Harden v. Colvin

Filing 20

ORDER by Magistrate Judge Michael E. Hegarty on 01/29/2016. The Court concludes that the ALJs opinion was based on substantial evidence, thus, the decision that Plaintiff Tammy Sharlene Harden was not disabled is affirmed. (mdave, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 14-cv-03225-MEH
TAMMY SHARLENE HARDEN,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration,
Defendant.

ORDER
______________________________________________________________________________
Michael E. Hegarty, United States Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Tammy Harden appeals from the Social Security Administration (“SSA”)
Commissioner’s final decision denying her application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”),
filed pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433. Jurisdiction is proper
under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The parties have not requested oral argument, and the Court finds it
would not materially assist the Court in its determination of this appeal. After consideration of the
parties’ briefs and the administrative record, the Court affirms the ALJ’s decision and the
Commissioner’s final order.
BACKGROUND
I.

Procedural History
Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision denying her application for

DIB benefits filed on January 9, 2012, claiming arthritis, wrist issues, back problems, and bad knees

and hips, with an alleged onset date of March 1, 2011. [AR 12, 148-49, 188] Because Plaintiff
applied for DIB only, she had to establish that her disability began before her September 20, 2012,
date last insured. [AR 15] After the application was initially denied on July 6, 2012 [AR 78], an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing on July 18, 2013, upon the Plaintiff’s request [AR
30-64]. On August 12, 2013, the ALJ issued a written, unfavorable decision, finding Plaintiff had
not been disabled from the alleged date of the onset of disability through the date she was last
insured because considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience and residual functional
capacity [“RFC”], there were jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy that
Plaintiff could perform. [AR 9-29] On September 23, 2014, the SSA Appeals Council subsequently
denied Plaintiff’s administrative request for review of the ALJ’s determination, making the SSA
Commissioner’s denial final for the purpose of judicial review. [AR 1-6, 7-8] See 20 C.F.R. §
404.981. Plaintiff timely filed her Complaint with this Court seeking review of the Commissioner’s
final decision. [Docket #1]
II.

Plaintiff’s Alleged Conditions
Plaintiff was born on September 5, 1969, and was 42 years old on the alleged onset date.

[AR 25] The ALJ found that Plaintiff had an associate’s degree in applied arts and science as a legal
assistant, and past relevant experience as an administrative clerk, accounting clerk, and file clerk.
[AR 34, 61] Plaintiff, a former administrator in the Air Force and Navy, has a long record of
medical records mostly from the Department of Veterans Administrative (“VA”) providers and
involving both physical and mental issues. [AR 1298] However, as Plaintiff’s issues on appeal do
not question the ALJ’s handling of the mental RFC but merely the physical, the Court will focus
2

only on the physical. See Keyes-Zachary v. Astrue, 695 F.3d 1156, 1161 (10th Cir. 2012) (“We will
consider and discuss only those of [plaintiff’s] contentions that have been adequately briefed for our
review.”)
A.

Knee and Hip Issues

Plaintiff had long experienced knee pain and osteoarthritis of the hip. [AR 360, 563] A
November 22, 2011 MRI showed the left knee had marrow conversion but no internal derangement.
[AR 828] She received periodic lidocaine injections in her knees in late 2011. [AR 933] In
September 2012, additional MRIs of her knees showed minor abnormalities. [AR 1154-55]. In
January 2013, she reported daily, deep pain in her knees and hips, which worsened with activity.
[AR 1308]
B.

Upper Extremity Issues

The record first indicates Plaintiff experienced pain in her left wrist at an appointment on
May 22, 2009, although she at that time reported to the doctor that the pain was “chronic.” [AR 803,
491] She periodically complained of pain in her left wrist at subsequent visits and on August 2,
2010, went to the ER for wrist and hand pain. [AR 528] September 7, 2010 x-rays showed minimal
joint degenerative changes. [AR 486] A visit on September 27, 2010 notes her pain had increased,
her first and second digits were tingling, and she was struggling with household chores. [AR 474]
However, the same notes show a 5/5 in grip strength despite tingling. [Id.] After seeing a
chiropractor, Plaintiff told her provider on October 7, 2010, that her hand pain had improved
“tremendously.” [AR 469] Pain returned, however, by December [AR 413], and in January 2011,
she received a left wrist splint [AR 387]. An April 11, 2011 MRI showed a large geode (cyst) of
3

the lunate bone, a small perforation in her joint, a cyst in the soft tissues of part of the wrist, and a
small volume of fluid present. [AR 233] On July 6, 2011, Plaintiff reported increased hand pain
after a fall. [AR 1082] An August 18, 2011 occupational therapy consult included that Plaintiff had
difficulty gripping or lifting objects with her left hand and had 8/10 pain at rest and 10/10 pain with
activity. [AR 1-54] Yet, shortly after that appointment, she again had full grip strength at 5/5 [AR
909], although her wrist pain led her to have surgery on December 19, 2012, after the date of her last
insured. [AR 1327, 1555] In April 2013, she fell on her wrist and injured it again. [AR 1224]
C.

Spine Issues

Plaintiff reported her spine problems began in June 2008 when she was in an automobile
accident. [AR 562] In 2010, she visited a non-VA doctor and received a sciatic nerve block, which
she reported temporarily alleviated her pain. [AR 297, 562] Since the accident, Plaintiff reported
intermittent pain, occurring most days, and said she had experienced two flares in a year’s span
lasting for two days each. [AR 563] Other visits to doctors included complaints of back pain. [AR
464, 434, 404] An April 11, 2011 MRI of her lumbar spine showed basically normal results with
the exception of a high signal lesion that the doctor wanted to investigate further. [AR 232]
Plaintiff periodically reported ongoing back pain to her doctors in 2010-2013. [AR 464, 434, 369,
328] At a February 14, 2011 appointment, she reported her back pain was not constant, but brought
on or exacerbated by daily activities such as stooping, bending or lifting. [AR 373]
In May 2011, Plaintiff consulted with a neurosurgeon regarding her lower pack pain. [AR
1104] The doctor reviewed the April 2011 MRI and found Plaintiff’s sciatica could be the result of
compression of the sciatic nerve outside the spine, but he found surgical intervention was not
4

indicated. [AR 1005] Another MRI, this time on August 8, 2011, showed disc desiccation at L5-S1
compatible with degenerative changes. [AR 1018] By March 7, 2012, she presented with chronic
back pain that worsened with lifting. [AR 1548] The doctor noted that they discussed the chronic
nature of the back pain and that there would be no way to eliminate it completely. [Id.]
D.

