Martinez v. Colvin

Filing 21

ORDER: Decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and REMANDED for further findings. by Judge R. Brooke Jackson on 2/11/16. (jdyne, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge R. Brooke Jackson
Civil Action No 14-cv-2593-RBJ
RENEE D. MARTINEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant.

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on review of the Commissioner’s decision denying
claimant Renee D. Martinez’s application for Social Security disability benefits. Jurisdiction is
proper under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). For the reasons explained below, the Court reverses and
remands the Commissioner’s decision.
I. Standard of Review
This appeal is based upon the administrative record and briefs submitted by the parties.
In reviewing a final decision by the Commissioner, the role of the District Court is to examine
the record and determine whether it “contains substantial evidence to support the
[Commissioner’s] decision and whether the [Commissioner] applied the correct legal standards.”
Rickets v. Apfel, 16 F.Supp.2d 1280, 1287 (D. Colo. 1998). A decision cannot be based on
substantial evidence if it is “overwhelmed by other evidence in the record.” Bernal v. Bowen,
851 F.2d 297, 299 (10th Cir. 1988). Substantial evidence requires “more than a scintilla, but less
than a preponderance.” Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 2009). Evidence is not

substantial if it “constitutes mere conclusion.” Musgrave v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1371, 1374 (10th
Cir. 1992).
II. Background
Ms. Martinez, who was born on July 23, 1966, lives in Pueblo, Colorado. She has
previously worked as a nursing supervisor, health services administrator, general duty nurse,
nurse instructor, and home care provider, but she has not worked since her alleged onset date of
April 21, 2011. The claimant has a history of physical and mental health problems.
A. Procedural History
On May 25, 2011, Ms. Martinez filed an application for disability insurance benefits
under Title II of the Social Security Act, alleging disability beginning April 21, 2011. The claim
was initially denied on November 7, 2011. The claimant then filed a request for a hearing, which
was held on December 20, 2012, in front of Administrative Law Judge Debra Boudreau. The
ALJ issued a decision denying the claimant’s request for benefits on January 4, 2013. The
Commission denied her request for review on July 15, 2014, and Ms. Martinez filed a timely
appeal in this Court.
B. The ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ issued an unfavorable opinion after evaluating all of the evidence according to
the Social Security Administration’s standard five-step process. R. at 24-33. First, she found
that the claimant met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through June 30,
2012. R. at 26. Next, at step one, she found that Ms. Martinez had not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since her alleged onset date of April 21, 2011. R. at 26. At step two, the ALJ
found that the claimant had the following severe impairments: obesity, rheumatoid arthritis,
fibromyalgia, degenerative disc disease, trochanteric bursitis, obstructive sleep apnea, depressive

disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder. R. at 26. At step three, the ALJ concluded that Ms.
Martinez did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically
equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix
1. R. at 26–28. She then found that the claimant has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to
perform sedentary work except she can only occasionally lift 10 pounds; can stand and/or walk
up to two hours; can sit up to six hours; can frequently balance; can occasionally stoop, kneel,
crouch, and crawl; can frequently reach overhead bilaterally, with no other limits on reaching;
can handle and finger bilaterally on a frequent basis; and must avoid concentrated exposure to
temperature extremes, pulmonary irritants, hazardous machinery and heights. R. at 28–32.
Furthermore, the ALJ found that Ms. Martinez can understand and remember work tasks that
require up to three months to learn; interact appropriately with co-workers and supervisors; and
can tolerate routine work changes, travel, plan, set goals, and recognize and avoid work hazards.
R. at 28–32. Turning to step four, the ALJ found that Ms. Martinez was not capable of
performing any past relevant work. R. at 32. Finally, at step five, the ALJ found that there were
jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant could perform.
R. at 32–33. She thus concluded that Ms. Martinez had not been under a disability. R. at 33.
III. Discussion
The claimant contends that the ALJ made the following errors in her opinion denying
benefits: (1) the ALJ improperly adopted the opinion of the single decision maker (“SDM”)
under the guise of following Dr. Panek’s opinion; (2) the ALJ improperly assigned little weight
to the opinion of Dr. Hess, Ms. Martinez’s treating physician; and (3) the ALJ erred in giving
great weight to Dr. Suyeishi’s opinion and then failing to account for the limitations he
identified. The Court will address each in turn.

