may not be premised on one of the grounds enumerated in
clause (b)(1) through (b)(5)).” Spitznas, 464 F.3d at 1225 n.11 (citing State Bank of S.
Utah v. Gledhill (In re Gledhill), 76 F.3d 1070, 1080 (10th Cir. 1996)). “[A] successive
Rule 60(b) motion . . . [is an] inappropriate vehicle[] to reargue an issue previously
addressed by the court when the motion merely advances new arguments, or
supporting facts which were available at the time of the original motion. Absent
extraordinary circumstances, . . . the basis for the second motion must not have been
available at the time the first motion was filed.” Servants of the Paraclete, 204 F.3d at
1012.
2. Analysis
Applicant’s First Rule 60(b) Motion states that, in his original application, “Petitioner’s
counsel chose to proceed with exhausted claims only; having no clue, by no fault of his
own, that as the state court proceeded in absence of jurisdiction there was an argument
to be made as to a waiver of exhaustion rule.” Docket No. 126 at 8. Applicant claims
he received court materials in 2022 that revealed a motion he made in his criminal case
arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction over non-financial charges. Id. at 2.
Applicant claims he uncovered telephone calls that demonstrate his attorney hid his
jurisdictional motion. Id. at 6-7, 10. Applicant argues that “[h]ad the materials been
known to exist in 2014 they would have been provided and the claim made.” Id. at 8.

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Applicant’s Second Rule 60(b) Motion states “the original habeas corpus proceeding
in this Court should be void as it was rendered without jurisdiction because no final
judgment of conviction has yet to be rendered in Douglas County case 04cr706, and
absent final judgment, there is no judgment for a federal habeas court to review.”
Docket No. 129 at 2.
Applicant’s Rule 60(b) motions are filed subsequent to a habeas petition, so the
Court must evaluate whether the motions are true Rule 60(b) motions or successive
habeas petitions. Spitznas, 464 F.3d at 1215-16. Additionally, applicant has already
filed a Rule 60(b) motion in this case. Docket No. 103. To the extent the motions are
made under Rule 60(b), the Court will evaluate them as successive Rule 60(b) motions.
Servants of the Paraclete, 204 F.3d at 1012.
a. Applicant’s First Rule 60(b) Motion
Applicant’s First Rule 60(b) Motion does not provide a clear argument why his motion
should not be considered as a second or successive habeas application. He states
“there is authority for both” a second habeas petition and a Rule 60(b) motion, “but Rule
60 is the quickest avenue.” Docket No. 126 at 2. Respondents argue applicant’s
motion is a second or successive petition because applicant asks the Court to “review a
new claim that the state trial court did not have subject matter or personal jurisdiction to
bring him to trial.” Docket No. 137 at 7, ¶ 9. In his reply, applicant argues his “motion
solely requests Rule 60 relief as the integrity of the original habeas application was
corrupted by state conduct.” Docket No. 147 at 6, ¶ 22. Specifically, applicant states
that he “does not ask the Court to address, re-address, or reconsider any prior merit, or
non-merit based ruling, and/or to address or grant relief from any new claim of