Other Impairments

Plaintiff began complaining of left foot pain in 2010, the result of bunions she had been
experiencing for some time. [AR 241, 452] On March 22, 2011, she was assessed with a bunion
deformity and mild hammertoe, resolvable only via surgery. [AR 351] She underwent surgery in
August 2011. [AR 1034-36] By January 2012, she was walking and reported only mild foot pain
when walking or driving. [AR 890] Pain in her knees led to a diagnosis of muscle weakness, but
x-rays were normal. [AR 243] She received injections in her knee to help with the pain. [AR 946]
The record also shows her having issues with neck pain. [AR 276, 271, 360] These complaints led
a doctor at the orthopedic clinic to note that Plaintiff may have issues with fibromyalgia. [AR 1247]
Plaintiff also went to the emergency department to receive medication for migraine headaches. [AR
1353] Additionally, Plaintiff thought she had experienced asthma attacks, but a doctor noted they
were more likely panic attacks. [AR 361]
III.

Medical Opinion Evidence
The record does not contain functional capacity evaluations made at the request of Disability

Determination Services. However, just before Plaintiff claimed she became disabled, she underwent
a number of evaluations, most of them compensation and pension (“C&P”) examinations performed
by the VA to determine the level of her service-related disability. While her service-related
5

disabilities are not at issue in this appeal, the examiners commented on other complaints of pain,
such as Plaintiff’s wrist and back pain, thus these evaluations were considered by the ALJ. [AR 2226]
In February 2010, staff physician Dr. Richard Oh evaluated Plaintiff. [AR 377-85] Plaintiff
reported disability from mood disorder, anxiety, and pain in her knees and hips. [AR 378] Dr. Oh
opined Plaintiff “would not be limited in any primarily sedentary job and would be able to stand up
to two hours and to walk around an office as needed to perform a job as an office assistant as she
has been able to do that job without special accommodations.” [AR 382] In January 2011, just prior
to alleged her onset of disability, Plaintiff underwent another C&P examination, this time by Dr.
Caryl Murchinson, who noted Plaintiff could perform sedentary work, stand two hours per day, and
walk around the office as needed. [AR 382-86] Later, in April 2012, another C&P examiner, Dr.
Teresita Marcelo, said Plaintiff’s knee and lower-leg conditions impacted her ability to work in that
she could sit for 30 minutes to an hour, stand for 30-to-45 minutes, walk for not more than two
blocks at a time, lift 30 pounds, and that Plaintiff must change positions. [AR 1506-08, 1510-1521]
She also found Plaintiff independently handled activities of daily living, such as “dressing,
undressing, bathing, writing, eating, [and] driving.” [AR 1508] Dr. Marcelo additionally noted that
Plaintiff’s foot condition did not impact her ability to work. [AR 1437]
In January 2013, after Plaintiff’s last date insured, a nurse practitioner at the VA, Debra
McMurdo, noted Plaintiff “should not be lifting or bending (nothing heavier than a carton of milk)
at this time.” [AR 1313] McMurdo’s report indicated Plaintiff had recently had left-wrist surgery,
so Plaintiff should not be lifting with that hand, but she would be evaluated further as the wrist
6

healed. [Id.] Finally, in February 2013, Dr. Karen Ksiazek performed another C&P, finding
Plaintiff’s hip and knee issues did not limit her ability to work and noting her agreement with Dr.
Murchinson’s previous conclusions. [AR 1268-80]
IV.

Hearing Testimony
The ALJ held a hearing on July 18, 2013. [AR 30-64] Plaintiff noted she has joint custody

of her nine-year-old son, who lives with her half the time, and full custody of her four-year-old
granddaughter. [AR 35] She also has two adult children. [Id.] She served as an administrator in
the Air Force and Navy for four years until 2002, when she received a hardship discharge because
of her divorce. [AR 37, 1298] Plaintiff testified she receives disability benefits from the VA in the
amount of $1,089.00 a month, a 60-percent service-related disability for her mental health and knees
and hips. [AR 35-37] She does not drive because she does not have a car so instead takes the bus.
[AR 36] Plaintiff told the ALJ her “main issues” were depression and Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder (“PTSD”) caused she thinks by being in a car accident five years prior. She also said she
had pain in her back, knee, and neck that limits her, but that she “can move.” [AR 46-48].
When the ALJ asked her if she could perform a job in which she had to sit most of the day
40 hours per week, Plaintiff testified she could not do so:
. . . mainly because of my depression and anxiety. It’s hard for me to work full time
and juggle everything and work responsibilities. Like getting the kids [to] daycare,
to school, and getting there, and driving there, or riding the bus. It’s both physical
and mental, but moreso the extra stress working full-time and juggling everything.
[AR 57-58] However, she said she could clean her apartment, wash clothes, cook simple meals, go
grocery shopping, and care for her granddaughter, although her approach is to do things “a little at

7

a time.” [AR 43, 52-54] She told the ALJ she has the ability to walk two blocks to the bus stop,
stand for 15-to-30 minutes, and sit 30 minutes to one hour. [AR 48-49]. She noted she takes
medications for pain, and when the medications are working, her pain is generally at a five-to-six
out of 10. [AR 51] However, she said sometimes the pain is “at least a ten” everywhere – in her
back, knees, and hips – four-to-six days a week “depending on what’s going on.” [Id.] For pleasure,
Plaintiff said she reads on her iPad, watches television with her granddaughter, and spends time on
Facebook. [AR 55-56] She also serves as a volunteer for the American Legion. [AR 60]
Plaintiff’s attorney then examined her. [AR 58-60] In response to the attorney’s questions,
Plaintiff said she had four-to-six bad days each week, although it was not clear whether she thought
this was because of psychological issues or pain. [AR 59] She said she struggled to sit for an entire
day, using the example that she had attended an American Legion convention where she sat
frequently on a Friday and Saturday; by Sunday, it was difficult for her to get up and down. [AR
60]

