Aldrich et al v. DIRECTV, Inc. et al

Filing 33

ORDER denying 15 Motion to Dismiss; and denying as moot 24 Motion for Permission to Seek Leave to Amend Should Court Grant Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, by Magistrate Judge Michael J. Watanabe on 05/20/15.(nmarb, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 14-cv-02854-MJW
ERIC ALDRICH,
JIMMY CARPENTER,
MIKE ANTRAM,
MARVIN MARTINEZ, and
CLIFF SCHMIDT,
Plaintiff,
v.
DIRECTV, INC. and
DIRECTV, LLC,
Defendant.

ORDER ON
MOTION TO DISMISS (Docket No. 15)
and
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO SEEK LEAVE TO AMEND SHOULD
COURT GRANT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS (Docket No. 24)

MICHAEL J. WATANABE
United States Magistrate Judge

This case was referred to the undersigned by Chief Judge Marcia S. Krieger on
December 29, 2014, for all purposes upon consent of the parties pursuant to the Court’s
Pilot Program and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Docket No. 14).
In this action, five individual plaintiffs bring claims against DIRECTV, Inc., and
DIRECTV, LLC, under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et
seq., the Colorado Minimum Wage of Workers Act (“CMWWA”) and applicable
Colorado Minimum Wage Orders, § 8-6-101, et seq., C.R.S., 7 Colo. Code Regs. §

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1103-1, et seq., and the Colorado Wage Claim Act (“CWCA”), § 8-4-101, et seq., C.R.S.

Defendants1 now move to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) “for failing to meet the pleading requirements set forth in Rule 8(a)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Twombly, and Iqbal.” (Docket No. 15 at 3). Plaintiffs
filed a Brief in Opposition (Docket No. 23) as well as a Motion for Permission to Seek
Leave to Amend Should Court Grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 24).
Defendants filed a Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 25) and
Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion (Docket No. 26). Finally, plaintiffs filed a Reply in
Support of their motion (Docket No. 29). The court has carefully considered all of these
motion papers as well as applicable Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and case law. In
addition, the court has taken judicial notice of the court file, including the Complaint.
The court now being fully informed makes the following findings, conclusions of law, and
Order.
Under Rule 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A motion to
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) alleges that the complaint fails “to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “The Court’s function on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion . . . is not to weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at

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Defendants note in their motion to dismiss (Docket No. 15 at 1, n.1) that
effective January 1, 2012, DIRECTV, Inc., merged into DIRECTV, LLC, and out of
existence. Therefore, they assert that although plaintiff have named two defendants,
only one, DIRECTV, LLC, currently exists. This court, however, will refer to
“defendants” throughout this Order inasmuch as the Complaint has not been amended
to reflect the existence of only one defendant.

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trial, but to assess whether the plaintiff’s complaint alone is sufficient to plausibly state a
claim.” Spring Creek Exploration & Prod. Co., LLC v. Hess Bakken Investment II, LLC,
2014 WL 4400764, at *2 (D. Colo. Sept. 5, 2014). “A complaint must be dismissed
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) if it does not plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Cutter v. RailAmerica, Inc., 2008 WL 163016, at *2
(D. Colo. Jan. 15, 2008) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127
S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007)). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to provide
the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and
a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do . . . .” Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.” Id. “[A] plaintiff must ‘nudge [] [his] claims across
the line from conceivable to plausible’ in order to survive a motion to dismiss. . . . Thus,
the mere metaphysical possibility that some plaintiff could prove some set of facts in
support of the pleaded claims is insufficient; the complaint must give the court reason to
believe that this plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for
these claims.” Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir.
2007) (quoting Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1974).
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has held “that plausibility refers ‘to the scope
of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide
swath of conduct, much of it innocent, then the plaintiffs ‘have not nudged their claims
across the line from conceivable to plausible.’” Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d
1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2012). The Circuit court has further “noted that ‘[t]he nature and

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specificity of the allegations required to state a plausible claim will vary based on
context.’” Id. The court thus “concluded the Twombly/Iqbal standard is ‘a wide middle
ground between heightened fact pleading, which is expressly rejected, and allowing
complaints that are no more than labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action, which the Court stated will not do.’” Id.
For purposes of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court must
accept all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint as true and resolve all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Morse v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo.,
154 F.3d 1124, 1126-27 (10th Cir. 1998); Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1231-32
(10th Cir. 1996). However, “when legal conclusions are involved in the complaint ‘the
tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to [those] conclusions’ . . . .” Khalik, 671 F.3d at 1190 (quoting Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). “Accordingly, in examining a complaint under Rule
12(b)(6), [the court] will disregard conclusory statements and look only to whether the
remaining, factual allegations plausibly suggest the defendant is liable.” Id. at 1191.
Here, the court has very carefully reviewed the Complaint and the defendants’
allegations in their motion concerning the alleged pleading deficiencies. The court finds,
however, that the Complaint adequately pleads enough facts to state plaintiffs’ claims
for relief that are plausible on its face and complies with Rule 8(a)(2).
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 15) is denied. It is further
ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Permission to Seek Leave to Amend

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Should Court Grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 24) is denied as
moot.
Dated: May 20, 2015
Denver, Colorado

s/ Michael J. Watanabe
Michael J. Watanabe
United States Magistrate Judge