Self v. Colvin

Filing 23

ORDER denying 21 Motion for Attorney Fees, and denying WITHOUT PREJUDICE Motion for Costs. Selfs Motion for Attorneys Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act and For Costs Under 28 U.S.C. § 1920 25 is DENIED as to the request for attorneys fees and DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to the request for costs; and Self may request his costs by filing a bill of costs per D.C.COLO.LCivR 54.1 no later than December 4, 2015. by Judge William J. Martinez on 11/20/2015.(cthom, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge William J. Martínez
Civil Action No. 14-cv-2237-WJM
LAINE F. SELF,
Appellant,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Appellee.

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES, AND DENYING
WITHOUT PREJUDICE MOTION FOR COSTS

On May 8, 2015, the Court vacated the Commissioner’s denial of benefits to
Plaintiff Laine F. Self (“Self”) and remanded this action for further proceedings. (ECF
No. 19.) This matter is now before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees
Under the Equal Access to Justice Act and For Costs Under 28 U.S.C. § 1920
(“Motion”). (ECF No. 25.) For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is denied with
respect to Self’s request for attorneys’ fees and denied without prejudice with respect to
his request for costs.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
The Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”) requires that a court “award to a
prevailing party . . . fees and other expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action
. . . brought by or against the United States . . . unless the court f inds that the position
of the United States was substantially justified . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). “The
Government bears the burden of showing that its position was substantially justified. . . .

The test for substantial justification in this circuit is one of reasonableness in law and
fact.” Gilbert v. Shalala, 45 F.3d 1391, 1394 (10th Cir. 1995).
II. ANALYSIS
A.

Fees
The Court remanded this action to the Commissioner for further proceedings

based on its conclusion that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”):
1.

improperly discounted the severity of Self’s claimed depression because it
had never been formally diagnosed; because the depression apparently
stems from physical pain; and because the ALJ believed that Self’s
depression was self-diagnosed, which was an obvious misreading of an
exhibit (ECF No. 19 at 5–6);

2.

relied on an outdated report to determine Self’s ability to carry on activities
of daily living (id. at 7–9);

3.

failed to adequately explain why certain medical opinions deserved more
weight than others (id. at 9–11); and

4.

misunderstood Self’s prior work history, thus leading to unsupported
conclusions at Steps Four and Five (id. at 11–16).

Notably, and commendably, the Commissioner did not defend the ALJ’s
reasoning with respect to items 1 and 2, which were among the most obvious errors.
(See id. at 5 (noting that the Commissioner had chosen not to respond to certain of
Self’s arguments).) Instead, addressing Self’s arguments with respect to item 3, the
Commissioner argued that the ALJ’s reasoning with respect to the medical opinions

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was itself sufficient to sustain the ALJ’s findings. (Id.) Although this Court ultimately
disagreed, the Court did not view the Commissioner’s arguments as substantially
unjustified, nor would the ALJ have been substantially unjustified had that been the only
reasoning on which he relied. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D) (requiring this Court to
judge substantial justification with reference to the Commissioner’s arguments on
appeal as well as the ALJ’s reasoning below).
Concerning item 4, the Court again finds that the Commissioner’s position here,
and the ALJ’s reasoning below, was substantially justified, if ultimately erroneous. As
discussed at length in this Court’s prior order, it was not only the ALJ that
misunderstood Self’s prior work history. All parties, including Self and the vocational
expert, contributed to a minor comedy of errors at Self’s hearing, leading the ALJ and
everyone else to believe that Self had performed “skilled” work as a “sales manager”
when in fact he had not. (ECF No. 19 at 11–15.) T his assumption led the ALJ into
further reasoning errors. (Id. at 15–16.) Because these errors were a collective effort,
so to speak, the ALJ was substantially justified in his reasoning. Moreover, because
Self’s and the vocational expert’s confused hearing testimony appears to support the
ALJ’s conclusions, the Commissioner was substantially justified in defending the ALJ’s
conclusions on appeal.
Considering the foregoing, the Court “finds that the position of the United States
was substantially justified,” and so an award of EAJA attorneys’ fees is inappropriate.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).

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B.

Costs
Self also requests that the Court award him his filing fee as a taxable cost. (ECF

No. 21-1 at 2, 6.) D.C.COLO.LCivR 54.1 governs taxation of costs. Self accordingly
must file a bill of costs on the form provided by that Local Rule. Although the Local
Rule requires that the bill of costs be filed no later than fourteen days after entry of
judgment, the Court, in the interests of justice, will extend that deadline to fourteen days
after entry of this order.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1.

Self’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act and For
Costs Under 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (ECF No. 25) is DENIED as to the request for
attorneys’ fees and DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to the request for costs;
and

2.

Self may request his costs by filing a bill of costs per D.C.COLO.LCivR 54.1 no
later than December 4, 2015.
Dated this 20th day of November, 2015.
BY THE COURT:

William J. Martínez
United States District Judge

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