A vocational expert [“VE”] testified at the hearing that Plaintiff’s past relevant work

included administrative clerk, accounting clerk, and file clerk – all with light exertional levels. [AR
61] The ALJ then gave the VE the following scenario:
What I would like to do is stick with sedentary work, but look at unskilled, very
simple, repetitive kinds of jobs where you’re doing pretty much the same thing every
day and the job itself doesn’t change. I would like you to look at jobs that have very
little decision making required, and then physically no climbing or balancing. I
would say no crouching, crawling, or kneeling either, and occasional bending. And
let’s see, and then I would say limited contact with the public and her coworkers.
[AR 61] Based on that scenario, the VE concluded that a person with Plaintiff’s RFC could perform
occupations that included an addressor (25,000 jobs nationally, 200 in Colorado), a final assembler

8

(14,000 jobs nationally, 100 in Colorado), and a lens inserter (8,000 jobs nationally, 80 in Colorado).
[AR 61-62]
Plaintiff’s lawyer submitted additional medical evidence to the ALJ after the hearing, which
the ALJ considered. [AR 12] The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on August 12, 2013. [AR
09-29]
LEGAL STANDARDS
I.

SSA’s Five-Step Process for Determining Disability
Here, the Court will review the ALJ’s application of the five-step sequential evaluation

process used to determine whether an adult claimant is “disabled” under Title II of the Social
Security Act, which is generally defined as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity
by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than
12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B); see also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987).
Step One determines whether the claimant is presently engaged in substantial gainful
activity. If he is, disability benefits are denied. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520. Step Two is a
determination of whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment or combination of
impairments as governed by 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c). If the claimant is unable to show that her
impairment(s) would have more than a minimal effect on her ability to do basic work activities, she
is not eligible for disability benefits. See id. Step Three determines whether the impairment is
equivalent to one of a number of listed impairments deemed to be so severe as to preclude
substantial gainful employment. See id. If the impairment is not listed, she is not presumed to be
9

conclusively disabled. Step Four then requires the claimant to show that her impairment(s) and
assessed RFC prevent her from performing work that she has performed in the past. If the claimant
is able to perform her previous work, the claimant is not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e),
(f). Finally, if the claimant establishes a prima facie case of disability based on the four steps as
discussed, the analysis proceeds to Step Five where the SSA Commissioner has the burden to
demonstrate that the claimant has the RFC to perform other work in the national economy in view
of her age, education and work experience. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g).
II.

Standard of Review
This Court’s review is limited to whether the final decision is supported by substantial

evidence in the record as a whole and whether the correct legal standards were applied. See
Williamson v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1097, 1098 (10th Cir. 2003); see also White v. Barnhart, 287 F.3d
903, 905 (10th Cir. 2001). Thus, the function of the Court’s review is “to determine whether the
findings of fact ... are based upon substantial evidence and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom.
If they are so supported, they are conclusive upon the reviewing court and may not be disturbed.”
Trujillo v. Richardson, 429 F.2d 1149, 1150 (10th Cir. 1970); see also Bradley v. Califano, 573 F.2d
28, 31 (10th Cir. 1978).

“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a

preponderance; it is such evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support the conclusion.”
Campbell v. Bowen, 822 F.2d 1518, 1521 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.
389, 401 (1971)). The Court may not re-weigh the evidence nor substitute its judgment for that of
the ALJ. Bowman v. Astrue, 511 F.3d 1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Casias v. Sec’y of Health
& Human Servs., 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir. 1991)). However, reversal may be appropriate when
10

the ALJ either applies an incorrect legal standard or fails to demonstrate reliance on the correct legal
standards. See Winfrey v. Chater, 92 F.3d 1017, 1019 (10th Cir. 1996).
ALJ’s RULING
At Step One, the ALJ found Plaintiff engaged in substantial gainful activity between May
20, 2011, and August 4, 2011, after her alleged onset date of March 1, 2011. [AR 16] However, the
ALJ noted Plaintiff left her last job because she was fired, but it was unclear for what reason and
indicated it may have been because she was leaving to have an elective foot surgery. [Id.] Plaintiff
also indicated to a psychologist that she thought she was doing a satisfactory job at work, which also
persuaded the ALJ to find that Plaintiff’s last job did not end due to a medical impairment or
combination of impairments. [Id.] Thus, the ALJ concluded her work activity for that employer was
not an unsuccessful work attempt. [Id.] Nevertheless, because there was a period of more than 12
months in which Plaintiff did not work between March 1, 2011, and the date of last insured of
September 30, 2012, the ALJ went on to address the subsequent steps of the five-step sequential
evaluation. [Id.]
At Step Two, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had the following severe impairments from March
1, 2011, through September 30, 2012:
[S]tatus-post right lapidus and McBride bunionectomy and 2nd digit proximal
interphalangeal joint arthrodesis on August 24, 2011, marked bunion deformity on
left foot, bilateral chondromalacia patellae of the knees, left knee osteoarthritis,
bilateral hip strain, mild lumbar degenerative disc disease, mild degenerative joint
disease [of the] left wrist, probable lunottriquetral ligament tear in the left wrist,
headaches, and mood disorder.
[AR 16 (internal citations to the medical record omitted)] The ALJ also considered evidence of

