Cross, Jr v. Leyshon et al

Filing 36

ORDER dismissing this action, and denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, by Judge Lewis T. Babcock on 2/20/15. 35 Motion and Affidavit for Leave to Proceed Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 is granted. (dkals, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 14-cv-03274-GPG

ELMER L. CROSS, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
SHERIFF’S DEPUTY LEYSHON,
SHERIFF’S DEPUTY MAES,
SHERIFF’S DEPUTY TOMSICK,
MAJOR ANDERSON,
MAJOR OLIVAS,
CAPTAIN GUTIEREZ,
CAPTAIN MCMANUS, and
SHERIFF’S DEPUTY LAFERTY,
Defendants.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiff, Elmer L. Cross, Jr., currently resides in Denver, Colorado. When he
initiated this action on December 2, 2014 by submitting pro se a Prisoner Complaint
(ECF No. 1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he was an inmate
incarcerated at the Denver County Jail.
On December 2, 2014, Magistrate Judge Gordon P. Gallagher entered an order
directing Mr. Cross to submit on the court-approved form a Prisoner’s Motion and
Affidavit for Leave to Proceed Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and a certified copy of his
prison trust fund statement for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of
the Complaint. After being granted an extension of time and filing numerous documents
that did not comply with the December 2 Order, Plaintiff filed, on January 27, 2015, a