A. The SDM’s Opinion
Ms. Martinez argues that the ALJ improperly relied on the opinion of the SDM under the
guise of following Dr. Panek’s opinion. ECF No. 12 at 20. An opinion by an SDM is not a
medical opinion and is worthy of no weight in an ALJ's RFC assessment. Ogden v. Astrue, No.
10–cv–2450, 2012 WL 917287, at*4 (D.Colo. Mar. 19, 2012) (holding that “the opinion of an
SDM, who is not a medical professional of any stripe, is entitled to no weight”). However, the
ALJ may afford weight to a state agency physician’s opinion that adopts the SDM’s findings.
Holley v. Colvin, No. CIV.A.12-4057-JWL, 2014 WL172183, at *8 (D. Kan. Jan. 15, 2014).
Here, the functional limitations espoused by the ALJ can be traced back to the SDM’s
opinion. Compare R. 29 with R. 90. It appears that the ALJ followed the SDM’s RFC under the
belief that Dr. Panek had adopted the SDM’s findings as her own. R. 29. The ALJ attributed
great weight to Dr. Panek’s opinion and concluded the following:
The undersigned considered the analysis of Judy Panek, M.D., who reviewed the
findings of the single decision maker. (Exh 21F) Accordingly, Dr. Panek opined
that, due to the claimant’s rheumatoid arthritis, fibromyalgia, spine impairment,
trochanteric bursitis, osteoarthritis, obesity, pain and fatigue, the evidence
supported the Single Decision Maker’s residual functional capacity.
R. 30. However, Dr. Panek never stated that she agreed with the RFC assessed by the SDM. R.
876. Dr. Panek simply noted, “RFC completed by SDM on 11/7/11 for sedentary work with
frequent OH reaching, handling and fingering bilaterally.” R. 876.
The government argues that this case is analogous to Holley and Kern, where a state
agency physician reviewed and affirmed the SDM’s findings and then the ALJ relied on the state
agency physician’s opinion. ECF No. 13 at 11 (citing Holley, 2014 WL172183, at *8 and Kern
v. Astrue, No.CIV.A.11 1308 JWL, 2012 WL 4442622, at *7 (D. Kan. Sept. 26, 2012)). I
disagree. Holley and Kern are easily distinguishable. In both cases the state agency physician
stated that the SDM’s RFC assessment was “affirmed as written.” Holley, 2014 WL172183, at

*8; Kern, 2012 WL 4442622, at *6. Thus, the state agency physicians expressly and
unambiguously adopted the SDMs’ opinions as their own. Holley, 2014 WL172183, at *8; Kern,
2012 WL 4442622, at *6. However, Dr. Panek’s opinion does not clearly indicate her intent to
adopt the SDM’s opinion. Consequently, the SDM’s opinion should not have been afforded any
weight, and the ALJ erred in relying on the SDM’s opinion in formulating her RFC.
B. Dr. Hess’s Opinion
Ms. Martinez argues that the ALJ improperly assigned little weight to the opinion of Dr.
Hess, her treating physician. A treating physician’s opinion is generally entitled to deference and
often is afforded more weight than the opinions of non-examining physicians or an agency
physician. Robinson v. Barnhart, 366 F.3d 1078, 1084 (10th Cir. 2004). However, ALJs still
must assess what weight should be assigned to a treating physician’s opinion and may decline to
defer to such an opinion if a legally sufficient reason for doing so is provided. See id. (“[T]he
ALJ erred in rejecting the treating-physician opinion . . . in favor of the non-examining . . .
opinion . . . absent a legally sufficient explanation for doing so.”) (emphasis added); see also
Tarpley v. Colvin, 601 Fed. Appx. 641, 643-44 (10th Cir. 2015) (holding that the ALJ did not err
by declining to afford significant weight to a treating physician’s opinion, given that the ALJ
provided an adequate explanation of his decision that was consistent with the relevant legal
factors considered in such an analysis). In analyzing a treating physician's opinion, the ALJ must
first determine whether it should be afforded controlling weight. Krauser v. Astrue, 638 F.3d
1324, 1330 (10th Cir. 2011). A treating physician's opinion “must be given controlling weight if
it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques and is
not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record. If the opinion is deficient in either
of these respects, it is not to be given controlling weight.” Id.