11

cervical strain and reactive airway disease, but found neither was severe. [Id.] She also found no
acceptable medical source had diagnosed Plaintiff with panic and anxiety, so the ALJ did not
consider these as medically determinable impairments. [Id.] The ALJ concluded Plaintiff did not
have an impairment that met or equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments:
No treating physician or examining physician has mentioned findings equivalent in
severity to the criteria of any listed impairment. [] The undersigned finds no
evidence that [Plaintiff] was unable to ambulate effectively []. [Plaintiff] testified
that she goes shopping weekly. There is no evidence that she needed to use a walker,
two crutches, or two canes for ambulation, except on a temporary basis. Other
evidence in the record indicates [Plaintiff] has used the bus to travel. There is no
evidence that [Plaintiff] was unable to perform fine and gross movements effectively.
[She] can do housework, [and] prepare simple meals. Multiple treatment records at
the VA have described [her] as adequately or well groomed, with good hygiene.
[She] reported to a VA doctor that she was independent in dressing, bathing, eating,
driving, and writing.
[AR 17 (internal citations to the record omitted)]
Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments
that met or medically equaled a listed impairment deemed to be so severe as to preclude substantial
gainful employment (Step Three). [AR 17] The ALJ then determined that Plaintiff had the RFC
from March 1, 2011, through September 30, 2012, to perform “a limited range of work at sedentary
exertion as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a), except that she is limited to lifting and carrying 10
pounds occasionally, sitting about six hours, standing or walking about two hours in an eight-hour
workday with normal breaks. [Id.] She could not climb, balance, crouch, crawl, or kneel, but she
could occasionally stoop. [Id.] Mentally, she could perform “the basic demands of competitive,
remunerative, unskilled work,” and could “understand, remember, and carry out simple and
repetitive tasks that required little decision making.” [Id.] She could interact appropriately with
12

supervisors but “should have limited contact with co-workers and the public.” [Id.] In making this
finding, the ALJ provided just more than seven pages of detailed narrative, with extensive citations
to the record. [See AR 17-24] The ALJ’s narrative included discussion of the following:
•

•
•
•
•
•

•
•

Physical issues involving her degenerative disc disease, back injury, bad
knees and hips, arthritis, depression, and anxiety, and medicines she takes for
these issues;
Details of Plaintiff’s pain for lower back and hip issues and how that affects
her activities of daily living;
Depression and treatment and how that affects her ability to work;
Personal history impacting her depression, including previous spousal abuse
and a car accident;
Living situation and busy dynamic of her home;
Activities of daily living such as preparing easy meals, shopping, driving
kids to school and activities, dancing at least once a month, attending
American Legion lunches, meetings and conventions.
Plaintiff’s perceived limitations as to sitting, standing, and so on; and
Current disability benefits received

[AR 17-19 (internal citations to the record omitted)]
The ALJ then went on to review the medical opinions. [AR 19-24] The ALJ analyzed a
report from Plaintiff’s psychiatrist,Dr. Francine Pokracki, who in 2011 assessed Plaintiff with a GAF
score of 48.1 [AR 19] The ALJ noted that Plaintiff told the psychiatrist that she continued to be
1

In Keyes-Zachary v. Astrue, 695 F.3d 1156, 1162 n.1 (10th Cir. 2012), the Tenth Circuit
describes the GAF as follows:
The GAF is a 100-point scale divided into ten numerical ranges, which permits clinicians to
assign a single ranged score to a person’s psychological, social, and occupational functioning.
See American Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 32, 34
(Text Revision 4th ed. 2000). GAF scores are situated along the following “hypothetical
continuum of mental health [and] illness”:
• 91–100: “Superior functioning in a wide range of activities, life's problems never seem to get
out of hand, is sought out by others because of his or her many positive qualities. No symptoms.”
• 81–90: “Absent or minimal symptoms (e.g., mild anxiety before an exam), good functioning in
all areas, interested and involved in a wide range of activities, socially effective, generally
satisfied with life, no more than everyday problems or concerns (e.g., an occasional argument
13

“overwhelmed with chaos in her life” as a result of “poor boundaries, consequences, etc.,” which
greatly impacted her ability to cope, and precluded her being able to work reliably. [Id.] The ALJ
explained why she declined to give controlling weight to this treating source opinion for its lack of
supporting diagnostic or other examination findings.2 The ALJ countered that opinion with other

with family members).”
• 71–80: “If symptoms are present, they are transient and expectable reactions to psychosocial
stressors (e.g., difficulty concentrating after family argument); no more than slight impairment in
social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., temporarily falling behind in schoolwork).”
• 61–70: “Some mild symptoms (e.g., depressed mood and mild insomnia), OR some difficulty
in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., occasional truancy, or theft within the
household), but generally functioning pretty well, has some meaningful interpersonal
relationships.”
• 51–60: “Moderate symptoms (e.g., flat affect and circumstantial speech, occasional panic
attacks) OR moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., few friends,
conflicts with peers or co-workers).”
• 41–50: “Serious symptoms (e.g., suicidal ideation, severe obsessional rituals, frequent
shoplifting) OR any serious impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., no
friends, unable to keep a job).”
• 31–40: “Some impairment in reality testing or communication (e.g., speech is at times illogical,
obscure, or irrelevant) OR major impairment in several areas, such as work or school, family
relations, judgment, thinking, or mood (e.g., depressed man avoids friends, neglects family, and
is unable to work; child beats up younger children, is defiant at home, and is failing at school).”
• 21–30: “Behavior is considerably influenced by delusions or hallucinations OR serious
impairment in communication or judgment (e.g., sometimes incoherent, acts grossly
inappropriately, suicidal preoccupation) OR inability to function in almost all areas (e.g., stays in
bed all day; no job, home, or friends).”
• 11–20: “Some danger of hurting self or others (e.g., suicide attempts without clear expectation
of death; frequently violent; manic excitement) OR occasionally fails to maintain minimal
personal hygiene (e.g., smears feces) OR gross impairment in communication (e.g., largely
incoherent or mute).”
• 1–10: “Persistent danger of severely hurting self or others (e.g., recurrent violence) OR
persistent inability to maintain minimal personal hygiene OR serious suicidal act with clear
expectation of death.”
• 0: “Inadequate information.”
2