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Constitutional error regarding the state court judgment” and that he “only asks this Court
to reconsider its judgment on the prior habeas petition based on extraordinary
circumstances.” Id., ¶¶ 24-25.
In Spitznas, the court stated:
examples of Rule 60(b) motions that should be treated as second or
successive habeas petitions because they assert or reassert a federal
basis for relief from the underlying conviction include: a motion seeking to
present a claim of constitutional error omitted from the movant’s initial
habeas petition, a motion seeking leave to present newly discovered
evidence in order to advance the merits of a claim previously denied, or a
motion seeking vindication of a habeas claim by challenging the habeas
court’s previous ruling on the merits of that claim.
464 F.3d at 1216 (internal citations, quotations, and alterations omitted). The court
also stated that “a motion asserting that the federal district court incorrectly dismissed a
petition for failure to exhaust, procedural bar, or because of the statute of limitations
constitutes a true [Rule] 60(b) motion.” Id. The court described a relevant possibility:
A Rule 60(b) motion asserting fraud or other defect in the integrity of the
federal habeas proceeding may also constitute a true 60(b) motion,
although this type of motion requires a more nuanced analysis. For
example, whether a 60(b) motion that alleges a defect in the integrity of
the habeas proceeding based upon a claim of fraud on the court
constitutes a true 60(b) motion depends on the fraud alleged. If the
alleged fraud on the court relates solely to fraud perpetrated on the federal
habeas court, then the motion will be considered a true 60(b) motion. . . .
However, if the fraud on the habeas court includes (or necessarily implies)
related fraud on the state court (or the federal district court that convicted
and/or sentenced the movant in the case of a § 2255 motion), then the
motion will ordinarily be considered a second or successive petition
because any ruling would inextricably challenge the underlying conviction
proceeding.
Id.
The Court understands applicant’s First Rule 60(b) Motion to argue that the integrity
of the Court’s habeas proceedings was corrupted by missing evidence, partially based

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on fraud by the state court. Docket No. 126 at 6-8. Thus, applicant’s argument is
contained in a motion that Spitznas said should be considered as second or successive
habeas petition, namely, a motion seeking leave to present newly discovered evidence
in order to advance the merits of a claim previously denied. 464 F.3d at 1216; see also
Dopp v. Martin, 750 F. App’x 754, 757 (10th Cir. 2018) (unpublished) (“the jurisdictional
nature of [applicant’s] claim does not exempt his § 2254 application from dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction as a successive and unauthorized application.”). Because
applicant’s motion is properly considered as a second or successive petition, the Court
lacks jurisdiction to consider its merits.
When the Court determines that it lacks jurisdiction over a habeas petition, “it ‘shall, if
it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action or appeal to any other such court in
which the action or appeal could have been brought.’” In re Cline, 531 F.3d at 1251
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1631). “Factors considered in deciding whether a transfer is in
the interest of justice include whether the claims would be time barred if filed anew in
the proper forum, whether the claims alleged are likely to have merit, and whether the
claims were filed in good faith or if, on the other hand, it was clear at the time of filing
that the court lacked the requisite jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d
1210, 1223 n.6 (10th Cir. 2006)). Applicant does not argue the Court should transfer
his motion to the Tenth Circuit. See Docket No. 126.
On November 14, 2022, before filing his First Rule 60(b) Motion in this Court,
applicant filed a motion in the Tenth Circuit seeking to file a second or successive
habeas petition, arguing the “[s]tate trial court proceeded to trial, entered judgment,
conviction[,] and sentence in total absence of jurisdiction or lawful venue.” Docket No.

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124-1 at 16. In support of his motion, applicant cited the discovery of new evidence,
namely, a copy of the motion he filed in 2006 that was allegedly discovered by two legal
assistants in June 2022. Id. at 28. This is the same argument presented in plaintiff’s
First Rule 60(b) Motion. The Tenth Circuit denied applicant’s request stating,
“[b]ecause Mr. Vreeland knew the factual predicate for his proposed successive claim in
2006, he has not shown he can meet the requirements for authorization” for a
successive petition. Docket No. 125 at 2. Applicant provides no reason why his First
Rule 60(b) Motion presents a different argument than the one he presented to the Tenth
Circuit. Because the Tenth Circuit has already denied applicant’s request to file a
successive petition on the same evidence and argument, 3 the Court finds it would not
be in the interests of justice to transfer his First Rule 60(b) Motion to the Tenth Circuit.
b. Applicant’s Second Rule 60(b) Motion
Applicant’s Second Rule 60(b) Motion argues that this Court did not have jurisdiction
to evaluate applicant’s habeas petition because final judgment was never entered in his
criminal case. Docket No. 129 at 5. The essence of applicant’s argument is that final
judgment did not enter because no restitution was ordered and, under Colorado law,
judgment is not final until restitution has been entered. Id. at 4. Applicant argues that,
under Rule 60(b)(4), he is entitled to relief because this Court’s order on his habeas