If the ALJ finds that an opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, he must go on to
determine what weight to assign it. Id. At this second step of the analysis, the ALJ must “make
clear how much weight the opinion is being given . . . and give good reasons . . . for the weight
assigned.” Id. The factors relevant to this determination include: (1) the length of the treatment
relationship and the frequency of examination; (2) the nature and extent of the treatment
relationship; (3) the degree to which the opinion is supported by relevant evidence; (4)
consistency between the opinion and the record as a whole; (5) whether or not the physician is a
specialist in the relevant area; and (6) other factors brought to the ALJ's attention that tend to
support or contradict the opinion. Id. at 1131. However, an ALJ need not “apply expressly each
of the six relevant factors in deciding what weight to give a medical opinion.” Oldham v. Astrue,
509 F.3d 1254, 1258 (10th Cir. 2007). Rather, the ALJ must “provide[ ] good reasons in his
decision for the weight he gave to the treating sources’ opinion” and, if the ALJ rejects that
opinion completely, “he must give specific, legitimate reasons for doing so.” Id.; see also
Watkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1301 (10th Cir. 2003).
In the present case, the ALJ did not separately address each step of the two-step analysis
described above, but rather collapsed the analysis into a single finding that Dr. Hess's opinion
was entitled to “very little weight.” 1 See R. at 31. The ALJ's opinion cites a number of reasons
1

Ms. Martinez argues that under Tenth Circuit law, affording an opinion little weight is essentially the
same as rejecting it. ECF No. 12 at 26 (citing Chapo v. Astrue, 682 F.3d 1285, 1291 (10th Cir. 2012)).
Furthermore, she asserts that an opinion can be denied controlling weight for being inconsistent with
other substantial evidence in the record at step one, but it cannot be rejected for this reason at step two.
ECF No. 14 at 13 (citing Social Security Ruling 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *1). Ms. Martinez
misunderstands the law. Social Security Ruling 96-2p states that a finding that a treating source’s
medical opinion is not entitled to controlling weight at step one (which may be based on its inconsistency
with the record) does not necessarily mean the opinion is rejected at step two. Nowhere does it state that
an ALJ cannot consider whether the opinion is inconsistent with other substantial evidence at step two. In
fact, “the degree to which the physician's opinion is supported by relevant evidence” is one of the six
factors the ALJ is supposed to consider at the second step. Robinson v. Barnhart, 366 F.3d 1078, 1082
(10th Cir. 2004).

for assigning the opinion such weight: the opinion’s internal inconsistencies, the fact that it is
inconsistent with other evidence on the record, and the gross overstatement of the onset of the
purported limitations. R. 31. The claimant contends that (1) collapsing the analysis into a single
step is improper; (2) the ALJ did not adequately explain her stated reasons for giving the opinion
very little weight; and (3) the ALJ erred by affording more weight to Dr. Panek’s opinion than
Dr. Hess’s. As explained below, the Court is not persuaded these arguments.
Considering Ms. Martinez’s first argument, the Tenth Circuit has held that when an ALJ's
analysis of what weight to afford a treating physician's opinion makes clear that the ALJ
implicitly declined to give the opinion controlling weight, the decision should not be reversed for
failing to separately address each step. Mays v. Colvin, 739 F.3d 569, 575 (10th Cir. 2014)
(refusing to reverse the ALJ’s opinion due to the ALJ’s failure to expressly state whether he had
given the treating physician’s opinion controlling weight because “the ALJ implicitly declined to
give” the opinion controlling weight); see also Tarpley v. Colvin, 601 Fed. Appx. at 643 (“[A]ny
imaginable oversight on this score is clearly harmless because the ALJ's ruling unambiguously
demonstrates that he declined to give the opinions controlling weight.”). Here, the ALJ found
that Dr. Hess's opinion was inconsistent with other evidence in the record, R. at 31, which
constitutes a sufficient reason for not giving the opinion controlling weight. See Krauser, 638
F.3d at 1330. This, along with the ALJ’s decision to afford Dr. Hess’s opinion “very little
weight,” indicates that the ALJ implicitly declined to give the opinion controlling weight.
Therefore, the Court will not remand the ALJ’s decision on the basis that the ALJ failed to
separately address each step in this analysis.
Considering Ms. Martinez’s second argument, the Court finds that the ALJ adequately
explained her reasons for giving Dr. Hess’s opinion very little weight. Rather than