The Court again here notes that Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s opinion regarding
Plaintiff’s mental conditions; thus, the Court will not explore that issue further, but includes the
14

evidence in the record, including that Plaintiff started a full-time job the next month and worked for
more than two months, reporting she had satisfactory performance. The ALJ then reviewed her
opinion about Plaintiff’s lack of credibility, explaining that Plaintiff’s “asserted inability to work
full-time is not supported by any medical opinion given great weight, and is inconsistent with the
overall record.” [AR 20] The ALJ further clarified:
It is important to make a distinction between the trying circumstances in [Plaintiff’s]
life (she was raising three children on her own), and her medical impairments. To
establish disability under the program at issue, [Plaintiff] must demonstrate that she
cannot work because of a physical or mental impairment []. The statement of Dr.
Pokracki that [Plaintiff] was “overwhelmed” by the chaos in her life, or [Plaintiff’s]
statement that she would have difficulty “juggling everything” with a full-time job
are not relevant to the issue under consideration in this decision, i.e. whether the
claimant is precluded from work because of a physical or mental impairment (or the
combination thereof) [].
[AR 20 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original)] The ALJ then reviewed records from
Plaintiff’s long-time psychotherapist and social worker, David Kartchner, whose notes indicated life
stressors regarding raising children, child support, work (job stress, as opposed to unemployment),
and rent payments; yet, Kartchner noted she was “managing despite her current stress” and “was
managing her mood” and “coping adequately with life stressors.” [AR 21] The ALJ noted that
records from an additional psychiatrist, Dr. Michael Sturges, described Plaintiff as “smart, alert, and
emotionally challenged by her need to provide and care for her family,” and later indicated Plaintiff
was “amazingly competent, keeping many balls in the air.” [Id.] From these records, spanning
2011 and 2012, the ALJ concluded:
information here to demonstrate the thorough nature of the ALJ’s findings. The Court also did
not include the information from mental health providers in its discussion presenting medical
opinion evidence as it is irrelevant to the issues Plaintiff raises on appeal.
15

The above evidence shows [Plaintiff] was beset by multiple life stressors, but it does
not reflect an inability to work due to a mental or physical impairment. To the
contrary, the evidence suggests [Plaintiff] was functionally adequate in her role as
a “full-time mother” to three children, in addition to doing some volunteer work at
the American Legion.
[Id.] After reviewing other medical records from treating physicians, including GAF scores ranging
from 45 to 55, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff had a severe mental impairment of mood disorder. [AR
22] The ALJ thus noted limitations in that Plaintiff had no extended-duration episodes of
decompensation and only mild restriction of activities of daily living, but she had moderate
difficulties in maintaining social functioning and concentration. [Id.] Overall, the ALJ found
regarding Plaintiff’s mental conditions that the “objective medical findings do not support
limitations greater than those found in the [RFC].” [Id.] Regarding physical issues, the ALJ wrote:
Notwithstanding her reports of back, hip, knee, foot, wrist, and arthritic pain,
[Plaintiff] told Dr. Teresita Marcelo that she could sit 30-60 minutes, stand 30-45
minutes, walk not more than two blocks, and lift 30 pounds. [Plaintiff] reported she
was independent in dressing, bathing, writing, eating, and driving. [Plaintiff’s]
statements as to her exertional capacity (lifting, carrying, standing, walking, sitting,
pushing and pulling) to Dr. Marcelo are generally consistent with her written
statements to the Social Security Administration in June 2012 and in her testimony.
Later, on August 22, 2012, [Plaintiff] told Dr. Marcelo that she could stand 45
minutes, walk less than a block, and lift 35 pounds.
[AR 22-23 (internal citations to the record omitted)] The ALJ wrote that Dr. Marcelo accepted
Plaintiff’s reported limitations, but the ALJ declined to give controlling weight to this opinion “for
it is not fully consistent with other evidence in the record, or with the doctor’s examination
findings.” [AR 23] For example, the ALJ gave less weight to Dr. Marcelo’s opinion that Plaintiff
can only walk two blocks, as the ALJ found that inconsistent with the doctor’s examination finding
that Plaintiff had only slightly reduced range of motion in the knees, and the ALJ found the doctor’s
16

conclusion misaligned with other medical records and with Plaintiff’s own testimony that she at
times had been able to run to the bus. [Id.]
The ALJ also gave less weight to Dr. Marcelo’s opinion that Plaintiff could not sit for long
or that she needed to change positions beyond those normally available at work, noting the medical
record showed only mild degeneration in the lumbar spine. [Id.] Furthermore, the ALJ was
unconvinced of these restrictions because of Plaintiff’s testimony that she attended an American
Legion convention and sat at some length for two days, even though that later caused her pain. [Id.]
The ALJ also noted a doctor found that Plaintiff was not a candidate for back surgery as her
degeneration was mild. [Id.]

Regarding the spine problems, the ALJ wrote that Plaintiff last

worked from May 2011 until August 2011 at a sedentary job, with no evidence on the record “that
she was unable to perform the sitting or other exertional requirements of the job.” [Id.] However,
the ALJ gave substantial weight to Dr. Marcelo’s opinion that Plaintiff could not stand or walk for
a prolonged period of time as that conclusion was consistent with the entire record, including
Plaintiff’s impairments regarding her feet, knees, and hip. [Id.]
Regarding Plaintiff’s foot condition, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff recovered after her foot
surgery and could discontinue using a walker and resume full weight-bearing activity in regular
shoes. [AR 23-24] Plaintiff did have a bunion after the surgery, the ALJ wrote; however, Dr.
Marcelo indicated it did not affect her ability to work. [AR 24] The ALJ gave this opinion less
weight as Plaintiff’s continual problems with her left foot and history of surgery on her right foot,
in conjunction with her other impairments, “reasonably precludes standing or walking for long
periods,” although not as limited as only two blocks, as indicated above. [Id.]
17

The ALJ continued by analyzing the report of Dr. Murchison based on a C&P examination
of Plaintiff on January 31, 2011, at which the doctor indicated Plaintiff self-reported she could sit
to an unlimited extent but preferred to get up every 20 minutes to stretch her back, could stand for
two hours, walk two blocks, and run but chose not to because of her knees, hips and back. [Id.]
Regarding her view of this doctor’s opinion, the ALJ explained:
Based on her examination of [Plaintiff] and review of records, Dr. Murchison opined
[Plaintiff] could perform a sedentary job, and that she could stand up to two hours
and walk around the office as needed. Although Dr. Murchison’s opinion was just
prior to the alleged onset of disability, the undersigned gives the opinion the greatest
weight, for it is consistent with her examination findings and with the overall
evidence, including a later examination and opinion by Dr. Ksiazek from February
28, 2013 that she agreed with Dr. Murchison’s prior assessment. The undersigned
finds no intervening event or substantial change in objective medical findings that
would preclude [Plaintiff] from performing sedentary work.
[Id.]
Additionally, the ALJ reviewed the records indicating as of January 8, 2013, that Plaintiff
should not bend or lift anything heavier than a milk carton. [Id.] However, the ALJ noted this was
an instruction based on Plaintiff having just had surgery on her left wrist in December 2012, thus
it was a temporary restriction. [Id.] Regardless, the ALJ also pointed out that this restriction fell
outside the time period at issue in the disability decision. [Id.]
Finally, regarding the medical record, the ALJ discussed an examination on January 14,
2013, regarding Plaintiff’s reports of daily hip and knee pain. [Id.] The medical notes indicate no
significant abnormalities that would warrant surgery, which the ALJ found consistent with her RFC
decision and inconsistent with Plaintiff’s allegations requesting additional limitations. [Id.]
At Step Four, the ALJ determined Plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant work,
18