Where “courts have repeatedly explained [] the statutory authorization
requirements [for a district court to consider a second or successive petition], . . . a
district court might well conclude that [applicant’s] most recent unauthorized filing was
not made in good faith.” In re Cline, 531 F.3d at 1252. Because applicant filed this
motion after being denied a certificate of appealability on the same facts without
explaining why this argument does not constitute a successive habeas petition, the
Court can assume this motion was not filed in good faith as an additional grounds to
decline to transfer applicant’s motion.
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application, Docket No. 75, is void. Docket No. 129 at 5. Spitznas acknowledged that
challenges to an order as void pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4) are true Rule 60(b) motions
and not second or successive habeas petitions. 464 F.3d at 1216. The Court,
therefore, may address the merits of applicant’s argument.
Respondents claim that applicant made the same argument in state court and that a
state court found his argument to lack legal merit. Docket No. 138 at 5, ¶ 10.
Respondents argue that the Court is bound by the state court’s ruling. Id. Applicant’s
reply argues that respondents fail “to cite any decisional law on the merits of finality of
judgment.” Docket No. 147 at 13, ¶ 52.
Applicant’s argument fails for two reasons. First, under Colorado law, a sentence
that does not address restitution is still considered final. Applicant relies on People v.
Rosales, 134 P.3d 429, 431-32 (Colo. App. 2005), Docket No. 129 at 3, which
“concluded that a judgment of conviction is not final until sentence is imposed, that
restitution is a mandatory part of a sentence, and that sentencing is not final until
restitution is ordered.” People v. Dunlap, 222 P.3d 364, 369 (Colo. App. 2009). In
Rosales, “the defect in the sentence—failure to include restitution—was discovered and
addressed before the conclusion of defendant’s direct appeal.” Dunlap, 22 P.3d at
369. Dunlap, however, held that a “claim that an illegal sentence has been imposed
because of a failure to consider or fix restitution does not affect the finality of [a]
judgment of conviction.” Id. at 366.
Applicant also cites Leyva v. People, 184 P.3d 48 (Colo. 2008), for the proposition
that, “[w]hen an original judgment of conviction contains an illegal sentence on one
count, the entire sentence is illegal.” Docket No. 147 at 13, ¶ 53. The Colorado

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Supreme Court has subsequently explained that “Leyva incorrectly stated that a
conviction is not final until a sentence is lawful.” Hunsaker v. People, 500 P.3d 1110,
1114 (Colo. 2021). Hunsaker “disavow[ed] the notion that a ‘conviction’ does not occur
until an illegal sentence is corrected.” Id. at 1116.
Second, applicant does not demonstrate whether a judgment that is final for
purposes of Colorado law is also dispositive of whether the judgment is final for
purposes of this Court’s habeas review. Courts in the Tenth Circuit have held that,
even if a state court judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction, it does not mean that the
judgment is not final for the purpose of federal habeas review. See Owens v. Whitten,
637 F. Supp. 3d 1245, 1251 (N.D. Okla. 2022) (“even assuming Owens could establish
that his conviction is ‘void’ for lack of jurisdiction, that does not mean that his conviction
could not be ‘final’ as that term is used in § 2244(d)(1)(A). The plain text of
§ 2244(d)(1)(A) provides that a state-court judgment is ‘final’ when the petitioner can no
longer seek direct review of that judgment.”); Warnick v. Harpe, 2022 WL 16646708, at
*3 (10th Cir. Nov. 3, 2022) (unpublished) (“Mr. Warnick argues his state judgment could
not be ‘final’ because it was ‘void’ where the state court lacked the jurisdiction to convict
him. We disagree. A judgment becomes final ‘by the conclusion of direct review or
the expiration of the time for seeking such review.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(1)(A))). Applicant provides no reason why this Court’s judgment is void, and
the Court will decline to grant relief under Rule 60(b)(4). Thus, the Court will deny
applicant’s Second Rule 60(b) Motion.
B. Bail Motion and Judicial Notice Motion
Applicant’s Bail Motion seeks “an order granting Petitioner’s immediate release on