impermissibly making “conclusions in the guise of findings,” the ALJ adequately linked her
findings to “evidence in the record.” See Hardman v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 676, 679 (10th Cir.
2014) (holding that the ALJ erred by citing “boilerplate language” that merely listed the factors
the ALJ considered and was repeatedly used “to reject the testimony of numerous claimants”
instead of discussing specific evidence in the record supporting the ALJ’s conclusions). First,
the ALJ noted that Dr. Hess’s opinion was internally inconsistent. R. 31. She explained that Dr.
Hess first indicated that Ms. Martinez can initiate, sustain, and complete fine/gross movements
effectively, but subsequently opined that she is “essentially precluded” from grasping, turning, or
twisting objects and using her fingers or hands for fine manipulations. R. 2028. Second, the
ALJ stated that Dr. Hess’s opinion was not supported by the treatment record. R. 31. In her
analysis of the objective diagnostic evidence, the ALJ determined that the radiographs of Ms.
Martinez’s hips, cervical, and spine, as well as examinations of her hip, back, neck, and joint
pain only indicated mild to moderate findings. R. 29. The ALJ found the “mild to moderate
objective findings” to be inconsistent with the “marked limitations” identified in Dr. Hess’s
opinion. R. 31. Finally, the ALJ stated that Dr. Hess’s opinion was not supported by Ms.
Martinez’s work history. R. 31. She noted, “Dr. Hess opined that these marked limitations have
existed since the year 2006, even though [Ms. Martinez] was able to work as a nurse until the
year 2011, and was performing these functions.” 2 R. 31.
Considering Ms. Martinez’s third argument, it is not necessarily improper for the ALJ to
afford more weight to the opinion of the non-examining physician, Dr. Panek, than the opinion
of the treating physician, Dr. Hess. See e.g., Tarpley, 601 Fed. Appx. At 643-44 (affirming the

2

Ms. Martinez’s contention that this finding required the ALJ to further develop the record is incorrect.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b (noting that if the evidence is inconsistent, an ALJ “may” recontact the
physician for further explanation); Borgsmiller v. Astrue, 499 F. App'x 812, 816 (10th Cir. 2012) (noting
that the ALJ’s “duty” to recontact a medical source became discretionary effective March 26, 2012).

ALJ’s decision to afford significant weight to the nonexamining agency physician’s opinion
while affording no weight to the treating physicians’ opinions). The question of what weight to
afford a treating physician’s opinion is separate from the question of what weight to afford a
non-examining physician’s opinion. See 20 C.F.R. 416.927(c) and (e) (describing how the
Commissioner will “evaluate every medical opinion [she] receive[s],” the factors used in this
evaluation, and the process for evaluating treating source opinions and the separate, albeit
similar, process for evaluating “[o]pinions of nonexamining source”). As discussed above, while
a treating physician’s opinion is generally entitled to deference, the ALJ properly explained why
she gave Dr. Hess’s opinion “very little weight.” Regarding Dr. Panek’s opinion, since the Court
found that Dr. Panek did not expressly endorse the SDM’s opinion, the SDM’s opinion will
consequently not be afforded any weight on remand. Therefore, the ALJ must assess what
weight to give Dr. Panek’s Case Analysis as a stand-alone medical opinion separate from the
SDM’s conclusions. Considering that Dr. Panek’s Case Analysis is essentially a summarized
recitation of the other treating and nontreating medical professionals’ opinions, this may very
well lead the ALJ to afford Dr. Panek’s Case Analysis less weight than she did when she
considered Dr. Panek’s opinion to be an endorsement of the SDM’s opinion. However, this
assessment is distinct from the question of what weight to assign Dr. Hess’s opinion, and the
Court declines to adopt the categorical rule that an ALJ cannot afford greater weight to a
nonexamining physician’s opinion.
Considering this, the ALJ did not err by combining the analysis of whether to give Dr.
Hess’s opinion controlling weight with the analysis of what weight to ultimately give Dr. Hess’s
opinion. The ALJ also adequately explained why Dr. Hess’s opinion was given very little
weight. Lastly, while the ALJ will have to reconsider what weight to afford Dr. Panek’s opinion