but that considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience and RFC, Plaintiff could perform
jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy, including addressor, final assembler,
and lens inserter. [AR 24-25] As a result, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled at Step
Five of the sequential process and, therefore, was not under a disability as defined by the SSA at any
time from March 1, 2011, through September 20, 2012. [AR 25-26]
Plaintiff sought review of the ALJ’s decision by the Appeals Council on September 9, 2013
[AR 7-8], which was denied [AR 1-6]. Plaintiff timely filed her Complaint in this matter on
November 26, 2014. [Docket #1]
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in (1) finding Plaintiff’s May-August 2011
work was an unsuccessful work attempt; (2) concluding Plaintiff’s RFC did not require additional
restrictions based on manipulative and sit/stand limitations as well as pain3; and (3) determining
there were jobs within Plaintiff’s RFC available in significant numbers. Opening Brief, docket #13
at 1. Thus, Plaintiff concludes the disability denial is not based on substantial evidence. Id.
A.

Unsuccessful Work Attempt
Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in characterizing Plaintiff’s May-August 2011 work as an

unsuccessful work attempt. Opening Brief, docket #13 at 23-25. Defendant counters that this was

3

Plaintiff characterizes these arguments as three distinct issues of the ALJ’s failure to (1)
assign any manipulative restrictions in the RFC and develop the record, (2) place a sit/stand
option in Plaintiff’s RFC, and (3) make necessary findings regarding Plaintiff’s pain and
consider it in setting the RFC. Opening Brief, docket #13 at 1. The Court construes all three as
relating to the sufficiency of the RFC and therefore collapses its analysis of these three issues
into one.
19

not error and, in the alternative, any error here was harmless as the ALJ continued her analysis past
this Step One phase through the sequential evaluation. Response, docket #17 at 7-8.
Section 20 CFR 404.1574(c) governs unsuccessful work attempts, with 20 CFR
404.1574(c)(3) more specifically dealing with employment of less than three months. If a plaintiff
works for less than three months, it will be considered an unsuccessful work attempt if plaintiff has
the ability to work but stopped or reduced work because of the impairment. Plaintiff asserts her
upcoming foot surgery and effect of her foot condition on her ability to walk and use public
transportation caused her to stop working at her last job. Opening Brief, docket #13 at 29. The ALJ
did not make a specific finding regarding exactly why Plaintiff left the job, but in not believing it
was impairment-related, the ALJ concluded this was an unsuccessful work attempt. [AR 15-16]
Still, the ALJ continued her analysis through all five steps of the sequential evaluation, making any
error at Step One harmless. Cf. Carpenter v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 1264, 1266 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding
that any error at step two of the sequential evaluation process becomes harmless if the ALJ “reached
the proper conclusion that [Plaintiff] could not be denied benefits at step two and proceeded to the
next step of the evaluation sequence”).
As the Court’s subsequent analysis concurs with Defendant that the ALJ did reach the proper
conclusion, any error at Step One is indeed harmless. Additionally, the ALJ provided substantial
evidence as to her reasoning in concluding Plaintiff’s May-September 2011 work was an
unsuccessful work attempt, thus the Court does not find she erred.
B.

Appropriateness of the RFC
Plaintiff next argues the ALJ erred in development of Plaintiff’s RFC involving three
20

aspects: (1) manipulative limitations; (2) sit/stand restrictions; and (3) pain. Opening Brief, docket
#13 at 25-34. Defendant counters that the ALJ’s opinion regarding all aspects of the RFC was
handled properly and is supported by substantial evidence. Response, docket #17 at 9-17.
An RFC assessment is “an administrative assessment of the extent to which an individual’s
medically determinable impairment(s), including any related symptoms such as pain, may cause
physical or mental limitations or restrictions that may affect his or her capacity to do work related
physical or mental activities.” SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 at * 2. It is assessed “based on all of
the relevant evidence in the case record, including information about the individual’s symptoms and
any ‘medical source statements.’” Id. “[T]here is no requirement in the regulations for a direct
correspondence between an RFC finding and a specific medical opinion on the functional capacity
in question.” Chapo v. Astrue, 682 F.3d 1285, 1288 (10th Cir. 2012).
Here, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had the RFC from March 1, 2011, through September 30,
2012, to perform “a limited range of work at sedentary exertion as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a),
except that she is limited to lifting and carrying 10 pounds occasionally, sitting about six hours,
standing or walking about two hours in an eight-hour workday with normal breaks. [AR 17] She
could not climb, balance, crouch, crawl, or kneel, but she could occasionally stoop. [Id.] Mentally,
she could perform “the basic demands of competitive, remunerative, unskilled work,” and could
“understand, remember, and carry out simple and repetitive tasks that required little decision
making.” [Id.] She could interact appropriately with supervisors but “should have limited contact
with co-workers and the public.” [Id.]
The Court will address each of Plaintiff’s three RFC challenges in turn.
21

1)