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recognizance bail pending all further litigation as it pertains to Petitioner’s two Rule 60
relief requests, and/or new habeas application relief request, and/or any possible
appeals associated therewith.” Docket No. 131 at 8, ¶ 37.
“Despite the lack of specific statutory authority, it is within the inherent power of a
federal district court to enlarge a state prisoner on bond, pending hearing and decision
on a petition for habeas relief.” Pfaff v. Wells, 648 F.2d 689, 693 (10th Cir. 1981)
(citation omitted). “However, a showing of exceptional circumstances must be made
for such relief, or a demonstration of a clear case on the merits of the habeas petition.”
Id. “Release on bail pending disposition of the habeas petition, or pending appeal,
requires the habeas petitioner to show not only a substantial federal constitutional claim
that presents not merely a clear case on the law, but a clear, and readily evident, case
on the facts, but also the existence of some circumstances making the request
exceptional and deserving of special treatment in the interests of justice.” Martin v.
Solem, 801 F.2d 324, 329 (8th Cir. 1986) (citations, quotations, and alteration marks
omitted). “There will be few occasions where a prisoner will meet this standard.” Lee
v. Jabe, 989 F.2d 869, 871 (6th Cir. 1993). “Exceptional circumstances” that courts
have recognized as warranting release on bail pending review of a petition for habeas
corpus include serious medical conditions, see Johnston v. Marsh, 227 F.2d 528, 529
(3d Cir. 1955) (finding exceptional circumstances existed where the prisoner was “an
advanced diabetic, [who] was, under conditions of confinement, rapidly progressing
toward total blindness,”), and a sentence that is so short that, were bail denied, the
petitioner would necessarily serve the entirety of the challenged sentence before
resolution of his habeas petition. Boyer v. City of Orlando, 402 F.2d 966, 968 (5th Cir.

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1968).
Here, to the extent applicant seeks to be released based on his First Rule 60(b)
Motion, the Court has found that motion is a second or successive petition that the
Court may not consider on the merits. Applicant provides no authority suggesting that
the Court may exercise jurisdiction to consider the merits of a successive petition and
release him on bond. Moreover, for the reasons stated above, the Court finds
applicant cannot make a strong showing on the merits of his Second Rule 60(b) Motion.
Because applicant has not demonstrated a clear case for habeas relief on the merits,
the Court does not consider whether applicant has raised “exceptional circumstances”
that justify his release on bail pending resolution of this application. Pfaff, 648 F.2d at
693. Thus, the Court will deny applicant’s request to be released on bond based on his
Second Rule 60(b) Motion.
Applicant’s Judicial Notice Motion asks the Court to take Judicial Notice of several
exhibits in support of his First Rule 60(b) Motion and his Bail Motion. Docket No. 132.
Because the Court denies both Rule 60(b) motions for the reasons provided above, the
Court will deny applicant’s Judicial Notice Motion as moot.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is
ORDERED that applicant’s Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 60(b)(6) Based upon Extraordinary Circumstances [Docket No. 126] is DISMISSED
for lack of jurisdiction. It is further
ORDERED that applicant’s Motion for Relief and to Vacate Judgment Pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) [Docket No. 129] is DENIED. It is further

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ORDERED that applicant’s Motion for Release on Bail Pending Litigation of Motion
for Relief from Judgment based upon Extraordinary Circumstances Motion for Relief
and to Vacate Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 60(b) New Application for
Habeas Corpus Relief Under 28 U.S.C. 2254 or U.S.C. 2241 and/or any Appellate
Proceedings Relevant to any of the Above Litigation [Docket No. 131] is DENIED. It is
further
ORDERED that applicant’s Motion to Chief Judge P.A. Brimmer to Take Judicial
Notice of Attached Public Record Photographic Evidence in Support of Motion for Relief
from Judgment (ECF 126) and Motion for Release on Recognizance Bail [Docket No.
132] is DENIED as moot.
DATED: August 24, 2023.
BY THE COURT:

PHILIP A. BRIMMER
Chief United States District Judge

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