on remand in light of my holding that Dr. Panek did not endorse the SDM’s opinion, the ALJ is
not necessarily foreclosed from affording greater weight to a nonexamining physician’s opinion
than Dr. Hess’s opinion.
C. Dr. Suyeishi’s Opinion
Ms. Martinez next argues that the ALJ did not properly evaluate the opinion of Dr. Mark
Suyeishi. ECF No. 12 at 32. In November 2011, Dr. Suyeishi completed a Mental Residual
Functional Capacity Assessment (“MRFCA”) for Ms. Martinez. R. 87-89. In Section I of the
MRFCA, Dr. Suyeishi indicated that Ms. Martinez has moderate limitations in her ability to (1)
carry out detailed instructions; (2) maintain attention and concentration for extended periods; (3)
interact appropriately with the general public; and (4) accept instructions and respond
appropriately to criticism from supervisors. R. 88. In Section III of the MRFCA, Dr. Suyeishi
concluded that Ms. Martinez “retains mental ability to do work not involving significant
complexity or judgment; can do work requiring up to 3 months time to learn techniques, acquire
information and develop facility needed for an average job performance.” R. 89.
Ms. Martinez claims that the ALJ’s RFC finding accounted for the first three limitations
in Section I of the MRFCA, but that it did not account for the fourth Section I limitation in Ms.
Martinez’s ability to accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors.
ECF No. 12 at 32. Therefore, Ms. Martinez argues that having given Dr. Suyeishi’s opinion
great weight, the ALJ was required to explain why she did not adopt his fourth Section I finding.
ECF No. 12 at 32. The government asserts that the ALJ was entitled to rely solely on Dr.
Suyeishi’s Section III narrative, which constituted Dr. Suyeishi’s ultimate opinion about Ms.
Martinez’s mental health. ECF No. 13 at 18-19. The Court agrees with Ms. Martinez.

Section I of an MRFCA “is for recording summary conclusions,” while “Section III is for
recording a detailed explanation of the degree of the limitation for each Section I category.”
Fulton v. Colvin, No. 15-6054, 2015 WL 6847808, at *3 (10th Cir. Nov. 9, 2015) (internal
quotations omitted). The Tenth Circuit has held that “[w]here a psychologist's Section III
narrative does not contradict any Section I limitations and describes the effect each Section I
limitation would have on the claimant's mental RFC, the ALJ may properly look to only the
Section III narrative as the psychologist's opinion regarding mental RFC.” Id. (citing Carver v.
Colvin, 600 F. App'x 616, 618–19 (10th Cir.2015) (unpublished) 3). However, that does not
mean that the ALJ can turn a blind eye to Section I limitations. Carver, 600 F. App'x at 618–19.
“[I]f a consultant's Section III narrative fails to describe the effect that each of the Section I
moderate limitations would have on the claimant's ability . . . the MRFCA cannot properly be
considered part of the substantial evidence supporting an ALJ's RFC finding.” Id. (holding that
the ALJ did not err in failing to the Section I limitations, given that there was no “contradiction
between Sections I and III” of the MRFCA and no “failure to describe in Section III the effects
of any Section I limitations.”); see also Baysinger v. Astrue, No. 11-CV-00333-WYD, 2012 WL
1044746, at *6 (D. Colo. Mar. 28, 2012) (“[A]s to the argument that the ALJ is not required to
consider the impairments found in Section I per the POMS, I find that portion of the POMS is
contrary to Tenth Circuit law at least in the situation where . . . the findings in Section III of the
form do not adequately take into account those impairments.”).
In the present case, Dr. Suyeishi acknowledged in Section I that Ms. Martinez has two
“sustained concentration and persistence limitations” and two “social interaction limitations.” R.
88. Specifically, the sustained concentration and persistence limitations are moderate limitations
in her ability to (1) carry out detailed instructions; and (2) maintain concentration for extended
3

Although unpublished, the Court finds Carver persuasive. 600 F. App’x 616.