Manipulative Restrictions

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in failing to consider her manipulative limitations. Opening
Brief, docket #13 at 25. Defendant counters that the ALJ reasonably concluded Plaintiff could
perform a reduced range of sedentary work, a decision based on substantial evidence that should be
affirmed. Response, docket #17 at 8.
The Court finds first that the ALJ committed no error in assessing the RFC with respect to
Plaintiff’s manipulative restrictions. The ALJ properly considered the medical evidence concerning
the condition, which was minimal, and discussed the surgical intervention that corrected the wrist
problems. Further, the ALJ found one of Plaintiff’s severe impairments was wrist arthritis as well
as a possible tear in the ligament of her left wrist. While the ALJ did not explicitly list manipulative
restrictions in the RFC, she did by the inherent nature of allowing only “sedentary work,” include
a restriction that Plaintiff could lift no more than 10 pounds. See SSR 96-9p, 1996 WL 374185, at
*3. Meanwhile, Plaintiff did not testify at the hearing that she required additional limitations than
that, nor did any doctor opine as such. The record shows problems with her wrist before surgery,
but Plaintiff self reported she could lift 30-to-40 pounds occasionally and had full grip strength and
motion of her wrist, hand and fingers. Meanwhile, Plaintiff did not provide evidence of need for any
further manipulative restrictions.
Plaintiff next argues the ALJ was required to further develop the record regarding the
manipulative limitations. Opening Brief, docket #13 at 28. However, in Cowan v. Astrue, 552 F.3d
1182 (10th Cir. 2008), the Tenth Circuit determined that an ALJ need not seek out additional
information or a consultative examination if the evidence is sufficient to make a disability
22

determination. See also Hawkins v. Chater, 113 F.3d 1162, 1168 (10th Cir. 1997) (indicating that
the court “will not impose a duty on the ALJ to order a consultative examination unless the need for
one is clearly established in the record.”). This is particularly true when a plaintiff, as here, is
represented by counsel. Id.
Given all of the evidence relied upon by the ALJ and discussed in her opinion, the Court is
not persuaded that the ALJ erred in her handling of manipulative restrictions in the RFC nor that she
needed to further develop the record.
2)

Sit/Stand Restrictions

The ALJ included in Plaintiff’s RFC that she could sit for six hours and stand and walk for
two hours with normal breaks. [AR 17] Plaintiff contends “there is no evidence in the record that
[Plaintiff] is capable of either sitting or standing for this period of time.” Opening Brief, docket #13
at 30. Plaintiff essentially argues the ALJ erred in not giving controlling weight to a treating
physician, Dr. Marcelo, who opined Plaintiff could not sit for more than one hour, stand more than
30 minutes, walk more than two blocks, and said that she must be allowed to change positions. Id.
Defendant responds the ALJ explained the reasons she gave varying weight to the medical opinions,
and those reasons were consistent with the medical record, meaning the ALJ’s conclusions should
not be disturbed on review. Response, docket #17 at 12.
“An ALJ must evaluate every medical opinion in the record, although the weight given each
opinion will vary according to the relationship between the disability claimant and the medical
professional.” Hamlin v. Barnhart, 365 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing 20 C.F.R. §
401.1527(d)). The applicable regulations governing the SSA’s consideration of medical opinions
23

distinguish among “treating” physicians, “examining” physicians and “nonexamining” (or
“consulting”) physicians. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c). If the medical opinion of a treating physician
is well supported by medically acceptable evidence and is not inconsistent with the other substantial
evidence in the record, an ALJ must give it controlling weight. Sedlak v. Colvin, No. 11-cv-01247PAB, 2014 WL 717914, at *10 (D. Colo. Feb. 24, 2014) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2)).
However, if the opinion of a treating physician does not merit controlling weight or if there
is no opinion by a treating physician, the ALJ must consider the following factors in determining
how to evaluate other medical opinions in the record: length of the treating relationship, frequency
of examination, nature and extent of the treating relationship, evidentiary support, consistency with
the record, medical specialization, and other relevant considerations. Id. “An ALJ may dismiss or
discount an opinion from a medical source only if his decision to do so is ‘based on an evaluation
of all of the factors set out in the cited regulations’ and if he provides ‘specific, legitimate reasons’
for [the] rejection.” Id. (quoting Chapo, 682 F.3d at 1291).
It is error for an ALJ not to adequately state and explain what weight he or she gives to
medical opinions. See Langley v. Barnhart, 373 F.3d 1116, 1119 (10th Cir. 2004). The ALJ must
give “good reasons” for the weight he or she ultimately assigns each medical opinion. Watkins v.
Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1301 (10th Cir. 2003). The ALJ’s decision must be sufficiently specific
to make clear to any subsequent reviewer the weight given to the medical opinion, and the reason
for that weight. See Oldham v. Astrue, 509 F.3d 1254, 1258 (10th Cir. 2007). Even though an ALJ
is not required to discuss every piece of evidence, it must be clear that the ALJ considered all of the
evidence. Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009-10 (10th Cir. 1996). “[I]n addition to discussing
24

the evidence supporting his decision, the ALJ also must discuss the uncontroverted evidence he
chooses not to rely upon, as well as significantly probative evidence he rejects.” Id. at 1010.
Boilerplate language, unconnected to any evidence in the record, will not suffice to support an ALJ’s
conclusion. Hardman v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 676, 679 (10th Cir. 2004). An ALJ may reasonably
give less weight to a medical opinion that differs from that same doctor’s notes. See Newbold v.
Colvin, 718 F.3d 1257, 1266 (10th Cir. 2013).
As outlined thoroughly in the discussion above regarding the ALJ’s opinion, the Court finds
the ALJ provided detailed explanations of the weight she assigned the medical opinions. The ALJ
gave great weight to the opinions of Drs. Murchison and Ksiazek because they were consistent with
the record as a whole. The ALJ also explained her handling and weight of Dr. Marcelo’s opinion,
rejecting the sit/stand restrictions because they were not consistent with that same doctor’s notes,
did not align with Plaintiff’s activities of daily living as presented during testimony at the hearing,
nor did they map to the medical records as a whole. While Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s opinion
exhibits “picking and choosing” in the record to force a finding of nondisability, which the Court
agrees is disallowed per Hamlin, the Court’s review of the record in its entirety and its review of the
ALJ’s opinion shows the ALJ properly conducted a thorough analysis based on substantial evidence
and, as such, the opinion should not be disturbed on appeal.
3)