Prisoner’s Motion and Affidavit for Leave to Proceed Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915
(ECF No. 35), but stated that prison officials would not provide him with a certified copy
of his account statement. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Cross notified the Court that he was
released from custody on January 26, 2015, and currently resides at St. Francis Center,
2323 Curtis Street, Denver, Colorado 80205. Although Mr. Cross is no longer a
prisoner, the Court will not require him to submit on the court-approved form an
Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs, the in forma
pauperis form to be used by nonprisoners. Instead, the Court grants the Prisoner’s
Motion and Affidavit for Leave to Proceed Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (ECF No. 35)
filed on January 27, 2015 based on an inability to prepay fees or give security therefor.
The Court must construe the Complaint liberally because Mr. Cross is not
represented by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Hall v.
Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). If the Complaint reasonably can be
read “to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, [the Court] should do so
despite the plaintiff’s failure to cite proper legal authority, his confusion of various legal
theories, his poor syntax and sentence construction, or his unfamiliarity with pleading
requirements.” Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. However, the Court does not act as an
advocate for a pro se litigant. See id.
Subsection (e)(2)(B) of § 1915 requires a court to dismiss sua sponte an action
at any time if the action is frivolous, malicious, or seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief. A claim is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable
basis either in law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A legally
frivolous claim rests on “an indisputably meritless legal theory,” such as a claim that a
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non-existent legal interest has been infringed. Id. at 327. For the reasons stated below,
the Complaint and the action will be dismissed as frivolous.
In the Complaint, Mr. Cross states that he cannot provide a “complete”
background of his case but summarizes it as follows: “I am being laced/poisoned by
Deputies and nurses for an unknown Fed. Agency. The Sheriff’s Dept. and Denver
Health are intentionaly [sic] perpetuating 7 yrs. of harassment/aggitation/defaming/
isolating and ostracizing me and putting my life in danger.” (See ECF No. 1 at 4). Mr.
Cross then refers to his six previously filed lawsuits for additional background
information. In the Complaint, Mr. Cross asserts the following four claims: (1)
“aggravated attempted murder in the first degree by poisoning/lacing/cruel and unusual
punishment” against Defendants Leyshon and Maes; (2) “willful, intentional, instigation
and encouragment [sic] of creating dangerous environment and putting my life in
danger” against Defendants Maes, Tomsick, and Leyshon; (3) “willful, intentional
participation in cover-up of poisoning, creating life threatening danger and cruel and
unusual punishment” against Defendants Leyshon, Maes, Tomsick, Gutierez, Anderson,
Olivas, and McManus; and (4) “intentional obstruction of justice, willful participation in
cover-up of poisoning” against Defendant Laferty. (Id. at 5-8).
In support of claim one, Mr. Cross alleges that while incarcerated at the Denver
County Jail, Defendant Leyshon and Maes gave him “laced/poisoned” shower shoes
“designed to make my left arm go numb” and ordered that his lunch food be placed on
poisoned napkins “so I would swallow [the poison].” (Id. at 5). In support of claim two,
Mr. Cross alleges that Defendants Maes, Tomsick, and Leyshon whistle at him and
“encourage other inmates to do the same” in order to “aggitate [sic] me” and to create
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“danger/threats on my life.” (Id. at 6). In support of claim three, Mr. Cross asserts that
Defendants Leyshon, Maes, and Tomsick “are trying to get me to go over the edge now
that I am around two months from being released” and that Defendant Gutierez “is
always mocking me” and “refuses to put me in PC or give my legal work back or to let
me have any shoes at all.” (Id. at 7). He also alleges that Defendants Anderson,
Olivas, and McManus “are all guilty and complicite [sic] participants in cover-up of
poisoning by the ‘code of silence.’” (Id.). Mr. Cross finally asserts in claim four that
Defendant Laferty “has been refusing to give me exactly what I need for lawsuits.” (Id.
at 8). He seeks money damages as well as the “resignations, arrests, prosecutions,
jailing and prison” of Defendants. (Id. at 10).
This is the seventh lawsuit Mr. Cross has filed in this Court concerning his belief
that he is being poisoned by prison officials who allegedly are acting at the direction of
an “unknown/unnamed Federal Agency.” See Cross v. City of Denver, et al., 14-cv02793-LTB (D. Colo. Oct. 10, 2014) (dismissed with prejudice as frivolous); Cross v. Dr.
Crum, et al., No. 14-cv-02805-LTB (D. Colo. Oct. 14, 2014) (dismissed for failure to
comply with Court order to file an amended complaint and for failure to prosecute);
Cross v. City of Denver, et al., 14-cv-02872-LTB (D. Colo. Oct. 21, 2014) (dismissed for
failure to comply with Court order to show cause why the action should not be
dismissed as repetitive of No. 14-cv-02793-LTB); Cross v. Aramark Corp., et al., 14-cv02902-GPG (D. Colo. Oct. 24, 2014) (currently pending); Cross v. Sargent Koch, et al.,
No. 14-cv-02923-LTB (D. Colo. Oct. 28, 2014) (dismissed with prejudice as frivolous);
Cross v. Sheriff’s Deputy Leyba, et al., No. 14-cv-02948-LTB (D. Colo. Oct. 30, 2014)
(dismissed with prejudice as frivolous). Plaintiff persists in bringing multiple lawsuits
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arising out of the same set of circumstances. While Plaintiff’s claims have to some
extent evolved with each new lawsuit, his cases all stem from the underlying belief that
he is the target of a seven-year campaign of “poisoning” and “harassment / aggitation /
defaming / isolating and ostracizing.”
After reviewing the Complaint in the instant action, the Court finds that this case
is repetitive of the other cases Mr. Cross has filed because the claims, parties, and
available relief do not significantly differ between the two actions. See Park v. TD
Ameritrade Trust Co., Inc.,, 461 Fed. App’x. 753, 755 (10th Cir. Feb. 14, 2012).
However, the Complaint and action will not be dismissed for that reason.
The Court further finds that Plaintiff’s claims (1) are vague, conclusory, and
rambling; (2) do not comply with the pleading requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure; and (3) do not allege facts that demonstrate how each named
defendant personally participated in the asserted constitutional violations. At best, the
Complaint is a verbose diatribe that makes little sense, fails to articulate the specific
claims Mr. Cross is asserting, and fails to allege what each Defendant did that allegedly
violated his rights. Thus, even construing the Complaint liberally, Mr. Cross fails to