periods of time. R. 88. The social interaction limitations include moderate limitations in her
ability to (1) interact appropriately with the general public; and (2) accept instructions and
respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors. R. 88. Dr. Suyeishi’s Section III narrative
stated that Ms. Martinez “retains mental ability to do work not involving significant complexity
or judgment; can do work requiring up to 3 months time to learn techniques, acquire information
and develop facility needed for an average job performance.” R. 89. Thus, the Section III
narrative encapsulated the effect that the concentration and persistence limitations would have on
Ms. Martinez’s ability. However, the narrative failed to describe the effect that her social
interaction limitations would have on her ability. Therefore, “the MRFCA cannot properly be
considered part of the substantial evidence supporting [the] ALJ's RFC finding.” Carver, 600 F.
App'x at 618–19.
For the purposes of her step three analysis, the ALJ afforded Dr. Suyeishi’s opinion great
weight. R. 31. In her discussion of the record, the ALJ reiterated Dr. Suyeishi’s Section III
conclusions. R. 31. She also added, “[a]lthough she is moderately limited in her ability to
interact with the public and accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from
supervisors, she is not significantly limited in her ability to get along with co-workers or
maintain socially appropriate behavior.” R. 31. Notably, the ALJ looked beyond Dr. Suyeishi’s
Section III narrative by noting the social interaction limitations he listed in Section I. R. 31. The
ALJ’s RFC determination, however, only adopted Dr. Suyeishi’s Section III narrative and his
Section I finding that Ms. Martinez is moderately limited in her ability to interact with the public.
R. 28.
It is unclear why the ALJ acknowledged that Ms. Martinez is “moderately limited in her
ability to accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors” but then

subsequently concluded for the RFC that Ms. Martinez “can interact appropriately with coworkers and supervisors.” R. 28, 31. “[A] moderate impairment is not the same as no
impairment at all.” Haga v. Astrue, 482 F.3d 1205, 1208 (10th Cir. 2007). The ALJ was not
required to adopt Dr. Suyeishi’s finding of a moderate limitation regarding Ms. Martinez’s
ability to interact appropriately with supervisors; however, she was required to explain why her
RFC finding adopted only some but not all of Dr. Suyeishi’s limitations. Baysinger v. Astrue,
No. 11-CV-00333-WYD, 2012 WL 1044746, at *4 (D. Colo. Mar. 28, 2012) (“Thus, the ALJ
must explain any difference between the ALJ's RFC finding and the physician's opinion,
including why his RFC finding adopted only some but not all of the physician's restrictions.”).
Accordingly, the ALJ’s RFC was contrary to established Tenth Circuit law because the
ALJ rejected one of the moderate limitations in Dr. Suyeishi’s MRFCA without explanation
while adopting the others. Haga v. Astrue, 482 F.3d at 1208. Furthermore, the ALJ’s RFC was
not supported by substantial evidence as Section III of Dr. Suyeishi’s MRFCA did not
encapsulate the moderate limitations he identified in Section I. Carver, 600 F. App'x at 618–19;
see also Baysinger, 2012 WL 1044746, at *7. Thus, this case must be remanded for a proper
assessment of Ms. Martinez’s RFC. Once the Commissioner has properly assessed Ms.
Martinez’s RFC, the Commissioner can pose accurate hypothetical questions to the Vocational
Expert at steps four and five.
IV. Conclusion
In sum, the ALJ did not err in her analysis of what weight to give Dr. Hess’s opinion, and
adequately explained why Dr. Hess’s opinion was given very little weight. However, the ALJ
did err in relying on the SDM’s opinion in formulating her RFC. The ALJ’s RFC also
improperly rejected one of the moderate limitations in Dr. Suyeishi’s MRFCA without

explanation and was not supported by substantial evidence, given that Section III of Dr.
Suyeishi’s MRFCA did not incorporate the moderate limitations he identified in Section I.
However, it is not clear that correction of these errors will necessarily change the ALJ’s
conclusion that benefits should be denied, and thus the Court declines to award benefits at this
time. See Salazar v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 615, 626 (10th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the decision of
the Commissioner is REVERSED and REMANDED for further findings.
DATED this 11th day of February, 2016.
BY THE COURT:

___________________________________
R. Brooke Jackson
United States District Judge