Pain

Plaintiff asserts the ALJ erred by failing to make the necessary findings regarding Plaintiff’s
pain and consider it within the RFC. Opening Brief, docket #13 at 32. Defendant argues this in an
issue of the ALJ analyzing Plaintiff’s credibility, and the ALJ gave good reasons for finding Plaintiff
25

not fully credible. Response, docket #17 at 15.
When determining whether the claimant’s pain is credible, the ALJ must consider assertions
of severe pain and decide whether the ALJ believed them. Kepler v. Chater, 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th
Cir. 1995). To do this, the ALJ should consider factors such as:
levels of medication and their effectiveness, the extensiveness of the attempts
(medical or nonmedical) to obtain relief, the frequency of medical contacts, the
nature of daily activities, subjective measures of credibility that are peculiarly within
the judgment of the ALJ, the motivation of and relationship between the claimant
and other witnesses, and the consistency or compatibility of nonmedical testimony
with objective medical evidence.
Id. The ALJ should give a conclusion and the reasons for that conclusion, explaining “why the
specific evidence relevant to each factor led him to conclude claimant’s subjective complaints were
not credible,” affirmatively linking credibility findings to substantial evidence in the record. Id.
Further, because credibility determinations are within the province of the ALJ, a reviewing court
may not upset such findings where they are supported by substantial evidence. See Quantu v.
Barnhart, 72 F. App’x 807, 835 (10th Cir. 2003).
Once objective medical evidence shows that a claimant has an impairment that can
reasonably be expected to produce symptoms, the ALJ is required to consider the claimant’s
assertions of the symptoms and decide whether to believe them. Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d
1482, 1489 (10th Cir. 1993). “Credibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder
of fact, and we will not upset such determinations when supported by substantial evidence.” Diaz
v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 898 F.2d 774, 777 (10th Cir.1990); see also Cowan v. Astrue,
552 F.3d 1182, 1190 (10th Cir. 2008). However, “[f]indings as to credibility should be closely and

26

affirmatively linked to substantial evidence and not just a conclusion in the guise of findings.”
Huston v. Bowen, 838 F.2d 1125, 1133 (10th Cir. 1988) (footnote omitted).
While Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ did not sufficiently link her opinion to the record, the
Court’s review of the ALJ’s decision shows the ALJ followed the required approach. The ALJ
rejected Plaintiff’s complaints in part because she did not find them fully credible, particularly in
light of Plaintiff’s activities of daily living and testimony at the hearing. As detailed above, the ALJ
provided a substantial narrative explaining her decision, meeting the requirement that she “set forth
the specific evidence [she] relied on in evaluating the claimant’s credibility.” Poppa v. Astrue, 569
F.3d 1167, 1171 (10th Cir. 2009). Because the ALJ’s reasons for discounting the Plaintiff’s
credibility are supported by the record, her determinations are entitled to substantial deference.
White v. Barnhart, 287 F.3d 903, 910 (10th Cir. 2001); see also Qualls v. Apfel, 206 F.3d 1368,
1372 (10th Cir. 2000). Thus, on this record, the Court will not disturb the ALJ’s opinion.
C.

Jobs Available in Economy
Lastly, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly found there were jobs available in significant

numbers in the economy, relying on the vocational expert’s testimony that an individual having the
same age, background, experience and RFC as the Plaintiff could perform the jobs of addressor
(25,000 jobs available nationally and 200 in Colorado), final assembler (14,000 jobs nationally and
100 in Colorado), and lens inserter (8,000 jobs nationally and 80 in Colorado). Opening brief,
docket #13 at 34-35. Defendant responds the ALJ did not err and instead reasonably relied on the
VE’s testimony identifying jobs Plaintiff could perform at significant numbers in the economy.
Response, docket #17 at 18-19.
27

At Step Five of the sequential process, an ALJ bears the burden “to show that there are jobs
in the regional or national economies that the claimant can perform with the limitations the ALJ has
found [the claimant] to have.”

Haddock v. Apfel, 196 F.3d 1084, 1088 (10th Cir. 1999).

Specifically,
the ALJ must find that the claimant retains particular exertional [and non-exertional]
capacit[ies], decide whether the claimant has acquired transferable skills, identify
specific jobs that the claimant can perform with the restrictions the ALJ has found
the claimant to have, and verify that the jobs the claimant can do exist in significant
numbers in the regional or national economies. All of these findings must be
supported by substantial evidence.
Id. at 1088-89; see also Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1175 (10th Cir. 2005). “Determining
‘the functional demands and job duties’ of specific jobs and matching those requirements to a
claimant’s limitations is the very task the ALJ must undertake at step five.” Haddock, 196 F.3d at
1090. Accordingly, an ALJ may rely on the testimony of VEs and/or reliable publications, such as
the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT). Id.
In this case, Plaintiff cites Trimiar v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1326 (10th Cir. 1992) to challenge
that the ALJ erred in finding there were a significant number of jobs Plaintiff could perform in the
economy. Opening Brief, docket #13 at 34-36. However, as Defendant correctly argues, the Tenth
Circuit later clarified Trimiar, explaining the problem in that case was that the VE only testified to
the number of available jobs in the regional economy when the VE should have testified to both the
regional and national economy numbers. Raymond v. Astrue, 621 F.3d 1269, 1274 n. 2 (10th Cir.
2009). The Tenth Circuit has stated it does not have a bright line establishing the number of jobs
necessary to constitute a significant number, nor does an ALJ have to engage in a factoral analysis

28

when the number of relevant jobs available nationally is much larger than the number of jobs
available regionally. Id. Additionally, the Tenth Circuit has also held that 11,000 jobs in the
national economy was substantial evidence for an ALJ to support a decision of nondisability. See
Rogers v. Astrue, 312 F. App’x 138, 1142 (10th Cir. 2009).
Here, with the ALJ’s reliance on the VE’s testimony regarding jobs available in the national
and regional economies at the level of 47,000 total jobs, and with the entirety of the ALJ’s wellreasoned opinion, the Court finds the ALJ did not err.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s opinion was based on substantial evidence, thus,
the decision that Plaintiff Tammy Sharlene Harden was not disabled is affirmed.
Dated at Denver, Colorado this 29th day of January, 2016.
BY THE COURT:

Michael E. Hegarty
United States Magistrate Judge

29