provide a short and plain statement of any § 1983 claim. His vague and conclusory
assertions that prison officials are subjecting him to cruel and unusual punishment by
poisoning him with “laced” property, are part of a seven-year conspiracy and “cover-up”
by an “unknown, unnamed federal agency,” and are retaliating against him for filing
lawsuits do not satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8. As a result, Mr. Cross fails
to provide a short and plain statement of his claims that demonstrate he is entitled to
relief in this action.
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The general rule that pro se pleadings must be construed liberally has limits and
“the court cannot take on the responsibility of serving as the litigant’s attorney in
constructing arguments and searching the record.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux &
Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d
955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”);
Ketchum v. Cruz, 775 F. Supp. 1399, 1403 (D. Colo. 1991) (vague and conclusory
allegations that his rights have been violated does not entitle a pro se pleader to a day
in court regardless of how liberally the pleadings are construed), aff’d, 961 F.2d 916
(10th Cir. 1992). “[I]n analyzing the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s complaint, the court
need accept as true only the plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual contentions, not [her]
conclusory allegations.” Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. Because Mr. Cross fails to provide a
clear and concise statement of the claims he is asserting, the Court finds that the
Complaint fails to comply with Rule 8.
Moreover, the Court finds that the claims are factually frivolous. A claim is
factually frivolous if it depicts “fantastic or delusional scenarios,” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at
328, or where “the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible.”
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). The Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims
rest on “fantastic or delusional scenarios” whose factual contentions “rise to the level of
the irrational or the wholly incredible.” See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28; Denton, 504
U.S. at 33. Thus, the claims are baseless and Mr. Cross is not entitled to relief in this
action. The Complaint and the action will be dismissed as frivolous under §
1915(e)(2)(B).
The Court also warns Mr. Cross for a third time that “the right of access to the
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courts is neither absolute nor unconditional, and there is no constitutional right of
access to the courts to prosecute an action that is frivolous or malicious.” Tripati v.
Beaman, 878 F.2d 351, 353 (10th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted) (per curiam). “Federal
courts have the inherent power to regulate the activities of abusive litigants by imposing
carefully tailored restrictions in appropriate circumstances.” Andrews v. Heaton, 483
F.3d 1070, 1077 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Sieverding v. Colo. Bar. Ass’n, 469 F.3d 1340,
1343 (10th Cir. 2006); Tripati v. Beaman, 878 F.2d at 352).
Specifically, injunctions restricting further filings are appropriate where the
litigant’s lengthy and abusive history is set forth; the court provides
guidelines as to what the litigant may do to obtain its permission to file an
action; and the litigant receives notice and an opportunity to oppose the
court’s order before it is implemented.
Andrews, 483 F.3d at 1077.
If a pro se party signs a pleading in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) a court “may
. . . impose an appropriate sanction” upon that party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11©. Rule 11
serves several purposes, including, but not limited to, (1) deterring future litigation
abuse; (2) punishing present litigation abuse; and (3) streamlining court dockets and
facilitating case management. White v. General Motors Corp., Inc., 908 F.2d 675, 683
(10th Cir. 1990) (citing American Bar Association, Standards and Guidelines for
Practice Under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1988), reprinted in, 5 C.
Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure 212, 235-36 (Supp. 1989)).
Deterrence is the primary goal of a sanction. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496
U.S. 384 (1990). In order to comply with Rule 11 and avoid sanctions thereunder, a pro
se party’s actions must be objectively reasonable. White v. Gen. Motors Corp., 908
F.2d 675, 683 (10th Cir. 1990). A pattern of groundless and vexatious litigation will
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support an order enjoining a litigant from filing any claims without first seeking prior
leave of court. See Ketchum v. Cruz, 961 F.2d 916, 921 (10th Cir. 1992); Winslow v.
Romer, 759 F. Supp. 670, 677-78 (D. Colo. 1991); Colorado ex rel. Colo. Judicial Dep't
v. Fleming, 726 F. Supp. 1216, 1221 (D. Colo. 1989).
The Court may, in its discretion, place reasonable restrictions on any litigant who
files non-meritorious actions and who generally abuses judicial process. Phillips v.
Carey, 638 F.2d 207, 209 (10th Cir. 1981). These restrictions may be directed to
provide limitations or conditions on the filing of future suits. Id. Injunctions restricting
further filings are appropriate where (1) the litigant's lengthy and abusive history is set
forth; (2) the court provides guidelines as to what the litigant may do to obtain its
permission to file an action; and (3) the litigant receives notice and an opportunity to
oppose the court’s order before it is implemented. Tripati, 878 F.2d at 353-54. Mr.
Cross has the right to notice and to oppose, in writing, the imposition of future
restrictions. See Tripati, 878 F.2d at 354.
Finally, the Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal
from this order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status
will be denied for the purpose of appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438
(1962). If Mr. Cross files a notice of appeal he must also pay the full $505 appellate
filing fee or file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit within thirty days in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 24.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the Complaint (ECF No. 1) and the action are dismissed as
frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B). It is
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FURTHER ORDERED that leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal is
denied. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that the Prisoner’s Motion and Affidavit for Leave to
Proceed Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (ECF No. 35) is granted. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that all other pending motions are denied as moot.
DATED at Denver, Colorado, this

20th

day of

February

, 2015.

BY THE COURT:

s/Lewis T. Babcock
LEWIS T. BABCOCK, Senior Judge
United States District Court

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